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PREFACE 
The theme of the Winter Conference of the New Zealand Branch of the Australian 
Agricultural Economics Society - Agricultural Marketing: Structure / Conduct / Performance 
is very much at the top of the agenda in discussions in the industry. 
The conference provided an opportunity to listen to three of New Zealand's top agribusiness 
marketing practitioners and question their views about the realities of the market. This was 
matched against two academics who presented theoretical aspects of marketing. The debate 
that followed enabled participants to go away with a better understanding and view of the 
future way forward. 
In addition to the invited papers, there was a range of contributed papers which covered, in 
addition to the theme: 
Industry Structure 
Policy Issues 
Environmental Issues 
Specific Products Issues. 
There has been a high level of political hype surrounding the area of agricultural marketing. 
Behind the doors of the conference the opportunity was provided to address the issues in a 
more objective way. While not providing a specific solution, for there is no one solution, the 
conference papers and discussion clarified many issues and provided a broader perspective 
on where we should go from here. 
Papers on the conference theme have been brought together in the first section of the 
proceedings. The remaining sections contain the contributed papers by area. 
The conference also marked an important milestone in agricultural economics in New 
Zealand. At the AGM of the Branch Society it was unanimously decided to form the New 
Zealand Agricultural Economics Society. This society will have its own constitution and be 
incorporated in New Zealand. It is intended to retain strong links with the Australian body 
which supports the initiative. A member of the New Zealand Executive will continue to be 
a member of the Australian Council. 
Brian Bell 
President 
New Zealand Branch 
Australian Agricultural Economics Society 
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"ECONOMIC THEORY VERSUS PRAGMATISM: THE REALITIES OF DOING 
BUSINESS IN THE EXPANDING NORTH ASIAN MEAT MARKET" 
Graeme Harrison 
Managing Director, Asian New Zealand Meat Co Ltd, P.O. Box 2833, 
Wellington 
INTRODUCTION 
I have spent thirteen of my last eighteen years resident outside New Zealand, working in 
activities associated with the export of New Zealand meat. This experience, coupled with 
closely following developments in New Zealand agricultural policy and the meat industry, 
hopefully can be 'regarded as sufficient background to offer some observations on the 
practicalities of the international marketplace and the problems confronting a small country 
competing against barriers of agricultural trade protectionism. 
The apparent dominance of the nineteenth century concepts of free trade and comparative 
advantage in some quarters in the New Zealand economic policy formation process, has been 
a concern for me. Added to this has been the strong support for much of what Michael Porter 
had to say about the secrets of "competitive advantage" and the view that government is 
incapable of guiding agricultural and industrial policies for the future health of the country. 
Those preaching these concepts have contended that decisions should be left to market forces, 
with there being no place for government to back projects and enterprises which the best 
informed believe can be major future growth contributors. 
I spent time as a student studying the problems of agricultural trade protectionism and wrote 
my thesis on this subject, as it related to the workings of United States farm trade policy. 
That, along with.my subsequent experience working in an industry that took many years to 
adjust to the changes in sheepmeat trade access following Britain's entry to the EC, then 
during the past decade establishing and operating commercial entities in countries where farm 
trade protectionism has been the norm, has put me greatly at odds through first hand 
experience with those who cannot see beyond the orthodox level playing field view. 
In this paper I want to share some of my experiences from working in the North Asian meat 
market. I went to Tokyo in January, 1984 to establish the first foreign owned company of any 
scale to commence meat importing in Japan. Although there have been significant changes 
in the intervening years in trade access arrangements for meat, especially beef, the ANZCO 
Group continues to be the only foreign owned meat organisation in Japan importing on its 
own account the bulk of the product it handles. 
From small beginnings, with a paid-up capital of only $350,000 and no capital injections since 
establishment, the ANZCO Group today is a multi-national organisation with offices in Japan, 
. Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. After eliminating intergroup trading, ANZCO 
subsidiary and associate company sales in the year ended 30 September, 1992 totalled $478 
million. In the current financial year sales are expected to grow to around $600 million, 
largely due to expanding beef activities. 
While the original focus at the time of ANZCO's establishment was solely on improving 
opportunities for New Zealand lamb and mutton sales, particularly in Japan, the decision by 
the Japanese Government in June, 1988 to liberalise market access for imported beef from 
April I, 1991, set ANZCO on an expanded path of activities. After attempting to interest 
other New Zealand meat companies in a structured Japan beef market development strategy, 
ANZCO decided to invest in beef related businesses on its own account and in partnership 
with prominent Japanese and New Zealand companies. 
I openly acknowledge that I have a viewpoint to defend, in that ANZCO Group has single 
seller licensing status for New Zealand lamb and mutton exports to Japan. But in doing so 
I want to make it clear that I am not tied to any universal approach or preaching a set of 
values that can be applied in all export markets. Rather I want to put the case that it is 
essential to the future wellbeing of New Zealand agriculture and our ability to eam top export 
dollars from the industry that there is a level of understanding of business practices in different 
markets. In other words, our strategies for the international marketplace must be formulated 
taking account of the peculiarities of individual markets if we, as a nation, are to achieve the 
maximum returns from the marketplace. 
The workings of the Japanese economy are quite at odds with the views of some leading U.S. 
economists who have advocated blind adherence to the concepts of free trade. Japan is the 
world's second largest economy. It has during the past decade enjoyed the strongest annual 
growth of all leading industrial economies and it is the role model for the world's fastest 
growing economies found elsewhere in Asia. 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND BUSINESS PRACTICE SETTING 
The development of the industrial and agricultural sectors have been central objectives of the 
governments of Japan, Korea and Taiwan since the 1950s. Industrial policy has been based 
on building highly competitive manufacturing exports while in agriculture, all countries have 
pursued goals of self sufficiency. 
The success of "government leadership" policy has been analysed in a number of outstanding 
studies, including Chalmers Johnson "MITI and the Japanese Miracle".(I) 
_ Robert Wade, in his highly acclaimed recent book "Governing the Market", which is largely 
based on the Taiwan experience, sums up the North Asian economic model as follows: 
"A synergistic connection between a public system and a mostly private system, 
the outputs of each becoming inputs for the other, with the government setting the 
rules and influencing decision-making in the private sector in line with its views 
of an appropriate industrial and trade profile for the economy. Through this 
mechanism the advantages of markets (decentraiisation, rivalry, diversity, and 
multiple experiments) have been combined with the advantages of partially 
insulating producers from the instabilities of free markets and of stimulating 
investment in certain industries selected by government as important for the 
economy's future growth. This combination has improved upon the results of free 
markets". (2) 
Living in Japan one tried to be as polite as one could be when it came to discussing trade 
policy. I often heard how important it was that the United States, the EC and other countries 
should uphold the principles of free trade and avoid protectionism. Yet these same people 
overlooked the fact that Japan's economic success was based on ruthless protectionism, and 
other peoples' free trade. 
1.0 
The ideas on which classical Anglo-Saxon economic theory are based can be traced back to 
the times when the comparative advantage of nations was largely fixed by endowments, such 
as land, climate, mineral resources and people. But Japan's economic development has shown 
that comparative advantage evolves and industrial structures move towards production of more 
and more sophisticated products by: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
encouraging the development of an increasingly sophisticated set of domestic 
industries; 
setting up a framework in which companies must compete intensely to survive; 
making sure financial resources are available for important sectors; 
sustaining a mentality that Japan must have a strong presence in all key industrial 
areas. 
In this process industry has taken precedence over consumers in the allocation of goods. 
Yet the experience has been that incomes have risen and consumers have been able to 
enjoy a gradually increasing standard of living. Far from being neglected, the Japanese 
consumer is closely monitored by Japanese companies, and the demands of consumers are 
one of the crucial elements in the drive to produce top quality products. 
One long time observer of "goverrunent leadership" in Japanese industry has concluded: 
" ... the involvement of goverrunent varies widely from industry to industry and 
according to the stage of development of the industries in question. But the 
underlying management principle is not to maintain an open, free and competitive 
environment as an end in itself" .(3) 
A further consideration foreign owned companies need to be aware of before setting up in 
these markets is business behaviour. Lester Thurow, Dean of MIT's Sloan School of 
Management, in his recent book "Head to Head", summarises the predominant business 
thinking accurately when he states: 
"If one wants to understand Japanese companies, there is more to learn from an 
analysis of the empire builders than there is to learn from an understanding of the 
economics of Anglo-Saxon profit maximisation. The Japanese secret is to be 
found in the fact that they have tapped a universal human desire to build, to belong 
to an empire, to conquer neighbouring empires, and to become the world's leading 
economic power. Their goal is market-share maximisation (strategic conquest) and 
value-added maximisation (a measure that includes profits and wages), not simple 
profit maximisation. Only in the contracting phase of a product's life cycle are 
. profits maximised so that it serves as a cash cow to finance the expansion of new 
areas of endeavour". (4) 
The difficulties of foreign companies establishing commercial operations in Japan and 
North Asia have been extensively documented. Yet North Asia, as a result of continuing 
outside pressures, particularly from the United States, has become the world's leading net 
food importing region. It is now in value tenns the world's largest net meat importing 
region and the market can be expected to grow significantly between now and the year 
2000. 
NORTH ASIAN AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM 
While the success Japan and other Asian economies in the industrial sector cannot be 
denied, agriculture presents a different picture. In 1991 Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
imported $US43.7 billion of agricultural products. Of this $16.8 billion or 38 percent was 
supplied by the United States (see Table 1). 
Although all three countries have responded to pressures to gradually liberalise trade access 
for farm products, all continue to provide major assistance to their rural communities. This 
is illustrated in the measurement of "producer subsidy equivalents" (PSE). According to 
United States Department of Agriculture findings, the PSE levels in 1990 were 72 percent 
in Japan, 97 percent in South Korea and 30 percent in Taiwan. This should be compared 
with 10 percent in Australia and 3 percent in New Zealand (See Table 2). 
In the meat trades of Japan, Korea and Taiwan there are trade practices which make it 
difficult for the newcomer, whether foreign or domestic, to operate effectively in the 
market. Considerable investment is required to develop expertise and industry acceptance 
before this can be achieved. All three countries 20 years ago operated highly restrictive 
meat import programmes and have only adjusted as a result of external trade pressures. 
The internal meat distribution structures, particularly in Japan and Korea, still retain strong 
links with the current and past practices of "administrative guidance" and exclusive trading 
right practices. 
JAPAN BEEF INDUSTRY POLITICS 
Until the late 1950s Japan had virtually no livestock industries. Largely due to the 
directional role of the Livestock Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF), and the enactment of the Agricultural Basic Law of 1961, which aimed 
at restructuring and diversifying Japan's agricultural production, the policy of Japan has 
been essentially one of food self-sufficiency. Strict import controls were placed on beef 
imports in 1958 and the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC), an offshoot of 
MAFF, in 1965 commenced its influential role of controlling beef imports, which continued 
until 1991. 
The political power of the beef lobby in Japan has been enonnous. This has stemmed on 
the production side through the organisation of Japanese agriculture into a powerful 
cooperative structure and in the traditional meat trade, where for historical reasons, 
exclusive trading rights have applied, especially in the Kansai region . 
Until 1991 there were 37 designated importers of beef, together with 29 designated buyer 
groups. Beef import levies were used to fund producer and meat industry investment 
programmes, including the modernisation of slaughter, processing and distribution facilities. 
The channels, volumes and types of beef were "directed" until just two years ago, with 
particular assistance given to United States origin product following the United States -
Japan Beef Agreement of 1978. 
A GATT panel ruling against Japan in late 1987 on a number of agricultural product 
categories, and the subsequent agreement in June, 1988 to remove quota controls on beef 
imports from April 1, 1991 represent milestones in Japan's agricultural trade policy and the 
Pacific beef trade. 
Table I: North Asian Agricultural Imports by Selected Items and the Influence of Table 2: Comparative Producer Subsidy Equivalents 
United States Supplies. 
--.---~----
1982 1985 1988 1990 
Total Volume U.S. Volume U.S. Share (percent) ('000 Tonnes) (percentage) 
Japan Japan 
Com 16,646 14,047 84 Bee£IVeal 56 59 69 60 Sorghum 3,525 1,825 52 Pork 38 59 67 50 
Barley 1,520 75 5 Chicken 24 21 21 19 
Soyabeans 4,331 3,721 86 Dairy 77 90 97 86 
Raw Cotton 637 281 44 Rice 84 87 95 94 
"''heat 5,693 3,280 58 
Bee£IVeal 354 155 44 
Pork 413 41 10 South Korea 
Chicken 347 118 34 Beef 78 61 75 90 
Cattle Hides 188 133 71 Pork 46 56 31 57 
Citrus Fruit 432 418 97 Chicken 44 14 20 38 
Total ($US million) 29,721 11,740 40 Milk 48 29 66 69 
Rice 67 73 89 114 
South Korea 
Com 3,908 1,739 44 Taiwan 
Soyabeans 1,052 1,015 96 Beef 16 19 20 18 
Wheat 4,789 1,669 35 Pork 2 3 3 4 
Raw Cotton 431 227 53 Chicken 20 23 17 25 
Beef 269 48 18 Milk 38 43 48 47 I--' Cattle Hides 395 282 71 Rice 25 27 44 54 0 
Total ($US million) 7,423 2,609 35 
Australia 
Taiwan Bee£IVeal 6 4 3 3 
Com 5,470 5,260 96 Mutton/Lamb 5 3 3 3 
Soyabeans 1,959 1,898 97 Milk, Manufacturing 22 23 6 25 
Raw Cotton 342 70 20 
Wheat 860 752 87 
Beef 45 4 9 New Zealand 
Cattle Hides 235 85 36 Bee£IVeal 22 15 6 4 
Dairy Products 128 12 9 Mutton/Lamb 64 108 6 5 
Total ($US million) 6,550 2,423 37 Milk, Manufacturing 13 8 3 1 
North Asia Average PSE 
Total ($US million) 43,694 16,772 38 Japan 66 72 79 72 
South Korea 63 64 77 97 
Taiwan 16 24 28 30 
Australia 12 9 7 10 
New Zealand 33 22 4 3 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture "Pacific Rim Agriculture and Trade Report", 
September, 1992 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, "Pacif!.C Rim Agriculture and Trade Report", 
September, 1992 
I-' 
I-' 
Progressively Japan has reduced the tariffs on beef imports since 1991 from 70 percent ad 
valorem to the current level of 50 percent. Apart from tariff protection, Japan's domestic 
beef industry still continues to receive significant direct govermnent support. MAFF's 
Livestock Bureau budget in the 1993 fiscal year is ¥172.5 billion (almost $NZ3 billion), 
up 87 percent on 1990. 
JAPAN BEEF MARKET OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW ZEALAND 
Soon after the conclusion of the 1988 Beef Access Accords I prepared a report for the New 
Zealand Meat Producers Board, "The Japanese Beef Market: What Future for New 
Zealand?" Extracts from that report read: 
Introduction 
"The opening of the Japanese beef market represents a unique opportunity for the currently 
hard pressed New Zealand meat industry. The two and a half year period to April 1, 1991 
provides a period during which investment and strategic decisions will need to be made to 
ensure New Zealand is well placed to reap the benefits of this change in the mid-1990s and 
beyond." 
"By any objective criteria New Zealand's performance in the Japanese beef market has 
been modest. Over the years the Australians and more recently the Americans, have 
dominated the attention of the Japanese Trade, with specifications established for imported 
beef to take account of these supplying countries. Generally New Zealand has not 
established a credible beef reputation because of a lack of commitment to the market, both 
in resources and product supply". 
Lack of New Zealand Commitment 
"New Zealand is not regarded as a serious supplier to the Japanese market. Any past 
expressions of serious intent by the New Zealand Govermnent and the Meat Producers 
Board of New Zealand taking a more active role in the Japanese beef trade have lacked 
credibility because of an inability to match words with actions". 
Japanese Investment 
" ... It will be difficult for newcomers to penetrate {this market after liberalisation}. In the 
meantime key Japanese meat interest will ... step up their efforts to purchase plants and 
even cattle raising units in the United States, Australia and New Zealand". 
Post-Liberalisation Forecast 
"It is likely the period immediately after March 31, 1991 will be chaotic, with a number 
of new Japanese companies endeavouring to enter the beef trade. Inexperienced meat 
companies will become active, the traditional Dowa groupings can be expected to decline 
in importance, while the major Ham and Sausage processing companies (Nippon Meat 
Packers, Itoham Foods, Prima Ham, Marudai Foods and Snow Brand), with extensive fresh 
meat and meat processing facilities, will increase their roles in the Japanese beef trade . 
. Leading supermarket chains '" will endeavour to by-pass the meat trade by seeking to 
import directly their imported beef requirements". 
Fra!m1ented Approach 
"A fragmented approach by New Zealand to the changing Japanese beef market will ... see 
New Zealand continuing as a "small bit" player". 
Programme For Change 
"The following are seen as key elements in ensuring success: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
A united New Zealand meat industry approach .... 
Developing a capability to provide a full range of product to ser.ice Japanese buyers, 
including grainfed beef, changes in cattle raising patterns to ensure the supply of 
heavier weight animals, plus a wider spread of kill, and an active volume chilled trade. 
Promoting New Zealand as a reliable manufacturing beef supplier, capable of entering 
into long term contracts offering continuity of supply, consistent pricing policies and 
consistent product quality. 
Offering the opportunity to selected Japanese companies to invest in New Zealand beef 
processing activities specifically aimed at supplying the Japanese market. 
The utilisation of the current New Zealand Meat Group (ANZCOiJanmark) experience 
in Japan. 
{Organise} marketplace trade support activities. 
Form a working party to progress industry consensus. 
Invite key Japanese groups and individuals to New Zealand. 
Send key industry personnel to Japan to view the New Zealand Meat Group's 
operations and aspects of the Japanese beef market." 
The 1988 report was discussed, together with other working papers, with leading New 
Zealand beef exporting companies on the premise that a joint approach be adopted. 
Unfortunately no positive responses were forthcoming, so like the little red hen, ANZCO 
pressed on with its own initiatives. 
Separate joint venture arrangements were established with two of Japan's largest food 
companies, Itoham Foods Inc and Nippon Suisan Kaisha Ltd. In the case of the joint 
venture with Itoham, this has resulted in the establishment of New Zealand's first large 
scale commercial cattle feedlot in Mid Canterbury operated by Five Star Beef Ltd. 
In 1990 an operation in Australia was established, ANZCO International (Australia) Pty 
Ltd, to acquire Bush's Pet Foods Pty Ltd and to commence Australian beef procurement 
and sales activities to support North Asian region marketing initiatives. 
I--' 
N 
JAPAN BEEF MARKET SEGMENTS 
The Japanese beef market effectively falls into three broad segments, with the end-user of 
the product determining the quality of beef required. 
At the top of the scale is highly marbled product, almost entirely produced from domestic 
cattle fed on grain diets for 24 to 36 months. This beef is consumed mainly in high class 
restaurants and hotels and accounts for about one tenth of the total market of 830,000 
tonnes. 
At the bottom end of the market is processing beef. This includes product used for 
manufacturing, canning and hamburger production. Accounting for about one fifth of the 
total beef trade, tariff levels and prices have limited demand to date as it competes with 
other meats, especially pork, but also mutton and horsemeat. 
The bulk of the table beef trade is the so-called "mass" market segment. This includes less 
desirable cuts from domestic high quality beef, domestic dairy beef and imported beef. 
Most of the beef sold in restaurants, supermarkets and butcher shops are in this category. 
The combination of import liberalisation and extensive trade promotion activities by the 
United States and Australia has lifted significantly the share of imported beef in retail sales. 
Despite the presence of high tariffs, Japan is now by value the world's largest beef 
importing country. In 1992 Japan's beef imports were worth ¥264.6 billion ($NZ3.9 
billion), while total meat imports were ¥768.5 billion ($NZI1.3 billion). 
Last year Japan imported 411,511 tonnes of beef, almost double the level of 1987, the year 
immediately prior to the Beef Accords that led to market liberalisation. This year we 
expect Japan's beef imports will exceed 450,000 tonnes and by the year 2000 Japan is 
likely"to be importing over 700,000 tonnes of beef. 
Regrettably last year New Zealand's share of Japan's beef imports was just 2.0 percent or 
8,378 tonnes. It was the lowest annual market share for New Zealand since Japan 
commenced importing beef in the mid 1950s. 
Although Okinawa accounted for just 1.7 percent of Japan's beef imports in 1992, 49 
percent of New Zealand's shipments went to this straightforward market where the bulk 
of business has traditionally been transacted through Japanese trading houses. In Mainland 
Japan, New Zealand supplied a minuscule 4,277 tonnes. It was no coincidence that 
ANZCOlNew Zealand Beef Holdings (a joint venture company between ANZCO and 
Affco) handled an estimated 84 percent of New Zealand's beef trade to Mainland Japan and 
52 percent of total New Zealand beef imports in Japan. In this regard it is worth 
highlighting that ANZCO does not have any preferential licensing arrangements for beef 
and is one of 21 New Zealand exporters. 
BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
Prior to ANZCO's establishment New Zealand's lamb and mutton trade to Japan was 
highly fragmented, with 38 exporters, but the bulk of product ultimately was purchased by 
three Japanese trading companies. Such a trading structure has been historically typical of 
"the way most of Japan's raw material needs have been sourced. It can be effective for 
sales of bulk, readily saleable, products where a market need has already been established, 
but rarely has it operated in the interests of the supplying organisations. 
As consumer requirements have broadened and overseas suppliers have sought new market 
opportunities, the traditional Japanese trading houses have lost market share. Innovative 
Japanese food manufacturers and distributors have either vertically integrated offshore or 
formed overseas alliances. However, the speed of change in the food industry has only 
quickened in recent years as a result of the removal of import barriers on some leading 
food items, appreciation of the yen and labour shortage problems. 
To advance beyond passive relationships with a traditional Japanese trading company 
requires a substantial commitment. As J.N. Huddleston, in his very practical book "Gaijin 
Kaisha: Running A Foreign Business in Japan", states: 
"To say merely that the company will have a long-range financial commitment to 
Japan begs the question, for it means that the country is being considered as an 
investment option, instead of a five-year pay-back, ten years, but if it does not come 
in ten years, then the company will look elsewhere. What is required instead is the 
commitment that the company's Japanese business either succeeds or fails in Japan: 
The company will be in Japan. Perhaps Westerners should look to their forebears, the 
Vikings, who, when they invaded a new territory, burned their boats. There was no 
retreat. A successful company does the same: 'Come hell or high water we are going 
to be in Japan. Japan is not a discretionary program. It is a country you believe you 
must be in. There is no retreat out of Japan. If you fail, find another approach. The 
Japanese competition just waits to see how deep are your pockets. Nine times out of 
ten the foreign company doesn't have the staying power'. "(5) 
Mutton and horsemeat were important raw materials in the formative years of the Japanese 
processed meat industry. They were granted tariff free trade access in the early 1960s. 
However, the elimination of quotas on pork imports in 1971, together with stricter labelling 
regulations and rising consumer incomes, saw consumer demand in the late 1970s shift 
from mass produced items using "substitute" meats to more distinctive pure pork items. 
New Zealand failed to respond in the 1970s to labour changes in Japan, with a marked shift 
from carcase to boneless mutton. ANZCO in the 1980s was able to recover market share 
for New Zealand mutton through the operation of contract boning plants in Korea and 
Taiwan and the introduction of specification changes in New Zealand. 
The differential duties currently imposed on pork imports in Japan are expected to be 
removed within the next two years as a result of United States trade pressure and settlement 
of the GAIT Uruguay Round. This may lead to the virtual elimination of mutton as a raw 
material for processed meat production in Japan. 
Unlike the bulk of mutton imports, lamb has been consumed in Japan as a table meat. 
Consequently it proved to be a much more difficult product to sell through the traditional 
Japanese trading houses, particularly when beef imports began to rapidly expand in the late 
1970s. 
Consumer prejudices against lamb remain high. Outside Hokkaido, only through the 
ANZCO Group maintaining a relatively high turnover of customers have we been able to 
secure a reasonably constant business. Chilled lamb was seen in the early years of the 
company to be the key to retail sales growth but the realities of production constraints in 
New Zealand make this a difficult task. 
...... 
w 
In the face of increasing price competition from other meats, particularly imported beef, 
and large promotional spends by the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation, the United 
States Meat Export Federation and domestic producer organisations, lamb will continue to 
struggle to hold market share in the next three years. The ANZCO Group will need to 
continue to invest significant sums in consumer and trade support activities. 
The inability of the traditional Japanese trading companies to operate outside the 
mainstream meat trade has been demonstrated in the lack of performance of New Zealand 
beef exports to Japan since 1989. Although there are 21 licensed New Zealand beef 
exporters to Japan, the Japanese trading houses were not prepared to invest in establishing 
end user relationships for New Zealand beef during the "Simultaneous Buying and Selling" 
tender arrangements, which accounted for a significant share of annual quotas after the 
1988 Japan-United States Beef Accords. Since market liberalisation, apart from Okinawa, 
where there is an established demand for New Zealand beef, the Japanese trading houses 
have accounted -for only a small share of New Zealand beef shipments to Japan. 
As was the case in Japan prior to April I, 1991, Korean beef imports have been 
administered by a Government central purchasing agency, namely the Livestock Products 
Marketing Organisation (LPMO). Unlike the Japanese LIPC tenders, the LPMO has 
conducted an open tender system which has been more beneficial to New Zealand. With 
a higher proportion of future annual quotas to be allocated to a "Simultaneous Buying and 
Selling" system, marketplace relationships will play an increasingly important role. Until 
Korean beef access is Iiberalised, which is scheduled by July, 1997, the market will 
continue to be manipulated by the authorities. 
PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
The mission of ANZCO has been to profitably expand the medium to long term . sales of 
imported food products in Japan and elsewhere in North Asia, with particular emphasis on 
New Zealand meat. As the Group has entered the beef trade it has seen opportunities in 
the wider PaCific Basin (see Figure 1). 
ANZCO and its related companies have achieved the following performance milestones: 
(1) Continuous annual sales turnover growth since establishment and profitable trading 
results every year. 
(2) Only twice in the decade prior to ANZCO's establishment had New Zealand been 
the main supplier of sheepmeat imports by Japan. In seven successive years, 1984 
. to 1990, New Zealand was the leading supplier. The combination of falling sheep 
numbers in New Zealand, removal in 1989 of the previous 10 percent tariff on EC 
imports and liberalisation of market access for beef, have seen New Zealand reduce 
its market share of Japanese sheepmeat imports to below half in 1991 and 1992. 
(3) The ANZCO Group has consistently achieved, since 1984, an annual market share 
of more than 60 percent of all sheepmeat sold in Japan, with Australia becoming 
a growing source of supplies since 1989. 
. (4) In 1992 the Group sold 80,000 tonnes of meat and petfood in North Asia and 
North America. 
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(5) ANZCO has consistently been the largest purchaser of lamb forequarter items and 
mutton carcases from the New Zealand meat industry during the past 9 years. 
(6) ANZCO and Janmark pioneered a number of innovations in the New Zealand meat 
industry, including the introduction of denuded boneless lamb shortloins and french 
racks, mutton specification and carton size changes, and the introduction of small 
cartons for the chilled lamb trade. These innovations have been transferred to 
other trades, particularly Europe, and the industry consequently has become a 
stronger competitor. 
(7) ANZCO Japan has become the largest single buyer of Australian lamb and mutton 
so Id to Japan. 
(8) A joint.venture between ANZCO and Itoham Foods Inc, has constructed New 
Zealand's fust commercial scale cattle feedlot at Wakanui, Mid Canterbury. The 
joint venture has become the largest supplier of New Zealand chilled beef to Japan. 
(9) Bush's Pet Food Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of ANZCO Group, in the short space of 
three years supplies over 20 percent canned dog food to the market in Japan. 
(10) An ANZCO subsidiary has become Japan's third largest sausage casings importer 
and supplier. 
(11) Only one other foreign company has successfully built and operated a meat 
processing plant in Japan since the construction of the factory by ANZCO in 1987. 
That plant is 60 percent owned by Cargill Inc, the world's largest grain trading 
company and owner of the third largest beef company in the United States, Excel 
Corporation. 
(12) ANZCO is only one of two foreign owned meat companies with an office in 
Taiwan. 
(13) Only two New Zealand meat industry related companies have offices in Korea. 
These are ANZCO (in Busan) and Weddel (operating as Malayan Refrigeration Co 
Ltd in Seoul). 
In progressing ANZCO's objectives the following factors have been critical: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Access to stable financing arrangements. 
Staff skills. 
Stable supply sources. 
Established sales and distribution channels. 
Price competitiveness. 
Reputation. 
Marketplace processing capabilities. 
Strategic market development and associated alliances. 
These elements apply in most markets but are even more critical in North Asia, especially 
Japan. As a 1987 study by Booz, Allen & Hamilton for the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Japan and the Council of the European Business Community concluded: 
"The complexities and difficulties of doing business in Japan are primary barriers 
to greater investment by foreign companies." 
Continuity is a crucial element in Japanese business relationships. Although ANZCO was 
established with a low capital base, the quasi-governmental functions of the company's 
major shareholder, the New Zealand Meat Producers Board, and the fact that it had been 
in existence for more than 60 years, "legitimised" from an establishment and banking 
viewpoint the activities of ANZCO. 
While the purists find difficulties with this approach, in practice what we have done is fmd 
ways to at least get us on the playing field. Subsequent performance, selling lamb and 
mutton in an extremely difficult market, has enabled us to build a business which has 
provided the critical mass to recruit good people, build strategic relationships, develop new 
business with all the attendant risks, and return an acceptable level of profit. 
We have come under the focus of the theorists. In a speech, no doubt written by an 
official with such convictions, the Minister of Agriculture, J. Sutton, in commenting on the 
activities of ANZCO at the 1990 Annual Conference of the New Zealand Meat Industry 
Association, said: 
"I am concerned that without the needle of intra-industry rivalry, performance will 
be below potential. Indeed, that is a certain outcome unless the Meat Producers 
Board has away of changing human nature - a task which eluded all the market 
planners of Eastern Europe over the first half century or so of their ascendancy".( 6) 
Long before the "Hussey" report (7) for the New Zealand Business Roundtable appeared, 
we were visited by New Zealand Treasury officials in Japan, who raised with us, but not 
during meetings with our customers and partners, the same doctrine which appeared four 
years later in the "Hussey" report. At least in their case they did take the trouble to visit 
the marketplace and talk to us. 
REALITY 
On the matter of competition it needs to be recognised that in Japan, New Zealand supplied 
only 1.8 percent of Japan's meat imports by value in 1992. Of the total Japanese meat 
market, New Zealand product accounted for less than .1 percent, with New Zealand 
sheepmeat less than 0.5 percent. 
With no domestic sheep industry, low consumer acceptance of lamb and mutton and the 
most direct frontal competition between Australia and New Zealand found anywhere in the 
world, the North Asian sheepmeat market represents a formidable challenge for New 
Zealand product. 
In keeping with our licensing responsibilities, ANZCO purchases sheepmeat from all export 
processors in New Zealand who are under no obligation to sell to ANZCO. Like any 
marketing organisation, ANZCO has built stronger ties with those suppliers who have been 
prepared to make longer term commitments and perform accordingly. 
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Despite 111 years of experience in meat exporting, the New Zealand meat industry 
generally has a very limited understanding of the importance and commercial value of 
marketing companies. The industry has operated in a manner where for the most part the 
primary focus has been in New Zealand, battling each other to secure livestock from 
farmers for processing. Insufficient profits have been retained to build marketing structures 
of substance or invest in the levels of research and development usually found in the 
leading export industry of a nation. 
Although Japan has been consistently New Zealand's second largest trading partner during 
the past five 'years, investment in marketplace organisations by New Zealand owned 
companies has been minimal. Only four New Zealand owned organisations have 
marketplace structures in Japan able to import and service their customers. These 
organisations are the New Zealand Dairy Board (New Zealand Milk Products Ltd and 
Nippon Protein Ltd), Kiwifruit Marketing Board, Independent Casings and the ANZCO 
Group. 
Foreign investment rules in Taiwan and Korea, plus in the case of Korea trade access 
barriers on beef and sheepmeat imports, have made it difficult for foreign owned meat 
companies to establish offices which perform more than a commissioned agent sales role. 
This will change in the next five years. 
Since ANZCO's establishment New Zealand sheep numbers have declined significantly and 
the distortions resulting from New Zealand's higher access level of205,000 tonnes of lamb 
and mutton to the EC, compared with 17,000 tonnes for Australia, has greatly distorted the 
international sheepmeat trade. 
Like lamb, New Zealand beef will have to make the transition in Japan and before the end 
of this decade, in Korea, from being commodity items to carefully planned, market 
positioned products. Only by doing this will market opportunities be realised. This 
requires long-term commitment in recruiting and training staff, investment in facilities and 
trade support· activities. Above all it requires a commitment to what is appropriate to 
achieving success in each marketplace, putting aside short-term political or production 
orientated considerations in New Zealand. 
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the volumes of New Zealand lamb and 
mutton sold in the North Asian market would have been significantly below the levels 
achieved by ANZCO had the previous fragmented export structure continued. Today, it 
is just as relevant as ever for retention of these licensing rights in the face of increased 
competition resulting from better trade access for beef, pork and chicken. 
As to beef, there would still be no New Zealand owned marketplace organisation on the 
ground in Japan to progress opportunities for New Zealand beef had ANZCO not been in 
existence. 
In a small country dependant on exports for its peoples welfare, especially one where its 
leading industries are confronted with major trade access barriers, it is almost unbelievable 
that any group of responsible citizens can promote the view that government should not 
playa leading role in promoting potential winners. Sector policy can take the form of 
providing low-cost capital, relief from commerce commission constraints on a case-by-case 
. basis and tax incentives. It can promote a highly competitive domestic economy while at 
the same time allQwing a collective approach in the way particular overseas markets are 
developed. 
What such an approach recognises is that the economy is too important to be left to private 
interests. The process of achieving a consensus is difficult in a highly pluralistic society 
such as New Zealand. Yet to claim that the role of government in economic activities is 
worthless, is to deny the successes of Japan and other economies in Asia who have 
followed its model. 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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AGRICULTURAL MARKETING STRUcrURES: 
- AN INTEGRATED MARKET BACK SYSTEM 
- TIlE NEW ZEALAND DAIRY BOARD EXPERIENCE" 
ALISTAIR BETTS, GROUP GENERAL MANAGER (MARKETING) 
NEW ZEALAND DAIRY BOARD 
P.O. BOX 417 
WELLINGTON 
Ladies & Gentlemen; the proposition on agricultural marketing structures that I 
want to develop today is that the New Zealand Dairy Board is one of New 
Zealand's most successful international agricultural marketing operations because 
of the integrated nature of the structure. 
It has shareholder cohesion, it has supplier cohesion - indeed they are one 
in the same people. 
The integrated market back/milk production forward structure gives it 
sufficient critical mass to compete internationally against major multi-
nationals and also deal with them as customers. 
Our two largest international brand competitors and customers, Nestle and 
Kraft General Foods, both have a turnover many times larger than New 
Zealand's total gross domestic product. 
The integrated selling operation allows us to control distribution to and in 
individual country markets. Therefore: 
we don't compete with ourselves 
we can make and take long term investment decisions in both 
infrastructure and advertising and promotion 
Recent criticisms of the New Zealand dairy industry'S structure which have 
received a high profile have come from the report commissioned by the 
N.Z. Business Roundtable released last October. 
The Roundtable insists that it commissioned the Hussey report to act as 
a catalyst for some real debate on agricultural marketing arrangements. 
. We might. be accused of paranoia, but more and more, it seems to be 
being used as the basis for a concerted campaign, a highly political one, 
directed against us and other producer groups. 
The structure of the New Zealand dairy industry is supported and 
endorsed by its supplier shareholders. 
Its marketing strategies are producing increasingly encouraging results. 
It has a proven ability to adapt arrangements to changing circumstances, 
and will continue to do this as vigorously in the future, as in the past. 
The New Zealand Dairy Board's markets are outside New Zealand. 
The New Zealand Board is therefore a global marketing organisation. 
If one refers to the milk flow history and projections (Attachment 1), it can be 
seen that considerable growth has taken place in recent years and this is projected 
to continue. 
Accordingly, there will be an ongoing need to place increasing volumes of New 
Zealand dairy solids into the international markets. 
New Zealand already holds 25% of the accessible international dairy trade. 
However, accessible trade equates to only 3% of the total world dairy market. 
Further, it can be seen that our major competitors only need to move their 
production a fraction of a percentage point and an over or under supply position 
in their markets will impact quite dramatically on the 3% of accessible market. 
In terms of competing for a share of that 3%, all of our competitors do so on a 
subsidised basis. 
Against this background our objectives are: 
To increase product placement security. 
To generate incremental income in excess of the cost of placement. 
To achieve this, the type of targets we are looking at can be demonstrated by the 
projected sales split of our business over the next three years. 
Our industrial tonnage is looking to grow 22% to 800,000 tonnes. 
Consumer placement 47% to 400,000 tonnes. 
This latter growth is critical to the achievement of our objectives and I would like 
to talk here briefly about the New Zealand Dairy Board's own brand consumer 
products strategy . 
In 1992/93 New Zealand Dairy Board Group own brand consumer sales reached 
377,000 tonnes containing 200,000 tonnes of New Zealand dairy product. 
By region, South East Asia is now taking the largest tonnage followed by UK 
where our volume is frozen under quota with Latin America and Africa third 
equal followed by the Middle East then Australia. 
...... 
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In terms of product, wholemilk powder volume is 50% of the tonnage followed 
by butter and then cheese. 
IN-MARKET INFRASTRUcrURE 
In developing these businesses in the emerging markets, the growth of our in-
market infrastructures - facilities and people have been critical. We have 
developed our own, joint ventured or acquired outright existing infrastructures. 
In each case, the investment analysis is as if it was on a free standing commercial 
basis. This means that a standard return on investment or return on funds 
employed analysis is utilised to measure the projected or existing performance of 
such structures. 
To give you a feel for what's out there and how it integrates, I would refer you 
to Attachment 2/2A. 
Looking specifically at some of the regional structures: (Attachments 3-6) 
The Middle East - presently this is headquartered in Bahrain. Under the 
holding company we have an operating company New Zealand Milk 
Products (Middle East) which physically executes a lot of the business 
throughout the region. This is complemented by New Zealand Milk 
Products (Iran) managing the business in that country and it can be seen 
there are three other companies currently under formation - New Zealand 
. Milk Products (UAE) Dubai, Saudi New Zealand Dairies Limited in 
Daman and New Zealand Iran Dairy Marketing Limited. 
All of these companies will act as principals procuring the product directly 
from New Zealand and will be involved in own brand consumer marketing 
processing and distribution. 
In Latin America, holding company management is resident in Florida and 
oversees a group of companies who act as direct principals procuring 
product from New Zealand in Chile, Peru, Guatemala, EI Salvador and 
Mexico. 
It can be seen that we also hold direct investments in manufacturing 
marketing and distribution operations in Chile with Sop role and in 
Jamaica with Dairy Industries. Barbados Dairy Industries where we have 
a minority interest is in milk processing utilising imported solids from New 
Zealand. 
In Asia the network is much larger and reflects the size of the business 
that has been developed there. Many of the companies are involved 
exclusively in own brand consumer activities or alternatively in industrial 
marketing. This structure has evolved from initially a liaison office leading 
to trading companies and then as the business is more segmented into 
specific companies or divisions of a company concentrating on particular 
market segments. There are several manufacturing/processing operations 
within the South East Asia group. 
Through these in-market structures integrated back into the manufacturing 
industry we are able to: 
manage the placement of increasing volumes of dairy product 
to continue to enhance the value of that product with the in-market 
customers and consumers 
to capture the downstream value inherent in this activity 
all of this is what I describe as "an integrated macro distribution structure". 
MACRO DISTRIBUTION CONCEPT IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETING 
It is the process and all costs attributable to the movement, conversion, 
distribution and placement of product with the final customer or consumer. 
Referring to the segmentation of our business in-market, it can be seen that the 
average gross margins available from the various segments varies from a 1-3% 
margin on differentiated bulk commodities through to a 35-45% margin from own 
brand consumer business. (Attachment 7) 
If this is applied by way of analysis of in-market profit arising from participation 
in an integrated structure through to sale into the retail outlet, it can be seen that 
there are profits to be taken from each step in the transaction ranging from 
distribution, warehousing and selling at the front end through processing and 
packing back to the bulk F AS equivalent at the New Zealand port. 
Translating this into US dollars per metric tonne on for example milk powder, it 
can be seen that from a retail price equivalent to US $5,000 back through this 
distribution chain to the New Zealand port, only 30% of the dollar value remains. 
If one takes profit from the transaction point then in bulk commodity trading, a 
1 % net profit on the F AS would only generate US $18 a tonne. Moving further 
downstream, a 5% net profit from an industrial ingredient sold in-market would 
generate US $100 a metric tonne. 
Whereas a 5% net profit from selling into retail after all costs including 
advertising and promotion are accounted for, then the return per metric tonne 
increases to US $200. 
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Accordingly the further downstream one participates in the macro distribution 
chain, the greater the ability to take profit back against the product placed. 
BRAND EQUITY 
If one is going for the higher profit inherent in own brand consumer, then critical 
in this is not only investment in infrastructure, but investment in the development 
of brands. 
It is a common misconception that adding value is simply converting a bulk 
commodity to an ingredient or consumer product. This is not so, it's merely 
adding costs. 
It is not until the customer or consumer perceives that the product is valuable to 
them that the true value is added. . 
In-market we add value to our products by working on the customer. 
New Zealand Dairy Board quality image. 
New Zealand clean and green quality image. 
New Zealand milk products local service. 
Brand advertising FERNLEAF, ANCHOR, CHESDALE, ANLENE. 
Positive perceptions and emotions created through advertising all add value to our 
brand and pr9duct with our customer. 
If you consider the range of competitors for New Zealand Dairy Board own brand 
consumer products in milk powder, Nido from Nestle and Klim from Bordens 
USA, in cheese Kraft General Foods and in butter Lurpak from M.D. Foods 
Denmark are consistent competitors in South East Asia, Latin America and the 
Middle East. 
More and more we consider corporate brand owners as our competitors in the 
marketplace although in the industrial/commodity sector, country competitors are 
still relevant. 
The point is the more we can grow our own brand consumer product which gives 
us security of product placement and participation in downstream profits, the less 
we have to worry about the whims of our subsidised country competitors out of 
the EEC, USA and Australia. We insulate our business from commodity market 
swings. 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
In terms of measuring the investment in the development of our brand in-market, 
it's like any other commercial enterprise: its growth in product placement on a 
single brand single product basis. The example of FERNLEAF full cream milk 
powder sales in Taiwan demonstrates this: (Attachment 8) 
1991 launch year sales grew to an average of 100 tonnes a month. 
1991/92 this was lift through advertising, promotional and distribution 
activities to 300 tonnes a month with 
1992/93 averaging 450 tonnes a month. 
This is also measured in terms of market share and over this period FERNLEAF 
in the Taiwan full cream milk powder consumer market has grown from an initial 
5% market share to 30% now. 
As with any other commercial enterprise the profitability of the product in an 
individual market is also measured. 
From this it can be seen that in the launch year 1991 where US $3.5 million of 
A & P expenses were incurred against a gross profit of US $2 million on the 
initial low volume launch sales, a US $2 million loss was made. In the 1991/92 
year with the growth in volume and advertising and promotion increased to US 
$6.5 million, the brand made a further loss of US $1.5 million. 
The 1992/93 year just finished saw the brand come into profit at US $2.3 million 
against an increased advertising expenditure of US $8 million with sales growing 
to 5,000 tonnes with a US $26 million turnover. 
The 1993/94 year is budgeted to reach 6,000 tonnes, US $30 million turnover, a 
total profit of US $3 million which brings the accumulated profit/loss situation 
to a positive US $1.7 million. 
It should be noted that there is a second level of profit measurement incorporated 
into these figures. 
The benchmark on an annual basis reflects the international price for full cream 
milk powder. It is noted that the transaction price that the company buys the 
product from the New Zealand Dairy Board is substantially above the 
international price. This equates an immediate "added value dividend" by way of 
product pricing back into the New Zealand dairy industry, reflecting achievement 
against one of the objectives previously established. 
Each market launch for an individual product is projected on this basis and 
monitored. 
...... 
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Accordingly it can be demonstrated that performance measurement in the 
marketplace is a combination of: 
Product Price 
International market price on bulk undifferentiated commodity determined 
by EEC/now USA and other country export subsidies. 
Product/Marketing Profit 
Return over the international product price less all costs attributable to the 
macro distribution process. . 
Investment Profits 
Retained or dividended back. 
This latter performance measurement refers to the corporate performance. 
All of this is captured in the Milk Products Holdings (South East Asia) Private 
Limited consolidated profit and loss account. 
From this it can be seen that growth in both own brand consumer and industrial 
product placement is being achieved. 
The gross margin split also demonstrates the value of own brand consumer as 
compared to industrial. However, this is offset to some extent by the A & P 
required. Also of interest in these accounts is the return on shareholders funds. 
Although this may be considered low in terms of food industry averages 
internationally, it must be remembered that a portion of the in-market value 
created through this integrated structure has already been taken back against the 
product price into the New Zealand end of the business. 
So, in the marketplace prior and post investment analysis/evaluation is on an 
international commercial basis. It is the interface of this back into the industry 
through the Board that is often misrepresented both within and external to the 
industry. 
PAYMENT FOR MILK 
The opening price is based on a forward projection of product income 
from the Board's marketing network worked back through to product 
prices to the dairy companies. 
These prices are adjusted through the season as projections become reality 
and subsidiary operating profits are partially remitted. 
Dairy companies add to it through improved efficiency over the internal 
payment models. 
Dairy company payments are further supplemented by receipt of differential 
premiums on the manufacture of higher costing product specifications together 
with market driven payment incentives. 
PRODUCTION COMPETITION 
Dairy companies compete with each other in terms of payout to farmers. 
They compete against the standard industry average through the cost 
models. 
They compete for manufacture of non-standard products and payment 
differentials reflected back from market demand. 
Farmers also compete with each other and against both industry and 
district production averages, for by beating these, they get a higher iq.come. 
Thus there is competition at all levels of the New Zealand dairy industry from the 
in-market shelf right through the distribution chain which is co-ordinated through 
the New Zealand Dairy Board back through the industry itself, right to the dairy 
farmer. 
The structure is a strength that leads to our success. However, it's probably 
unique because of the nature of the product it handles, starting from milk which 
is produced on a daily basis, in many cases into perishable products. It is not 
necessarily a model for other primary industries to follow. 
CONCLUSION 
To many, as a result of recent orchestrated publicity, the New Zealand 
Dairy Board is synonymous with monopoly. 
Monopoly equates a lack of competitIOn which is simply not true 
throughout our industry and in the marketplace. 
Like any marketing organisation, we are working for a monopoly of the 
consumer / customer's mind in our product categories in competition with 
many other suppliers and products. 
Our structure provides the critical mass and strength to compete in a far from 
economically perfect international marketplace. 
The various measurements of performance of that structure are entirely consistent 
with those utilised by many other "commercial" enterprises. 
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NZDB GLOBAL CONSUMER BUSINESS 
REGIONAL SALES ANALYSIS: OWN BRAND CONSUMER BUSINESS 
METRIC TONNES 
I REGION I 1991/92 Actuals I 1992/93 Forecast I 1993/94 Planned 
North America 100 100 120 
North Asia 200 450 500 
S.E.A. 46,000 60,000 72,000 
Cent/Sth America 18,000 25,000 32,000 
Africa/Europe 4,000 6,600 32,000 
Middle East 9,800 10,500 17,000 
Australia 6,500 10,000 12,000 
Pacific 3,000 3,500 4,000 
U.K. 65,000 65,000 65,000 
C.I.S. - - 5,000 
I TOTALS I 152,600 I 181,150 I 239,620 
I 
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NZDB GLOBAL CONSUMER BUSINESS 
PRODUCT GROUP ANALYSIS: OWN BRAND CONSUMER SALES 
METRIC TONNES 
I Product Group I 1991/92 Actuals I 1992/93 Forecast I 1993/94 Planned 
Wholemilk 43,000 63,300 106,000 
Skimmilk 2,900 4,950 6,520 
Butter 76,800 79,300 88,300 
Ghee 2,400 3,600 4,500 
Natural Cheese 18,000 19,800 22,000 
Processed Cheese 9,500 10,200 12,300 
TOTAL 152,600 181,150 239,620 
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CONSUMER MILK POWDER 
MARKET PRICE~ 
Retail 
Distribution 
Price 
Ex Factory 
CIF Price 
FAS Price 
USD 5,000 MT 
Equivalent 
USD 4,000 MT 
USD 3,250 MT 
USD 2,600 MT 
USD 1,900 MT 
USD 1,800 MT 
A 1 % net profit on commodity trading equates USD 18 per MT 
A 5 % net profit on an industrial ingredient sold in-market delivered 
equates U5D 100 per MT 
A 5 % net profit from selling into retail after all costs including A & P 
and return on in-market infrastructure equates USD 200 per MT 
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THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE 
PERFORMANCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF LAND BASED 
INDUSTRIES AND FIRMS 
Summary 
Wayne Cartwright 
Professor of Strategic Management 
University of Auckland 
This paper reviews the confusion in use of theory in analysis and strategy 
formation relating to land based industries and firms that operate internationally. 
A system value chain model is proposed and key strategic issues are identified and 
discussed. 
Keywords: International Competitiveness, Land Based Industries, 
Agricultural Marketing, Value Chain 
Broad Theoretical Perspectives 
This paper is presented as a contribution to the debate concerning the relationship 
between the performance of agricultural marketing and the structure of its 
industries and organisations. The term 'agricultural' is broadly interpreted in the 
context of New Zealand land based production to include horticulture and forestry 
as well as pastoral and arable agriculture. 
The discussion at this conference is intended to include aspects of the recent ACIL 
report on agricultural marketing regulation in New Zealand (Hussey, 1992). The 
ACIL report and subsequent responses from industry leaders - for example, Pope 
(1992) - typify an unfortunate characteristic of the ongoing debate about 
agricultural marketing. This is the propensity for two groups - professional 
economists and professional managers - to talk past each other. The result 
is a debate that is sometimes confrontational and seldom productive. The reason 
for this situation is that the two groups are using models based on different 
assumptions and patterns of logic. These alternative models that relate 
performance and structure are shown in Figure 1. 
Model 1 represents the mainstream of analysis and commentary from economists. 
. The focus of attention is the influence of alternative market structures on market 
performance, both directly and indirectly through the influence of structure on the 
conduct of firms. Attention is usually directed at the structure of markets at the up-
stream end of the system value chain, especially the exchange processes for the 
products of land-based enterprises, and at the stage of export marketing. Model 1 
devotes relatively less attention to the structure of down-stream markets that are 
located offshore. The reason for this is selectivity not clear. The model uses theory 
to predict the attributes of structure that will determine improved conduct and 
performance. Policy prescriptions are then indicated by a comparison of actual 
structure and conduct with the ideal conditions identified by theory. 
Model 2 represents a frame of reference that professional managers of firms can 
be expected to use. In this case, strategy formation and implementation is driven 
at the firm level by its vision and objectives. Strategy then positions the firm in its 
macro environment and chosen competitive arena, and strategy is also directed 
towards achieving an organisational structure and governance that supports the 
implementation of strategic initiatives and achievement of objectives. Performance 
is measured in the same dimensions as the chosen objectives, which will usually 
reflect ultimately the concept of maximising shareholder value over time, subject 
to meeting the expectations of other stakeholder groups. 
Model 2 not only describes in general terms the typical strategic behaviour of 
managers and directors, it also represents a large body of theoretical and empirical 
literature in strategic management and organisational development. It is surprising 
that this literature is not given greater prominence in discussions of agricultural 
marketing issues. 
One of the striking differences between the logic of the two models is the 
treatment of monopolistic competition. Model 1 is based on the logic that 
movement towards a perfectly competitive market structure will increase 
performance, measured as the aggregate profit of firms. A structure in which firms 
exhibit monopoly or monopolistic competition is deemed 'market failure'. In stark 
contrast, achievement of such a position of distinctive competitive advantage is 
precisely the aim of the managers who behave similarly to Model 2, and this 
behaviour is well supported by management theory. As presented here, the two 
bodies of theory and professional practice are in conflict. Since considered and 
assertive policy prescriptions emerge from proponents of both theoretical 
perspectives, this lack of consistency between them is a source of confusion and 
potentially serious error in policy formation. Some form of resolution is required. 
The Land Based System Value Chain 
The system value chain is a concept that can assist in clarifying strategic 
relationships and issues. It was developed primarily as a tool for organisational 
strategic analysis - but has been extended to a system embraCing a sequence of 
organisations (Porter, 1985). A similar concept was established long ago in the 
agribusiness literature (Goldberg, 1968). Figure 2 provides two representative 
system value chains. Both are land based, but one is a model of a manufacturing 
system that culminates in either industrial usage or end-user consumption, while 
the other represents a fresh product system value chain. At first appraisal, these 
diagrams may seem to be no more than descriptions of channels or product flows. 
However, their interpretation is intended to go deeper than this. Each stage in a 
system comprises one or more firms that add net value by either further 
transforming products that are transferred from the adjacent upstream stage or by 
providing services that increase the value of these products. The firms at each 
stage operate in a definable macro environment and competitive arena specific to 
that stage. However, some macro environmental variables impact on multiple 
stages, and the 'nature of competition at any particular stage may be influenced by 
the strategies adopted by firms both upstream and downstream. 
The representative models in Figure 2 show the value-adding stages that are 
located in New Zealand (the home-base) and those located internationally. In 
general, a home-base system value chain may interface with multiple international 
value chains, corresponding to alternative geographical business locations and 
different value-adding transformation opportunities. 
The relationships between the value-adding activities of adjacent stages may range 
from open market transactions, through various forms of restricted trading, to full 
internalisation or integration. The 'perfectly competitive market' model referred to 
above corresponds to a system value chain with open market transactions between 
all stages and freedom of entry and exit at every stage. By contrast, the theory of 
transaction costs seeks to explain the logic of firms internalising the exchange 
processes between activity stages (Williamson, 1975). 
Strategic Objectives and Issues 
There is likely to be general agreement with Hussey (1992) that activities within 
land based industries should be managed and structured in order to maximise the 
'national interest'. This concept is not well defined but is a function of the wealth 
derived by New Zealand residents as returns to their land, effort and skills, and 
investments that are utilised in the system value chain, and through the multipliers 
triggered by activities in the system. 
Thus the crucial issue is to determine the strategies that will maximise the national 
interest. These strategies will exist at three levels. At the level of Government, 
initiatives and actions usually referred to as 'industry policy' are determined, 
ranging from intervention in particular value chain activities to the less direct 
influences of general economic and social policies. At the level of industries, which 
are sets of firms that have vested interests in their mutual interactions as either 
suppliers or buyers, strategies may be formed to achieve voluntarily a joint 
approach to certain tasks. The third level of strategy is developed and implemented 
by individual firms, within the environment established by Government industry 
policy, and voluntary joint industry activities. 
The problem of maximising the national interest from a land based value chain can 
be stated as follows: 
1. The goal is to maximise continuously a function of the wealth derived by 
New Zealand residents from participation in land ownership, provision of 
effort and skills, and investment, within a system value chain. 
2. The potential for attainment of this goal is determined by: 
a) The natural factor endowment of land and climate. 
b) Capabilities and capacities to develop continually the technical and 
managerial core competencies that provide, with the natural factor 
endowment and investment, the resources required to create wealth 
in competitive environments. 
c) Deployment of New Zealand investment to development of factor 
endowments and core competencies, and to establishing business 
operations at selected stages in the system value chain. 
It is clear that the business activities involved go well beyond the conventional 
perspectives of agricultural marketing. The focus must be on the management and 
organisation of businesses that will succeed in the international stages of land 
based system value chains. The key strategic issues to be addressed are: 
Issue 1: Selection of international industries in which to compete 
The reason for selection is that some industries are inherently more 
attractive than others (see Porter, 1985). Note the use of the term 
'industries' rather than 'markets', reflecting recognition of all 
competitive dynamics that extend beyond the buyer-seller 
relationship. Some international industries are multi-local; the arenas 
of competition are countries or distinct regions. Other industries are 
global in the sense that competition extends across national 
boundaries (see Yip, 1992). 
Issue 2: Selection of the stages in the system value chain to enter 
These decisions involve investment allocations and set limits on the 
strength of the competitive position that can be attained, and on 
profits. As firms invest further down system value chains, they tend 
to increase their ability to achieve competitive strength and larger 
profit margins are available to them, while prices become increaSingly 
stable. Other components of risk may increase. Offshore ventures 
may well include research and development activities as well as 
manufacturing and marketing. In some instances, capabilities will be 
leveraged into manufacturing and marketing products that use inputs 
that are sourced entirely offshore. 
Issue 3: Formation and implementation of strategies to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage in international 
competitive arenas 
This condition is characterised by the ability to achieve above-average 
profit performance over the long run in targeted industries. The reason 
for seeking above-average performance in international competition is 
that the alternative strategy of aiming for middling or below-average 
performance leads to declining business performance, as competitors 
are able to commit larger retained earnings to improve their relative 
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capabilities to deliver valued products and service to customers. 
Issue 4: Structure of firms within the system value chain, especially 
decisions to integrate vertically and horizontally via 
alliances, cooperative arrangements and mergers 
These decisions are driven by the requirement to have organisational 
structures that will support internationally competitive strategies. 
Customer requirements and competitive dynamics in the entire system 
value chain are relevant to these decisions. In New Zealand, as well 
as in other countries, Government policy influences the structure and 
strategy of firms. Current examples include statutory provision of 
single exporter status, facilitation of joint action groups, the influence 
of trade policy and trade negotiations. Obviously, Government 
interventions should be made in the context of their impact on the 
performance of firms in the entire international system value chain 
and should not be limited to just the home-base New Zealand stages 
and transactions. That is why reviews such as the ACIL report, which 
focus on domestic regulatory policy issues, are prone to missing the 
point. 
Issue 5: Return to New Zealand residents the economic rents that 
can be generated in both the domestic and international 
sectors of the system value chain 
Achievement of international competitive advantage and the resultant 
profit performance is not a sufficient criterion. In addition, the 
structure of business activities in the system value chain must provide 
sufficient management control and bargaining power to ensure that 
the distribution of profits to offshore interests is managed. This issue 
involves decisions about ownership of resources, the stages in which 
investment is made, and the bargaining power of the firms that are 
established in the system value chain. In practice, strategy often 
involves a trade-off between the improved international competitive 
performance that can be achieved through leveraging the participation 
of foreign firms and the extent to which these firms capture economic 
rents. 
Issue 6: Capacity of firms within the system value chain to engage 
in continuous innovation 
Firms must improve continuously their competitive position through 
innovation in products, processes and services and even through 
creation of entirely new market opportunities. Those that do not will 
eventually suffer declining performance as competitors achieve 
superior quality, lower cost positions and move to meet - or even form 
- new customer needs. Hamel and Prahalad (1993) call this approach 
to competitive strategy 'stretch and leverage'. The model shown in 
Figure 3 reflects the Hamel and Prahalad 'process' model of 
international competitiveness as well as concepts developed by 
Buckley, Pass, and Prescott (1990). It is being used currently by the 
writer and colleagues to analyse the determinants of competitive 
innovation ventures in land based international system value chains. 
The model proposes that competitive performance is interactive with 
managerial processes that are guided by stretch goals and strive to 
leverage resources. The processes generate sources of competitive 
advantage and are stimulated by them. Industry structure and 
organisational governance influences - positively or negatively - the 
processes that generate competitiveness. 
The results of strategic analysis and decisions at firm and industry levels, based on 
the above issues, will yield quite different strategies and organisational forms in 
different land based industries. This is because the determinants of competitive 
advantage and above-average performance differ according to the characteristics 
of buyers and competitors in international industries, and also due to the nature of 
interventions by foreign governments. Thus, the strategies and structures that are 
best for any particular system value chain are unique to that particular situation. 
Internationally competitive strategies and structures for, say, solid wood mouldings 
differ greatly from those for sawlogs. The key success factors for milk protein 
ingredient products are different to those for consumer whole milk powder. All of 
these examples differ from the approach that will yield greatest performance from 
marketing NewZealand fresh apples in Europe. Thus, the inference contained in the 
ACIL report (Hussey, 1992, p xxxii) that common solutions apply to all industries 
seems entirely misplaced. 
Theories of Multinational Enterprise 
Since some of the New Zealand firms engaged in land based international 
competition are multinational enterprises (MNE's) while many of their competitors 
also have this structure, it is surprising that the agricultural marketing debate has 
not utilised more theoretical and empirical evidence from this source. Time does not 
permi-t a review here, but it can be noted that the system value chain model 
discussed above is embraced by the broader and influential 'eclectic theory' due to 
Dunning (1981) and to the transnational organisational form discussed by Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (1989). 
Selected Specific Issues 
To conclude this presentation, the following are brief comments on selected issues 
raised by the ACIL report and other recent reviews of agricultural marketing. 
1 . Confusion of Industry Unattractiveness with Strategic 
Performance. Most participants in the ongoing debate concerning the 
performance of the NZ Kiwifruit Marketing Board have failed to distinguish 
between the profoundly unattractive and uncontrollable dynamics of the 
European fresh fruit competitive arena in 1992, from the competitive 
performance of the NZKMB. In fact, despite dismal financial results, the 
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competitive performance of the Board was well above the industry average. 
Tactical errors were apparently made, but the strategy itself proved to be 
quite robust. 
The Doubtful Logic of the Proposal for Many Small Exporters. 
Recent reviews, including the ACIL report and a report on kiwifruit marketing 
(Douglas and Burgess, 1992) have extolled the virtues of structures whereby 
the upstream part of the system value chain has many small exporters. The 
evidence advanced in support of this proposition is essentially the model of 
contestable entry and perfect competition. There are two problems with the 
proposal. First,it is based on the reasoning that benefits will arise due to the 
avoidance of the agency costs that are assumed to be incurred in larger 
organisations. The existence of these benefits is questionable because 
agency theory itself is based on doubtful assumptions. The corporate 
management literature demonstrates that the behaviour of managers and 
directors of well managed firms is likely to be substantially congruent with 
the objectives of owners. Management theory thus differs from the selfish 
personal interest assumption of agency theory. The second problem with 
small exporters is that they are unlikely to be capable of achieving 
competitive advantage in international markets that have relatively 
concentrated buyers sellers, which is a common condition. 
The Irony of Near Congruence Between Regulated and Fully-
Adjusted Contestable Structures. The NZ Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board and most of the businesses of the NZ Dairy Board have relatively 
strong international competitive positions and performance. This suggests 
that the strategies and corporate structure of these statutory single 
exporters are not greatly dissimilar from those that would eventually emerge 
if access to product were made freely contestable to New Zealand interests. 
If this is so, the national interest would actually be harmed by the process 
of fragmentation and subsequent re-integration that would occur if the 
statutory provisions were removed. On pragmatic grounds, the case for 
removal of the regulations would be difficult to sustain. 
The Pre-emptive Cross-Subsidy Threat. ACIL essentially dismiSS the 
threat to producer returns and the national interest if multinational 
companies such as Kraft-GF, Nestle and Dole were permitted to gain direct 
access to purchase from farmers and orchardists. The ACIL analysis is faulty 
because it ignores the opportunity that such buyers would have to adopt 
pre-emptive strategies that they would implement through their power to 
cross-subsidise internationally. Although this strategy would not be 
sustained indefinitely, it could be continued for long enough to erode the 
competencies of New Zealand bidders. These would not have the capacity 
to. compete successfully even though the multinational buyers would use 
their bargaining power to reduce prices paid to producers. 
5. Bundled Returns. ACIL's identification of the problem of bundled returns 
is quite valid. However, contrary to the inference made by ACIL, this is not 
a necessary artifact of the single-desk statute. Instead, it results from 
cooperative principles of governance that can exist in an unregulated 
environment as well. 
6. Loss of Unrewarded Strategic Options. A lesson from the process of 
State forest sales to foreign interests has been that the benefits of future 
strategic options in the utilisation of trees have been transferred to foreign 
owners, without sufficient compensation. This problem arises because 
strategic options may be undefinable at time of asset sale with the result 
that vendors are unable to press for their inclusion in the valuation process. 
Analogous sources of losses to the nation could occur through sale of other 
land based resources to offshore investors. 
Concluding Comments 
This paper has attempted to establish the following points: 
1. Two distinctively different models are being used in the 'agricultural 
marketing' debate. They are in conflict, which leads to confusion and the 
possibility of serious errors in policy formation. 
2. The use of the concept of the land based system value chain has been 
proposed, to provide a broader framework for analysis and the development 
of strategy. 
3. The strategic issues involved go well beyond the usual perspectives of 
agricultural marketing. The needed focus is on the management and 
organisation of businesses in international competitive arenas. Six key 
strategic issues were proposed. 
4. Different strategies and structures will emerge as optimal in different 
industries. The notion of a single common 'solution' is misplaced. 
5. The analysis of issues and development of strategy would benefit from 
greater utilisation of literature in the fields ofthe multinational enterprise and 
the management of competitive innovation. 
The professional groups involved in the debate should strive to develop a common 
base lor analysis and discussion, this avoiding their tendency to talk past each 
other. 
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SUMMARY 
The ongoing diScussion about the role of producer boards in New Zealand is 
characterised by different theoretical approaches, and is dependent on descriptions 
of structure and behaviour to indicate performance. The reasons why producers 
seek to invest and vertically integrate into the marketing channel for their 
products is described. Legislative support for this activity has lead to the 
development of producer marketing boards which are seen to provide wider social 
benefits. Some of the key issues in the discussion about the performance of the 
boards are detailed, and the wider range of social responsibilities are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of agricultural marketing boards in the development of agricultural 
industries has been the topic of ongoing debate and discussion at these and other 
meetings. Despite the number of papers which have been presented and reports 
prepared there still seems to be a wide divergence of opinion, and policies have 
changed little. The fact that policies have not changed in the face of the 
widespread deregulation which has occurred in other sectors of the economy is 
often seen as a testimony to the success of the organisations. However, the 
discussion has continued if not increased in recent years with little new evidence 
or finn concluSions being reached. 
At one level the discussion can be seen as a difference of opinion between the 
economists' perspectives of efficiency, and marketing managers view of the 
control needed to develop markets effectively. For example, the discussion at the 
1991 Large Herds Dairy Conference and the papers presented by Spring (1991) 
and Kerr (1991) appear to be discussing the same topic from widely different 
viewpoints. Spring focuses mainly on the nature of the international market and 
the structural aspects of the New Zealand Dairy Board which would suggest that 
it is performing efficiently. Kerr uses more specific economic arguments to 
suggest that certain components of the current structures are leading to an 
inefficient allocation of resources and thus poor performance. 
These differences are reflected in a number of other studies. Douglas and 
Burgess (1992) use specific evidence of poor performance in the Kiwifruit 
marketing to suggest that inefficiencies created by monopoly marketing are more 
costly than commercial profits. A recent paper by Schroder, Wallace and 
Malvondo (1993) use structural arguments to suggest that the growth of 
international networks reflects successful marketing performance with the Dairy 
Board. Probably the most recent report is that produced by ACIL (1993) in 
which sophisticated arguments are developed to identify distortions and 
inefficiencies which exist in the current structures. While suggestions are made 
for changes to the current structures which might improve performance there is 
little finn evidence on the performance of these organisations that would suggest 
any dramatic change in government policy. 
Although these reports and papers have all contributed to the discussion and 
provided a wealth of descriptive and anecdotal evidence, there does not appear to 
be any clear consensus or evidence for change. This is probably not surprising 
considering that all of these papers are forced into the situation of looking at the 
structure and conduct of the organisations from which the performance can only 
be implied. Even statutory reviews such as that of the Kiwifruit Marketing Board 
in 1991 do not seem to be able to provide any clear evidence or indications of 
performance which might provide an ongoing means of evaluating the success of 
structures. Not surprisingly, the statutory and exclusive nature of organisations 
such as single selling marketing boards makes any single obvious measure such as 
profitability impossible to measure. The reliance on structure and conduct 
measures to assess performance has obvious difficulties, but perhaps the more 
interesting difficulty is the divergence between economic principles and business 
management practices which is so often a part of the discussion. 
In my own writings on the topic I have attempted to take neutral stance which 
would lead to a more careful evaluation of all of the arguments and developments 
which have occurred. In this paper I will try and review some of the basic 
theoretical constraints involved and use arguments which reflect both the 
marketing and economic theory components. In the next section I will review 
basic reasons why producers have become involved in the marketing channel for 
their products and consider why different products (including non-agricultural 
products) have evolved different marketing channels. Following this I will review 
some of the specific issues which I feel should be included in a more rigorous 
treatment of the problem. While this will not lead to any fInn conclusion or 
strong suggestions for policy change, it may help in clarifying some of the 
arguments which are commonly put. 
PRODUCER INVOLVEMENT IN MARKETING 
In any business sector, the decision about whether to invest in downstream or 
upstream activities has always been a difficult one, and forms the basis of a 
considerable literature on marketing channel decision making. In principal, the 
decision that a manufacturer faces in deciding whether or not to invest in a 
distribution rrrrn is related to a farmers decision about supporting a marketing 
board. While this linkage may not be obvious at first, the key similarity is that 
they are both decisions about integration and changing investment in the 
marketing channel for a product. In considering why a producer would want to 
invest in a marketing channel it is logical and obvious to consider the literature on 
vertical integration. This is a complicated literature and has both economic and 
management implication which in recent years have become integrated through 
concepts such as agency and contract theory. 
At the simplest level, fIrms making vertical integration decisions trade off the 
investment in the marketing channel with the perceived benefits in terms of risks 
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and returns. The cOncept of transactions costs has also shown that there is more 
than jUst market prices and costs involved. For example, firms may consider the 
costs associated with time and managerial involvement, and receive returns in the 
form of information and decision-making flexibility. These factors obviously 
have implicit costs and benefits but they are typically not included in any standard 
economic analysis. Integration or investment in a market place can take many 
forms. For example, the decision of a farmer to sell product on consignment 
reflects such trade-offs. In this case the farmer trades off the simplicity of a 
farm-gate transaction with the risks and potential returns involved in hiring a firm 
as an agent to represent them in the market place. Viewed from this perspective 
it can be seen that there are very wide range of alternative means for an 
individual firm to develop complex contractual arrangements which involve 
varying degrees of integration with the market place. The fact that these 
arrangements can and do occur is a part of a good business practice would throw 
considerable doubt on the sometimes heard statement that farmers should have no 
involvement in agricultural marketing. 
As well as vertical integration, individual firms can also form implicit contracts 
with other similar firms operating at the same level in the marketing channel. 
Such horizontal integration will in some cases have implications for the marketing 
behaviour of the firm, and in this paper I would like to discuss two forms of this 
integration in more detail. 
Cooperatives 
The cooperative form of business structure is common in practice, but is often not 
clearly defined in the literature. Perhaps one of the most useful definitions that I 
have come across is that a cooperative is a form of horizontal integration with the 
objective of vertical integration. This distinction is important because it clearly 
separates it from other common business structures such as partnerships and 
suggests at least some source of financial advantage. It would appear that at least 
from the producers point of view, the formation of a cooperative structure is an 
alternative to undertaking such integration themselves. The individual firm is 
seeking to make an investment in the market place while minimising the 
transaction costs and seeking any economies of size which may exist in that 
investment. It is obvious that these investments could be made without the use of 
a cooperative structure but these have at least been seen historically as a highly 
effective means of making such investments. 
Although many cooperatives undertake a wide range of business activity, the fact 
that most cooperatives have started from very focused activity such as input 
purchasing, produce packing, and marketing and processing, would lend support 
to the vertical integration motive. It should also be noted that the financial 
structure of cooperatives which tend to link profits with payments for inputs or 
outputs is also similar to the transfer pricing problem which occurs within a large 
integrated fInn. The financial aspects of cooperatives are discussed further in a 
later section of this paper. 
Industry Associations 
Industry or trade associations are very common and exist in almost all industries. 
They also represent a form of horizontal cooperation or integration between 
firms, but they differ in that they are not so clearly linked to vertical integration. 
The associations provide benefits to individual firms through a range of activities 
which appear to have considerable economies of size but low capital outlays. In a 
recent article on industry associations in New Zealand, Enderwick and Wilson 
(1992) show that such groups are typically involved in a wide range of activities. 
In order of the time spent on activities they list; dissemination of information, 
setting industry standards, making representations to government, market research 
and planning, data collection, providing training and skills, and product 
development. They also noted that these activities do not seem to those which 
were suggested by the report of report where it was stated that industry 
associations had a major role to play in the development of New Zealand export 
industries. 
In the report it was suggested that these organisations should have a greater role 
to play in the coordination and improving of competition, but there are some key 
characteristics of industry associations which have made it unlikely for them to 
play such a proactive role in industry development. The first characteristic is that 
many of the benefits from activities such as information sharing and 
representation rely on them being representative of the industry concerned. 
Secondly, the fact that they are voluntary organisations means that they must 
continue to demonstrate to members that there are positive benefits from 
membership. Because they are normally funded from subscriptions or voluntary 
levies they are constrained to undertaking activities which involve low capital 
investment or have clear mutual benefits to all members of the industry. There is 
clearly a trade-off between activities which require a high level of representation, 
and those which require a large level of financial investment and possibly 
disproportionate benefits to members. It is not surprising then that Enderwick 
and Wilson noted that the major constraint on the expansion of activities for these 
associations was financial resources. 
- Industry associations can have a major role to play in providing particular 
marketing services for individual firms but it would appear that their role is 
limited by the voluntary nature of the organisations. Thus, it is not surprising 
that there are frequent calls for legislation or the creation of compulsory levies to 
increase their effectiveness. Voluntary associations which attempt to make 
substantial investments in marketing activities frequently have problems with 
individual fInns who wish to free-ride in the raising of funds, and enforcing 
product standards or marketing behaviour. 
In terms of agency theory the costs of maintaining such an association can be 
high, and strategies such as the creation of exclusive brands are commonly used 
to overcome such problems. Legislation which enforces participation in an 
industry association will obviously reduce the agency costs associated with 
maintaining a voluntary organisation. For this reason it is not uncommon to find 
these organisations petitioning government for the right to impose levies on 
members of an industry. While this can occur in any industry it appears to be 
particularly prevalent in agricultural industries around the world, and New 
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Zealand has recently followed other countries in creating general legislation which 
allows agricultural groups to levy their members where there is sufficient 
producer support. 
Legislation 
The commodity levy legislation allows industry groups with sufficient support to 
levy their members for specific purposes such as promotion and research, but 
other more specific legislation creating producer marketing boards, has embodied 
far more extensive powers. It is not always clear why such legislation is 
prevalent in agricultural industries, but arguments based on public goods and 
market failure are typically used to justify such intervention. Other commentators 
have argued that rent-seeking behaviour on behalf of producers has been the 
driving force behind the legislation, but I have concern with this argument. Rent 
seeking is a phenomenon which is common to all industries, but its prevalence in 
agriculture suggests that there is a more fundamental belief amongst producers 
and government that social benefits can be gained from such legislation. The 
simple rent-seeking argument also lacks support because many of these bodies do 
not fully utilise the powers which have been created under their legislation. This 
would suggest that individual producers do have some concept of the most 
appropriate type and level of marketing activity rather than simply arguing for the 
maximum level of central control in an industry. As we have seen in the past, 
producers exert influence over marketing strategies through their monitoring 
activities and election of officers. This has often resulted in considerable debate 
about level and uses of levies, and the assumption of powers such as single 
selling. 
The fact that producers in an industry would wish to seek legislative control over 
their members is not sufficient justification for those rights to be granted, and 
typically arguments based on more general social benefits are required. It is 
apparent that governments are prepared to do this both in their producer board 
legislation, and other forms of industry support. In New Zealand this is normally 
argued on the need to generate overseas earnings. This argument would appear 
to be further supported in the Commerce Act which allows particular types of 
business behaviour in the national interest. 
The existence and form of these social benefits must be the primary justification 
for legislative intervention, but unfortunately this perspective has often been lost 
in discussions about whether producers benefit from the legislation. Producer 
benefits are obviously important, but the implications of such policies can often 
extend beyond this. 
It has been argued that producers have a right to control any activity which 
influences the marketing of their products, and although this is obvious in the 
case of voluntary organisations, it is not at all clear in the case of compulsory 
membership or legislation. While there might be some argument that producers 
have the right to tax themselves for purposes such as promotion, research, and 
even investment or trading activities, there would appear to be no case for them 
having the right to influence the property rights of other individuals or firms. 
There is a major distinction between producer boards which raise funds from 
their members and those which undertake activities such as licensing or single 
selling because in these latter institutions they have the ability to influence the 
rights of people who are not represented by the body itself. While the transition 
from generic marketing and market intervention to licensed exporters may appear 
to be straight forward and logical for producers, the political and social 
implications for property rights are more substantial. 
This brief overview describes how the logical business behaviour of producers 
investing in the market structure has manifested itself in a number of ways. It 
was shown that opportunities extend well beyond individual firms, and include 
opportunities for joint activity through cooperative firms, or industry-wide bodies. 
The agency theory arguments suggest why it is logical for producers to seek 
legislative support for some particular types of integration. 
An understanding of why structures and different business forms exist, and their 
role in the strategy of the individual firm is vital. If we were able to understand 
why producers in the wool industry have resisted high levels of centralised 
control and have adopted quite different strategies to that of dairy or apple 
producers, then we may gain a better understanding of the benefits from such 
activity. It is not caused by any fundamental differences in the producers 
themselves, or their business capabilities, but is undoubtedly linked to more basic 
factors such as the nature of the market and the products themselves. 
The fact that producers attempt to control and invest in the marketing channel for 
their products is not surprising. It is also efficient for them to form 
representative organisations and seek legislation to assist in this activity. 
However, this legislation and its impact on property rights, has focused attention 
on the economic benefits and marketing performance of producer boards. In the 
following section several key issues in this discussion are considered in more 
detail. 
KEY ISSUES 
Rather than reviewing all of the arguments for and against marketing boards, I 
have chosen to identify some specific theoretical issues which highlight the 
difficulties involved in assessing the performance of such organisations. 
Benefits from Single Sellers 
The debate over producer intervention in marketing channels has frequently 
focused on the benefits or costs associated with single selling marketing 
organisations. In an earlier paper I have traversed many of the economic 
arguments which show that from a theoretical point of view there are potential 
gains from the centralised control of exports in a market Zwart (1988). The 
theory of price discrimination is well understood by economists and shows that 
equating marginal revenues rather than prices across market segments can lead to 
higher average returns. Because total production is not controlled, these benefits 
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are not monopoly rents, but rely on influencing the market allocation and product 
mix decisions within the industry. 
In the ACIL (1992) report it is demonstrated that such benefits are likely to be 
small except for the obvious cases such as capturing the rent from voluntary 
quotas. While an empirical debate may continue, it is clear that some potential 
aggregate benefits do exist and could be captured by single selling marketing 
boards. Even industries (such as meat industry) which do not have a single 
selling organisation appear to have set up structures which control and regulate 
the flows to particular markets in an attempt to capture such benefits. 
When it comes to using marketing or strategic management theory to suggest why 
single selling should exist, the case is less clear. In a competitive industry, firms 
would normally choose their own size and structure through very extensive 
monitoring and development of appropriate strategies for particular markets. This 
would include a wide range of distribution channel structures and variable sized 
businesses which pursue independent strategies, and the theory would not assume 
that complete control over a distribution channel is appropriate or advantageous. 
As noted by Schroder, Wallace and Malvondo (1993), the internal structure and 
marketing activities of the New Zealand Dairy Board would appear to reflect 
many of these realities. The board has made substantial investments in the 
distribution channel and trades in a wider range of products. While this structure 
may emulate that of a multi national agribusiness firm, the management theory 
tells us little about the constraints which may be imposed by the exclusive nature 
of the organisation. 
From a management perspective, flexibility and choice of distribution channel are 
seen to be important in the development of appropriate strategies for each firm. 
However, with producer ownership, the opportunity for individual firms to use 
complex contractual arrangements to spread the risks associated with investment 
in the distribution system is constrained. Under highly controlled marketing 
systems farmers are often placed in a position of making investments or owning 
assets in order to control the distribution channel which may be less than optimal. 
For example, it had been argued in recent years that cooperative ownership of 
meat ownership would benefit meat producers, and yet the excess capacity which 
exists has meant that growers themselves have borne the financial burdens 
associated with these investments. The rapid growth of smaller, and in some 
cases privately owned processing firms,would suggest that they are certainly 
competitive with solely farmer owned organisations. 
As noted previously, the appropriate form of channel investment is at best 
unclear. Perhaps the clearest evidence that I have been ab~,. '. cover comes 
from the PIMS study of international firms (Buzzel & Gal /YtJ.) The data base 
for the study comes from the independent business units in ae range of multi 
national rmns. The simple evidence presented in figure 1 would suggest that 
firms which forward integrate into the marketing channel are less likely to be 
successful than those which integrate into downstream activities. While no 
detailed argument is presented as to why this might be the case, it would not be 
inconsistent with general marketing theory which suggests that firms more clearly 
oriented to consumer requirements are most likely to be successful. 
Figure 1: Profitability and Vertical Integration 
Forward 
Integration 
Products 
International food markets have changed dramatically in the past twenty years, 
and have themselves developed more sophisticated strategies for the marketing of 
food products. While cause and effect is not clear, they have undoubtedly 
become more concentrated and reliant on programmed purchasing of perishable 
and processed food products. These firms have developed strategies for 
providing consumers with a continuous flow of products whose supplies vary by 
time and location. The strategies of many of our producer boards reflect these 
demands, in the sophisticated distribution channels which they have developed 
and through trading in a range of products beyond those produced in New 
Zealand. However, their major competitors in supplying retailers are many times 
larger, and have far more flexibility in the products that they access. Multi 
_ national agribusiness firms are truly backward integrated and are more specialised 
in the business of meeting consumers' food needs. To continue to operate in this 
environment New Zealand food exporting organisations may have to become 
increasingly global in terms of the range of products offered, or alternatively find 
some means of integrating with other multi-national firms. 
From this discussion it can be seen that there is potential conflict between 
producer-owned organisations which attempt to capture the highest returns for 
New Zealand products through grower investment and control, and allowing 
greater investment and freedom of opportunity for rmns, outside traditional 
agriculture, and perhaps New Zealand, to playa role. In many ways, the factors 
involved in this trade off are not dissimilar from those involved in the more 
general debate about foreign investment in New Zealand, and will have similar 
emotional and political implications. 
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Unbundling and Cooperatives 
The recent report by ACIL (1992) provides probably the most comprehensive and 
public review of agricultural marketing that has been available in New Zealand 
for some years. As a part of this review they have brought forward an argument 
based on the pooling of returns from price discrimination. It was shown that 
where prices differ in particular markets as a result of price discrimination there 
will be over production and the maximum benefits will not be captured from a 
market place. I feel that these arguments deserve more careful scrutiny, and 
perhaps adaptation to a more general framework or treatment. 
In figure 2 the basic model used in the report is reproduced. It is shown that in a 
market where there are distinctive demands and individual prices are set in each 
market, but pooled for payment to producers, then growers will produce at a 
quantity where the marginal revenue from a market is less than the cost of 
production. In such a case, it is argued that reducing production to the point 
where marginal cost equals marginal revenue from the market will increase 
producer revenue. This argument appears logical and basic, but the interpretation 
has been influenced by this specific demand conditions assumed. In this diagram 
it is assumed that there are only two markets, one of which has an inelastic 
demand, and the other a perfectly elastic demand at what is assumed to be the 
world price. This diagram would most commonly be used where there is a 
voluntary quota and the returns from that quota are pooled for payment to all 
producers. In the diagram this is represented by point A where producers receive 
the pool price P eqm and produce quantities Qeqm. At this level of output producers 
are able to capture benefits from the higher priced market and it is correct to 
observe that the price producers receive is certainly higher than the world price 
(P~ which is the marginal revenue from the market place. 
From this point it is argued that if production could be restricted to <4, or point 
D on the diagram, then producers would be better off because the marginal cost 
of production would equal the marginal revenue. This could be done by ensuring 
that returns from the high priced market were not returned directly to the 
producer in the form of a pool payment, but were paid in some other manner 
equivalent to a return on investment. While this argument is sound, it is not 
sufficient to suggest that the payment of pooled returns will always lead to over 
production, or that they are always inefficient. 
Figure 2: Price Pooling 
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In figUre 3 a more general diagram of the returns from price discrimination and 
pooling is presented. This diagram is taken from an earlier paper by Martin and 
Zwart (1988). The demand curve represents the return from a market where the 
same price is charged in each market. It is equivalent to PE in figure 2, but is a 
downward sloping demand curve. The line AR is also equivalent to that shown 
in figure 2 and represents the pooled return from price discrimination activity. It 
was shown in Martin and Zwart that equating marginal revenues across all 
markets will result in an average return higher than when prices are equated, but 
that this return is asymtotic to the demand curve. 
This model can be used to show that producers are better off to operate at point 
A using price discrimination than under a purely competitive market or (point D') 
because they are able to produce a large quantity and receive a higher return for 
the quantity. While point D' appears to be similar to the most desirable point in 
figure 2 (D) there is a difference. The main difference is that the marginal 
revenue in the market is well below the competitive price which would be 
received. In fact, this is the case in any competitive market where there is a 
downward sloping demand curve. 
It would be correct to observe that for any agricultural industry in New Zealand 
the marginal revenue from the market place is well below the market price, and 
in some cases would be negative at competitive market prices. There appears to 
be some confusion between the competitive outcome (point D') and the 
discriminating monopolist outcome (D in figure 3). Because marginal revenue 
lies below the downward sloping demand it is certainly true that producers would 
be better off by restricting production to <l,p., but this level of production control 
is not normally justified nor recommended on economic grounds. 
The more generalised analysis would show that in terms of producer returns, 
single selling and price pooling is superior to competitive markets, but not as 
profitable as price discrimination with production control. This point has not 
been lost in some of the industries concerned, and is reflected in policies such as 
moratoriums on dairy production and special charges for new entrants to 
industries, all of which have been the topic of considerable debate. Hussey's 
model does show clearly that in cases where there are rents from voluntary 
restraints, or returns on the capital invested, then these should be returned in a 
different manner. 
Voluntary restraints have become an increasingly important part of the 
agricultural trading environment and in the case of dairy production in New 
Zealand probably represent a significant part of producers' income. What is less 
clear, is how these returns could be "unbundled" from growers' prices, and I am 
not aware of any cases where this is done in a satisfactory manner. The most 
common theoretical means for doing this is to tender the access rights to the 
quota, but in this case the returns are normally made to the government. This is 
certainly not unrealistic as it can be argued that the social benefits from the 
preferential access lie with the tax-payers in general rather than the producers. 
In the ACIL report it is argued that the other major form of pooling comes from 
including returns from other products and capital investments in farm prices. 
This is certainly the case with the single selling marketing orj~anisations in New 
Zealand but it is also an equivalent problem in almost all cooperative firms. The 
fact that cooperatives have complicated capital structures which often make it 
difficult to separate product returns from capital returns is of concern to 
economists and financial analysts, but as noted in the earlier section there are 
other strategic and transaction cost reasons why they might exist. Certainly, their 
prevalence in agriculture markets around the world and their ability to compete 
with firms with more conventional capital structures cannot be ignored. 
In the earlier section of the paper it was suggested that marketing boards have 
evolved for different reasons and in a different manner than cooperative firms, 
but that they do share many common characteristics. The capital structures of 
these organisations have come under increasing focus in recent years and pose 
problems beyond those of pooled prices. For example, the problem of asset 
ownership and past investment are frequently handled inadequately, and the 
significance of these problems has been acknowledged by specialists in 
cooperative management. In a recent report prepared for the New Zealand 
Agricultural Cooperative Association, Parnell (1992) raised concerns about asset 
structures and returns on capital for cooperative firms. 
The main point to be made here is that the problems in managing preferential 
access and returns to capital go beyond the issues of pooled returns and price 
discrimination. In more general terms, pooling of prices from different market 
segments is a common business practice and is itself not sufficient justification to 
limit single selling. 
Performance Measures 
One theoretical issue which still appears to be unresolved is how to measure 
performance at the aggregate level of agricultural marketing. Many observers 
make judgements based on growth of an industry, price trends, level of 
diversification and product development, and the extent of market channel 
development. Unfortunately many of these measures are influenced by changes in 
- market conditions which can occur rapidly and lead to hurriedly revised opinions. 
Even in this past year there have seen substantial changes in market conditions 
which have occurred quickly, and led to considerable reevaluation of marketing 
structures. Even more sophisticated measures such as growth in market share or 
aggregate value added are suspectable to changes in domestic production or policy 
decisions of producer boards. 
In recent years there has been an increasing emphasis on competitiveness of 
industries and there seems to be a growing desire to categorise industries and 
identify successful strategies. The process in itself does not seem to be 
particularly fruitful especially with a government which has a stated policy of 
avoiding the picking of winners. What is more important is that the producers 
themselves, or their organisations, have a clear means of measuring the success 
of individual strategic decisions and investments. This can only come through 
ensuring access of all organisations to top level management and financial 
reporting. 
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Other attempts at measuring performance consisted of comparing FOB returns per 
kilogram of exports over a number of industries and countries. This was based 
on the argument that exporters in a number of countries face similar market 
conditions and opportunities for product development and that the value per unit 
of product exported might reflect their performance. The initial data reported in 
Zwart and Moore (1990) suggested that there was no obvious comparative 
advantage to New Zealand agricultural marlceting nor to particular industries 
within New Zealand. The enthusiasm with which this information was debated 
might suggest that there is some value in exploring such international comparisons 
with more detailed analysis. It is unlikely that there is any single measure of 
success in a market place, but in the absence of normal measures such as a return 
on investment or some equivalent it will prove difficult to make any strong 
statements about competitiveness or performance. 
The rapidly growing literature on strategic groups and taxonomies suggests that 
there is no single best way to approach a particular marlcet place, and that 
individual firms will seek their own source of comparative advantage which will 
ensure the financial viability of the firm. Perhaps there is something to be gained 
from this literature by focusing more on the viability, and risks faced by the farm 
firm rather than the marketing activity or structure of the producer organisations. 
It is also important to avoid being distracted by the apparent level of disharmony 
which may exist within an industry. It appears that in New Zealand, industries 
such as wool and meat have high level of debate and discussion about the 
performance of marketing firms and activities undertaken by the marketing 
organisations, but this does not imply any lack of success on behalf of those 
industries. In fact, the critical evaluation and judgements which are being made 
may prove to be more valuable in the longer term. . 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The discussion in this paper has shown that producer involvement in marketing is 
driven by the need for the individual firms to become vertically integrated in the 
marketing channels for their products. These investments are logical and easily 
justified as a part of sound business management practice. Horizontal integration 
between firms is also a common practice across most business sectors and can 
provide vital support for marlceting activities. Around the world such 
organisations have played an active role in agricultural marlceting, and have 
frequently sought government legislation to support these activities and overcome 
free-riding problems. This legislative support however, brings with it social 
responsibilities both to producers and taxpayers. 
In the changing economic and regulatory environment in New Zealand these 
social implications have been increasingly questioned by firms outside the 
industry as well as by producers themselves. The theoretical discussion has 
largely focused on the potential benefits of the organisations for the producers 
concerned, but the different theoretical approaches and the measurement problems 
continue to make this a difficult task. 
The management in these organisations have expressed concern about the effort 
and resources involved in the justification of their role, but this is likely to 
continue. Voluntary organisations are responsible to their members and must 
continue to justify their existence but producer boards have responsibility to both 
their members and to the society which created the legislation. For this reason it 
is important that boards accept these responsibilities and provide information 
which will allow their performance to be monitored. 
It is also likely that the changing marlceting environment will lead producers to 
question existing strategies or consider alternatives for their investment in the 
market place. These changes should not be seen as threatening, but rather as a 
sign of growing business maturity and acceptance of personal responsibility, 
which is consistent with other developments in the New Zealand economy. 
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A SOLE MARKETING AUTHORITY: PREDICI1NG THE CONSEQUENCES 
Frank Scrimgeour 
Department of Economics, University of Waikato, Hamilton 
SUMMARY 
The role of Statutory Marketing Authorities has long been discussed in the 
economics literature. Despite the numerous critiques of such arrangements they have 
been surprisingly resilient. In New Zealand in the 1990s there is a renewed 
questioning of the appropriateness of such arrangements. However the debate has 
polarised, without adequate discussion of the consequences of such reform. A clear 
understanding of the impacts of reform is necessary if reforms are to become reality. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the consequences of deregulating an industry 
with a Sole Marketing Authority. 
Key words: monopoly, deregulation, efficiency, incentives 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural product markets are subjects to significant fluctuations due to the 
characteristics of agricultural supply and demand such as inelastic demand and supply 
in the short run, a history of significant technological ad,;,ance, and elastic supply 
in the long run. As a result of fluctuating agricultural prices and declining real prices 
for some products, regulations have been imposed on many agricultural product 
markets. The value and effectiveness of these regulations has long been questioned 
in the literature but the issues have resurfaced in recent years with the publication in 
1992 of the ACIL Report on agricultural marketing in New Zealand, the depressed 
Kiwifruit market, and the current proposal to deregulate the domestic apple market. 
Proposals for deregulation of agricultural markets have come and gone but 
regulations have been persistent despite deregulation occurring in other sectors of the 
economy . .In part this is due to the marketing efforts of the existing institutions and 
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in part because farmers have not been persuaded that reform would increase their 
Incomes. 
The significance of the ACIL report was that it argued that "Producers will be the 
major direct beneficiaries of regulatory reform in agricultural marketing" (ACIL, 
1992). This assessment has not been refuted or conceded by farm leaders which 
suggests that it is appropriate to look more closely at the impact of deregulating 
agricultural markets. 
This paper seeks to provide an initial assessment of the impact on farmers of partial 
deregulation of an industry with a Sole Marketing Authority (SMA) to allow the 
possibility of additional exporters as new entrants (NE) so that the SMA becomes a 
Joint Marketing Authority (JMA). It does not assume the dismantling, evolution, 
modification or replacement of the existing marketing structures. It only assumes that 
other agents are free to compete with the existing marketing structures. 
However, the paper does recognise that the regulatory regime has a significant effect 
on the development of competition, and innovation. This significantly impacts the 
rate and nature of technological change and the rate of productivity growth. Hence, 
this paper argues that the regulatory regime is as important as the institutional 
structure in achieving efficient outcomes. 
RATIONALE 
The advantages of competitive markets have been spelled out in the literature since 
Adam Smith. However generations of farmers, officials and economists who have 
grown used to market interference fail to be convinced that deregulated agricultural 
markets will increase farm returns. To the extent that industries with Sole Marketing 
Authorities succeed, it is argued that they succeed because of the SMA - to the extent 
that such industries fail it is argued that it is in spite of the assistance of the SMA, 
and the industry would be worse off without it. 
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Recent arguments that Sole Marketing Authorities can not be regarded as optimal 
marketing structures have drawn strong criticism from the existing SMAs and their 
supporters. Fears, both well founded and unfounded, have meant the continuing 
debate is more characterised by heat than light: 
The optimists argue that farmers (in aggregate) would be better off as a result of 
reform. The argument is that appropriate signals to producers, processors and 
marketing managers will result in appropriate farm and Eilfarm production from 
farms and factories, plus appropriate marketing activity using the appropriate level 
of capital at each stage in the chain from farm gate to market so that products of the 
appropriate quality are produced to maximise profits. Appropriate signals and greater 
accountability resulting from the changes would result in higher productivity growth. 
By way of contrast the pessimists argue that New Zealand farmers will become 
peasant farmers, divided amongst themselves and pitted against the multinationals. 
The gloomy picture is one of lower incomes and depressed agriculture. 
Which of these pictures is the most accurate? What would happen to farmer income 
and wealth if new entrants were able to compete against a SMA so that it was no 
longer a SMA but just a JMA of those who choose to stay with the remaining pooled 
marketing arrangements? This paper seeks to investigate the impact of such 
deregulation by predicting the likely response of new entrants and the JMA to the 
new deregulated market structure. 
HISTORY 
Throughout the world sole marketing authorities exist for both agricultural and non-
agricultural products. Locally there is the NZ Dairy Board and the NZ Kiwifruit 
Marketing Board and the NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board which are each 
characterised by different farming systems, products, and markets. However they all 
. have monopoly export rights. Different forms of SMAs exist throughout the world, 
particularly in the third world and the former Soviet Bloc. Some are State Trading 
Agencies while others are at arms length from government. Campbell and Fisher 
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(1991) perhaps assuming government intervention in agricultural market comment 
"many governments ... still prefer to sponsor producer controlled marketing boards 
rather than engage in price-support operations themselves". 
However in the international market place these SMAs must compete with other 
SMAs and competitive firms such as Nestle and Chiquita. SMAs may have monopoly 
power in terms of domestic supply, but they market products in competitive markets. 
Such authorities are often criticised because of the distortions they create and the 
resulting inefficiencies. Criticism usually derives from them being legislated 
monopolies. The criticism is multiplied in the case of monopolies that have monopoly 
power in terms of marketing product but no power to control the quantity of product 
that is produced. 
Despite the criticisms SMAs are often vigorously and successfully defended by the 
SMAs themselves and by farmers. This defence is quite remarkable given the 
corportisation and privatisation of larger parts of the public sector. In part this may 
relate to their history. 
At least two of the SMAs in New Zealand have in essence been around for seventy 
years with the Dairy Industry Control Board established in 1923 and the Fruit Export 
Control Board in 1926. Over this period not only has production and marketing 
_ systems been revolutionised but also information and communication technology has 
advanced dramatically. This suggests that even those who are convinced SMAs have 
made a glorious contribution to New Zealand of history should not assume they are 
appropriate for the future. This process of critical evaluation is important given that 
"once an institution like a marketing board is established, there is considerable 
reluctance to dispense with it even if superior alternatives exist. This inertia is 
associated both with concerns about the costs of change and about the loss of special 
advantages a select group of producers may suffer if new marketing arrangements are 
established" (Campbell and Fisher, 1991). 
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ARGUMENTS FOR SOLE MARKETING AUTHORITIES 
The case for SMAs has long been made in endeavours to maintain or increase the 
level and stability of farm incomes. "Proponents of single desk selling arrangements 
try to justify them on one or more of several grounds. They include, for example, the 
opportunity to extract price premia in some markets, the need to countervail buying 
power, the need to undertake product promotion, the preference of some centralised 
importing agencies to deal with a statutory authority and the need to assure quality" 
(Piggott, 1992). 
Monopoly power 
It is argued that a single seller overcomes the problems of New Zealand farmers 
competing against themselves and as a result SMAs obtain price premia. "The 
essence of the price premia argument for single-desk selling arrangements is that 
through controlling the flow of exports to a particular market....higher prices can be 
obtained than those obtained in the absence of a single-seIler arrangement (piggott, 
1992). This is consistent with the argument that "if a country exports a product which 
faces an inelastic demand curve by the rest of the world it will be to its advantage 
to exploit its position by the imposition of, say, export taxes" (Scobie, 1973). 
Ouality standards 
Demand for any product is very sensitive to the consistent quality of the product 
supplied. It is often argued that the existence of a SMA guarantees that consumers 
consistently get high quality produce and that New Zealand does not lose market 
share to another country as might happen if one New Zealand exporter sold inferior 
produce which spoiled the reputation of all New Zealand product. 
full!ity 
Farmers as individuals have no market power. In this context it appears that they 
have some market power if they act together. To ensure cooperation and facilitate the 
. cohesion of the group it is argued that farmers should get equivalent returns for their 
farm produce even if it ends up in different products, or markets. 
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOLE MARKETING AUTHORITIES 
The arguments in favour of SMAs have not gone uncontested. The evidence that 
SMAs exert monopoly power, maintain quality and ensure a fair return for farmers 
is at best mixed. 
No monopoly power 
Numerous authors argue that SMAs do not in fact have any monopoly power. "There 
are doubts about whether Australian agricultural commodities fulfil the necessary 
requirements which allow export controls to achieve market power premiums on 
overseas markets" (Industry Commission, 1991). While generally sellers might have 
limited power in export markets, there may be particular markets where they do. 
However this will depend on the characteristics of different markets such as whether 
there are alternative sources of supply. The probability of premia being attained is 
low given that empirical evidence suggests "New Zealand is a small country whose 
aggregate price elasticity of demand for exports can be taken as infinity for 
subsequent empirical analyses" (Scobie, 1973). 
Monopoly costs 
Furthermore even if SMAs can generate export premia the achievement of these 
premia is not costless. "Export licensing or single-desk selling themselves can impose 
costs, since they limit market entry and can prevent competitive pressure from 
ensuring that sales into premium markets are undertaken at least cost. Administering 
and policing export controls also are not costiess. Thus the objective of capturing a 
market power premium on export markets through controls on competitive access 
would only be sound if any extra costs imposed by those controls were less than the 
extra income obtained" (Industry Commission, 1991). "It is possible that artificially 
created monopoly may be detrimental to continuing efficiency ..... Lack of competition 
can discourage initiative and breed complacency with respect to such matters as 
innovations in transportation, economies in handling and the development of new 
markets (Campbell and Fisher, 1991). Public support is a problem to the extent that 
it raises expectations of Government bailouts and so distorts risk evaluation. 
Inefficiency is a problem in terms of both efficiency and equity in that the efficient 
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end up subsidizing the inefficient. 
Inappropriate quality 
The actions of SMAs to maximise farm gate returns means that they may in fact over 
emphasize quality. "All markets exhibit clear quality/price relationships. There are 
profitable markets for lower quality produce ifit is labelled and priced appropriately. 
However, lower quality produce selling at a lower price does not help the market 
raise average market returns ..... There is a disincentive in current regulations for 
marketers to encourage allow lower quality output to be marketed, even if it can be 
sold profitably" (ACIL, 1992). 
Bundling - inappropriate incentives for farmers. managers and marketers 
The payments of returns to producers purely by product price means returns from 
different investments are bundled together. "The consequences of a bundled return 
is that production moves away from the level which maximises profitability on the 
farm assets. If the market price for additional production is less than the bundled 
return - which is the price the producer receives - then this production will be loss 
making because it will be sold for less than it cost to produce". Furthermore "the 
farm gate price is a bundle of returns from separate investments. It is a pooled return. 
However the producer, not surprisingly, treats it as a return to farm investment only 
and acts accordingly". "Profits from off-farm investment are not a reason for more 
investment in farming" (ACIL, 1992). 
DIFFICULTIES IN COMPARING MARKETING WITH AND WITHOUT SMAs 
As Piggott has pointed out it is very difficult to evaluate the arguments on the basis 
of experience. First an SMA may have existed for a long time, secondly it is difficult 
to obtain the necessary data to make a comparison as it is commercially sensitive, 
and thirdly there are difficulties in disentangling price premia that are attributable to 
market power from those that are due to other considerations. 
KEY ISSUES FOR FARMERS 
For farmers 'to receive maximum profits they need to be part of an industry with 
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efficient farm production, efficient factory processing and efficient marketing. 
Efficient farm production requires the optimal mix and level of inputs and the 
optimal mix and level of output. Similar efficient factory processing requires the 
optimal mix and level of inputs and outputs as does efficient marketing. Optimality 
at each stage in the production/marketing chain requires the marginal costs being 
equated with marginal revenues. 
Farmers clearly have the information necessary to optimise the production according 
to the price signals they receive. The receive price signals for both inputs and 
outputs. However they do not have the information to optimise at other step in the 
production/marketing chain. The managers at the other links in the chain potentially 
have the ability to make these optimising decisions but whether they do or not 
depends on both the institutional framework under which they operate and the 
degree of accountability. 
Ownership and legislated monopoly does not in itself lead to maximum farm returns . 
Maximum returns can only be achieved if all agents face the appropriate price signals 
and incentives. Hence it is appropriate for farmers to take as keen an interest in the 
ownership structure and regulatory regime as in ownership itself. 
A MODEL OF AN AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 
Gross farm incomes are determined by the volume of farm product and the price paid 
_ for that product. The farm gate price for product depends on market returns and costs 
beyond the farm gate. Clearly farm gate product prices vary due to fluctuations in 
market price, marketing costs, and processing costs. Given that the farmer receives 
the residual, the cumulative effect of any small changes in costs or prices can have 
a substantial impact on farm gate prices and farm incomes. 
Given the variety of products that can be produced from farm produce and the variety 
of technologies which can be used to produce the product it is tempting to imagine 
that different levels of profit are associated with the production of different product. 
However if the processing/marketing system is efficient, production of the each 
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product will continue until the marginal revenue associated with that product is equal 
to the marginal revenue associated with the next product and in the nth case is equal 
to marginal cost as in equation 1. 
MRJ = MR2 = ~ = MC equation 1 
This suggests that with the advent of competition new entrants would have to 
compete on the basis of improved technology, different contracting arrangements or 
some other advantage to the potential supplier. If however the JMA is producing 
output where the ·marginal revenue is less than the marginal cost there is the potential 
for new entrants to produce with marginal revenue greater than or equal to marginal 
cost and so obtain market share. 
However it is possible that the payout by the JMA does not solely relate to the 
product being marketed but in part is dividends from past investment activities. In 
this situation the new entrant competing against the JMA may be prepared to pay a 
higher price for the product (P prodNE) yet still not be able to compete with the total 
payment by the JMA which consists of (PprodlMA + PotherlMA ) as in equation 2 . 
P prodNE > P prodlMA < P prodlMA + P otherlMA equation 2 
In this situation the other unrelated investments clearly function as a barrier to entry. 
The potential problem of farm product payments disguising inefficient processing and 
or marketing suggests that even without deregulation there are strong arguments for 
producers to receive both a) payments for product and b) dividend payments for 
processing and marketing to ensure efficiency within a sole marketing authority. 
This raises the question as to whether the separation of dividend payments and 
product payments would be sufficient to overcome this problem in a deregulated 
industry. 
Suppose an industry pays a product price of $10 a unit of which 25% is equivalent 
. to a dividend and the balance product price. In the absence of competition it could 
well be that $7.50 would be paid as product price and $2.50 as dividend. 
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However suppose a new entrant came into the market prepared to buy product at 
$8.50 per unit. Presumably the JMA would up its product price to $8.50 and drop 
its dividend to $1.50 equivalent. The new entrant cannot compete in this way in that 
it has to pay its cost of capital to its owners. 
The only discipline that would stop this is if the shares were freely tradable. 
The prospect of tradable shares worries some farmers. There are concerns about the 
potential loss of control of their industry and the also fears of lower returns due to 
dividends to outside investors. It would seem ownership changes would only occur 
if farmers willingly sold their shares which presumably only happen if that increased 
their welfare. The prospect of outside investors siphoning off income from farmers 
rests on the assumption that farmers receive the residual farm gate price (FGP) which 
is the market price (MP) less the return on the investment in processing and 
marketing (ROI)as in equation 3. 
FGP = MP - ROI equation 3 
However to obtain supply new entrants have to pay at least the same price as that 
paid by the JMA and hence new entrants will only exist if they can achieve their 
required rate of return (ROI) and still pay the same as the JMA or other competitors 
for farm product. This suggests farmers may be unduly worried about the impact of 
tradable shares. 
IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL FOR FARM INCOMES 
Deregulation provides incentives for new firms to emerge to take advantage of 
opportunities to produce products where marginal revenue exceed marginal cost. 
These opportunities may be due to innovation which results in lower processing 
costs, lower marketing costs or the achievement of higher market export prices. 
Assuming that new entrants emerged and captured a share of the existing producers 
the loss of these suppliers to the JMA could potentially result in a short-run fall in 
prices for those left in the pool due to excess capacity relative to the volume of 
product. 
10 
.j::> 
w 
To combat dissatisfaction within the pool the pool would offer a range of prices to 
retain its most valuable suppliers. This would attract investment in the most profitable 
enterprises and cause disinvestment in the least profitable enterprises. This result 
would in -essence be the same as expected from a model of atomistic competition. 
If an SMA produces according to the MC=MR model the deregulation of the industry 
should be no great threat. However deregulation does provide a spur to a JMA to 
ensure that throughout time innovation occurs and that marginal revenues continue 
to equate with marginal costs. The biggest threat to the status quo may well come 
from part of a JMA wishing to break off and go it alone as opposed to competition 
from other firms in New Zealand or overseas. 
IMPLICATIONS OF MODEL FOR RESEARCH 
Consideration of the response to deregulating an industry with an SMA raises two 
important questions for further research. Firstly, the question arise as to whether post 
farm processing and marketing activities equate marginal revenues with marginal 
costs. This is probably the best indicator of the efficiency of an SMA. Secondly 
given that this paper suggests deregulation provides no great economic threat to 
efficient SMA!; there must be some other reason why a significant proportion of 
farmers are wary about deregulation. It is appropriate for further research to identify 
the basis for these concerns, the underlying farmer objectives, the appropriateness of 
these objectives and the possibility of achieving them. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Deregulation of an industry with an SMA would allow the hew entrants to emerge. 
The speed of entry of new entrants would depend on the efficiency of the existing 
SMA and how accurately it balance marginal revenues with marginal costs. The 
emergence of new entrants would possibly lead to non-homogenous product prices 
in the short run but prices would tend to equilibrate for homogenous product in the 
long run due to competitive forces as new entrants compete for the products returning 
above average profits. Competitive pressure would more sharply define the 
homogeneity 'of product and so it could be expected that prices would vary more 
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according to quality, location, time, and contractual arrangement. Greater variation 
in prices based on these real product attributes would significantly impact on-farm 
and off farm investment patterns. 
Deregulation without the enforcement of anti-trust legislation would mean 
competition would be slow to emerge due to barriers to entry unless JMA shares 
were freely tradable. 
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AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
THAT COULD BE UTILISED IN THE 
NEW ZEALAND AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 
B.A. Finlayson 
SUMMARY 
Institutional structures and the incentives that they create for shareholders and 
managers have a significant effect on the use of resources. Criteria for assessing 
efficient institutional structures are derived from a theoretical framework based on 
property rights, 'transaction costs, agency costs, and corporate finance theory. The 
rationale as to why cooperatives have been selected to organise agricultural 
marketing and processing activities is discussed. Various problems with producer 
board and cooperative structures and supporting regulations are identified, and 
corporatisation, deregulation and privatisation issues are then evaluated in terms of 
acting as a possible panacea for these problems. 
Key Words: Institutional structures, corporatisation, privatisation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Institutional structures such as those used to define producer boards' and 
cooperatives' activities and the incentives that they create for shareholders and 
managers have a significant effect on the use of resources, as over 70 percent of 
New Zealand's exports are processed and marketed by these types of organisations 
(Hussey, 1992). There has been a great deal of public debate within New Zealand 
over the last three to four years regarding the validity of these types of institutional 
structures, and whether they should be entrenched through the use of statutes and 
regulations. In particular, Crocombe et al (1991), who presented the views of the 
Porter Project, recommended that the producer boards should be dismantled, while 
more recently, the report prepared by Hussey (1992) for the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable has recommended that producer boards should be corporatised and 
exposed to competition. 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARING ALTERNATIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
Property Rights. Transaction Costs. and Agency Theory 
. Ronald Coase (1937) demonstrated that firms are created when it is costly to transact 
in the market, relative to using the contractual relationships embodied in a firm's 
hierarchical structure. These transaction costs can arise as a consequence of factors 
such as less than perfect contracts, imperfectly defined property rights, and imperfect 
information. In 1960 Coase developed his theorem that in the absence of transaction 
costs, the allocation of rights has no effect on the distribution of resources, apart 
from a wealth effect. However, where transaction costs exist, the allocation of 
rights will affect the distribution of resources as externalities can arise where 
contracts are too expensive to complete. This view forms the basis of a comparative 
institutional approach to economic analysis, where the allocation of rights needs to 
be made on the basis of the criterion of minimising transaction costs, and does not 
presuppose any normative distribution of rights. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) complemented Coase's theory by indicating that 
shareholders have to incur agency costs when there is a need to separate ownership 
and control, as agents' preferences for income and leisure may be different to the 
principals' objective function. Consequently, shareholders need to put in place a 
system for monitoring management performance, and ensuring that their property is 
managed efficiently. This means that decision making, and risk bearing functions 
will be determined on the basis of the allocation between shareholders of property 
rights, and the nature of contracts between the shareholders as principals, and 
managers in their capacity as agents. 
Farna and Jensen (1983) extended agency theory to encompass the need for a Board 
of Directors of a company who are required to control managers in their capacity of 
representing the residual claimants of a firm's cash flows. Williamson (1988) 
elaborates on this theory and posits that property rights fall under a governance 
structure which is defined by financing arrangements. Debt represents a rule based 
governance with a specified return on investment, while equity is a discretionary 
governance which provides the residual claimants of a firm's current and future net 
cash flows with the right to make decisions and the obligation to bear the risks. 
Williamson agrees with Fama and Jensen that the Board of Directors arises as a 
consequence of the need to safeguard equity, but goes further and links the level of 
equity fmance in a firm to the degree of specificity of the assets in the firm, which 
in turn will be determined by considerations relating to transaction, rather than 
agency, costs. 
Efficiency and Comorate Finance Theory 
The contractual arrangement that arises to address these governance and agency 
problems for a particular firm will constitute the institutional structure, and will have 
important implications for efficiency at both the macro.and micro levels. Efficiency 
can be broken down into the following two components (Hemming and Mansoor, 
1987): 
• 
• 
productive efficiency which arises when costs are minimised for a given level 
of output; and 
allocative efficiency which occurs when outputs in terms of quantity, quality 
and various other characteristics of goods and services meet customer 
requirements. 
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Productjve efficiency is a function of the institutional structure of the firm, while 
allocative efficiency is determined by the degree of competition in an industry. 
Focussing on productive efficiency and following the definition of efficiency for a 
corporate proposed by Brealey and Meyers (1984), this will occur if a firm invests 
in assets up to the point where the marginal return on investment is equal to the 
opportunity cost of investing in alternative assets. These two parameters are defined 
by referring to the proposition developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958) (UMMU) 
which forms the basis of modern corporate finance theory. 
MM concluded that the average cost of capital for shareholders investing in any firm 
is completely independent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalisation 
rate of a pure equity stream of its class. In other words, investment and financing 
decisions are independent and the cost of capital will be solely a function of the risk 
attached to the future cash flows generated by the corporate's investments. This 
theory has subsequently been modified to encompass factors such as the tax 
deductibility of interest, the costs of bankruptcy, and the degree of asset specificity. 
In the theory's revised form, the marginal return on shareholders' investments can 
be defined as the change in the present value of the future cash flows arising from 
an investment before interest costs, but after taxes, and the opportunity cost is the 
firm's risk adjusted after tax weighted average cost of capital. 
MM's theory was subsequently developed into a practical tool for monitoring 
company performance by Treynor, Sharpe (1964) and Linter (1965) who developed 
a means of measuring the risk of alternative investments using the capital asset 
pricing model (UCAPM"). Within the CAPM framework, risk can be disaggregated 
to reflect business and financial risks, some of which will be unique to the firm, 
while the residual risk will reflect facto~s which impact on the economy as a whole. 
CAPM is derived from the theory developed by Markowitz (1952) who demonstrated 
how investors hold diversified portfolios to minimise risk. CAPM builds on this 
result, and is based on the assumption that investors can eliminate unique risks 
through investing in a well diversified portfolio, and therefore only require a return 
in excess of the risk free government stOCk rate which is proportional to the level of 
market risk. Black and Scholes (1973) further enhanced the ability of corporate 
fmance theory to evaluate performance by developing an option pricing formula, 
which provides a means of empirically estimating the value of future potential cash 
flows .. 
Taking these corporate finance theories together, if a firm's operating system, assets, 
or financial arrangements, can be restructured so that the present value of the actual 
and potential cash flows accruing to shareholders are increased, relative to the 
business and financial risks attached to the new structure, then this revised strategy 
will increase productive efficiency. 
Efficient Institutional Structures 
Efficiency will be achieved at both the macro and micro levels if markets are 
competitive, and externalities are minimised. In order to minimise externalities a 
contractual arrangement addressing agency and governance issues needs to be used 
that maximises the present value of the future net cash flows generated by 
shareholders' property. This goal is equivalent to maximising the long run economic 
rate of return on equity, and provides an objective and quantifiable means of 
comparing the return on shareholders' funds from current investments, with the 
value of alternative equally risky investments. Due to its focus on measuring risks 
relative to returns, where risk return trade-offs will logically be constant across 
alternative investments, this methodology can potentially be applied to any 
commercial operation, and provides a powerful mechanism for rationing capital, 
guiding strategy development, monitoring performance, and aligning shareholders' 
and managers' incentives. 
ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
Porter and Scully (1987) identified the following alternative institutional structures 
that are relevant to commercial entities in the agricultural sector: 
• Sole Proprietorship; 
• Joint Stock Corporations; and 
• Cooperatives. 
The essential characteristics of each of these institutional structures are as follows: 
Sole Proprietorship 
This form of institution is a closed organisation where decision making and risk 
bearing functions are borne by the owner. The entity is closed as there is only a 
single owner who can contribute equity capital to the business. Ownership is freely 
tradeable, and the shares effectively create a perpetual right to the cashflows 
generated by the assets governed by the shares. 
Joint Stock Corporations 
These entities are open organisations where the risk bearing function of ownership 
is separated from managerial control. Under this structure, there are no formal 
constraints on who can become a shareholder, and the shares are freely tradeable at 
their market value. This structure creates a principal agent problem where the 
principal must create, monitor, and enforce contracts that will induce the agent to 
maximise the principal's objective function. Shares in the company with their 
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associated decision rights are allocated to shareholders in proportion to the level of 
capital invested in the operation and provide them with a right to a percentage of the 
future residual cashflows which is directly in proportion to the level of capital 
contributed to the company. These shares also provide effective perpetual rights to 
the cash flows generated by the assets governed by the shares. 
Cooperatives 
Producer cooperatives are closed organisations where the risk bearing function of 
ownership is separated from managerial control. These organisations are closed in 
the sense that only suppliers can have an ownership interest in the organisation. As 
the shares are not freely tradeable, and' can only be sold back to the cooperative at 
their par value, they only provide a temporary right to the cash flows generated by 
the assets governed by the shares. The amount invested in the business is generally 
a function of patronage and represents the amount that is retained in the operation 
after allowing for operating costs, payments to suppliers for the cost of the raw 
material and capital supplied to the cooperative, and the repayment of capital at its 
par value to former suppliers who no longer wish to sell produce to the cooperative. 
THE RATIONALE FOR PRODUCER BOARDS AND COOPERATIVES 
Mr Dick Davidson, Chairman of the Meat and Wool Section of Federated Farmers 
provided the following rationale for cooperative structures which appears to be a 
representative view of primary producers. "Many farmers regard the cooperatives 
as the most efficient commercial structure, achieving producer control, building on 
collective strel).gth and eliminating the intermediate middlemen" (Calder, 1990). 
In other words, the cooperative principle has been adopted in the areas of processing 
and marketing by primary producers in New Zealand as a means of ensuring that 
they receive a competitive return on the capital invested in their farming operations. 
Corporate entities, who may not be owned and controlled by people within the 
agricultural industry, are perceived by many primary producers as having incentives 
to minimise prices to suppliers in order to maximise rates of return on their own 
capital. In comparison, cooperatives and producer boards, which are also structured 
on cooperative principles, will explicitly maximise returns to suppliers. In the case 
of producer boards, there is the added advantage that by acting as a single seller they 
may be able to extract a monopoly rent from world markets, or offset the potential 
for weak selling in limited access markets. 
As the potential for corporate entities to demonstrate monopsonistic behaviour is 
perceived by primary producers as a key threat to their industry they have 
successfully put in place statutory and regulatory barriers which entrench 
cooperatives and preclude competition. These barriers to competition are most 
apparent in the dairy, pipfruit, and kiwifruit industries where producer boards 
exercise their exclusive rights to export produce. In the case of the New Zealand 
Dairy Board ("NZDB"), eleven of its thirteen board members must be either 
appointed, or elected by a cooperative, or group of cooperative companies, thus 
ensuring that both processing and marketing of export dairy produce is regulated by 
cooperative principles. 
PROBLEMS WITH PRODUCER BOARD AND COOPERATIVE 
STRUCTURES AND THE SUPPORTING REGULATIONS 
Limits on Ability to Diversify Asset and Product Base 
Under the Cooperative Companies legislation cooperatives are subject to significant 
constraints on their ability to diversify horizontally and vertically as they have a very 
narrow and specific definition of their objects which is linked to their 
supplier/shareholders' commercial activities. The most liberal arrangement applies 
the dairy cooperatives which is defined by the Cooperative Dairy Companies Act 
1949 ("CDCA"), where a cooperative dairy company is required to have the 
following principle objectives: 
• 
• 
• 
the manufacture of butter, cheese, dried milk, casein, or butterfat supplied 
to the company by its shareholders; or 
the sale to another cooperative dairy company or to the NZDB of the milk, 
cream, or butterfat so supplied; or 
the collection, treatment, and distribution for human consumption of milk or 
cream so supplied. 
In the Companies Act 1955, Dairy Companies have had their powers extended, 
enabling them to engage in associated industries such as building freezing works, 
_ providing insurance, and manufacturing fertiliser. Even taking these extensions into 
account, and noting that the relaxation of the defmition of activities has not been 
extended to other types of cooperatives, this close specification of objects and powers 
indicate that cooperatives are limited in their ability to capture benefits in terms of 
enhanced cash flows accruing to shareholders through realising economies of size 
and scale, or reducing business risks through diversifying the source of inputs, and 
supply of outputs. 
Inefficient Funding Arrangements and Distorted Prices 
Theory 
(i) Overview 
A cooperative provides services to its shareholders, and these shareholders generally 
have control of the operation on the basis of the level of supply, which in the case 
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of dairy. cooperatives is determined by the amount supplied in the immediately 
preceding financial year. In comparison, a company can supply services to non-
shareholders, and voting rights are allocated on the basis of contributed capital. The 
key difference between these arrangements is that cooperative shareholders do not 
view their shares as income earning investments, but provide a right to supply the 
cooperative, and receive a service at cost. 
Within this structure, a cooperative's primary objective is to maximize the payout 
to suppliers. Because a cooperative's shares primarily confer a right to supply, 
shareholders have a significant incentive to place pressure on cooperative 
management to payout funds, rather than accumulate reserves, as the shareholders 
do not capture any benefits in the form of capital gain when the shares are sold back 
to the cooperative. In comparison, a company does not face any incentives from 
shareholders to payout funds unless the rate of return on equity is less than the 
shareholders' opportunity cost on these funds. 
(ii) Short Term Investment Horizon 
Porter and Scully (1987) develop this view and argue that cooperatives are likely to 
be under capitalised relative to a corporate structure, due to investors' limited time 
horizon and the inability to transfer shares. Because patronage and investment vary 
over time there is an inequality for suppliers between the dividend payments that 
they receive, and the investments that they make. This means that because the 
owners' claims on the future cash flows of the cooperative's assets is less than their 
productive life there is a strong incentive to adopt a short term investment horizon. 
These problems are compounded by the fact that shares can only be transferred to 
the cooperative at par value, and membership is open to new investors if they wish 
to supply the cooperative, leading to a free rider problem. Accordingly, the 
incumbent owner/decision makers' incentives to make investments which maximise 
the profitability of the cooperative are diminished significantly as they cannot capture 
the capitalised value of these benefits. 
(iii) Cash Flow Problems 
These funding difficulties are aggravated when returns received by primary 
producers are depressed relative to the returns that can be obtained from producing 
alternative products. Under these circumstances, producers have a strong incentive 
to sell their shares.back to the cooperative, and under the conditions specified in the 
Cooperative Companies Act 1956, they must be accepted, unless greater than 20 
percent of the issued shares have been surrendered. This can occur at the same time 
that the cooperative is experiencing financial difficulties, and means that a 
cooperative's funding arrangements have the potential to be extremely unstable. The 
CDCA places dairy cooperatives in a slightly stronger position as they are not 
obliged to repurchase shares unless the shareholders have not supplied milk, cream 
or butterfat in the immediately preceding period of five years. However, this 
provision does not significantly enhance the stability of the cooperative's funding 
arrangments as it increases dairy producers' incentives to maximise the annual cash 
payout. 
(iv) Distorted Prices 
The inefficiencies arising from the cooperative structure's funding arrangements are 
further compounded by the failure to distinguish in the payout to suppliers the return 
on produce sold to the cooperative, returns from sundry products such as Lada cars, 
and the return on capital invested in the cooperative. Because the return on these 
items are bundled up together, farmers will receive price signals which will overstate 
the amount of raw material that can be exported profitably (Hussey, 1992). 
Evidence 
The combination of insufficient and poorly targetted funding, and oversupply of raw 
material have been graphically portrayed in the kiwifruit industry where the Kiwifruit 
Marketing Board has not been able to stem the burgeoning supply of kiwifruit, and 
has been unable to put in place adequate systems to market the produce, resulting in 
technical bankruptcy and losses in the order of $100 million. Similarly, the New 
Zealand Meat Producers Board ("NZMPB") adopted a sole meat exporting role 
between 1982 and 1985, and incurred losses of nearly $1.0 billion, which were 
subsequently paid by the taxpayer, due to over-estimating the sustainable payout to 
meat producers. In the apple industry, the Apple and Pear Marketing Board 
(" APMB") was successfully sued under the Commerce Act in 1990 for trying to 
introduce transferable crop certificates, which were essentially quotas limiting entry 
into the apple industry. In the Dairy industry, this problem has been circumvented 
by the introduction of legislation which specifically exempts the NZDB from Part II 
of the Commerce Act. 
At the cooperative level, these operations do not appear to be competing effectively 
against corporate entities in the meat industry. In particular, Fortex, which is a 
listed company that was established in 1985, now has approximately 18 percent of 
the market for export lamb in the. South Island, which it processes using two chains, 
with the balance of the lamb kill being processed by approximately 45 chains, the 
bulk of which are owned by cooperatives. Some of these cooperatives have 
experienced serious financial difficulties, particularly Alliance which incurred a loss 
of $152 million in 1990/91. In the North Island, AFFCO is in a similiar position, 
having incurred a loss of $86.2 million in 1990/91 and is presently investigating 
alternative means of raising additional capital to help reduce its excessive burden of 
debt. 
At a more general level, the problems arising from funding constraints and over 
supply provide a rationale for the strategies that producer boards and cooperatives 
have used to defme their operations. These entities have traditionally focussed on 
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producing commodity products which are exported to a limited number of highly 
protected markets. This type of marketing strategy requires a relatively low level 
of value to be added to products, but is unlikely to be particularly profitable, and has 
a high level of business risk. This is due to the large number of competing suppliers 
who cause operating margins to remain at low levels, a limited number of buyers 
who can switch to alternative sources of supply at relatively low cost, and the 
potential for sudden changes in levels of protection as a consequence of political 
decisions. The combination of these factors cause prices to be extremely volatile. 
Specific examples of these circumstances include the NZDB and its focus on 
supplying commodity butter to the United Kingdom ("UK") until the 1970s, and 
more recently, the beef industry's dependence on manufacturing beef supplied to the 
United States. 
Inefficient Management Incentives and Surplus Assets 
Theory 
(i) Lack of Objective Criteria to Ration Capital and Measure Managers' 
Performance 
Fama and Jensen (1983) indicated that the unrestricted transferability of common 
stock at market values provides an important mechanism for controlling agency 
problems as poor performance will result in below market returns on shares. This 
mechanism is not available to shareholders in cooperatives as members cannot 
exchange shares in the market at the capitalised value of the future net cash flows 
accruing to shareholders. As a result,there is no external information available to 
principals which can be used as a basis for evaluating managers' performance in 
their capacity as agents. This means that internal monitoring systems must be used. 
As the gains to managerial efficiency calmot be capitalised, the incentives to monitor 
are reduced. Given difficulties making comparisons across cooperatives due to the 
mixing of product prices and the return on capital, only anecdotal evidence is 
available. Furthermore, the ineqUality between dividends and investments means that 
there will be no clear consensus on what is the appropriate management objective, 
further complicating the principal agent relationship. 
(ii) Distorted Management Incentives 
Because there is no objective criteria such as return on shareholders' funds which 
can be used to determine the efficiency of asset use from both a planning and 
monitoring perspective, and a potentially highly politicised shareholder structure, 
managers have neither the incentives or the ability to efficiently allocate resources. 
The protective legislation which physically precludes competition against cooperative 
structures such as the NZDB and APMB further removes the need for managers to 
be efficient. These arrangements create similiar incentives to those faced by 
bureaucrats in government departments that are not required to earn a competitive 
after tax return on. capital invested in these types of operations. 
As noted by Alchian (1965), because bureaucrats (the agents) and the government 
(the principal) do not have access to shared information, there is a principal agent 
problem. Accordingly, managers are given less managerial discretion than private 
sector counterparts which inhibits effective rewards in terms of remuneration, and 
creates risk averse behaviour due to an inability to make necessary operating, 
investment and financing decisions. The insights of public choice theory can also 
potentially be applied to the management of cooperative structures, where the lack 
of a commercial criteria to evaluate performance creates a situation where an 
increase in pay, power, and prestige can be gained through attempting to maximise 
budgets, and this becomes an end in itself (Niskanen 1971). This creates incentives 
for managers to accumulate surplus assets, particularly when the relevant industry 
is profitable relative to other primary industries. 
Evidence 
(i) Surplus Assets 
The Chief Executive of the NZDB indicated that an average dairy farmer had 
approximately $175,000 invested in the NZDB and cooperatives in 1990/91, and 
$750,000 invested in their farm (Gough, 1992). Assuming that the farm and 
associated assets were 50 percent fmanced by debt of $375,000, these figures 
indicate that an average dairy farmer had net assets of $550,000 invested in 
producing milk and associated income at this time. 
MAF (1992) estimated that dairy farmers earned an average annual income of 
$40,719 before tax in 1989/90 and 1990/91, of which Hussey (1992) estimated 
income totalling $9,550 was related to the UK butter quota, which is not recorded 
in the NZDB's assets, and is effectively a transfer from the UK to the members of 
the New Zealand dairy industry. Therefore the returns from this quota can be 
excluded from the analysis. Combining these results, and deducting tax at 33 
percent, the average dairy farmer earned income after interest and tax of $20,883 per 
annum, which yields a return on shareholders' funds of 3.8 percent. This yield will 
be overstated as the NZDB only valued its land and buildings over this period at up 
to 90 percent of estimated net current values. 
The estimated average return on shareholders' funds. compares with an estimated 
average risk free rate of approximately 12.0 percent and a cost of equity for a 
market portfolio of 16.0 percent that applied over the period of analysis. This 
outcome suggests that there was an opportunity cost in the order of $67,100 per 
annum for an average dairy farmer over the period being analysed, and implies that 
there was a substantial amount of surplus assets dedicated to milk production and 
associated activities. As the farm properties, livestock, and on-farm plant and 
equipment are managed in a competitive market, the surplus assets would logically 
lie in the cooperative/producer board network. 
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(ii) Accountability Structure 
The Dairy Board Amendment Act 1992 ("DBAA") was 'introduced to address the 
types of concerns outlined above, and provides an example of the extent to which 
there is only limited management accountability for the use of the assets vested in 
the NZDB, and how the implicit inefficiencies are entrenched by legislation. The 
DBAA was introduced in an effort to assign ownership of the Board's capital to 
suppliers and improve accountability for the use of that capital. While the first 
objective has been achieved, it appears that the second goal has become increasingly 
remote as ownership of the NZDB capital has been defined in terms of milkfat 
supplied, rather than capital contributed. In tandem with the requirement that 
ownership is not transferable, there are strong political pressures not to use 
commercial criteria such as return on shareholders' funds to evaluate performance. 
Specific accountability measures are defined in terms of a report which the NZDB 
will initiate from time to time, under terms of reference specified by the NZDB after 
consultation with the Minister of Agriculture, and the dairy industry. The audit will 
be prepared by an appointee of the NZDB who will be required to identify the extent 
to which the NZDB has established objectives, if any, and the extent to which the 
NZDB has put in place policies and strategies to use its resources effectively and 
efficiently for the purpose of achieving its objectives. The NZDB will pay for the 
audit and supply a copy of the conclusions and recommendations to any cooperative, 
or supplying shareholder, if requested. 
The failure to specify any efficiency criteria such as return on shareholders' funds, 
the lack of incentives for shareholders and managers to adopt this criteria, and the 
potential conflict of interest that any auditor will experience in preparing 
recommendations which the NZDB is prepared to pay for, indicates there is a high 
probability that there will not be any material improvements in productive efficiency 
under this new structure. Similarly, allocative efficiency is likely to further 
deteriorate due to a new provision in the DBAA which specifically precludes Part 
II of the Commerce Act 1986, which regulates restrictive trade practices, having any 
effect in relation to inter alia the acquisition and sale of dairy produce destined for 
export. While this arrangement is designed to protect existing farmers from over 
supply,this arrangement also creates the potential for NZDB management to 
introduce anti-competitive practices against farmer owners. 
CORPORA TISA TION 
There has been an increasing level of recognition of the problems being experienced 
by producer board and cooperative structures and Hussey (1992) recommended that 
the producer boards should be corporatised. Following on from the State Owned 
Enterprise model, corporatisation is defined as the adoption of a corporate structure 
where voting rights are allocated to shareholders in proportion to the level of equity 
contributed to the business, and the key management and investment criteria is the 
long term return on shareholders' funds. Shares would still only be allocated to 
suppliers, but equity contributions would be related to a criterion such as level of 
investment, rather than patronage. These shares would provide a perpetual right to 
the cash flows generated by the assets governed by the shares, and therefore could 
be freely traded amongst suppliers at market value. 
The most important objective that is achieved by any corporatisation programme is 
the removal of the inequality between investment and return and the consequent 
confusion between political and commercial objectives, and the identification of 
transparent management accountabilities set in terms of commercial criteria. 
However, corporatisation in isolation will not ensure that productive and allocative 
efficiency are achieved. A key component of any enhanced management framework 
is the clear definition of prices for primary products and capital, both of which are 
necessary conditions for achieving productive and allocative efficiency. 
DEREGULATION 
Overview 
A key requirement underpinning any corporatisation process is the need to establish 
the entity in a structure which can be compared with other private sector operations, 
and required to earn a competitive rate of return on capital invested in the business. 
Supporting this strategy, it is necessary to put in place a regulatory structure which 
facilitates, rather than precludes, competition in the procurement of produce, while 
still retaining the benefits arising from capturing premiums in protected limited 
access export markets. 
Local Market 
If the cooperatives, or producer boards, were corporatised managers would come 
under increasing pressure to increase rates of return on shareholders' funds and 
maximise any competitive advantages that their organisations might possess. While 
this pressure may lead to an improvement in productive efficiency, it could 
encourage the shareholders to behave as monopsonists, and result in allocative 
inefficiency. 
As Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) noted, full competition is not necessary to 
achieve productive and allocative efficiency, as the threat of competition may be 
sufficient. This will occur when sunk costs, which act as exit barriers, are low. It 
appears that the most likely source of monopsonistic behaviour that would arise in 
the agricultural sector in the event of deregulation would be derived from capital 
intensive enterprises such as the dairy cooperatives in regions such as Northland, 
where there are a limited number of competing processors. 
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Offsetting this conclusion, Cartwright (1990) noted that the increasing concentration 
in the drury processing industry has primarily been a function of the NZDB standard 
cost payout mechanism. In the event that the NZDB and the processing companies 
were corporatised and the industry deregulated, this pricing anomaly would disappear 
and it is possible that the increasing concentration in the dairy industry would also 
cease. If competition did not naturally evolve, suppliers could negotiate collectively 
and demonstrate counterveiling power. In the event that the creation of cash flow 
problems, a reduction in profitability, and administrative difficulties were 
insufficient, suppliers could resort to regulatory solutions such as the Commerce Act 
1986. 
Export Markets. 
Managers in cooperative structures such as those utilised by the producer boards are 
unlikely to have the ability to effectively exploit any monopoly power that they may 
have in world markets. As Hussey (1992) pointed out in relation to the NZDB, in 
the first instance New Zealand is a signatory of GATT which prevents anti-
competitive practices. Secondly, due to the highly protective nature of the world 
agricultural markets there is an over supply of produce. In association with a large 
number of competing suppliers these circumstances are likely to negate any of the 
producer boards' efforts to increase world prices through restricting supply. 
While the producer boards may not be be able to act as monopolists, there is clear 
evidence that there is a substantial premium above world prices to be gained by New 
Zealand exporters in limited access markets such as the UK butter market (Crocombe 
et al, 1991), and where unrestrained competition between domestic exporters could 
erode this margin. However, a single desk operator will not provide an efficient 
means of capturing this premium due to the lack of competition. It would be more 
efficient to create perpetual, tradeable rights to export to limited access markets, 
where these rights were structured as proportions, or shares of the overall quota. 
In this way, competition would be introduced, there would be no incentive to under-
invest, and exporters to the limited access markets would not have any incentives to 
cut prices in an effort to increase market share, thereby removing any need for weak 
selling. These assets could be allocated initially by either an independent body who 
would tender the rights to sell produce in the particular market, with the funds being 
redistribUted to the industry, or assigned on the basis of historical usage. 
PRIV A TISATION 
The Need to Access Capital Markets 
While corporatisation and deregulation clarifies prices, improves management 
incentives and accountabilities, and generally enhances returns on shareholders' 
funds, corporatised entities are still likely to experience difficulties obtaining 
sufficient capital to fund any significant growth initiatives due to the narrowness of 
their shareholder base, and the need to maintain a minimum proportion of equity as 
a percentage of assets. 
This problem is particularly apparent in the dairy industry where there has been a 
surge of interest at the primary production level, but increased production is being 
constrained by insufficient processing capacity. Examples include Alpine in North 
Otago, which has only recently lifted a moratorium, limiting processing capacity to 
existing farmers. Similarly, in the Waikato, the New Zealand Dairy Group has had 
to place restrictions on the number of new suppliers that it can absorb over the next 
two years. The problem of free-riding has also become apparent with disputes 
occurring over who will actually fund the necessary increases in processing capacity. 
Due to the size of the cooperatives and producer boards, the implementation of any 
major restructuring programme will almost certainly require the ability to access 
capital markets such as the New Zealand Stock Exchange. In addition to funding 
growth programmes, the ability to access capital markets would provide the 
cooperatives and producer boards with a number of important disciplines and 
opportunities including the following: 
Disciplines of the Capital Markets 
Capital markets provide listed companies with significant disciplines through giving 
shareholders the ability to monitor performance and sell their shares in the event that 
they are not satisfied with managerial performance. This mechanism provides 
incentives for agents such as sharebroking firms to closely monitor companies, make 
comparisons with alternative investments in terms of risk and return, and recommend 
adjustments if poor performance is identified. If performance is sufficiently poor, 
there is the threat of takeover, or ultimately receivership, and the removal of existing 
management. 
Opportunities in Capital Markets 
Capital markets provide listed companies with financial flexibility due to the ability 
to access debt and equity markets, and enables companies to raise sufficient equity 
to effectively and efficiently manage financial risks and realise potential economies 
of scale. Capital markets also provide a useful medium of rating management, and 
providing incentives to attract and reward managers capable of maximising 
shareholders' funds. This is due to the transparency of market prices, and the ability 
to remunerate managers in terms of their performance by structuring employee 
remuneration packages which provide strong incentives to perform. 
In particular, the liquidity of capital market financial instruments provide the 
opportunity to introduce employee share ownership plans enabling staff to share in 
the growth in shareholders' funds. This policy helps offset conflicts that have 
traditionally arisen between providers of capital and labour. By making employees 
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shareholders their incentives will be correctly aligned with other investors in the 
company. As part of a placement, shares can also be allocated to current and 
prospective customers, encouraging them to continue to support the business, or 
placed with strategic shareholders who can provide access to customers, new 
technology, or future funds. 
The transferability of shares also provides primary producers with the ability to make 
a choice on whether they wish to invest in agricultural processing and marketing 
operations, and creates opportunities to facilitate capital formation through 
diversifying investment portfolios and developing combinations of shares and other 
assets which reflect individuals' risk return requirements. 
Shareholding Restrictions 
Primary producers can influence the behaviour of shareholders through the use of 
restrictions such as a golden share which consists of a special share which carries a 
veto for use in special circumstances. The New Zealand Government has used a 
golden share on a number of occasions when it has privatised a former public entity, 
and considered that it needed additional safeguards. The principle problem with 
these restrictions is that they reduce the value of the shares as they represent a 
constraint on management's actions, and can offset the threat of takeover. 
Restrictions commonly embodied in golden shares include placing limitations on 
individual voting control, foreign ownership, asset disposals, and the winding up of 
the company. 
CORPORATISATION AND PRIV ATISATION INITIATIVES PRESENTLY 
BEING CONSIDERED IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Meat Cooperatives 
The problems with a cooperative, relative to corporate, institutional structure have 
been most apparent in the meat industry where both types of organisations are 
competing against each other. Due to. the capital intensive nature of cooperative 
meat processing works, the exit costs have been substantial, and this has led to to 
intense competition in an effort to procure stock to maintain throughput and cover 
fixed costs. This has resulted in price wars and large losses for cooperatives such 
as AFFCO and Alliance. The cooperatives' problems have been compounded by 
owning plants which were built in an environment protected by statute until 1981. 
Under the legislation that was in place until this time, a meat processing works could 
not be established if it could be demonstrated that the operation would have a 
negative impact on existing. processing activities. With the introduction of 
competition, a large proportion of the cooperative plants became increasingly 
technically obsolescent and this has been reflected in the closure of various meat 
processing chains. Due to problems retaining equity funding, the cooperatives have 
had to resort to raising debt to finance the upgrading of new plant, and this has 
significantly increased the financial risks of running these operations. 
In recognition of these problems, AFFCO and Primary Resources, a commercial 
subsidiary of the NZMPB and a major shareholder in AFFCO and Alliance, are 
considering the sale of equity to the public (Independent, 1993). No decision has 
been made at this stage on how AFFCO and Primary Resources will structure the 
corporate vehicle used to issue shares to the public, but a likely candidate would be 
the use of a replica of the arrangement utilised by Wesfarmers Limited, which was 
floated on the Australian Stock Exchange, and is 54 percent owned by Wesfarmers 
Cooperative, with the balance being owned by financial institutions, farmers and 
private investors. In addition, Wesfarmers Limited is protected by a founders' share 
which provides the cooperative members with a majority vote in the event of a 
takeover (Calder, 1990). 
Problems with a Combined Cooperative/Company Structure 
While the use of a listed vehicle would help address the meat cooperatives' funding 
difficulties in the short term, this arrangement will only address the symptoms, 
rather than the underlying cause, of the problems with a cooperative structure. 
Without addressing the mismatch between investment and associated returns, 
cooperative members will continue to have strong incentives to fund short term 
investments, possibly resulting in cash flow difficulties, and prompting the use of 
political criteria to guide and assess managerial performance. All three factors will 
lead to sub-optimal performance, and significantly increase the cost of equity capital, 
relative to corporatising AFFCO, and then accessing the equity markets. 
This conclusion can be extended to all of the cooperatives operating in the 
agricultural sector, subject to the intermediate step of deregulating the industry and 
introducing competition. By corporatising the cooperatives and producer boards 
before introducing them to competition, the problems of sunk costs and the excessive 
competition that has arisen in the meat industry could be minimised. Having 
addressed productive efficiency issues, the market could then be deregulated, and 
shares made tradeable to non-supplying shareholders at market prices. If producers 
had any residual concerns about monopsonistic behaviour these could be addressed 
through a golden share. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The cooperative structure limits horizontal and vertical integration, is likely to result 
in a short term investment horizon, creates the potential for cash flow difficulties 
when producer returns are depressed, mixed price signals which result in oversupply, 
and creates poor management incentives which can encourage the accumulation of 
surplus assets over time. The combination of these factors is likely to result in the 
inefficient investment of funds available to cooperatives. These problems are further 
compounded by a regulatory structure which prevents competition, further distorting 
management's incentives, and places an obligation on single desk producer boards, 
with the exception of the NZDB, to accept all produce offered to them. As a result, 
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cooperatives and producer boards are liable to be in a position where they must 
accept inputs from suppliers that they do not want, process and package these inputs 
with inadequate capital intensive plant that it is difficult to obtain funding to upgrade, 
and produce outputs that are sold in unprofitable markets with volatile prices and low 
operating margins. 
These implications suggest that the cooperative/producer board structure has 
significantly reduced productive efficiency by constraining the potential profitability 
of processing and exporting operations in the agricultural sector, and increased 
business and financial risks. These factors are likely to have compounded the natural 
bias in cooperatives towards short term investments, and resulted in under-investment 
in processing and marketing. At the saine time, the bundled returns on equity and 
prices for primary produce will have caused over investment in primary production, 
although the level of excess assets will have been counteracted to some extent by the 
increased level of risk arising from the returns derived from downstream cooperative 
processing and marketing operations. 
Allocative efficiency has also been impaired through the use of single desk 
structures, and by exempting the NZDB from Part II of the Commerce Act, 
requiring them to accept all produce offered to them. At the processor level, 
allocative efficiency has been reduced by limiting membership of the NZDB to 
directors of cooperative processors. Given the difficulties these entities have raising 
capital, and the attendant moratoriums that have, or are, in place, the benefits of the 
increased returns from dairying are being limited to a relatively small Club of 
existing dairy farmers, who are in a position where they can create barriers to entry 
by introducing onerous capital charges on new entrants to the industry. 
In conclusion, the use of a privatised corporate structure, operating in competitive 
markets, is likely to significantly enhance the returns on capital invested in the 
agriCUltural sector through the realisation of productive and allocative efficiencies. 
While the value of land and associated assets may fall in the short term as a 
consequence of the clarification of product prices, the returns on capital invested in 
processing and marketing will be enhanced by the removal of regulatory constraints, 
the increased availability of capital, and improved management capability. Other 
things being equal, the combination of these factors will provide primary producers 
with a net gain on their existing capital, and significantly enhance prospects for 
generating future capital. 
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ABSTRACT 
The modem theory of the firm as developed by Coase (1937) et al is one of transaction 
costs and governance. This paper discusses uncertainty and small numbers bargaining 
as the two primary sources of transaction costs. The theory is then discussed in relation 
to the emerging and restructured New Zealand meat industry. The future direction of 
moves to coordinate the supply of agricultural products is discussed together with fruitful 
areas of research to assist the establishment of a coordinated industry. 
Keywords: Transaction costs, meat industry, deregulation, vertical coordination. 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of articles in the December 1992 issue of the American Joumal of Agricultural 
Economics reminds us that modem industrial organisation theory has yet to be applied 
rigorously to agriculture. As Barry, et a/ (1992) note, the modem view of the firm ........... . 
contrasts sharply with the traditional production function approach" used in agriculture. 
We intend to demonstrate the value of the new approach by applying transaction costs 
analysis to the New Zealand Meat Industry and making some predictions based on the 
theory. 
THE NEW ZEALAND MEAT INDUSTRY 
For much of its history the New Zealand (NZ) Meat Industry existed for one purpose - to 
supply cheap meat to the United Kingdom (UK). 
The cheapness of the meat came from the pasture-based farm systems in New Zealand, 
and not from a processing system which had to be geared for a peak seasonal kill and 
which was consequently underutilised for much of the year. Cheapness was also 
maintained by having coarsely graded frozen product shipped in carcass form and cut in 
low opportunity cost time at UK retail outlets. 
The initial meat industry structure which evolved to provide this product comprised a 
relatively large number of NZ owned livestock producers; a relatively small number of 
mainly UK owned processors and wholesalers; and a large number of small scale UK 
owned retailers. The UK interests were generally vertically integrated from processing 
through to retailing in order to reflect the importance of a secure supply of a cheap product. 
Concentration of processing and distribution capacity in the hands of overseas firms led 
to perceptions by NZ Producers of monopoly profits for the overseas interests. Accordingly 
there was increasing forward integration into processing by NZ producers to try to claim 
or eliminate these overseas profits. This integration took the form of the purchase or 
development of processing capacity by farmer owned cooperatives, but it was reinforced 
by the statutory empowering of producers to control exports in the 1920's. 
Apart from these attempts to alter the power balance between overseas and NZ interests, 
little real change took place in the industry for most of its existence. It was still there to 
deliver a cheap mainly undifferentiated product to a captive market as late as the 1960's. 
In retrospect it is quite clear that the inertia in the system was reinforced by the introduction 
(at producers' request) of economic licensing in 193f. As far as we can ascertain, only two 
works closed and one opened between 1939 and 1981 when licensing was abandoned. 
Such new capacity as was needed came from adding chains to existing works. Similarly 
increasing hygiene requirements were met by upgrading existing, often outdated, works. 
One exception to the general lack of change was the opening of the American beef market 
in the 1950's which led to market but not to product diversification. 
Inevitably however, the realities of a changing world intervened, and, following the entry 
of the UK into the EC in 1973, and a continuous decline in NZs terms of trade, major 
policy changes were made to the industry and to the economy by government in the 
1980's. (see Sandrey et al (1990), Davison (1991). Of particular importance to the meat 
industry were the removal of farm subsidies in 1984, the deregulation of the meat industry 
in 1981, and transport and labour market reforms, all of which led to massive restructuring. 
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Essentially the restructuring has taken three forms. First the UK owned processing 
companies have largely exited from processing. Second the industry is in the process of 
closing down old outdated plants, replacing them with new more productive plants, and 
simultaneously trying to reduce surplus capacity - a process which still has some way to 
go. And third, the industry is trying to orient itself to a variety of much more differentiated 
products· and markets, noteably in Asia. These pressures are causing NZ companies to 
try to establish stronger ties by way of contracts with the farmers, either to get stock in 
general, or to get a particular type of stock for a particular market. Initially, it should be 
noted, some of the contracts were designed to facilitate farmers shifting from sheep to beef 
at a time when farmers lacked capital. 
Most major North Island meat companies now offer contractual procurement systems. 
These commonly involve an advance payment where the ownership of the animal is 
transferred to the processor with the balance of "grazing fees' paid on the difference 
between slaughter value and processing cost. The timing of supply and product 
characteristics vary between contracts, but it is noteworthy that the flexibility allowed in 
most contracts about both time and quality suggests that procurement, rather than 
procurement of ~ is the main objective of these contracts. 
This coordination has not however been very successful despite some apparent early 
successes with the contracts designed to provide farmers with capital. To understand why, 
we need to look at the theory of the firm and of Vertical Coordination and apply it to the 
industry. 
THE MODERN THEORY OF THE FIRM: COASE'S CONTRIBUTION 
Basic Theory 
The modem theory of the firm begins with Coase (1937) and his perception that the firm 
is a device for eliminating market transactions. Firms, he argues, are substitutes for 
market-led coordination of production, in that the co-ordinating system within a firm is not 
an overt system of prices, but a direct command from an entrepreneur. The direct 
command, notes Coase, is "of course related to an outside network of prices and costs', 
but it is nevertheless an alternative to the market, and must be explained, logically, either 
as a mechanism desired per se for some contribution it makes to the utility functions of 
economic agents (the desire to lead or be led, perhaps), or as a mechanism which is 
desired because it is more efficient than the market. Coase rejects the per se argument 
and argues that the firm is a device for minimising transaction costs, and that the extent 
to which activities are coordinated "in-firm' (which we may also think of as the extent to 
which activities are vertically coordinated within a marketing channel) reflects the extent to 
which the costs of using the market exceed the benefits. 
Coase's" article suffers a little from a failure to distinguish between a coordinating 
mechanism and the coordinator, so that he at times appears to contrast the market and 
market prices (a mechanism) with the entrepreneurial commands and the entrepreneur (a 
mechanism and its coordinator); nevertheless he makes the central point that transactions 
take place between"economic agents, particularly in input markets, in at least two different 
ways;- the market transaction, and the internalised in-firm transaction. 
Transaction costs and Contracts 
Cease further argues that between the market transaction and the in-firm transaction there 
lies a continuum of varying forms of contract, which partially internalise the transaction but 
which state the limits to the power of the entrepreneur in any given transaction. 
Since market transactions may be viewed as contracts, albeit very short term contracts with 
minimal control by the entrepreneur; and since in-firm transactions again involve contracts 
of various lengths, but this time with the maximum degree of control by the entrepreneur, 
we may think of the entire spectrum of coordinating mechanisms as a series of contractual 
relationships over which the entrepreneur has increasing control as he/she moves towards 
full integration of transactions into the firm. Hence the modern theory of the firm is a 
theory of transactions, contracts, and governance, rather than a theory based solely on 
production functions. 
Coase makes the further point that transaction costs rise mainly with uncertainty, so that 
firms (or other forms of vertical coordination such as contracts) are unlikely to exist in the 
absence of uncertainty. 
THE MODERN THEORY OF THE FIRM: TRANSACTION COSTS 
Basic Causes of Transaction Costs 
The next stage in the evolution of the modern theory was to define and refine the idea of 
transaction costs - a task undertaken initially almost single handedly by Oliver Williamson. 
A summary of his contributions and of the contributions of such writers as Klein Crawford 
and Alchian, Malgrem, Arrow, Wu, and many others is contained in the book "Law and 
Economics of Vertical Integration and Control' by Blair and Kaserman (1981). 
Blair and Kaserman suggest in their summary that despite the existence in the literature 
of some seventeen different reasons which have been advanced for high transaction costs, 
at the firm (as opposed to the industry) level there are really only two reasons, under which 
the rest can be subsumed. These are: 
(i) uncertainty about the conditions under which exchange will take place, 
and 
(ii) problems related to small numbers bargaining. 
Each of these needs to be discussed separately. 
Uncertainty 
First, uncertainty. Transaction costs will rise, suggest Blair and Kaserman, where there is 
uncertainty about price to be paid, about the quality of the good or service to be 
purchased, or about the availability of the good or service at a specified price/quality. Such 
uncertainty may arise as a result of variability of input supply, perhaps because of 
seasonality, or perishability, or some other lumpiness in output; or finally because there is 
a price rigidity in output or input markets which leads to periodic shortages or surpluses. 
The cause of this latter source of instability is not specified but might plausibly be assumed 
to be related to asymmetry in information markets or some kind of institutional impediment 
in the market place (variable policy intervention for instance). 
High costs are imposed in these circumstances in the form of excessive inventories, 
spoilage, unused plant capacity, insurance schemes, etc., and, if it is at all possible to 
reduce these costs by some kind of vertical coordination, then firms will do so. Typically 
this coordination will take the form of a short or long term explicit or implicit contract which 
is aimed at smoothing out the variations by specifying price, quality, or "availability at a 
price/quality. However firms may fully integrate if by doing so they further reduce costs. 
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We should note here that the conditional 'if" is very important. It may not be possible to 
reduce some fluctuations by vertical coordination, particularly those in final demand, and, 
as we note later, it may not be possible to reduce such costs unilaterally without creating 
disequilibrium with other non-integrated firms. Moreover the$'e are costs involved in 
integration. 
Small Numbers Bargaining 
Second, Blair and Kaserrnan argue that transaction costs will rise where there is an ex 
ante or an ex post small numbers bargaining problem for one of the parties to a 
transaction. Such a situation occurs when one ofthe parties has many options, while the 
other party has few options (either before or after the. contract is signed), and it is easier 
to think of the "small numbers' as referring to the options rather than to the number of 
individuals involved in any given transaction. Thus one can think of a group of farmers 
who can sell their stock to many different companies (one party with many options), and 
the individual processor who has to purchase from a limited mainly regional pool of farmers 
in strong competition with other companies (one party with few options). In such a 
situation the person with the small number of options (the company) has the small numbers 
bargaining problem and therefore an incentive to integrate. 
Small numbers bargaining problems will be compounded by the degree to which the assets 
of the party with the least options are specific to the transaction, and by the number of 
times the transaction needs to take place. In general the more specific the asset and the 
more repeated the transaction, the greater the level of dependence and the higher the 
transaction costs. Note however that repeated transactions may lead to leaming so that 
the most powerful influence on bargaining problems tends to be asset specificity. 
Again, it must be emphasised that integration will not necessarily solve the problem of high 
transaction costs in every instance where there is a small numbers bargaining problem. 
For instance, if one reverses the example above and hypothesises that it is the group of 
farmers who have few options in dealing with a monopoly processor which can Source 
product from many farmers, it may not pay the farmers to integrate forwards if there are 
no efficiency gains from integration (i.e. if the monopoly has fixed proportions of inputs), 
and/or if the farmers have to pay the full costs of integration in the form of legal costs and 
a payment for the entire discounted stream of future monopoly profits. 
Bounded Rationality and Guile 
In both instances (uncertainty, and small numbers bargaining problems) the transaction 
costs of one or both parties will be raised by what Williamson (e.g. 1979) describes as 
bounded rationality and guile - the two manifestations of transactional man which make him 
less certain but more cunning than economic man. 
Bounded rationality, or the inability of any person to foresee and specify every event in the 
future, enhances the effects of uncertainty, and results either in incomplete contracts which 
are expensive to mpnitor and arbitrate, or a move from contracts to full integration in order 
to internalise the monitoring and arbitration costs. 
Guile or the ability to use cunning to extract a larger share of residual proms and quasi 
rents, results in the possibility that contracts either on an ex ante or an ex post basis will 
unduly favour one party or the other. For instance the party with specific assets can be 
held to ransome on an ex post basis, unless there are hostage clauses in the contract and 
low enforcement costs. Generally speaking the possibility of guile will move the party with 
the least options away from contracts and towards full integration, since full integration 
allows the possibility of a more stringent governance structure than the contract. 
Summary of Causes of Vertical Coordination 
The relative degree of vertical coordination in any given firm rests on the extent to which 
uncertainty and small numbers bargaining problems, compounded by bounded rationality 
and guile, impose costs on transactions between firms. The more the uncertainty and the 
smaller the number of options for any party to a transaction, the more that party will try to 
integrate by contract. As the number of transactions increase, and as the specificity of the 
assets of the integrating party increases, bounded rationality and guile push the firm 
towards full integration. The limit of the process is reached when the costs of extending 
the govemance system (essentially monitoring costs) exceed the benefits (reduced 
transaction costs). 
It must again be stressed that even under the circumstances outlined the costs of 
integration may exceed the ben ems, so that integration may not take place. Moreover 
integration may exact such a price from at least one of the parties in terms of loss of 
autonomy and possible loss of the role as residual claimant, that they will oppose 
integration as long as they have other options. Nevertheless the general trend will be 
towards some form of integration in these circumstances, particularly where there is a 
mutuality of interest, or a lack of other options for either or both parties, or where legal and 
tax advantages favour such integration. Note that the mutuality of interest will be affected 
by the relative attitudes to risk of the two parties. Hence mutual division of any residual 
profits will be influenced not only by bargaining power (and access to information) but also 
by degree of risk aversion. 
Vertical Coordination at Industry Level 
Blair and Kaserman also review the rather meagre literature on vertical coordination at the 
industry as opposed to the firm level and conclude that if one firm integrates and the others 
do not, then either the industry will move into disequilibrium as all residual variations are 
pushed on to the non-coordinated firms, or all the non-coordinated firms will be forced to 
integrate in order to match reduced costs. They state that this is an important area for 
future research. 
We now apply this theory to the NZ Meat Industry. 
APPLICATION OF THEORY TO THE NEW ZEALAND MEAT INDUSTRY 
The existence of contracts and various forms of vertical integration within the NZ Meat 
Industry establishes a prima facie case for the presence of high transaction costs in the 
marketing channel. 
We should note however that much of the vertical coordination which has already taken 
place has been in reaction to historical pressures which are no longer as significant as they 
once were. 
In particular the entry of the UK into the EC has led to a reduction in the dependence of 
UK firms on the NZ product and to a weakening incentive for UK firms to integrate 
backwards into the NZ processing industry. Hence the gradual departure of the UK firms 
from NZ processing, - a departure which has been accelerated by their decline within the 
UK due to a variety of causes. 
Again, deregulation of the meat industry, removal of NZ farm subsidies, and changes in 
overseas demand have created overcapacity in the processing industry and a reduced 
incentive for NZ farmers to integrate forwards into processing. It is now the processors 
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and not'the fanners who find their options restricted. As a consequence farmer support 
for cooperatives is declining and further changes in cooperative structures seem likely (see 
AFFCO Annual Report 1993). In particular a separation of ownership from suppliers 
seems likely to emerge. 
The main incentives to integrate are now coming from the uncertainty of the processing 
companies about availability of differentiated stock at a price/quality, and from the 
restriction of the companies' options in procuring stock in general (essentially a small 
numbers bargaining problem). 
To amplify:- as a general rule, the more a firm differentiates its products and the greater 
the investment it. makes in that differentiation, the higher will be the costs of non-supply of 
the product. Thus the differentiating finn will seek to reduce the uncertainty of supply by 
some kind of vertical coordination. 
While it is not clear to what extent end-distributors of meat products can, or want to, 
differentiate meat and meat products, it is reasonably clear that many markets and many 
customers within those markets now require a broadly differentiated product (e.g. chilled 
lamb for the US market, beef for Japanese market etc). Thus the processing companies 
have an incentive to vertically coordinate into procurement systems to reduce uncertainty 
about supply at a price-quality. Note, however that there is a further uncertainty here since 
it is diffICult to establish quality on a pre-slaughter basis. Nevertheless we would expect, 
and in fact we find, companies attempting to coordinate with the farms through contracts. 
Here, however, a second problem arises. The existence of general overcapacity in the 
processing industry, combined with the need for companies to cover high fIXed costs leads 
to reduced options (small numbers bargaining problem) for those companies which are 
trying to sign contracts. This problem is exacerbated by the difficulty of identifying and 
defining quality. Hence we would either expect a lack of success at establishing contracts 
(which we do find) or a higher degree of coordination, i.e. full integration onto the farms 
(which we do not find). 
The industry therefore seems to have reached a short tenn impasse. However we suggest 
that the theory tells us some possible directions in which the industry may move in the long 
term and also ,suggests the main areas into which we need to direct our academic 
resources. 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RESEARCH 
Many commentators have suggested that the movement towards differentiated products 
will continue (Crocombe, G 1990, Parker 1992) and we subscnbe to this view, if only 
because quality control is increasingly becoming important in all industries. 
Accordingly it is to be expected that the pressures on individual processors to provide a 
reliable supply of a differentiated product will increase. 
They will therefore'continue to move towards contracts or towards some other fonn of 
vertical coordination. 
However, faced with the general problems of stock procurement due to overcapacity, and 
the particular problems of identifying quality stock, the companies are unlikely to succeed 
in establishing contractual relations with the farmers unless capacity within the industry 
further declines, and/or unless identification and procurement of stock becomes so specific 
that the farmers' options for sale are reduced, thereby forcing the farmers towards 
contracts. 
If neither of these outcomes eventuates, then the companies will have three choices: 
(i) do not service differentiated markets; 
(ii) source differentiated product from countries other than New Zealand 
where there are fewer problems of identifying or supplying the 
differentiated product; 
(iii) integrate backwards on to the farms. 
Despite numerous newspaper comments on the desirability or otherwise of vertical 
coordination and differentiated products, little appears to be known about the short and 
long term profitability of these options for individual companies and for the industry as a 
whole. Even less is known about the broader welfare implications of the choices. We 
suggest therefore that a programme of research is essential to try to answer some of the 
following questions. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
To what extent are NZ Meat products differentiated? At what part of the marketing 
channel are they differentiated? 
What is the present extent and form of vertical coordination (either by contract or 
integration) in the NZ Meat Marketing Channel? 
What are the attitudeslbeliefs of the economic agents in the channel towards 
vertical coordination? 
What is the potential for NZ processing firms to source differentiated product from 
countries other than NZ? 
What is the operating capacity of the NZ processing industry? How much of that 
capacity is surplus to overall requirements? How far is the capacity geared towards 
a differentiated product? 
What are the product characteristics that need to be identified for various markets 
and how can these be identified pre-slaughter? 
7. What are the implications for the management of pastoral farming systems of 
growing animals to contract specifications? 
8. 
9. 
What are the economic and welfare implications for an individual firm and the 
farmers that supply that finn of vertical coordination? What are the economic and 
welfare implications for an individual firm and its suppliers of failure to coordinate 
vertically? 
What would be the impact on the industry as a whole if some firms vertically 
coordinated and others did not? 
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CONCLUSION 
The present situation within the industry is summed up by Jeff Jackson CEO of AFFCO. 
'So long as the industry continues to be characterised by an unstable 
supply base and a focus on capacity utilisation, the opportunities to create 
higher value products are limited to small volume specialised markets - for 
no company can afford to invest in a market development project for which 
certainty of supply cannot be guaranteed.' 
Transaction cost economics produces an analytical framework within which these problems 
may be addressed. These lines of research are currently being persued by a multi-
disciplinary research team at Massey University. 
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ABSTRACT 
The economic liberalisationmeasures adopted in New Zealand since 
the mid 1980s have accelerated competition and the pace of change 
in the agribusiness environment. One of the skills that 
agribusiness managers need in an increasingly turbulent 
environment is the capability to identify and monitor strategic 
issues of most concern to the firm's livelihood. This study 
reports on an exploratory survey which identifies the strategic 
issues regarded as important by a sample of New Zealand 
agribusiness decision makers. In addition, this study 
investigates the possibility that the relative concern for these 
strategic issues may vary across important firm characteristics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The New Zealand government implemented various economic 
liberalisation measures since mid-1984. Many agribusiness firms, 
over the last decade, have felt the impact of these unprecedented 
economic reforms. Dobson and Rae (1990) revealed that many 
agribusiness firms in New Zealand considered the reduction in the 
profitability of exports caused by the appreciation of the New 
Zealand dollar, the increased cost of working capital, reduced 
subsidies to farmer customers, and reduced purchasing power of 
customers in the domestic market as the most unfavourable changes 
that affected profits. The volume of lamb exported by New 
Zealand, for instance, fell by 28 percent between 1984 and 1991 
due primarily to the declining sheep numbers and farm investment 
(Storey 1992). Employment in agriculture, agricultural services 
and processing fell both in numbers and in share of total 
employment as well (Savage 1990) . 
The existence of an uncertain economic environment in agriculture 
is widely accepted (Havlicek 1986). Environmental adversity 
confronts agribusiness organisations and decision-makers with a 
basic survival issue of how to learn to deal effectively with 
these changed environments. There is, therefore, a growing need 
for managers to be increasingly aware of the impact of an 
environmental change on the business. How organisations (e.g. 
agribusiness firms) cope with environmental uncertainties and 
changes will probably be the most important determinant of their 
future success or failure (Camillus and Datta 1991). 
Decision makers respond differently to changes in the 
environment. Dutton and Duncan (1987) proposed that a major 
reason organisations respond differently to changes in economic 
environment involves how strategic issues are identified and 
interpreted by decision-makers. There is, therefore, a need to 
understand the perceptions of actual managers relative to 
strategic issues and their importance. The identification of 
strategic issues regarded as important by agribusiness decision 
makers is a key step in the design of research and educational 
activities aimed at improving the strategic management processes 
within agribusiness (Westgren et al. 1988). policy makers and 
scholars, for instance, can provide valuable assistance in 
gaining information and developing decision procedures to better 
cope with the issues. Furthermore, the identification of 
strategic issues by managers may assist researchers and managers 
in recognizing critical gaps in their perceptions of the 
environment. 
The strategic issue identification process is a critical element 
of strategic decision-making (Dutton et al. 1983; Mintzberg et 
al. 1976). Many agribusiness firms now include strategic issue 
identification as part of a full blown strategy revision exercise 
and as part of a comprehensive annual strategic review (King 
1982). Very few agricultural economists, however, have conducted 
research relating to strategic management and planning in 
agribusinesses (Dobson 1989). Westgren et al. (1988) have 
identified strategic issues which were considered as important 
by a small sample of agribusiness decision makers in California. 
Their results suggested the importance of strategic management 
~nd strategic issue identification to agricultural managers. In 
particular, their study documented key differences in concern for 
various strategic issues based on structural characteristics of 
the firm. No studies as yet have been done related to strategic 
issue identification among agribusiness firms in New Zealand. 
The environment in the 1990s promises to be full of potential 
surprises posing significant challenges for agribusiness 
strategic planners. Identification of strategic issues can be 
valuable in planning and in helping an organisation gear up to 
take advantage of potential opportunities offered by any crisis. 
Sirrte the identification of strategic issues is a key managerial 
task, this study reports on an exploratory survey effort to 
identify strategic issues as perceived by a sample of 
agribusiness decision makers in New Zealand. The objectives of 
this article are: (1) to determine if specific strategic issues 
are regarded as important and if priority concerns can be defined 
by a sample of agribusiness decision makers in New Zealand; and 
(2) to investigate the possibility that the relative concern for 
strategic issues may vary across important firm characteristics. 
STRATEGIC ISSUE IDENTIFICATION 
A key part of the strategic management process is identification 
of issues that warrant consideration and analysis. There has 
been discussion in the strategic management field about the need 
for a better understanding of how strategic issue identification 
can lead to effective analysis and responses. In fact, 
alternative approaches have been suggested to better understand 
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and use identification of strategic issues. 
King (1982) revealed four ways to deal with strategic issues in 
an organisation. First, strategic issues can simply be resolved 
by an individual or group in authority or a recognized expert in 
the area. . Second way to deal with a strategic issue is to 
formally model it. For instance, a formal predictive model could 
be developed to predict the likelihood of a maj or change in 
industry pricing strategy. Third way to resolve a strategic 
issue is to use an "issue staff study". This method involves 
providing the issue to a planning staff which then collects data 
and then conducts analyses to resolve the issue. The fourth 
approach to resolving a strategic issue is through the use of 
strategic issue analysis (see King (1982) for details). Other 
approaches that surfaced in the literature include: strategic 
issue management (Ansoff 1980), development of strategic data 
bases (King and Cleland 1977), strategic issue diagnosis (Dutton 
and Duncan 1987), and integrative planning system (Camillus and 
Datta 1991). 
Various definitions of a strategic issue have also emerged in the 
literature. King (1982) defines strategic issues as those which 
are potentially important to the firm's overall performance, are 
controversial in that individuals could have differing 
assessments of the impact of the issue, and imply that pursuit 
of differing strategies should be considered by the firm. Dutton 
and Duncan (1987), on the other hand, describes strategic issues 
as those developments or events which have not yet achieved the 
status of a decision event. Ansoff (1984) defines a strategic 
issue as a forthcoming development that is likely to have a major 
impact on the firm's ability to achieve its objectives. 
Westgren et al. (1988) argued that strategic issue identification 
is of particular importance for agricultural economists. They 
presented two primary reasons for their assertion. The first 
reason pertains to agricultural economists' long tradition of 
scanning the agricultural environment and suggesting issues for 
consideration to agricultural decision makers. The second reason 
relates to the fragmented nature of a number of industries within 
the agribusiness sector which suggests the distinctive nature of 
the sector. It is, therefore, possible that the issues faced by 
a number of industries (e.g. food processing) within the 
agribusiness sector are different from those of other industries. 
Downey and Erickson (1987) also mentioned that the distinctive 
features of agribusiness require a different type of management 
approach. 
Strategic issue identification should be the first step in the 
whole planning process (King 1982) and should be part of the 
strategic process (Bryson and Roering 1988). Evidences have been 
reported indicating that some organisations have gained 
substantial competitive advantage due to the ability of the firm 
to identify strategic issues of relative importance early enough 
(Camillus and Datta 1991). Being able to identify and recognize 
the significance of key strategic issues will enable 
organisations take prompt actions that could make them leaders 
in their field. Daniel (1992) proposed three areas where 
strategic issues should be evaluated: the environmental analysis, 
competitor analysis, and internal firm analysis. In addition, 
Dutton and Duncan (1987) revealed that the assessment of the 
importance of a strategic issue is a key factor in the process 
of strategic issue identification. The identification of 
strategic issues seems to be a key element in the ability of 
managers to practice strategic thinking (Porter 1987) . 
This study, therefore, reports on an exploratory survey which 
identifies the strategic issues regarded as important by a sample 
of agribusinesses decision makers in New Zealand. To date, there 
has been generally no strategic management studies done across 
agribusiness industries in New Zealand. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study used a mail survey of agribusiness decision makers 
across New Zealand over the period October-December 1992. Survey 
questionnaires were mailed to 175 agribusiness firms. A total 
of 57 businesses provided either complete or partial responses 
to the questionnaire for a response rate of 33 percent. Personal 
interviews were also conducted during the period January-February 
1993 to supplement the information received through the mail 
questionnaires. 
The sample of 57 firms represented a wide range of New Zealand 
agribusinesses, including firms selling fertilizer, animal health 
products, farm equipment, wool brokerage and exporting services, 
-skin and leather products, forestry products, fish products, 
dairy cooperatives, farm consultancy businesses, farm and 
agribusiness finance firms, stock and station agents, 
agricultural product packaging services, meat processors and 
exporters, and statutory boards_ Thirty six of the responding 
firms are corporations or corporate subsidiaries, 15 are 
agricultural cooperatives, four are sole proprietorships, five 
are partnerships, and six are industry organisations (e.g. 
statutory marketing boards, state owned enterprises) . 
The questionnaire employed in the study included sections similar 
to -those of the Westgren et al. (1988) study conducted for a 
sample of California agribusiness firms. The survey instrument 
included questions involving 16 issues related to the general 
business environment, 13 issues relating to the industry's 
competitive environment, and 15 issues related to the firm's 
internal environment. As in the Westgren et al. (1988) study, 
respondents were asked to evaluate the relative importance of 
these issues. In particular, respondents were requested to 
indicate if each specific issue was very important (a ranking of 
4), important (a ranking of 3), somewhat important (a ranking of 
2), and not important (a ranking of 1). Additional questions 
were asked regarding the type, size, product lines, and location 
of the firm. 
SURVEY RESULTS 
The survey respondents were asked to consider strategic issues 
in three categories: general business issues, competitive issues, 
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and internal issues (Table 1). The items listed in the first 
category correspond to the general environment defined by Wack 
(1985). The items listed under competitive and internal issues 
relate to factors within the firm's task environment (Robinson 
and Pearce 1983) . 
One of the objectives of this study was to determine if concern 
for specific issues varied across different types of agribusiness 
firms. To make the analyses complete, levels of concern for the 
various issues presented in Table 1 were also determined based 
on the following firm characteristics: (1) legal form; (2) 
product line; and (3) cadre size. 
The first part of this section describes the respondents' 
attitudes towards strategic issues. Subsequent parts focus on 
the extent to which certain firm characteristics discussed above 
affect prioritization of the strategic issues. 
Overall Prioritization of Strategic Issues 
As exhibited in Table 1, the average level of concern was 
relatively similar for the general business issues and the 
competitive issues. The average level of concern for internal 
issues was slightly higher than the other two categories at 2.96. 
Specific differences of perceived importance were also observed 
for specific issues within each category. For instance, on the 
average, more than half (nine out of 15) of the total number 
internal issues were considered as important (greater or equal 
to 3.00) by respondents compared to only three general business 
issues and two competitive issues. 
In terms of the average responses for the strategic issues, the 
average level of concern range from 1.85 (foreign tax policy) to 
3.67 (demand for the product) for the general business issues; 
from 1.86 (identification of minor product rivals) to 3.23 (raw 
material access) for the competitive issues; and from 1.98 
(depreciation of inventory) to 3.48 (productivity) for the 
internal issues. However, not considering the issue of 
identification of minor product rivals, average levels of concern 
for competitive issues range from 2.44 to 3.23. 
For the general business category, respondents showed strongest 
concern for the demand for the product. In terms of the average 
responses, . this issue was also considered the most important 
among all the issues listed in all three categories. In fact, 
about 95 percent of the respondents considered this issue as 
either important or very important. In contrast to the Westgren 
et al. (1988) study, environmental regulations both in the 
domestic and foreign scenes were not the greatest concerns of New 
Zealand agribusinesses. Instead, consistent with the results of 
the Dobson and Rae (1990) study, respondents showed more 
sensitivity to the value of the New Zealand dollar. Dobson and 
Rae surveyed a sample of New Zealand agribusiness firms in 1990 
regarding their responses to various economic liberalisation 
measures. Their results indicated that the reduction of 
profitability due to the change in the value of the New Zealand 
dollar was considered the most unfavourable change in the 
economic environment related to economic liberalisation. 
Farm income was also of considerable concern for New Zealand 
agribusinesses. Although the average level of concern for farm 
income was higher than that for the value of the New Zealand 
dollar, more respondents considered the latter issue as either 
important or very important. As expected, foreign trade policy 
was considered a stronger concern than domestic trade policy. 
Consistent with the results of Westgren et al., tax policies as 
a group received relatively lower rankings. Interestingly, the 
issue regarding governmental subsidies was no longer a major 
concern for New Zealand agribusiness decision makers. In 1990, 
Dobson and Rae reported that reduced subsidies paid to purchasers 
of the firm's products was among the most unfavourable changes 
in the economic environment. 
In contrast to the Westgren et al. study, the respondents' 
greatest concern among the competitive issues was for raw 
material access. Concern for rival's market share was also high. 
As expected, the concern for identification of new market 
opportunity was higher in the foreign rather than in the domestic 
market due perhaps to the smallness of the New Zealand domestic 
market. 
For the internal issues, the respondents showed considerable 
concern for productivity and management effectiveness. The 
respondents also displayed considerable concern for the financial 
position of their businesses. For instance, income statement, 
'liquidity, return to shareholders, and balance sheet received 
relati vely higher rankings. Interestingly, respondents as a 
group showed relatively less concern for research and development 
as a strategic issue. Westgren et aI, (1988) also revealed the 
same result in their survey of California agribusinesses. 
Legal Form 
The sample respondents were divided into five groupings based on 
their legal business form: corporation, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, cooperative, and others. The "others" group was 
comprised of state owned enterprises, statutory boards, and 
industry organisations. The average responses of the strategic 
issues as well as the rankings are exhibited in Tables 2 and 3. 
The sample comprised of 27 corporations, four sole 
proprietorships, five partnerships, 15 cooperatives, and five 
other forms. The Westgren et al. study did not analyse their 
responses based on legal form perhaps due to the smallness of 
their sample size. 
The results between the overall rankings and the rankings sorted 
by type of legal form seemed to be similar which could indicate 
that some degree of consensus exists among these diverse 
agribusiness firms. For instance, the strategic issues highly 
ranked across the various types of business forms in the general 
business category were generally the demand for the product, farm 
income, and the value of the New Zealand dollar. Foreign trade 
policy was highly ranked as well by the sole proprietorship 
agribusinesses. Cooperatives indicated a high level of concern 
m 
N 
for interest rate while other business forms assigned a high 
level of' concern for both domestic and foreign environmental 
regulations. 
In terms of the competitive issues, corporations displayed 
considerable concern for raw material access, change in rival's 
market share, and identification of new foreign market 
opportunity. Sole proprietorships were concerned about 
bargaining power of customers and suppliers, raw material access, 
and rivals' mergers and acquisitions. Partnerships, on the other 
hand, indicated a high level of concern for identification of new 
domestic market opportunity and raw material access. Change in 
rivals' market share was a major concern by the "other" type of 
legal form. 
With respect to internal issues, all the groups indicated a high 
level of concern for productivity and management effectiveness. 
Corporations ranked liquidity highly among the internal issues 
while sole proprietorships exhibited great concern for labour 
skills. 
Product Lines 
The levels of concern for the various strategic issues differed 
depending upon whether the firm supplied inputs to farmers and 
whether they were product marketing and processing firms. 
Therefore, firms were divided into two groups based on the 
character of their products. Firms which supplied input products 
and services to New Zealand farms were grouped into the "input" 
group. This group includes firms which sold animal health 
products, fertilizer, farm machinery, finance firms, and farm 
consultancy businesses. Processing and marketing firms were 
grouped into the "output" group. The output group includes firms 
involved in the following: dairy cooperatives, wool brokerage and 
exporting, meat processing and exporting, skin and leather 
products, forestry products, agricultural product packaging, 
fishing, and stock and station agents. There are 26 firms in the 
input group and 31 firms in the output group. Average responses 
and rankings for specific issues for the input group and the 
output group are presented in Table 4. 
The firms in the output group generally indicated a heightened 
level of concern for strategic issues than did the firms in the 
input group. With respect to the general business issues, both 
groupings concurred on being most concerned about the demand for 
the product. The input group, however, ranked farm price as 
third in terms of the level of concern in contrast to the rank 
of 11th given by the output group. As expected, the output group 
were more concerned about the value of the New Zealand dollar and 
labour relations due perhaps to the fact that most of the firms 
in the output group exported their products overseas. Moreover, 
firms in the output group have a higher level of concern for 
foreign environmental regulations than the firms in the input 
group. 
In terms of the competitive issues, both groupings expressed 
considerable agreement as to the relative importance of raw 
material access and changes in ri vals' market share. An 
interesting divergence emerged, however, with respect to the 
identification of new market opportunities. The input group 
ranked the domestic market higher than the foreign market. In 
contrast, the output group ranked identification of new foreign 
market opportunity significantly higher than the identification 
of new domestic market opportunity. 
Interestingly, the input group were much more concerned about 
their proj ected than their current balance sheet and income 
statements. The output group, however, were much more concerned 
about the current than the projected balance sheet and income 
statements. 
Firm's Cadre Size 
Strategic management process often differ significantly by size 
of firm (Westgren et al. 1988). It is, therefore, of interest 
to determine if the levels of concern for strategic issues 
differed by size of cadre. The size of the firm's cadre is used 
as a proxy for firm size in this study. 
,':'< 
The number of firm employees. varied among the agribusiness firms 
in the sample. Since there are no formal way of defining the 
size of the firm based on the number of employees, firms were 
separated into two groups. Hence, based on the number of 
employees, 28 firms with less than or equal to 30 employees each 
were grouped into the ·small" category and 27 firms with more 
than 30 employees each were grouped into the "large" category. 
Two firms were excluded from the analysis due to incomplete 
information regarding their cadre size. 
Average responses and rankings based on the categories of small 
versus large cadres are given in Table 5. The firms in the large 
group generally indicated higher concern for the strategic issues 
than the firms in the small group. The average levels of 
response for each three issue categories were consistently higher 
for the larger firms. This result is consistent with the 
Westgren et al. (1988) study of California agribusinesses. 
With regard to the general business issues, larger firms 
displayed more sensitivity to labour relations than did smaller 
firms. This result is not surprising considering the greater 
number of persons employed by larger firms than smaller firms. 
Smaller firms ranked foreign trade, tax, and environmental 
policies as much more important than did the larger firms. 
Larger firms ranked foreign trade policies as much more important 
than did the smaller firms in the Westgren et al. study. The 
result of this study is not surprising considering the fact that 
most of the firms in the sample exported their products overseas. 
Smaller firms, due to their size, were more concerned about the 
impact of foreign policies on their business operations than did 
larger firms. 
With respect to competitive issues, smaller firms expressed more 
concern for customers' bargaining power and change in the number 
of rivals than did the larger firms. Understandably, smaller 
0'\ 
W 
firms may feel more threatened than larger firms by changes in 
industry concentration and market power. Larger firms, however, 
ranked identification of new market opportunities in both the 
domestic and foreign markets higher than did the smaller firms. 
Larger firms, on the average, have a higher level of concern for 
the internal issues than smaller firms. Relative to internal 
issues, smaller and larger firms' levels of concern were greatest 
for management effectiveness and productivity, respectively. In 
addition, smaller firms ranked liquidity higher than did the 
larger firms. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Agribusiness firms in New Zealand, over the last decade, have 
felt the impact of unprecedented environmental uncertainty. One 
of the management skills that is needed in an uncertain business 
environment is the capability to identify and monitor strategic 
issues of most concern to the firm's livelihood. Moreover, the 
identification of strategic issues regarded as important by 
agribusiness decision makers is a key step in the design of 
research and educational activities aimed at improving the 
strategic management processes within agribusiness (Westgren et 
al. 1988). Policy makers and scholars, for instance, can provide 
valuable assistance in gaining information and developing 
decision procedures to better cope with the issues. Furthermore, 
the identification of strategic issues by managers may help 
researchers and managers recognize the critical gaps in their 
perceptions of the environment. 
This study reports on an exploratory survey which identifies the 
strategic issues regarded as important by a sample of New Zealand 
agribusiness decision makers. In addition, this study 
investigates the possibility that the relative concern for these 
strategic issues may vary across important firm characteristics. 
The results of the study generally indicate that respondents are 
concerned with strategic issues. In particular, the firms in the 
sample are quite concerned about the demand for their product, 
raw material access, productivity, and management effectiveness. 
Internal issues are also generally of greater importance relative 
to the general business and competitive issues presented. 
Results also suggest, however, that levels of concern for 
specific strategic issues vary across various structural 
dimensions of the firm like type of legal form, product lines, 
and size of firm. 
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Table 2. Average Responses of Specific Strategic Issues by Type of Legal Form 
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FARM BUSINESS MARKETING BEHAVIOUR AND STRATEGIC 
GROUPS IN AGRICULTURE 
'Fraser McLeay, Sandra Martin, and Tony Zwart 
Lincoln University 
Abstract 
Agricultural marlceting literature does not describe the farm business marketing process as part 
of an integrated strategic operation with interfunctional relationships between many business 
activities. It is often implicitly assumed that farmers follow relatively homogenous pattems 
of strategic behaviour. Likewise, the farm management discipline tends not to include the 
marketing behaviour of farmers within its domain. This contrasts with the business 
management literature which suggests that marketing and strategic management are complex 
processes and that businesses may utilise a variety of strategic approaches in their attempts 
to gain competitive advantage. 
Strategic group studies empirically identify groups of firms within an industry which follow 
similar strategies. Although the investigation of strategic groups within the agribusiness 
sector has been identified as an important area for future research, there appears to have been 
little research which has examined strategic groups at the farm business level. This paper 
presents results of an analysis of the farm business marketing and strategic management 
processes. These show that strategic groups of Canterbury intensive crop farmers exist, and 
the marketing, business, and management characteristics associated with each distinctive 
strategic focus are described. 
Key words 
Agricultural Marketing, Strategic Behaviour, Strategic Groups, Farm Management 
Introduction 
It can be argued that agriCUltural marketing specialists have often studied the marketing 
behaviour and strategic management processes of farmers in an over-simplified manner. 
Agricultural economists have traditionally taken the view that marketing is a process which 
occurs after the product leaves the farm gate or with a change of ownership, meaning farmer 
marketing decisions are frequently limited to sales decisions and production planning is 
excluded from the marketing process (McLeay and Zwart, 1993). Most detailed studies have 
only examined individual elements of the marketing process, often using operations research 
techniques to identify one optimal solution. This implicitly assumes that farmers should follow 
one pattern of strategic behaviour. On the other handfarm management specialists often view 
production as the' cornerstone of farm management with supporting functions of record 
keeping, financial analysis and legal planning. This model of farm management evolved from 
production economics with financial management supporting this production activity (Lyons 
et al. 1987). Marketing decisions are excluded from this management process as is a 
mechanism to facilitate the interactive thinking which is needed to take a strategic approach 
to managing a farm business (Lyons et al. 1987; Harling and Quail, 1990). 
Within the business literature however, marketing is seen as an essential component of 
business management and the marketing management process is usually modelled in a 
strategic manner that illustrates the interactions with other functional areas of the firm as well 
as non controllable environmental factors. That is, marketing strategy is seen as part of an 
integrated process with complex and often synergistic relationships between a number of 
business and marketing operations, and it is frequently shown that a business may take a 
variety of strategic approaches in its quest for competitive advantage (eg. Porter, 1980; Miles 
and Snow, 1978; McGee and Thomas, 1986). 
Reasons for the perceived distinctions between the literature streams include that the 
biological nature of farm produce, the small scale nature of farming enterprises, and the 
competitive structure of the agricultural sector make the management of farm businesses 
different from other businesses. Business management theory has developed from conceptual, 
empirical and anecdotal research into the management processes of non-farm businesses. 
While it is naive and possibly dangerous to suggest that principles from the business literature 
should be prescribed to fanners or incorporated into farm management or agriCUltural 
marketing theories, the issue of whether farm businesses are so fundamentally different from 
other businesses that farm managers decision making processes should be described and 
studied using techniques and theoretical frameworks that are different from those used to 
analyze and illustrate the management behaviour of non-farm businesses needs to be 
addressed. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of alternative strategies may exist at the farm 
business level, each of which focuses on a distinctive combination of important strategic 
variables. For example, a farmer might follow a cost minimisation strategy and attempt to 
produce maximum output at the lowest possible costs. Alternatively a quality driven strategy 
would mean a focus on quality and price premiums rather than production cost minimisation, 
thereby producing what the market wants with respect to quality and attracting high returns 
per unit of output. 
While research on strategic management is seen as being of high profile by agribusiness 
professionals (Rogers and Caswell, 1988; Dobson and Akridge, 1989; Westgren et ai. 1988), 
at the farm level research into this area has been limited. However there is a growing 
recognition that business management principles, particularly those from the strategic 
management discipline may have something to contribute the farm management literature 
(Wright, 1989; Martin et al. 1990; Brunhl:er, 1990; Renborg, 1988; Harling and Quail, 1990). 
The majority of the small number of farm level strategic management studies attempt to 
prescribe formal strategic planning models similar to those prescribed for large businesses 
although there is little empirical or anecdotal evidence to show if these techniques will help 
farm businesses managers achieve their objectives (eg White, 1987; Jeppesen, 1990). 
Although it is often considered that strategy is a formal hierarchial process, the strategic 
management process at the farm level may follow a more entrepreneurial mode, being 
informal and unstructured and performed intuitively or instinctively (Mintzberg, 1992). Little 
is known about the strategic management processes of farmers, in particular the strategic 
m 
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- decisions made by fanners, the strategic alternatives available for fanners and the resulting 
strategic outcomes (Martin et al. 1990; Brunillcer, 1990). An empirical study which identifies 
the strategic dimensions underlying farm business strategy, could be used to determine if 
fanners follow different business strategies, and operationalise the complexity of the farm 
business marketing and strategic processes. Such a study could determine the extent to which 
fann business managers marketing and strategic behaviour differs from that of managers in 
other businesses. It may ultimately lead to a bridging of the perceived gap between the 
different branches of the literature. 
In the business literature strategic group studies have been used to empirically identify the 
alternative strategies which businesses follow, often when little a priori evidence exists about 
how many strategic groups exist or how many members they have. Groups are formed where 
members make similar decisions with respect to key variables, but patterns of strategic 
behaviour differ from group to group. It is argued that by better understanding strategic 
groups at the fann business level it may be possible to increase the understanding of the 
marketing behaviour and strategic management processes of fanners. 
In this -paper the results of an empirical analysis of the marketing and strategic behaviour of 
farmers are reported. It is shown that there are significant differences between intensive crop 
farmers patterns of strategic behaviour and the marketing, business and farmer characteristics 
associated with having each distinctive strategic focus are described. The implications of the 
results for the agricultural marketing and farm management disciplines are discussed. 
Methodology 
Overview 
The aim of this research was to identify and describe strategic groups and evaluate their 
marketing implications for farmers. The following paragraphs outline the methodology 
employed for analysis; the sample and rationale for focusing on that sample, and the variables, 
measurements and method of data collection. 
Method of data analysis 
An approach to strategic group analysis which is well developed in the strategic management 
literature involves identifying strategic groups by measuring firms relative positions over a 
number of strategic variables, categorising businesses into each group and using statistical 
tests to help develop proflles of strategic group members. Alternative techniques have been 
used to identify strategic groups and categorise firms into each group. These include rule of 
thumb adhoc procedures which place businesses into a priori determined groups on the basis 
of a limited number of strategic dimensions. Another method is to use statistical techniques 
to identify alternative strategies after preliminary data analysis. Because theoretical constructs 
for the a priori determination of strategic groups at the fann business level are not well 
developed, this study used cluster analysis to statistically identify groups of firms following 
similar strategies. 
When a number of strategic variables are involved, it is common to conduct a strategic group 
analysis in three stages similar to those shown in figure I (for example see Kim and Lim, 
1988; Douglas and Rhee, 1988; Dess and Davis, 1984). This procedure was followed in this 
study with all analyses were carried out using SPSS/PC+ version 4.1. Each stage is described 
in more detail below. 
Figure 1. Methodology used to fonn and describe strategic groups 
Slage 1 
Identify underlying strategic dimensions using factor analysis 
Slage2 
Subject factor scores to cluster analysis to identify groups 
of businesses which pursue similar strategies 
Slage 3 
Describe clusters and their marlc:cting implications, using ANOV A. 
multiple comparison and chi·square tests to highlight inter·cluster differences 
Stage 1: Factor analysis 
Because intercorrelations among some strategy variables were expected to be significant, a 
second stage varimax principle components factor analysis was used to reduce the number of 
strategic variables to a smaller more focused set of dimensions. If unstable factor loadings 
were present they would represent a methodological weakness in the study. Unstable factor 
loadings may result from the small number of cases (n=143) relative to the number of 
variables subjected to factor analysis (n=39). However the ratio is close to the conservative 
estimate indicated by Hair et al. (1990) of four to five as many cases as variables and should 
not present a limitation. In addition confirmatory analysis using other methods of factor 
extraction suggested the factors were relatively stable. 
Stage 2: Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis is a classification tool based on a family of algorithms which has been used 
to identify businesses and classify them _into groups or clusters on the basis of 
similarity/dissimilarity. It can be used when little is known a priori about the number of 
categories formed and what or who the members of these categories will be (Green and 
Carroll 1978, Dillion and Goldstein 1984). 
Non hierarchial methods have been shown to be preferable to hierarchial clustering 
algorithms, but have problems in determining initial starting points and an appropriate number 
of clusters. Punj and Stewart (1983) and Milligan (1980) suggest a 2 stage clustering 
methodology to address this problem. A preliminary clustering solution is used to select the 
number of clusters and identify cluster centroids and outliers. Remaining cases are then 
subjected to a non hierarchial clustering algorithm. This approach has been used in number 
of marketing studies including those by Lamb et al. (1989), and Lawless and Finch (1991). 
Ward's (1963) nnmmum variance algorithm using the squared euclidean measure of 
interobject similarity was used to determine the initial clustering solution. Ward's method 
is one of the most popular techniques for selecting cluster seeds (ReIsen and Green 1991). 
At the present time there are no statistically valid methods for determining an appropriate 
number of clusters, however a number of rules of thumb have commonly been used (Everitt, 
0"1 
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1980), The rule used in this study was to look for a increase in the cluster coefficients as the 
algorithm successively combines clusters, A marked increase suggests that two relatively 
dissimilar clusters have been combined,· suggesting the number of clusters prior to the merger 
is the most probable solution (Aldendefer and Blashfield, 1984; Hair et aI. 1990). This 
heuristic decision rule was supplemented by determining if strategic groups had external 
validity by examining if clusters varied significantly on descriptive variables that were not 
used to generate clusters using the procedures described below (Aldendefer and Blashfield, 
1984). 
Stage 3: Testing differences between clusters· 
A method which strategic group researchers frequently einploy to delineate the attributes of 
strategic group members involves describing each cluster after using statistical techniques to 
identify the variables where values differ significantly from one strategic group to another. 
In this study inter-cluster differences attributable to each factor or variable were tested using 
F ratio comparisons of variances among the mean of criterion variables from a one way 
ANOVA analysis (Johnson, 1967) and using Duncan's multiple range tests of homogeneity, 
adjusted for unequal cluster size. Because of· the qualitative way in which some of the 
questions were answered the differences between clusters for some variables were tested using 
chi-square tests of independence rather than an ANOV A. 
Sample 
Relative to farmers in other farming systems, arable farmers seem particularly suitable for this 
type of study because a potentially high level of diversity exists in the strategic and marketing 
decisions they could make. They are in a position to adju'st their strategies especially by 
changing product mix, quicker than other farmers. The 'study is limited to the Canterbury 
region where the majority of New Zealands arable farmers are concentrated. This was to limit 
the influence of non-controllable environmental factors since farmers in this region are likely 
to operate within relatively similar climatic conditions and have similar growing conditions 
and soil types .However they are in a position to sell through a large number of distribution 
channels and grow a relatively diverse range of crops. 
Farms were identified from the New Zealand Department of Statistics 1991, Agricultural 
Survey data. Intensive crop farms are classified as those farm businesses which receive more 
than 75% of income from cropping and all farms in the Canterbury region meeting this 
criteria were included in the sample. 
Variables, Measurements, and Method of Data Collection 
Marketing and strategic variables were identified by surveying literature from the disciplines 
of business and agricultural marketing, farm management, agricultural economics, industrial 
organisational economics, and strategic management; at all times taking into account the 
unique nature of farm businesses, Special attention was focused on examining existing 
conceptual strategic typologies including Porter's (1980) generic strategies and Miles and 
Snow's (1978) strategic typologies as a starting point for identifying appropriate variables. 
Taxonomic classifications of strategy including many strategic group studies were also 
reviewed. As it is necessary to have a detailed knowledge of the industry to specify correct 
strategic variables (Cool, 1985), the literature review was followed by detailed interviews with 
with farm owner/managers and farm management academics. 
As part of the overall analysis a number of different types of variables were identified. Some 
of these are related to strategic activity and were used as inputs to factor and cluster analysis 
(:;tages 1 and 2), others were used to test the relationship between strategy, the environment 
and performance, while additional variables were used to develop profiles of strategic group 
members (:;tage 3). 
The eight page questionnaire contained 49 attitudinal questions where participants were asked 
the extent they used various strategic and marketing activities, and their attitudes towards non 
controllable environmental factors on a five point scale. These include variables which assess 
sources of sustainable competitive advantage and distinctive competencies. Similar types of 
questions were used to ask farmers the perceived importance of 18 information sources and 
15 information types to their business operation. Additional questions were aimed at 
describing farm and farmer characteristics, crop mixes, sales methods and outlets, 
environmental factors and business performance. 
After being pretested twice by 5 Canterbury crop farmers the questionnaire was mailed to 
all 247 sample members. The first mailing included a cover letter, questionnaire and postage 
paid return envelope. Twenty one days later the non-respondents were mailed a reminder 
letter. A total of 190 questionnaires were returned (62 after the reminder letter). 48 returned 
but unanswered questionnaires reduced the effective mailout to 199. 144 completed surveys 
were received (1 was unusable due to missing information), giving an effective response rate 
of 72%. The response rate compares very favourably with that in similar studies and 
indicates non-respondent bias should not be an issue. In addition, because of the exploratory 
and illustrative nature of this research it is not essential to make inferences about the 
population. 
Results and Discussion 
The discussion of the results is broken into three parts; identification and description of the 
underlying strategic dimensions (factors), identification of strategic groups and description 
of the strategies their members follow, and description of strategic group members. 
Underlyin& Strategic Dimensions 
Appendix 1 presents the principle factor solution obtained after a varimax rotation of 
responses from the 39 key attitudinal statements (out of the original 49 attitudinal questions) 
which were related to strategic activity. -Factors are ranked in order according to the 
proportion of variance explained and have been named to reflect the strategic dimensions they 
represent. After checking that the data set was appropriate for factor analysis standard latent 
root equals one (factors=l1) and scree test (factors=14) criterion were used as guidelines 
to determine the number of factors in the first rotations. These were followed by several 
different trial rotations where factor interpretability was compared. 13 factors explaining 
69.2% of total variation appeared to give the best representation of underlying relationship 
among variables. The following paragraphs describe the strategic dimensions which each of 
the 13 factors appear to represent. 
1. Differentiation 
The first factor is related to activities concerned with differentiating produce, either by 
growing niche crops or involvement in further processing and value adding activities. This 
factor has high factor loadings on questions relating to growing crops which are different 
from those produced by other farmers and therefore require specialised knowledge, growing 
...... 
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· crops on a trialbasis, having specialised knowledge that other farmers do not have and being 
involved with· off farm marketing activities including owning and managing facilities that are 
normally owned by middlemen further down the distribution chain. 
2. Production flexibility 
Farmers who have high factor scores on the strategic dimension named production flexibility 
are likely to have flexible production plans, to regularly change their crop mix and to plan 
production by monitoring a number of market signals. 
3. Production focus 
This factor has high loadings on questions relating to production activities. Farmers with high 
scores on this strategic dimension would be expected to place high levels of emphasis on 
monitoring their crops, and updating production techniques. They are likely to use specialist 
techniques to maximise crop yields, be aware of crop costs and returns, and feel that 
maximising farm profits is their most important farming goal. 
4. Market knowledge 
This factor or strategic dimension is associated with understanding market requirements and 
the distribution channels the product moves through after it leaves the farm gate. Questions 
which load highly include those which are concerned with high levels of awareness of new 
crops and crop varieties, monitoring market signals to plan sales production decisions and 
simultaneously planning production and sales activities. 
5. Sales flexibility 
The sales flexibility factor has a significant negative factor loading on the question relating 
to selling crops by contract and a positive factor loading on . selling crops on the free market. 
Emphasis is placed on having flexible sales plans and not having sales decisions limited 
because of involvement in sales contracts. The high factor loadings on the questions which 
relate to storing crops so they can be sold when the price is highest and monitoring market 
signals to plan sales decisions are consistent with this interpretation. 
6. Market flexibility 
The market flexibility factor differs from the sales flexibility factor as it is associated with 
having flexible market outlets rather than being flexible in the method or timing of sales. A 
high negative loading on the question associated with dealing with a minimum number of 
market outlets and highly positive loadings on questions relating to seeking new merchants 
and market outlets and being aware of the differences returns from selling to different market 
outlets indicates farmers with high factor scores on this strategic dimension would be likely 
to continually seek new market outlets and sell to a large number of market outlets. 
7. Stability 
This dimension has high factor loadings on questions associated with planning crop mixes to 
minimise risk, havIng a stable crop mix and meeting long term market requirements which 
grow well on the farm. Therefore farmers with high scores on this factor are likely to grow 
a stable mix of crops which are perceived to have low levels of production and/or sales risk. 
8. Low cost focus 
The low cost focus strategic dimension has high factor loadings on questions associated with 
having low input costs. Farmers with high factor scores would be likely to have low input 
costs and budget and plan in order to obtain these low costs. . 
9. Financial imperative 
Factor loadings indicate farmers with high factor scores on this factor feel they can't afford 
to store crops and wait for the price to improve. The negative factor loading on the question 
asking if farmers obtain high crop prices by holding crops in storage until the price improves 
also indicates these farmers are unlikely to store crops. 
10. Commercial sensitivity 
The co=ercial sensitivity factor is associated with keeping knowledge from other farmers. 
Significant loadings on questions relating to growing crops on a trial basis, selling crops on 
the free market, maximising farm profits and monitoring market prices indicate farmers with 
high factor scores on this strategic dimension are likely to be secretive. 
11. Financial focus 
The eleventh factor appears to relate to the perception that the farm gate is the boundary of 
the business and viewing the farm operation with a simple financial focus. Businesses scoring 
highly on this dimension are likely to be fmancially secure and feel that there is little they 
can do to influence the price of their produce. 
12. Off-farm financial focus 
This factor is associated with investing money off-farm rather than into the farm. The high 
loading on the question involving farming in a relatively unconstrained manner because of 
easy access to capital means that farmers with high scores on this dimension are likely to 
have available capital that they are prepared to invest off-farm. 
13. Short term returns focus 
An examination of the factor loadings for the thirteenth factor indicates that farmers with high 
scores on the short term returns focus factor are likely to be involved in a number of activities 
associated with maximising short term returns. This factor has significant loading on questions 
relating to using specialist techniques to gain quality premiums and maximise yields, and 
being aware of crop costs and returns. A possible explanation for the significant negative 
loading on the question relating to growing crops which meet long term market requirements 
is that farmers with a high factor score on this factor perceive they meet short term rather 
than long term market requirements. 
Identification and Description of Strategic Groups 
Mter completing the factoring procedures orthogonal or uncorrelated standardised factor 
scores (mean 0, standard deviation 1) were saved for subsequent cluster analysis. Two 
businesses were considered outliers using the arbitrary rnle of failure to fuse within the last 
10% of clusters and dropped from subsequent analysis. 
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· The preliminary clustering. solution: indicated a large change in the increase in cluster 
coefficients as clusters 5 and 6 and 2 and 3 were merged indicating either a 5 or 2 cluster 
solution was appropriate. Therefore solutions containing between 2 and 5 clusters were 
examined for interpretability, and external validity by testing if there were significant 
differences between clusters over descriptive variables that were not used to generate clusters. 
A 5 cluster solution was deemed most meaningful as this solution was highly interpretable 
and appeared to have external validity. Solutions with less thim 5 clusters forced groups of 
farmers together which seemed to follow relatively different business strategies. 
Figure 2 indicates the percentage of businesses in each of the 5 clusters which were identified. 
These have been named according to the strategy which businesses in the groups follow after 
examining the factor scores for each strategic group on each strategic dimension. Mean factor 
scores and standard deviations from the second stage of the clustering procedure are presented 
in appendix 2. High mean scores indicate that a particular dimension is important to a 
business. For most strategic dimensions the small F probabilities indicate that cluster scores 
differ significantly over strategic dimensions; however the tests must be interpreted in the 
context that the groups were generated through cluster analysis. Duncan's multiple range tests 
show the significant differences which exist between individual clusters (strategic groups) for 
each strategic dimension. The graphical representation of mean strategic group scores for each 
strategic dimension presented under appendix 2 is also useful as an aid in determining the 
differences between group strategies. The following paragraphs briefly describe the business 
strategy followed by each cluster. 
1. Production/production flexibility strategy 
This group contains 28 farmers or 20% of the sample. Cluster members score highly on the 
strategic dimensions associated with having production flexibility, a production focus, high 
levels of market knowledge and low costs. The low loading on the stability dimension is 
consistent with high levels of production flexibility while low scores on sales and market 
outlet flexibility factors indicates businesses following this strategy are concerned with the 
costs and efficiency of production rather than sales concerns. 
2. Stability strategy 
The second cluster was the largest of all containing 32% of the sample. Farmers in this 
strategic group have significantly higher scores on the stability and financial focus factors 
than most other group members. The low score on the production flexibility factor is 
Figure 2 
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consistent with high scores on the stability factor indicating that these farmers consistently 
plant a standardised crop mix which they feel grows well on their farm. High scores on the 
strategic dimension relating to fmancial focus and low scores on the off-farm financial focus 
dimension signifies farmers following this strategy are likely to operate with a simple 
financial focus and view the farm gate as the boundary of the farm business. The low score 
on the market knowledge factor may be explained by low factor scores on the production 
flexibility, production focus and market outlet flexibility strategic dimensions. Because these 
farmers are unlikely to grow new crop types or varieties, or change production or sales 
techniques they may not need to monitor market signals to the same extent as other farmers. 
3. Production/market outlet focus strategy 
21 % of the sample follow a production/market outlet focus strategy. An examination of 
appendix 2 indicates these businesses place emphasis on production activities, but have an 
inflexible crop mix and a high degree of channel flexibility. The high scores on the market 
outlet flexibility factors indicates they sell to a large number of different agents or market 
outlets, are continually searching for new market outlets or agents, and are likely to weigh 
up the costs and returns of selling to different market outlets. 
4. Differentiation strategy 
Differentiators are members of the smallest strategic group, containing just 9% of the sample. 
Members scores are significantly higher than other firms on the strategic dimension relating 
to differentiation, suggesting these farmers are likely to differentiate their produce by growing 
niche crops, further processing and marketing, or involvement in other value adding activities. 
They score positively on all strategic dimensions except those associated with having a short 
term returns focus and viewing the farm with a simple financial focus. High levels of off-farm 
investment activity may be explained by involvement in further processing and marketing 
activities through vertical integration. The relatively flexible production focus is consistent 
with growing niche crops. A high score on the market outlet flexibility dimension may be 
associated with producing non traditional crops that are sold through market outlets that are 
different from those for traditional crops, or farmers developing their own markets for 
produce. Differentiators are likely to have high levels of market knowledge and score highly 
on the financial imperative dimension. 
5. Arbitrage strategy 
The flith strategic group contains 18% of sample members. Businesses are characterised by 
their high level of sales flexibility which means they are likely to sell crops on the free 
market rather than by contract. They will also store crops and wait for the price to improve. 
These farmers have a short term returns focus and focus on sales and investment opportunities 
(including off-farm investments) rather than production concerns. It appears that they obtain 
satisfaction either by obtaining high crop prices through gaining quality premiums or selling 
produce at an optimal time of year, or by involvement in off-farm financial activities. The 
high scores on the fmancial imperative dimension are hard to interpret because a sales focus 
indicates that these farmers would be likely to store crops and wait for the price to improve. 
Description of strategic groups 
In order to ascertain if the personal and management characteristics of strategic group 
members are consistent with the strategies they follow, discussion in the following paragraphs 
further develops profiles of group members by examining the differences between descriptive 
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variables relating to farm and farmer characteristics, crop mix, miscellaneous marketing 
'characteristics and information gathering activities. Results relating to the sales methods 
utilised by strategic group members, the influence the environment has on business strategy, 
and the performance implications of strategic group membership are not reported in this 
paper. For many variables test results indicate there are significant differences between 
strategic groups, suggesting that clusters have external validity. 
Fann and (ann characteristics 
The following paragraphs describe farming areas, financial characteristics, personal 
characteristics of owner managers, and their work experience. 
Fanning areas 
The results from the ANOVA and Duncan's tests for a number of farm area statistics are 
presented in the top part of appendix 3. Results show that farmers following a differentiation 
strategy have the largest land areas and effective crop areas and planted the largest areas of 
crops in the 1991/92 season, followed by farmers utilising a production focus/production 
flexibility strategy who have the largest areas of irrigated land. Members of both of these 
strategic groups have high scores on the production focus and production flexibility strategic 
dimensions. Farmers following an arbitrage strategy have significantly smaller effective crop 
areas and irrigated areas than all other strategic group members. No significant differences 
were found in the areas managed for other farmers, however farmers in the 
production/production flexibility cluster are slightly more likely to rent or lease land to or 
from other farmers, than some other strategic group members. 
Financial characteristics 
Information was collected on strategic group members levels of debt servicingl and the 
percentages of gross farm income earned from crop farming. Chi-square statistics indicate that 
there are not significant differences between strategic 'group members debt servicing 
requirements, however all differentiators have some debt. The previous observation explains 
why differentiators score highly on the financial imperative strategic dimension. 
There are significant differences between the percentage of strategic group members who earn 
more or less than 80% of their farm income from crop farming. Differentiators earn a 
relatively low amount of farm income from this source, possibly because some of their 
income is obtained through further processing; value adding, or other marketing activities 
which they do not classify as crop farm income. 
Personal characteristics of the fanner 
Results of a chi-square analysis indicate that significant inter-group differences exist between 
cluster members ages. The majority of farmers following a stability strategy are aged over 50 
while no more than one third of the farmers in any other strategic group are this old. 
Although most farmer have not attended tertiary institutions, there are inter-cluster differences 
betWeen the number of farmers with more or less than one years tertiary education because 
most farmers following a differentiation strategy have spent one or more years gaining higher 
education qualifications. A relatively high proportion of farmers utilising a differentiation and 
1 defmed as interest and principal payments as a propmtion of gross farm income for the 1991·1992 financial year 
arbitrage approach have spent between 3 and 4 years at tertiary institutions indicating these 
farmers may have obtained university degrees. 
Work experience 
The farming experience section of appendix 3 presents results from the analysis of a number 
of variables relating to farm experience. An examination of the results shows that farmers 
following a stability strategy have spent the most time involved with crop farming, working 
on their present crop farm and in charge of making decisions on either their present or 
another crop farm. Fanners following an arbitrage strategy have spent significantly fewer 
years gaining this type of experience signifying they have been intensive crop farming for a 
shorter period of time than many other strategic group members. These farmers are also 
relatively more likely to have worked at a non-farm job. 
Farmers were asked if they occupied positions with more responsibility than normal voting 
members with marketing cooperatives and farmer organisations, and if they owned or 
managed a non-farm business. Statistical tests could not carried out to assess if there were 
significant inter-group differences because many cells of the contingency table contained less 
than five cases, however clear inter-cluster variations appear to exist. Results clearly 
demonstrate that a high proportion of differentiators are involved in both farm and non-farm 
related organisations and business. These farmers do not appear to view the farm gate as the 
boundary of the business operations which is indicated by the low score on the fmancial focus 
factor and high scores on the of farm financial focus dimension. A high percentage of 
differentiators owning, managing or directing non-farm businesses may be associated with 
vertical integration and their involvement in further processing, value adding and marketing 
activities. A relatively high proportion of farmers following a production focus-production 
flexibility strategy are likely to occupy positions of responsibility in farmer organisations and 
marketing cooperatives. However unlike differentiators they limit their involvement to 
business activities directly related to the farm. 
Work away from fann 
Information contained in a section near the bottom of appendix 3 shows the differences in the 
periods of time cluster members spend working away from the farm. Farmers following a 
stability and arbitrage strategy spend less time working away from the farm at farm related 
activities than farmers whose strategies generally focus more on production activities and/or 
having flexible crop mixes. Farmers following a arbitrage strategy spend significantly more 
time than other group members earning income at another job meaning they. are more likely 
to have part time employment away from the farm. Although the statistics are not significant 
differentiators also spend a relatively large amount of time working away from the farm, 
possibly because they occupy positions of responsibility in other businesses and organisations. 
Members of the stability group do not spend many days working away from the farm. 
Crop mix 
Because the diverse range of crops grown in the Canterbury area and small number of farmers 
growing some crops makes it difficult to obtain an overall picture from examining individual 
crop data, crops were divided into niche, vegetable, specialry2 and traditional crop types. 
Analysis of crop areas or a concentration index based on relative areas are unlikely to indicate 
the importance of niche, or vegetable crops to a farm business, therefore inter-cluster crop 
mix variations were examined by analysing the numbers of each type of crop which strategic 
> Crops that are not vegetable or niche crops but require specialised techniques to produce or harvest 
" w 
.group members grew ( the average' numbers of each type of crop strategic group members 
produce is illustrated in figure 3). Although there were no differences in the number of 
traditional crops grown by farmers results from ANOV A analysis (not reported) indicate 
significant inter-group differences in niche, vegetable, specialty and total crop numbers. 
Differentiators and farmers in the production/production flexibility group grew a significantly 
higher total number of crops and niche crops than other strategic group members. These are 
the only strategies for which farmers have high scores on both the production flexibility and 
production focus dimensions:Differentiators grow significantly higher numbers of vegetable 
crops than all other strategic group members while farmers following a production/production 
flexibility grow the highest numbers of specialty type crops. 
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In the bottom section of appendix 3 the results from analysis of the number of agents or 
market outlets which cluster members sell to, the number of crops they grew in the season 
they were interviewed and had not grown previously, and the marketing orientation of cluster 
members are presented. 
Farmers following a production/market outlet focus and differentiation strategy sell their 
produce to significantly more agents or market outlets than other strategic group members. 
Production/market outlet. focusers high scores on the market outlet flexibility strategic 
dimension indicates they actively seek new market outlets and sell to large number of market 
outlets, while differendators grow many different types of non-traditional crops which may 
necessitate the utilisation of non-traditional market outlets or lead to farmers developing their 
own markets for these crops. Differentiators and members of the product/production flexibility 
cluster are significantly more likely to be growing crops which they had not grown previously 
than other cluster members. This appears to be associated with their flexible production plans 
and the large number of crops they grow. The marketing orientation of farmers was assessed 
by asking farmers if they agreed with the statement that they increase their farm business 
success by satisfying the needs and wants of either the buyers or final consumers of their 
produce on a five point likert type scale coded from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly 
agree). Differentiators scored highest on both questions indicating they have the highest 
marketing orientation of any strategic group. 
Information gathering 
Results from the intergroup analysis of the sources and types of infqrmation which farmers 
perceive 'to be important are presented in appendices 4 and 5. The results from ANOV A 
analysis and Duncan's tests are presented in appendix 4 with each information type and 
source presented in decreasing order of diversity. ANOV A statistics show there are significant 
differences (p<O.05) between [he perceived importance of overseas newspaper and magazines, 
agents, farmer group meetings, crop field days, farm workers, personal records, farm advisors 
and A. and P. shows as information sources. Similarly, contrasts were found for the value of 
management practices, crop costs and returns, overseas crop prices, New Zealand crop yields, 
overseas crop stockpiles, and new crops and varieties as information types. Results from 
Duncan's multiple range tests indicate there are significant differences between members of 
every strategic group perceived importance for at least some information sources. The types 
of information which farmers following a production/production flexibility strategy and 
production/market outlet focus strategy, do not differ significantly, possibly because members 
of these groups focus on production concerns. 
Appendix 5 presents the information gathering activities that are seen to be more important 
than average ranked in decreasing order of importance. Farmers following a stability strategy 
do not feel that a great deal of information sources or types are valuable, unlike producers 
utilising a differentiation approach. Results indicate the information gathering activities which 
farmers perceive to be impOltant change according to the strategic group they are in, and 
appear· to be consistent with the strategy members of each group follow. 
Summary of strategic groups 
In summary, members of each group appear to operate their businesses in a distinctive manner 
and follow clearly defined but seemingly different business strategies. 
Members of the productionjocuslflexibility strategic group appear to concentrate on the costs 
and efficiency of production rather than sales concerns. This cluster has large farms and crop 
areas and the largest area of itrigated land. Members spend more time working away from 
the farm at farm related activities than other farmers and utilise many types and sources of 
information especially those associated with production planning, production techniques and 
management practices. Their flexible production focus is driven by external market signals. 
The second group is concerned with stability and growing a stable croP'mix which has been 
grown previously on their farm. Owner/managers are relatively older than other farmers and 
have the greatest experience in terms of the years they have spent crop farming. Because they 
are usually fmancially secure [hey believe that there is little they can do to influence the price 
for their produce. They view [heir business operation with a relatively simple financial focus 
and appear to perceive the boundary of their business to be the farm gate. Little attention is 
paid to market signals or other types of information and participants feel they have low 
market knowledge. 
Farmers following a production/market outlet focus strategy place emphasis on production 
activities, but have an inflexible production mix and high degree of channel flexibility. They 
sell to a large number of different agents or market outlets and are continually searching for 
new market outlets. Relatively high levels of information regarding management practices, 
crop costs and returns, personal records, and crop field days are utilised. 
Differentiators concentrate on making crops different from those of other producers by 
growing specialty or niche crops, or being involved with adding value, further processing or 
....., 
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marketing activities. Differ~nriators are most likely to be owners, managers or directors of 
. non-farm businesses,. and occupy positions of responsibility in marketing cooperatives and 
farmer organIsations. Compared with members of other strategic groups, differentiators are 
more likely to have attended university and have the largest farms and highest levels of debt. 
They utilise a wide variety of types and sources of information. 
Arbitragers are ·characterised by their focus on sales and investment opportunities, both on 
and off-farm. Their high sales flexibility means their members are more likely to sell crops 
on the free market rather than by contract and will store crops and wait for the price to 
improve. It appears that farmers in this group obtain satisfaction by obtaining high crop prices 
either by obtaining quality premiums or selling produce at an optimal time of year. They 
spend more time working at non-farm jobs then members of other groups and have the 
smallest farms and cropping areas. This cluster feels that information regarding quality 
discounts and premiums, and crop prices is most important to them. 
Conclusion 
This study presents an empirically based classification of farm business strategies in which 
13 strategic dimensions which capture the complexity of the strategic management processes 
and five strategic groups of Canterbury crop farmers were identified. The results suggest that 
arable farmers can choose from a range of alternative strategies, each of which has specific 
marketing implications and have shown that the characteristics of farmers in each strategic 
group differ significantly. 
The conclusions from this research present a number of avenues worthy of further research. 
This study has intentionally studied a farming sector where there appear to be high levels of 
strategic diversity. While similar patterns of strategy may exist for other farmers the changes 
in the strategies they could undertake would be likely to be more subtle, and further research 
which examines if strategic groups exist in other farming sectors would be valuable. 
Developing more comprehensive measures which relate strategy to performance would allow 
a better understanding of the srrategy/performance relationship and the role that environmental 
variables have in moderating this relationship .. If it is accepted that alternative approaches 
could be equally profitable it is necessary to examine the issues of why alternative strategies 
have been chosen by individual farmers. It may be costly for farmers to move from one group 
to another because of barriers to imitation including managers distinctive competencies as 
well a firms initial resource endowments. A longitudinal study may provide information 
regarding how farmers strategic approaches vary over time and ascertain whether farmers 
move from one strategic group to another. Because most farm managers are owner operators 
it is possible that management competencies are less tradable than they would be for larger 
businesses and therefore may have a relatively large influence on the strategic approach most 
suitable for a business. 
The results of this study suggest that marketing is much more than an activity which occurs 
after the product leaves the farm gate. Although some farmers plant a standardised crop mix, 
sell through a small number of market outlets and do not gather market information the 
majority of respondents exhibit more sophisticated marketing behaviour. Some farmers change 
their crop mix and plan production by monitoring market signals. Others have an inflexible 
. crop mix , sell to a: large number of marketing outlets and are continually searching for new 
market outlets. Another group of farmers monitor sales and marketing opportunities and sell 
when prices are at their peak or attempt to gain quality premiums. Finally some farmers 
exhibIt very sophisticated marketing behaviour by utilising a number of approaches to 
. differentiate their produce from that grown by other producers. 
The range and complexity of marketing actIVIty identified in this study suggests that 
traditional agricultural marketing and farm management approaches to analysing farmers 
management and marketing behaviour can benefit from insights which can be gained from 
business marketing management and strategic management literature. Marketing behaviour 
can be much more than sales decisions and an undue focus on this behaviour leads to the 
exclusion of other activities such as production planning and product differentiation. Similarly 
a view of farm management which excludes marketing and integrated strategic behaviour is 
restrictive. This study clearly shows that farm firms, like other businesses make strategic 
choices from a number of strategic dimensions. 
However it is important that paradigms from within the business literature are not embodied 
into agricultural marketing and farm management theory in a naive and uncritical manner. 
From a simple marketing orientation only differentiators could be considered totally marketing 
orientated because they pay a great deal of attention to market signals, differentiate their 
produce from that of other farmers and attempt to satisfy the needs and wants of both the 
buyers and final consumers of their produce. Only a small proportion of these farmers 
followed this strategy whereas a much larger percentage followed a stability strategy and had 
low levels and market orientation. The behwiour of farmers was closer to that which 
agricultural economists would perceive to take place in a competitive market. Although the 
relationship between strategy and performance was not specifically investigated in this study 
the fact that farmers following each of the five strategies had managed to survive despite the 
upheavals in the mixed cropping industry since deregulation suggests that each of the five 
strategies may be successful. Therefore the lack of a marketing orientation should not be 
construed as a lack of strategic sophistication. 
This research has identified a range of alternative strategies which are used by farmers. No 
one strategy is likely to be optimal for all farmers with the strategy most suitable for a 
particular business being the one which best aligns the distinctive competencies and resource 
endowments of a business with environmental opportunities and threats. The disciplines of 
agriCUltural marketing and farm management will be enriched by viewing farm management 
with this strategic perspective. 
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Appendix 3 
Farm and Farmer Characteristics 
rAll!( CBARACfiRIS'1'ICS 
fARMINa AREAS (hect_rea) 
FArm are. 
Et'tectivtI croppinq area 
Area cropped durinq 1991/92 
Iriiqated area 
strategio Group 
Av r r 
ratio prob 
211.9 .228.5 221.8 31&.1 130.3 226.6 2.0·f. 0.091 
205.2 322.0 130.S 167.. 62.3 224.0 
2U.1 170.6 204.0 2'''.8 106.1 192.3 8.15 0.000 
153.6 89.S Jl9.3 155.7 53.. 124.9 
203.9 142.5 14.7.1 21 .... 5 '5.1 159.6 7.92 0.000 
121.8 83.3 108.7 HO.3 41.9 114.6 
125.6 53.8 62.3 85.6 32.9 fi9.1 3.fi9 0.001 
152.8 82.1 79.8 9".4 44.4 100.1 
Area I!LiI.naqed tor .. mother farmers ".1 0.0 0.' 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.8 1.01 0.405 
21.9 0.0 0.0 9.8 
Area rented or leased to others 16.2 1.1 
7.2 
2.3 
B.B 
2.1 0.6 4.4 1.05 0.386 
Area rented or leased. trolD. other. 
OWNER/HIUDlGII.R CBARACnR!S'l'ICS 
fMKIRG KXl'Ii:RIKNCi. Cyears) 
Involvement with crop tolrll:ling 
In charge ot making crop 
tam decisions 
Working' on present h,rlll 
In charqe of _klnq decisions 
on present tam 
75.8 
H.2 
2J6.4 
21.4 
57.0 
18.1 
41.J 
7.3 J.7 3 •. 3 
55.4. 
14.6 
11.8 
38.3 
32.6 1.70 0.153 
108.1 
23,14 29.18 24..15 23.85 Hi.72 24..53 5.10 0.000 
10.22 10.87 13.73 7.U 10.60 U.87 
11.14 2 .... 31 18.90 19.23 12.64. 19.20 .... 4.6 0.002 
12.32 12.02 11.8. 10.22 9.83 J2.09 
11.17 25.69 20.91 11.62 13.24. 20.14 5.24. 0.001 
12.&8 12.20 Jl.32 7.89 11.22 12.32 
14..26 21.06 16.12 15.54 11.16 16.50 3.69 D.OO') ... ·• 
1l.93 10.65 10.04 9.39 JO.04 10.99 
&OR.!( AllAY I'RCM i'AJU( (day. per aonth) 
Workln9 at film relilted 
activitiea 
4..05 
5.56 
Earnin9 incone at another job 0.39 
1.50 
MISCiI.lANEOOS HUD.'1'ING CBARAC'l'iRISrICS 
Numbtir of _gente or 11I.lrket outlet. 3.64 
crop_ were _old to 1a.t year 1.79 
NWDber of thia year_ crop. not 
9rown previou.ly on film 
Buyer orientation:l 
Finil1 cona\Ul1er orientation:l 
1.64 
1. 81 
3.29 
0.71 
2.71 
l.08 
1.73 3.86 3.92 1.86 2.87 2.72 0.322 
J.37 5.84 2.50 1.'5 3.98 
0.63 0.15 2.15 4.16 1.38 1.25 0.000 
1.79 2.15 2.61 5.83 3.28 
3.84 5.76 5.85 3.48 4.32 6.211 0.000 
J. 75 3.47 2.79 2.46 1.58 
0.68 0.66 1.85 0.64 0.97 5.062 0.001 
0.97 1.01 1.68 0.91 1.32 
2.93 2.71 3.31 3.04. 3.02 1.376 0.24.6 
l.ll J.01 0.63 1.10 0.98 
2.59 2.4.7 3.23 2.40 2.61 1.641 0.168 
J.07 0.94 0.83 0.94 1.05 
Hean. are reported, .tilndard deviation. in italic_ 1 • P < 0.01 ... p < 0.05 
1-2 1-3 
••• p < 0.01 
DUDCIUl'. Multiple bug. Te.t. for IAterqrQup DiffereAce,1 
1-. 1-5 2-3 2-. 2-5 3-. 3-5 .-, 
• Filrmers were .allked. the extent to which ttley agreed wittl the atatelllent that they increased their taIl'll business IHlcces. by • .atisfying the need. and. want. of either the buyera or final consUlllerli 0' 
ttleir produce on a .ca1e 'rani 0 (strongly diugree) to 4 (strongly agree) 
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Appendix 5 
Information sources and types ranked by level of importance 
Information sources 
Strategic group 
Production Flexibility Stability Prod. Imarket outlet foc. Differentiation Arbitrage Average 
Crop field days 3.25 Agents 3.15 Crop field day 3.28 Budget 3.08 Agents 2.80 Crop field days 2.86 
. Personal records 2.79 Other Fanners 2.56 Personal records 3.17 Crop field days 2.92 Odler fanners 2.76 Agents 2.86. 
Agents 2.75 Crop field days 2.51 Agents 3.03 Other fanners 2.92 Crop field days 2.56 Other farmers 2.69 
Other fanners 2.50 Personal records 2.22 Other fanners 2.90 Personal records 2.85 Personal records 2.44 Personal records 2.63 
Fann group meetings 2.44 Family members 2.09 Family.mem 2.40 Family members 2.77 Budget 2.36 Budget 2.31 
Budget 2.43 Newspapers 2.07 Fnner group mlings 2.45 Fanner group mlings 2.77 Newspapers 2.32 Accountant 2.22 . 
Accountant 2.25 Budget 2.27 Overseas newspapers 2.77 Accountant 2.20 Family 2.18 
Magazines 2.25 Machinery field days 2.14 Fann advisor 2.46 Family 2.20 Farmer group meetings2.lO . 
Farm advisor 2.21 Newspapers 2.13 Accountant 2.38 Newspaper 2.09 
Machinery field days 2.11 Accountant 2.13 Magazines 2.31 
Overseas magazines 2.00 Newspapers 2.23 
Farm workers 2.15 
Information types 
Strategic group 
Production Flexibility Stability Prod. Imarket outlet foc. Differentiation Arbitrage Average 
Management practices 3.61 Local growing condo 3.20 Management praCL 3.61 Crop costs & r.,nuns 3.54 Crop costs-rellU'llS 3.36 Pests & Diseases 3.22 
Crop costs & renuns 3.54 Pests & diseases 3.09 Pests & diseases d· 3•56 Management pracL 3.46 Financial 3.32 Local growing condo 3.14 
Production techniques 3.39 NZ crop prices 3.08 Local growing condo 3.17 Prod. techniques 3.08 NZ crop prices 3.28 NZ crop prices 3.13 
Pests and diseases 3.14 Financial 2.73 Crops costs & renuns 3.17 Pests and diseases 3.07 Local growing condo 3.25 Management practices 2.98 
NZ crop prices 3.14 Production teclmiques 2.67 NZ crop prices 3.10 NZ crop prices 3.00 Pests and diseases 3.13 Financial 2.98 
Stock prices 3.07 Machinery 2.49 Production techniques 3.03 Overseas crop prices 3.00 Production tech. 2.88 Production techniques 2.96 
Local growing condo 3.07 Stock prices 2.49 Financial 2.93 New crops-varieties 2.92 Quality discounts 2.84 Crop costs-renuns 2.91 
Machinery 2.97 New crops/varieties 2.16 Stock prices 2.90 Local conditions 2.77 Management pracL 2.84 Stock prices 2.74 
New crops & varieties 2.75 Management practices 2.11 Machinery 2.70 NZ crop yields 2.69 Stock prices 2.67 Machinery 2.60 
Overseas stockpiles 2.14 Quality discounts 2.00 New crops/varieties 2.60 Stock prices 2.62 Overseas crop prices 2.40 New crops-varieties 2.45 
Quality discounts 2.11 Overseas crop prices 2.37 Consumer info 2.54 Machinery 2.38 Quality discounts 2.24 
Quality discounts 2.30 Overseas stockpiles 2.46 New crops-varieties 2.21 Overseas crop prices 2.18 
Machinery 2.38 
Quality discounts 2.08 
Scores are based on a scale from 0 (not important) to 4 (extremely important) 
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SURVEY OF THE FARM MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTANCY INDUSTRY 
J.W.M. Gardner and W.J. Parker 
Department of Agricultural & Horticultural Systems Management 
Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand 
ABSTRACT 
The reduction in State funding of agricultural extension in New Zealand since 1987 has 
presented self-employed farm management consultants with new challenges and possible 
opportunities to expand their businesses. A survey of consultants was undertaken in 
1992 to obtain descriptive information about the consultancy profession, including age, 
experience, qualifications, proportional use of time in extension as opposed to 
consultancy, client base, type and number of reports written, chargeable hours and the 
use of management aids. A total of 176 (58%) usable responses were obtained. The 
paper compares the attributes of the different consultant groups surveyed (MAFTech, 
Livestock Improvement Corporation and private consultants), and highlights the significant 
role that MAFTech has historically played in training consultants. The commercialisation 
of Agriculture New Zealand suggests more training costs will have to be met by the 
private sector. 
Key words: consultant, MAFTech, mail survey, client base. 
INTRODUCTION 
Substantial changes have been made to the extension and consultancy services available 
to New Zealand farmers over recent years. In particular, Government funding of extension 
services is being phased out. The State Service, which at its peak had 350 advisors, was 
restructured to Agriculture New Zealand in July 1993 and has a staff of 100 consultants. 
The new Crown owned consultancy business is to be privatised over the next two years. 
In the dairy industry the Livestock Improvement Corporation (L1C) farm conSUlting staff 
will be increased to 32 in 1993. They offer "free" advice to dairy farmers, mainly through 
mass extension activities and farm discussion groups. In contrast, the four 'Farmwise' 
consultants employed by the L1C mainly work with individual farmers on one-off projects. 
Several of the larger dairy companies also employ extension workers (termed production 
officers) to provide technical advice and to assist with the implementation of dairy 
company policies (e.g. the New Zealand Dairy Group employed 13 staff in this role in 
1992). The New Zealand Wool Board operates an extension service to wool growers. 
Wool production officers (n = 9) provide advice to sheep farmers on all aspects of wool 
growing and preparation. Finally, there are the private farm management consultants. 
The total number of consultants offering farm management advice is not known. The 
majority are probably members of the New Zealand SocietY of Farm Management, which 
requires that all members acting as farm management consultants are registered under the 
rules cif the Farm Management Consultants Registration Board (Schedule A, rule (3)). 
Furthermore, the minimum qualification for membership of the Society is the Diploma in 
Valuation and Farm Management or a Bachelors degree in Agriculture/Horticulture or a 
closely related discipline (Rule 7(2)). The Society in 1991 had a total membership of 800 
of whom about 250 were registered farm management consultants. This included some 
Agriculture New Zealand and Livestock Improvement Corporation consultants. The 
number of registered farm management consultants has increased in recent years 
reflecting both increased membership and a new requirement for mandatory registration 
of all consultants. 
It was against this background of change that a survey of farm management consultants 
was undertaken. The paper reports on the section of the survey related to the training 
and background of consultants, their work, client base and activities and the types of 
management aids used to carry out this work. 
SURVEY METHOO 
A mail survey was conducted in autumn-winter of 1992. A questionnaire was sent to all 
consultants registered under the rules of the New Zealand Society of Farm Management 
and all agricultural consultants employed by Agriculture New Zealand. A check of the 
registered farm management consultants showed only two were Livestock Improvement 
Corporation consulting officers. A list of these officers was subsequently obtained and 
all were sent a questionnaire. The only identifiable consultants omitted from the survey 
were those advertising in the Telecom "yellow pages" who were not members of the 
principal entities described above. 
An eight page questionnaire was used. It sought descriptive data on the time involved in 
extension (defined as transfer of information/technology to the farming community for 
which no fee was charged) as opposed to consultancy (providing advice/information to 
clients on a fee paying basis). and the composition of consultant's client base. Details 
about client numbers and chargeable time, along with information on how chargeable time, 
was allocated between land purchase, valuation, estate planning, general consultancy, ", 
farm supervision and one-off projects was obtained. In the final section, a series of 
personal questions were asked about age, gender, educational qualification, current 
employer, number of years as a consultant, and whether the consultant operated the 
business from home or from an office. 
Of the 302 questionnaires mailed, 236 were returned (78.1 % response rate). However, 
60 of these replies were not usable because the respondents were not currently practising 
farm management consultants. Thus the 'usable' response rate was 58.3% (Table 1). 
Table 1 The number of survey respondents and their employers. 
Employer 
MAFTech 
Private 
Landcorp 
Livestock Improvement Corporation 
University 
Farm Improvement Club 
Other 
• Private and publicly listed companies. 
RESULTS 
Number 
71 
63 
4 
22 
3 
2 
11 
176 
% 
40 
36 
2 
13 
2 
1 
7 
100 
The age, experience, education and initial employer of the responding consultants is 
shown in Table 2. The private consultants at 45 years of age were on average nine years 
older than MAFTech consultants and eleven years older than Lie consultants. The amount 
of experience in consultancy was associated with age. Thus, private consultants had more 
practising experience (19 years on average) than either MAFTech or Lie consultants (12 
years and 8 years respectively). Only 7% of the respondents were women, and these 
were all employed either by MAFTech or the Lie. 
00 
0 
The differences in age and experience between the three groups are due to fewer young 
people commencing private consulting careers in recent years. The economic difficulties 
confronting the farming sector during the late 1980's and the down-sizing of State funded 
agricultural extension probably dissuaded potential consultants from commencing a career 
in private consultancy. 
Private consultants also differed from MAFTech and lie consultants in terms of their 
highest educational qualification (Table 2), The latter consultants were primarily (90%) 
undergraduates or postgraduates. In contrast, over half the private consultants held 
University Diplomas and only 43 % had an undergraduate or postgraduate qualification. 
Table 2 shows that a low proportion of MAFTech and lIC consultants were registered 
valuers (4 and 5% respectively). Amongst private consultants more than half (56%) were 
registered valuers, as were nearly half of the other consultants (44 %). Membership of the 
New Zealand Society of Farm Management was very strong among private and other 
consultants (99 and 95% respectively) in comparison to MAFTech (51 %) and L1C (27%) 
consultants. 
The initial employer for each group is presented in Table 2. Nearly all MAFTech 
consultants (92%) commenced their careers with this organisation. A high proportion of 
L1C consultants also started with this employer (71 %). On the other hand, the first 
employers of private consultants varied considerably. Approximately three quarters of all 
private consultants commenced their careers with the Rural Bank, MAFTech or a Farm 
Improvement Club. Only 14% commenced their careers as private consultants. 
Table 2: Age, experience. highest educational qualification, registration as a valuer, 
melT'!bership of N Z Society of Farm Management and initial employer of 
consultants. (Figures in brackets are the number of responses per 
category). 
Employer 
MAFTech Private Other lIC 
Age (years) 36'(71) 45'(63) 42" (18) 34'(22) 
Experience (years) 12'(71) 19°(65) 16'" (18) 8'(22) 
Women (%) 13 (9) 14 (3) 
Education' 
UEfT rade Cert 1 (1) 4 (3) 11 (2) 
Univ. diploma 9 (6) 52 (32) 28 (5) 9 (2) 
Undergraduate 80 (56) 40 (25) 50 (9) 68(15) 
Postgraduate 10 (7) 3 (2) 11 (2) 23 (5) 
Registered valuer (%) 4 (3) 56 (36) 44 (8) 5 (1) 
Member NZSFM (%) 51 (36) 99 (64) 95 (17) 27 (6) 
Initial employer (%)2 
MAFTech 92 (65) 20 (13) 33 (6) 10 (2) 
Rural Bank 1 (1 ) 25 (16) 6 (1 ) 10 (2) 
Maori Affairs 3 (2) 2 (1) 6 (1) 
Landcorp 5 (3) 28 (5) 
lIC 71 (15) 
Private 14 (9) 11 (2) 
. Farm Imp. Club 1 (1) 25 (16) 5 (1) 
Other 3 (2) 8 (6) 17 (3) 5 (1) 
•. , Differences between means within rows are significant at P < 0.05. 
, % of total education responses within each employer. 
n 
(174) 
(176) 
(12) 
(6) 
(45) 
(105) 
(16) 
(48) 
(123) 
(86) 
(20) 
(4) 
(18) 
(15) 
(11) 
(18) 
(12) 
2 % of total responses who commenced consultancy work with each respective 
employer. 
Mean 
40 ± 1 
14 ± 1 
7 
1 
26 
61 
9 
27 
70 
49 
11 
2 
5 
9 
6 
10 
7 
The results highlight the historical importance of MAFTech as the first employer for both 
private and other consultants. The changed focus of MAFTech in recent years from a 
Government department to a commercial organisation is likely to reduce the post-tertiary 
training of new recruits for consultancy. This means that more of the job training costs 
will need to be met by the private sector. It also means that the type of University 
education provided should be reviewed to ensure that new graduates are better equipped 
to start an immediate cost-recovery career as a consultant. 
The annual salary which respondents believed a person working full time in Farm 
Management consultancy should earn at the commencement and after 10 years of 
consultancy is shown in Table 3. Private consultants had significantly higher expectations 
than the other groups for both commencing salaries and salaries 10 years out, with the 
gap between the views of MAFTech and private consultants for salaries after 10 years 
being substantial. This probably reflects a great awareness in the latter group of the 
overhead costs involved in running a private business. 
Table 3: Recommended salary at the commencement and after 10 years of 
consultancy work. 
Salary 
Commencement 
Year 10 
Employer 
MAFTech Private Other 
26718' 
46788' 
31152' 
59583' 
26389' 
54444" 
lIC 
27667' 
53049' 
•• b Differences between means within rows are significant at P < 0.05. 
n 
(169) 
(169) 
Mean 
28349 
52888 
A large proportion of time was allocated to consultancy (for which a fee was charged) by 
MAFTech, private and other consultants as opposed to extension for which no fee was 
charged (Table 4). As expected lIC consultants spent nearly all their work time carrying 
out extension for dairy farmers. The client base for work activities for MAFTech and 
private consultants consisted largely of sheep and dairy clients (76% for MAFTech and 
71 % for private consultants). However, private consultants spent much more time with 
sheep farmers than did MAFTech consultants but conversely less time with dairy farmers 
than did the MAFTech consultants. The "other" consultants allocated more of their time 
to sheep farmers and to arable farmers than did any other group. 
co 
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Table 4: Proportion~1 use of time (%) in extension and consultancy work for various 
consultancy/extension groups, and the average composition of the 
respective clients. (Figures in brackets are the number of responses per 
category). 
Employer 
MAFTech Private Other Lie n Mean 
Extension' 11'(58) 10' (50) 19'(14) 81° (22) (154) 20 == 2 
Consultancy 81'(58) 75" (53) 53°(15) 19' (22) (159) 59 == 3 
Client base (%)' 
Sheep 34'(59) 47' (54) 55'(15) l' (13) (152) 39::: 3 
Dairy 42'(59) 24' (54) 13'(15) 98' (22) (171) 40::: 3 
Arable 7(58) 7 (54) 9 (15) o (13) (151 ) 7::: 1 
Bull beef 4'(58) 4' (54) 4'(15) l' (13) (151) 4::: 1 
Horticulture 3 (57) 7 (54) 2 (16) o (13) (160) 4::: 1 
Farm forestry 1 '(57) l' (54) 4'(15) 0' (13) (150) 1 == 0 
Other 1Q..I68) ..J..Q (52) 11..115) -1 (14) (151) ~::: 2 
Total' 101 100 100 101 100 
'.'.' Differences between means within rows are significant at P<0.05. 
'The balance of time was spent on activities other than extension or consultancy. 
, Percent of total clients within each of the categories listed. 
The types and number of written reports prepared by consultants, other than LlC 
consulting officers are shown in Table 5. The high level of reports claimed by some 
respondents indicates that these consultants may have provided total reports for their 
business, rather than for their own output. The data should be interpreted with caution, 
although the relative ranking of report work is likely to be reliable. MAFTech reports were 
primarily in the field of general consultancy. Private consultants however, wrote a greater 
variety of reports, covering not only general consultancy but also valuation and drought 
relief. They also wrote more reports under the Town and Country Planning Act but fewer 
newspaper articles than did private consultants. The" other" consultants had the most 
varied workload with substantial numbers of reports in all fields other than arbitrations. 
Table 5: Types and number of written reports prepared by consultants (excluding 
Dairy Board consulting officers) during 1991. (Figures in brackets are the 
number of responses per category). 
Employer 
MAFTech Private Other n Mean 
General consultancy 88' (51) 51' (59) 35' (14) (134) 71 == 6 
Valuation 9' (20) 90' (35) 43' (7) (53) 59::: 15 
Drought relief 10' (21) 23' (19) 22' (4) (44) 17 == 3 
Arbitrations 2 (18) 3 (28) 2 (7) (53) 2 ::: 
Town & Country 
Planning Act 3' (23) 7' (18) 21' (4) (45) 5 ::: 2 
Newspaper articles 13 (57) 5 (25) 19 (4) (85) 11 ::: 2 
Other reports 18 (38) 11 (33) 28' (8) (79) 15 ± 2 
,., Differences between means within rows are significant at P<0.05. 
Approximately 50% of the MAFTech consultant's time was spent on general consultancy, 
whereas private consultants spent less time on general consultancy and more time on 
valuation and farm supervision (Table 5). The "other" consultants were similar to private 
consultants in their allocation of time with regard to general consultancy and valuation. 
The average hours charged in 1991 and the allocation of chargeable hours between 
various work activities is outlined in Table 5. Private consultants had more chargeable 
hours than either MAFTech or other consultants and this reflects the fact that some State 
funding was still being provided to MAFTech at the time of the survey and that individuals 
in the' other' category were often doing company work. 
Table 6: Hours charged (1991) and allocation of chargeable time between various 
work activities. 
Employer 
MAFTech Private Other n 
Hours charged 1055" (58) 1204' (50) 918' (14) (132) 
Time allocation (%)' 
Land purchase 7 (54) 7 (52) 10 (15) (141) 
Valuation l' (52) 18' (62) 17' (16) (140) 
Estate planning l' (52) 2' (50) l' (15) (137) 
General consultancy 58' (64) 44' (62) 42' (15) (141) 
Farm supervision 8' (53) 15' (60) 7' (15) (138) 
One-off projects 11' (62) 5' (51) 11' (15) (138) 
Other .1.§' (53) __ 8' (59) 
--12' (15) (137) 
Total (%) 101 100 100 
'.' Differences between means within rows are significant at P<0.05. 
, % of chargeable time for the activities listed. 
Mean 
1108 ± 39 
7 ± 1 
11 ± 2 
1 ± 0 
50 ± 2 
11 1 
9 1 
.11 2 
100 
Table 7 shows the use of a number of management aids by consultants Some 
management aids were used extensively by all groups (e.g. facsimile, business cards) 
while the usage of other aids was low (e.g. radio telephones and moisture probes). 
Computers (either desktop or portable) were used by more than 50% of all respondents. 
Portable microcomputers were used by 41 % of private consultants. The data for pasture 
probes were interesting. Both MAFTech consultants and Livestock Improvement 
Corporation consultants made considerable use ofthese aids (59 and 100% respectively). 
In contrast, only 9% of private consultants and 23% of "other consultants" used these 
instruments. This difference may reflect the traditional emphasis of private consultants 
on farm business analysis, while MAFTech and LlC have historically provided technical 
advice on enhancing physical production systems. 
co 
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Table 7: Use of ma"nagement aids (% respondents) by consultants working for 
different employers. (Figures in brackets are the number of respondents 
in each category). 
Employer 
MAFTech Private Other lie n Mean 
Computer - desktop 90 (64) 64 (41) 78 (14) 23 "(5) (124) 71 
- portable 82 (58) 41 (26) 65 (11) 82 (18) (113) 65 
Car phone 16 (11) 22 (14) 29 (5) 5 (1 ) (31) 18 
Radio telephone 1 (1 ) 8 (5) 11 (2) (8) 5 
Facsimile 100 (71) 80 (51) 94 (17) 100 (22) (161) 92 
Business card 87 (62) 88 (56) 100 (18) 100 (22) (158) 90 
Livestock scales 66 (47) 19 (12) 23 (4) 18 (4) (67) 39 
Soil auger 97 (69) 63 (40) 44 (8) 50 (11) (128) 73 
Pasture probe 69 (49) 9 (6) 23 (4) 100 (22) (81) 47 
Moisture probe 7 (5) 8 (5) 1 (6) (11) 6 
Other aids "24 (17) 25 (16) 20 (3) 27 (6) (42) 24 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reported on the personal attributes, work activities, client base and 
management aids of New Zealand agricultural consultants. The substantial role that 
MAFTech (now Agriculture NZ) has historically fulfilled in consultant training has important 
implications for the future of the industry. The reductions in consultancy staff in the State 
sector has provided a pool of potential employees for private consultants t6 draw upon, 
but in 5 and 1 0 years time, when many private consultants will be approaching 
retirement, there will be a shortage of appropriate skilled people for consultancy work 
unless a commitment to training is now made by the private sector. 
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AN APPLICATION OF THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
IN GOVERNMENT ASSET MANAGEMENT i 
Prakash Narayan and Rod Forbes 
MAF Policy, Wellington 
ABSTRACT 
Government Departments began paying a capital charge on their assets from 1 July 
1991, making explicit the cost to the Government of maintaining its capital 
investment in the departments. Thus, making clear the full cost of goods and services 
produced by the' departments, and providing information and incentives needed for 
efficient management of the Government's investment. 
Ultimately, individual departments will negotiate specific charge rates as part of the 
annual budget cycle. In the transition period, MAF and other selected departments 
negotiated individual charge rates for 1993/94 with the Treasury. The Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) was used to determine the cost of equity capital, a component 
of the asset charge rate. 
In this paper, the CAPM is described and then used in determining MAF's cost of 
capital. Data for the analysis and the results are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Crown has an investment of over $10 billion in the net assets of government 
departments. The cost of this capital investment is a significant element of the full 
cost of goods and services produced by departments. A capital charge regime was 
developed for the Government by the Treasury (Moore 1989). The method adopted 
by the Government to calculate charge rates was the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). 
Government departments began paying a capital charge on their assets from 1 July 
1991, making explicit the 'cost to the Crown of maintaining its capital investments in 
departments. Implementation of the capital charge regime was part of the Public 
Sector Financial Management reform process, which had three major objectives: 
(a) to show the full cost of operating a department, by including a cost of capital 
in the costs of the department; 
(b) to enable realistic selling prices for outputs to be determined; 
(c) to enable rational investment decisions to be made. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not 'necessarily those of MAF 
Policy. The assistance of Gary Lewis, Director Corporate Finance, is acknowledged. 
The capital charge regime was introduced in a competitively neutral way. Funds to 
cover the capital charge are added to the purchase price of outputs from departments 
(revenues) and then paid by departments (expended) to the Treasury. However, for 
the supply of goods and services to third parties, this charge would be added to any 
existing charges, to cover the use of net capital assets involved in the production of 
such goods and services. 
In the absence of a capital charge regime applying to departments which provide 
goods and services to the private sector, the Government is effectively subsidising 
production. On the other hand, if the capital charge is set too high an implicit tax 
on production occurs. It is important, therefore, that the method used to calculate the 
capital charge is one recognised and accepted in the market place. One such 
method2 is the CAPM, which was adopted by the Government. 
The Government should be able to expect a similar rate of return from its investment 
of taxpayer's funds in departments to that expected from similar investments in the 
private sector. This means that an individual department's cost of capital should be 
that of a comparable private sector firm or finns. That is, comparable in nature of 
operations and risk, and thereby presume a notional degree of leverage for the 
department. 
A capital charge gives managers the information they need to make the appropriate 
trade-off between tying up Crown resources and using other means of production 
(McCulloch 1991). For example, owning versus leasing of fixed assets such as 
buildings and vehicle fleets. 
THE CAPITAL CHARGE THEORY 
The Approach 
As a transitional measure for the first year of full operation, the Government decided 
to adopt a simple regime as a starting point for refinement with experience over time. 
A charge rate of 13 percent was established to apply to all departments for fmancial 
year 1991/92 and this rate was subsequently carried over to 1992/93. 
In March 1992, the Cabinet authorised the Minister of Finance to approve'the process 
to establish department-specific rates. In October 1992, the government agreed to a 
pilot group of departments to establish such rates for the 1993/94 financial year. The 
Minister of Agriculture requested that MAF be added to the initial list of departments 
chosen, because of its large revenues from third parties. The individual departments 
were to determine and negotiate charge rates with the Treasury. Some of the 
required parameters were set by the Government. 
When applying the capital charge regime to departments, there are two particular 
issues to be addressed: 
Southpac Corporation Ltd advised MAF in 1990 that the pre-tax dividend yield was a more 
appropriate proxy to the cost of equity when calculating a capital charge. Arbitrage pricing 
theory, provides another method (Anderson, Newman and Seed 1992). 
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(a) identifying all assets and liabilities that should be included in the calculation 
of capital base and then detennining appropriate valuations for all the assets 
~d liabilities; 
(b) detennining the appropriate rate of return for the capital employed. 
The capital charge is defined as the capital base times the charge rate. The capital 
base is the net assets of MAF. The charge rate is based on the weighted average cost 
of debt and equity capital and expected future growth for private sector counterparts. 
This is a before tax rate. 
For each department, the methodology required input on the following: 
(a) market comparators or industries that are appropriate to "line up" with the 
department's core businesses; 
(b) the business risk (the industry beta factor) applicable to the selected industry; 
(c) the financial structures (gearing or leverage) usually found in the industries 
selected in (1) above; 
(d) core businesses' revenues as weighting factors to derive a single department-
specific rate. 
Cost of Debt 
The cost of debt (KJ is the average debt risk premium above the risk free rate. 
K d · 
where Rr 
(Rd - Rf) 
Cost of Equitv 
Rr + (Rd - Rr) ......... Equation 1 
Before tax rate of return on a risk-free asset, such as 
five year government bonds. 
Average debt risk premium above the risk free rate 
required by the market. 
The CAPM relies on the linear relationship between risk and return and expresses 
that relationship as follows: 
Ke 
where B 
(R,. - Rf ) 
Rr + B(R,. - Rf) ••••••• Equation 2 
Beta coefficient or the relative risk of the asset or 
investment. It measures an asset's volatility relative 
to the sharemarket as a whole or the covariance of 
the asset's returns with the market portfolio returns. 
average equity risk premium above the risk free rate 
required by the market. 
R". return on a market index (ie a fully diversified 
portfolio). 
The beta coefficients measure the expected responsiveness of an asset's returns to 
changes in returns on a market portfolio (a market index) free of any diversifiable 
risk. The CAPM, initially developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), assumes 
that each asset's return can be related to the return on a 'market' portfolio which is 
considered to be free of any diversifiable3 risk. 
This linear relationship is known as the characteristic line, and is estimated by 
ordinary least squares regression of return on the assets over time CR;J against the 
return on the market portfolio (R,.J over the same duration. That is: 
R;, 
where 3.; 
Bi 
ei 
3.; + BiR,., + ei, ..... Equation 3 
is the intercept tenn, measuring the expected return on an 
asset i when the return on the market portfolio is zero, and 
represents the average value over time of the diversifiable 
returns of the asset (Dobbins and Witt, 1983) 
is the beta coefficient, and is an indication of the riskiness 
associated with an asset relative to the market portfolio. 
For example, a beta coefficient of 2.0 for an activity would 
indicate that an activity was twice as risky as the portfolio, 
whereas a beta coefficient of 0.5 would signal that an 
activity was half as risky as the portfolio. 
is a random error tenn. 
Thus, two sets of data are initially required to detennine the beta coefficients, the 
returns on each asset and the return on the market portfolio. Beta coefficients 
generated by equation (3) are then used in equation (2) to calculate the cost of equity 
capit3l. 
CAPM has become a standard tool for investment managers, company executives and 
utility managers in the US (Economist, February 1993). Although it is acknowledged 
that CAPM is quite appropriate for calculating the cost of equity capital, it has a 
number of drawbacks. The major drawback is the undefmable nature of the market 
portfolio. The market portfolio is regarded, in theory, as comprising all of the 
resources in an economy, but there is no universal measure of this. It is thus 
impossible to measure beta accurately. Analysts often use the sharemarket index as 
a surrogate for the entire market. 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The cost of debt and cost of equity capital calculated from above equations are then 
used to calculate the weighted average cost of capital (W ACC) using the following: 
DiversifIable (also called non-systematic) risk is unexplained variations in returnS, while 
non-diversiflllble (also called systematic) risk is that associated with the general 
fluctuations in the economy. 
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WACC (d) Kd + (I-d) [Ke /(I-T)] .... Equation 4 
where d 
T 
proportion of debt to total capital (debt plus equity). 
tax rate. 
For this exercise, the W ACC derived above would be adjusted by subtracting the 
future growth rate (essentially the inflation expectation) over a 12 month period to 
arrive at the capital charge rate. This prevents expected future growth being brought 
to charge before it- is actually earned. The capital charge is the nominal cost of 
capital minus expected holding gains (Lewis 1991). 
DERIVATION OF A MAF CHARGE RATE 
The proposal was that selected government departments negotiate their individual 
charge rates with the Treasury. However, the Cabinet had set some minimum and 
maximum bounds, some fixed parameters, and some default parameters, for the 
analysis. These were as follows: 
(a) risk-free rate: 7.2 percent (5 year bond forecast for 1993/94); 
(b) risk premium for debt: 0.5 to 1.5 percent (historic); 
(c) expected growth (inflation rate): 1.5 percent (forecast for 1993/94); 
(d) effective tax rate: 15 to 25 percent (historic); 
(e) equity risk premium: 4 to 9 percent (historic); 
(f) default betas between 0.5 and 1.0 (estimate); 
(g) default debt equity ratios of 50:50 (estimate). 
MAF is structured into a number of business groups for the delivery of outputs -
Quality Management, Fisheries, Agriculture NZ, Policy and the Regulatory Authority. 
For this exercise, MAF classified its activities into five categories consistent with 
market comparators. The categories, designations and gross revenue estimates for 
1992/93 and estimated asset values as at June 1993 are set out in table 1. 
Table 1: 
Activity 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Total 
MAF activities, revenues for 1992/93 and asset values as at June 
1993 
Designation Revenue Assets 
($ m) ($ m) 
Product luspection 62.187 15.743 
nlsease/Pest Prevention 53.9l9 12219 
Fisheries Research 23.101 31.107 
Other Fisheries Activities 23.398 6.091 
Other MAF Activities 47.524 4.143 
210.129 69.303 
Cost of Debt 
The Treasury proposed that the 5 year Government Bond rate be used as a proxy for 
the risk-free rate.4 
Cost of Equity 
Based on commissioned studies of the NZ eqrntJ.es market, the Treasury had 
suggested an equity risk premium of seven to eight percent. For this exercise, the 
Government decided on a range of between four and nine percent was used. 
Effectively, the ouly negotiable parameters between MAF and the Treasury were the 
choice of market comparators, their beta coefficients, and their debt equity ratios. 
Treasury staff favoured the use of international, particularly United States, 
comparators. MAF was mindful that it earns product inspection revenue from NZ 
companies and argued, successfully, for NZ market comparators. 
MAF sought the services of CS First Boston Pacific to identify market comparators 
and to calculate their beta coefficients. Financial gearing coefficients for the 
identified comparators were purchased from Datex Services Ltd. (See table 2 for the 
list of comparators.) 
The way the betas were calculated was to rely on a minimum of three years of data. 
This precluded two of the identified comparators, Tasman Agriculture and Fruitfed. 
The approach was as follows: 
(a) subtract the weekly closing price from the opening price for each company 
and the all ordinaries capital index; 
(b) average the differences over a four weekly period; 
(c) carry out regression analyses for each four weekly period over the past forty 
periods; 
(d) plot the beta coefficients and calculate the average for the forty periods with 
any individual negative beta allocated a zero value. (The latter was at MAF's 
suggestion. ) 
Graphs 1 and 2 in appendix I set out plots of the beta estimates for seven companies 
in the agriculture and associated services sector, and three companies in the meat and 
by-product sector, respectively. The graphs illustrate the inherently unstable nature 
of shon term beta estimates and the need for longer term estimates. The means, 
standard deviations and coefficients of variation for both groups were 0.6, 0.41, 0.62 
and 0.65, 0.47 and 0.72, respectively. 
Table 2 sets out the average beta coefficients and financial gearing (as at latest 
balance date) for the identified market comparators of MAF. The overall sector 
values are derived by using market capitalisations, as at latest balance date. 
Some private sector financial analyst advocate the 90 day bill rate as a better risk-free interest 
rate proxy, because of its higher degree of certainty over the 5 year bond rate. 
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Product inspection 
It was agreed that the overall sector data of table 2 was appropriate for MAF's 
product inspection activities. It was also agreed that the average beta should be 
rounded to 0.6 with a average debt equity ratio of 45:55. 
Disease/pest prevention, other fisheries and other MAF activites 
There was nothing directly comparable from NZ sources for these activities. The 
revenue flows from these activities are not sensitive to the economic cycle. It was 
agreed that US utility companies were a reasonable comparator. This was consistent 
with the aligning of policy advise activities of other departments in the pilot study 
with US utilities. The beta was 0.4 with an associated debt equity ratio of 50:50. 
Fisheries research 
As this is a research activity, the beta applied to a Crown Research Institute (CRI) 
was initially considered. The CRI beta was set at the top of the range of the asset 
betas for electrical (0.4) and telecommunication (0.6) utilities. However, because 
fisheries research supports the negotiated setting of total allowable catch, it is 
therefore a policy issue of importance to both the fishing· industry and the 
government. It was agreed that the beta for research should in the mid range at 0.5. 
The utilities debt equity ratio of 50:50 was considered appropriate. 
Table 2: Beta coefficients and financial gearing of agricultural related 
companies 
Companies Betal Eqnity (%)' 
Mair Holdings 0.69 56 
Fortex Group Ltd 0.39 50 
NZ Light Leathers 0.22 56 
Meat & By-products Sector 0.65 54 
Reid Farmers 0.23 63 
Regal Salmon 0.72 68 
Apple Fields 0.34 45 
Tasman Agriculture nd 91 
Grocorp ·Pacific 0.76 63 
Eastern Equities Corp 0.39 52 
Fruitfed 
-
nd nd 
NZ Rural Properties nd 81 
NZ Salmon 0.93 86 
Agland Holdings 0.35 36 
Agriculture Services Sector 0.60 62 
Overall Sector (Weighted) 0.62 55 
1 . Source: CS First Boston Pacific 
2 Source: Datex Services Ltd 
A summary of the betas and notional equity percentages applicable to MAF activities 
are set out in table 3. 
Table 3: Beta coefficients and notional leverage of MAF activities 
Activity Beta Equity (%) 
Product Inspection 0.6 55 
Disease/pest Prevention 0.4 50 
Fisheries Research 0.5 50 
Other Fisheries Activities 0.4 50 
Other MAF Activities 0.4 50 
Capital Charge Rate 
Appendix II sets out the derivation of the post-tax WACC using the approved method 
for this exercise. The charge rate was the derived WACC less growth (inflation rate) 
assumption of 1.5%. Table 4 sets out the range of charge rates for the different MAF 
activities. 
Table 4: Range of charge rates by activity for MAF 
Activity Low (%) Mid(%) High (%) 
Product Inspection 8.18 9.82 11.66 
Disease/pest Prevention 7.53 8.73 10.05 
Fisheries Research 7.76 9.13 10.65 
Other Fisheries Activity 7.53 8.73 10.05 
Other MAF Activities 7.53 8.73 10.05 
A sifigle MAF capital charge rate was then derived from the above figures by 
weighting the individual activity's mid range rate by the ratio of activity revenues to 
total revenues. Table 5 shows this derivation, from which a rate of 9.1 % was 
obtained. 
Table 5: . MAF specific charge rate weighted by revenue· 
Activity Mid Rate (%) Revenues ($m) Share 
Product Inspection 9.82 62.187 2.91 
Disease/pest Prevention 8.73 53.919 2.24 
Fisheries Research 9.13 23.101 1.00 
Other Fisheries Activities 8.73 23.398 0.97 
Other MAF Activities 8.73 47.524 1.97 
Total 210.129 9.1" 
--
* Rounded to nearest tenth of a decimal point 
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DISCUSSION 
The charge rate for MAF would be levied by Treasury as a single rate over all 
MAF's· assets as at June 1993 for the 1993/94 year. The resulting capital charge 
would be $6.3 million. Whether the individual charge rates are applied to business 
activities would be up to senior management. 
On efficiency grounds, it ought to be spread on the basis of individual activity with 
their specific risk premiums and assets employed. Although the differences in charge 
rates are small - ranging from 8.73 to 9.82 - there are significant differences between 
assets used by activities. When revenue is divided by asset value in table 1 for each 
activity, two extremes are found for fisheries research at 0.74 and other MAF 
activities at 11.47. For the other three activities, the result ranges between 3.84 and 
4.41. In "fisheries research", the asset value is dominated by the purpose built, deep 
sea research ship (the MY Tangaroa), while for the "other MAF activities" there is 
substantially less need to own fixed assets. 
Table 6 sets out the derivation of capital charges for specific activities of MAF. 
Table 6: Derivation of activity capital charges for MAF 
Activity Assets Rate Charge 
($m) (%) ($ m) 
Product Inspection 15.743 9.82 1.546 
Disease/pest Protection 12.219 8.73 1.067 
Fisheries Research 31.107 9.13 2.840 
Other Fisheries Activities 6.091 8.73 0.532 
Other MAF Activities 4.143 8.73 0.362 
Total 6.347' 
----
---_. 
* Difference between this and using the total asset value with the single MAF rate is due to 
rounding errors. The single MAF rate is also derived by using revenue as weights rather than 
assets. The Treasury had stipulated the use of the former method. 
The 9.1 % charge rate was effectively a rate for the 1992/93 year, in which MAF and 
other departments were required to meet 13%. This had implications for MAF's 
private sector clients. MAF QUality Management's meat sector clients had already 
raised this concern. 
On the basis of projected external revenue for Meat Services of $48.9 million for 
1992/93, a specific capital charge of 9.8% and a capital base of $10.9 million, the 
savings to the meat industry would be about $0.35 million over a 12 month period. 
Although very minor in tenns of total revenue, there was an equity issue and a public 
relations value in having the flexibility to change the asset charge. The 13% rate was 
established before the start of the 1993/94 fmancial year with the meat inspection 
contracts fmalised part way into the fmancial year. The downward movement in the 
WACC was entirely due to the declining five year Government Bond yields. 
The Government seems to be satisfied with this capital charge regime now in place. 
The fonner secretary of the Treasury, Graham Scott, stated in Accountant's Journal 
(April 1993) prior to retiring that " .... the capital charge regime is doing what it is 
meant to do - forcing people to realise that if they are not using something, they 
should get rid of it." 
However, this may be a little premature, as the charge may be acting as a somewhat 
blunt instrnment in the current economic climate: a climate of downward adjusting 
interest rates, perhaps changing risk perceptions from that of the past, and the 
Government exercising very tight fiscal constraints. Gary Lewis', (MAF's Director 
Corporate Finance) concluding comment in his October 1991 article in the 
Accountant's Journal is still pertinent. 
"The capital charge regime is a positive step forward in State sector 
management and should be seen as such, provided it is practical and 
applicable. " 
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APPENDIX II: DERIVATION OF CHARGE RATES BY MAF ACTIVITY 
The post-tax 'nominal weighted average cost of capital for this exercise was derived 
as follows: 
Wn = d * [Rr+ ~ - Rr)] + (1 - d) * {[Rr+ b * (R,., - Rr)] / (l-t)} 
where: d 
b 
t 
Rr 
(Rd - Rr) 
(~- Rr) 
debt proportion of total assets. 
beta coefficient. 
effective tax rate. 
risk free rate. 
debt risk premium. 
market risk premium. 
A capital charge is then derived by subtracting the estimated growth from the 
nominal weighted average cost of capital (W ACC). 
Activitv 1 : Product Inspection Revenue 
LOW MID HIGH 
DEBT: 
Risk free rate (%) 7.20 7.20 7.20 
Debt Risk Premium (%) 0.50 1.00 1.50 
Cost of Debt 7.70 8.20 8.70 
Debt Ratio 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Cost of Debt (Weighted) 3.47 3.69 3.92 
EQUITY: 
Risk free rate (%) 7.20 7.20 7.20 
Market Risk Premium (%) 4.00 6.50 9.00 
Beta Coefficient 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Effective tax rate 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Cost of Equity 11.29 13.88 16.80 
Equity ratio 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Cost of equity (weighted) 6.21 7.63 9.24 
W ghted Ave Cost of Capital 9.68 11.32 13.16 
Less Growth 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Capital Charge Rate 8.18 9.82 11.66 
, 
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Activitv 2, 4 & 5: Diseasetpest Prevention. other Fisheries and Remaining 
Revenues 
LOW MID HIGH 
DEBT: 
Risk free rate (%) 7.20 7.20 7.20 
Debt Risk Premium (%) 0.50 1.00 1.50 
Cost of Debt 7.70 8.20 8.70 
Debt Ratio 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Cost of Debt (Weighted) 3.85 4.10 4.35 
EQUITY: 
Risk free rate (%) 7.20 7.20 7.20 
Market Risk Premium (%) 4.00 6.50 9.00 
Beta Coefficient 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Effective tax rate 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Cost of Equity 10.35 12.25 14.40 
Equity ratio 0.50 0.50 0.50 
I 
Cost of equity (weighted) 5.18 6.13 7.20 
W ghted Ave Cost of Capital 9.03 10.23 11.55 
Less Growth 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Capital Charge Rate 7.53 8.73 10. I 
.... 
-
Activitv 3: Fisheries Research Revenues 
LOW MID HIGH 
DEBT: 
Risk free rate (%) 7.20 7.20 7.20 
Debt Risk Premium (%) 0.50 1.00 1.50 
Cost of Debt 7.70 8.20 8.70 
Debt Ratio 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Cost of Debt (Weighted) 3.85 4.10 4.35 
EQUITY: 
Risk free rate (%) 7.20 7.20 7.20 
Market Risk Premium (%) 4.00 6.50 9.00 
Beta Coefficient 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Effective tax rate 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Cost of Equity 10.82 13.06 15.60 
Equity ratio 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Cost of equity (weighted) 5.41 6.53 7.80 
W ghted Ave Cost of Capital 9.26 10.63 12.15 
Less Growth 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Capital Charge Rate 7.76 9.13 10.65 
-
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PERCEPTIONS OF FARMER ATTITUDES AND OBJECTIVES; 
A BRAZILIAN EXAMPLE. 
~.L.Dalmazo, G.A.G.Frengley, W.J.Sorrenson.* 
A paper presented to the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Branch of the Australian 
Agricultural Economics Society; Picton, 1993. 
ABSTRACT: 
Brazil's Government agricultural extension service was established post-war, 
using the USA example of technical specialisation. Financial and farm 
management implications of technical advice were ignored, to the detriment of 
the service. In 1988 Federal support was abandoned leaving each State to supply 
the service, albeit still failing. 
To establish reasons for the failure, perceptions of farmers and extensionists were 
surveyed. Personal objectives and attitudes of farmers in southern Brazil were 
matched with the perceptions extensionists have of their farmer clients. Results 
indicate extensionists are generally mistaken in their belief of the usefulness of 
new technology for farmer needs, implying that a significant portion of public 
funds used for research and its transfer to farmers is wasted. 
Although in New Zealand agricultural research and extension is organised in a 
different way and our agriculture is relatively well developed, the strong disparity 
in views discovered in Brazil, serves as a salutary reminder that farmers' needs 
and objectives must be correctly assessed to prevent the misdirection of research 
and extension funds. 
Paper contents; 1 Figure, 4 Tables and discussion. 
* 
Naldo Dalmazo is an Extension Research Officer, Sadia Agro-industrial 
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PERCEPTIONS OF FARMERS' ATTITUDES AND OBJECTIVES: 
A BRAZILIAL"I STUDY. 
N.L.Dalmazo, G.A.G.Frengley, W.J.Sorrenson. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic growth in many countries, is tied to increased farm production. Owner-operator 
farms commonly predominate in the agricultural sector of these countries and the prospect 
for an increase in output pivots around the farmer and his family. To enable the transition 
to higher output levels to be attained, rural development agents have a duty to ensure the 
successful transfer of new technology through the adoption of appropriate management 
systems. An understanding and recognition of the objectives and decision making 
processes of the farm family is central to the appropriate advice to enable growth to be 
achieved. 
International consultancy and project experience has shown that despite the hard work and 
admirable intentions of rural extension agents, agricultural output and the well-being of 
their farmer clients commonly do not improve as much as expected over time. Rates of 
technology adoption are often poor, and client bases fall. The implications are that either 
the agents' expectations are too high or that the approaches being used are not as effective 
as they should be, and the needs of farmers are not being met. 
Given that economic growth pivots around owner-operator farmers, rural development 
agents must have an intimate knowledge of the needs and objectives of their clients. 
While farmers may have personal aspirations, the focus of their everyday existence is their 
farming commitment and the needs of their family. This calls for extension methods 
which will effectively identify the melded needs and objectives of the farm family as the 
end point of all [mancial, management and technical proposals examined by the extension 
agent and his client. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the results of research into the objectives and 
decision-making processes of owner-operator farmers in Brazil. General implications for 
improving the effectiveness of rural extension agents and the usefulness of agricultural 
research in many countries are elaborated. 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Agriculture in Southern Brazil 
Small scale owner-operator farms of less than 60 hectares comprise the majority (88%) of 
farms in the three southern-most states of Brazil. They are imponant to Brazil's total 
agricultural sector. In 1991 they produced 41 % of the Brazil's major grain products (rice, 
maize and soybeans) and significant ponions of the country's beef, pig, and chicken 
1.0 
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production. Most owner-operators are of European descent with a predominant portion of 
their production systems reflecting the traditional methods of their ancestors. The average 
farm size is about 20. hectares and farmers are market oriented. Almost 80% of the gross 
farm income is sold with the remaining 20% being consumed for subsistence 
requirements. 
Production systems are diversified. Most farmers rear pigs and grow maize, black beans, 
and soybeans. Dairy cows form an integral part of most production systems and a variety 
of garden crops are grown for subsistence. Maize grown on the farm is fed to pigs or sold 
for feed rations which are used primarily for raising chickens under contract to 
agroindustrial companies in an integrated production/marketing system. The size of the pig 
production enterprise on a farm is determined primarily by the average maize production 
of the farm. Farms average about 7 sows. Average annual farm income in 1991 was 
US$14700.00. 
Almost all owner operator farmers have electricity and freezers. TVs, and washing 
machines are now commonly found on farms . Schooling is available throughout the 
southern states up to the eighth year. A survey conducted in 1988 (Dalmazo et al 1988) 
showed that 67% of all farmers attended school for 3 or 4 years with 16% attending 
classes between the 5th to 8th year. 86% of all farmers interviewed expressed a desire to 
study more "to defend themselves" or "to be better informed". 
The soil in the region is of basaltic origin, sometimes stony. As little as 25% of the area 
is suitable for mechanised cultivation and all small-scale farmers still use oxen for soil 
preparation, weeding and for transport. 
Extension in Brazil 
An extension service was formed in Brazil during the second half of the 1940s modelled 
on the American system. The system has not altered appreciably. All work is organised 
on a technical or subject basis. Concern is focused on applications of technology, almost 
invariably ignoring the financial implications, the overall farm management system or the 
likely effect on the farm family. Extension methods used today are principally farmer 
meetings, field days, and farmer excursions. The basic assumption of the extension 
approach employed, was that net farm incomes would increase as more modem technology 
was applied. The model spread through all states. 
The extension enterprises were initially solely government funded. In the last 15 to 20 
years private agro-industri·al companies and farmer co-operatives initiated extension 
services, all based on the same approach. Consistently, training of extensionists has been 
based on the premise of improving the diffusion of technology. 
As Government support increased, state extension services grew and a large centralised 
national extension organisation was formed to provide support to the state enterprises. This 
model continued up to 1988 when the federal government decided to abandon the national 
organisation because of budget restrictions and concerns related to its efficiency. At the 
same time the necessity for and effectiveness of state extension enterprises were being 
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questioned. Political support for these services was waning as farmers were increasingly 
dissatisfied and demand fell. 
A private consultancy service surfaced in Brazil some 20 years ago. It dominated some 
regions. At that time the country was receiving substantial external funding for 
development. Subsidies for agriculture were significant and distortionary. For example, in 
1973 farmers could buy subsidised fertiliser at 40% of the true cost; agriculrural 
development loans were interest free. As banks insisted on farm devlopment projects 
being prepared before loans could be granted, many consultants' offices were established. 
Project proposals of all types were based on technical feasibility with scant recognition of 
fmancial viability. The extent of subsidisation practically gnaranteed financial success. At 
the farmer level all assistence was technical. 
University agricultural courses were technically oriented. Subjects such as decision-
making, farm management and other economic methodologies necessary to determine 
optimal farming systems were considered to be incidental and accorded low priority. In 
this way a full generation of "technologists" was created and critical questions about 
economics, profitablity, risk and system optimality were left to the farmer himself. 
Technologists were not trained to view farmers as clients attempting to achieve their own 
objectives. Hence the farmer was not considered by the technologist as the focal point of 
his/her job. Technologists were ill-prepared to see beyond a crop, or an animal activity to 
the real end point of their advice. Each component of the farm system devised and co-
ordinated by the farmer to satisfy personal objectives was viewed technically as a separate 
dimension. 
More recent changes to Brazil's economy have brought about a rapid decline in rural 
credit, along with the number of consultants' offices. The extension service in southern 
Brazil used as a model throughout the country is now undergoing restructuring and 
refunding. Offices have been closed. Some rural areas have been without extensionists 
for months and the salaries of these officers have been falling in real terms. It is pertinent 
to observe that there has been little complaint from farmers about the reduced services 
durin..g this restructuring period. 
3. OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH. 
From the outset extension workers believed they were doing their best to effect the 
adoption of new technology, but farmer interest in advice has been declining. Agricultural 
productivity in recent decades appears to have been relatively unaffected by extension 
effort (as evidenced in Figure 1). Of the major grain crops, the productivity of blackbeans 
and soybeans has followed a declining trend since 1950. Although the productivity of 
maize has trended to a markedly higher plain since the 1970s, between year variations in 
yields have changed drammatically. Yields in the rwo consecutive years, 1978 and 1979 
were lower than any other year since 1950. 
(Figure 1). 
Numbers of instances have been reported in which farmer/extension co-operators returned 
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to their old farm management systems after the extension activity ceased. Extensionists 
have become non-plus sed. Extension themes and priorities change regularly. Discussions 
between extension personnel and researchers co=only conclude with the same point: "we 
have the technology available, you (the extensionist) have to diffuse it." By contrast, 
extensionists complain that the technology is produced only for resource rich farmers. 
They also state that appropriate technology and methodology for small-scale owner-
operator farms is not available. 
To obtain evidence needed to clarify the issues alluded to and to gain insight to the loss of 
extensionists' clients, an attitude survey of the interested group - the farmers, was 
conducted (Dalmazo, et al 1988). Central questions are what are their objectives; how do 
they make farm related decisions; how do they react to risk; and what are their attitudes 
towards reco=ended technologies? At the same time similar questions posed to 
extensionists exposed some misperceptions of their clients problems. 
The Survey 
Survey information was obtained using a regionally stratifled sample of 90 farmers (farm 
size 6 - 35 ha) and 26 extensionists from the Santa Catarina region of South Brazil. 
Information was obtained from farmers by personal interviews and through a mail survey 
(55% response) of extensionists. 
Farmers' views are reflected in the fIrst three tables below. They create an information 
benchmark against which the views of the extensionists can be compared. Table 1, 
describes farmers' personal objectives; Table 2, fInancial objectives; Table 3, farmer 
attitudes to risk, investment and labour. Finally Table 4 (split into two parts) is used to 
explore and contrast the perceptions of farmers and extensionists. Answers to each of the 
questions throughout the survey is volunteered. In all tables responses to each question 
su=ed to 100% but answers which were insigniflcant in number were ignored. 
Table 1 Here. 
Although the farmers are market oriented the results show that they are careful (Q2) and 
worried about their future (Q4). They want to keep farming for subsistence food 
production and freedom of choice and action (Q1,2). They do not perceive a good future 
(Q4,5) although responses to question 3 indicate farmers are either cautiously optimistic or 
consider subsistence farming a better alternative to unemployment in a city. Utility gains 
outweigh the negatives and their reco=endation is to continue farming (Q3), but 
consider that their current position within the competitive economy is worsening (Q5,6). 
As in the case of most farmers in a worsening economic position - as they perceive - a 
safe position is the best strategy '(Q2,8). But they are willing to work harder (longer hours 
are also implied) than they already do (Q7), to increase their income (Q8). 
For these farmers the effective resources available are land and labour. Capital use is 
. restricted: with high monetary inflation rates, exchange is frequently effected using real 
goods. Risks inherent in money exchange and new debt, co=only required for the 
adoption of new technology, are avoided as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Here 
Data from Table 2 complements the answers in Table 1. In general farmers in the 
surveyed group are nnwilling to borrow (Ql) because of the associated risk and inadequate 
return at present (Q5). They spend as little as possible (Q2), and avoid bank credit for 
farm working expenses (Q4). 
The cash constraint alluded to in question 3 stems from the needs for cash and labour 
which are heightened when su=er crops (maize, blackbeans and soybeans) are being 
sown. Variable inputs must be paid for and the labour requirement associated with animal 
traction is intensive. 
The result of the complex of flnancial and management objectives described in Table 2 
(Ql,2,5), is a production system based on family labour and with few purchased inputs. 
This explains why the size of the pig enterprise is determined by the farmer's capacity to 
grow maize. Question 6 in Table 2 relates more closely to the decision-making process 
but is included here to highlight that the inter-related objectives, which define the 
management system, are not co=only quantifled. 
There are few externally imposed constraints, budgeting is not used and market 
information is minimal. In these circumstances, with fragile soils, a lack of decision-
making tools to explore other choices, and with an aversion to risk, the chosen farming 
systems relate rationally to farmers' objectives. 
Following Tables 1 and 2, it is not difficult to predict farmer response and attitudes to the 
adoption of new technology when this is co=only capital intensive. If technological 
change is advised and this is offered without regard to the associated fmancial effects and 
changes in the farm management risk profIle, it will most likely be ignored. Table 3 
provides further insight. 
Table 3 Here. 
The responses shown in Table 3 reflect farmers' focus on security. They are are interested 
in improving their farms (Ql), but with as little risk as possible (Q2) and are aware of the 
need for capital to improve their farming systems. 
The best investment option for a relatively large sum was seen to be farm buildings (Q7). 
This choice is preferted because they are aware that the most profltable farming systems 
in the region involve more intensive animal production: it is also inflation resistant. 
Almost 50 % prefer low risk and low gain (Q2) and only 13 % chose medium or high 
risk. This need for security or a safety fIrst attitude to their preferred management system 
is further supported by the remaining responses to question 2; 25% chose investments 
returning a low constant gain with no risk. Clearly they are prepared to work harder 
(Table 1, Q8) for a low but safe return (Table 3, Q2,3). 
In Table 3, questions 4, 5, and 6 are related to the information sources used by farmers. 
Most farmers have good contacts with several institutions such as co-operatives, 
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government consultants and farmer unions. The survey responses suggest that these 
advisory contacts are providing little assistance to farmers making production decisions. 
Farmers are clearly con~erned about the financial risk which would be induced in order to 
adopt new technology. 
With the intention of detecting any differences between the farmers' objectives and 
problems and those perceived by extension workers, a twin survey was conducted among 
the region's farmers and government extension agents. The results are presented in two 
parts in Tables 4 A and B, which contrast the responses of the farmers and extensionists. 
Table 4a and part 1 of 4b here. 
While 71 percent of farmers stated their principal objective was to keep farming (Table 
4A,Ql), only 8 percent of extensionists explicitly recognised this. Admittedly a further 27 
percent suggested farmers were pre-occupied with survival. 50 percent of extensionists 
suggested that farmers' main objective was to increase farm income to secure an income 
for their children. In marked contrast, only 9 percent of farmers ranked increased income 
their top priority. 
Table 4a Here 
Table 4B provides the most telling evidence that few extensionists have clearly understood 
farmers' problems and perceptions. Failure to do so may have heightened farmers' 
~ problems through the resultant conflict of ideas imposed by inappropriate advice. 
w 
Farmers have been slow or unwilling to adopt new technology causing concern for 
extensionists and researchers. Reasons for this were sought and as maize is a vital 
component of the farmers' integrated management system, the identification of principal 
constraints affecting the uptake of technology centered on this crop. 
Maize has much to do with problems of soil erosion, the viability and the size of the 
complementary pig enterprise, farmers' needs for working capital and their labour demand. 
Opportunities to increase the productivity and efficiency of maize production would 
therefore impact on the profitability of their integrated management system and the 
economic Viability of their farms. 
The technology of maize production has been heavily researched but farmers have been 
slow to use the new information. The reasons for the slow rate of adoption (shown in 
Table 4B) are clear and logical from the farmers' viewpoint but do not correspond to the 
perceptions of the extensionists. The difference is marked and infers that in general the 
extensionists surveyed had an inadequate understanding of integrated farm management 
systems in which technical oppoitunities are over-ridden by the predominating finance, 
labour and utility constraints. 
. The extensionists perceptions of farmers reasons for the non-adoption of the 
recommended technology for maize production were that they do not know the technology 
(31 %), followed by tradition/no motivation (23%) and no technical alternatives (15%). 
The principal economic factors were identified as a lack of resources (35%) and an 
unfavourable input/output price ratio (27%). 
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Farmers' responses suggest the problem of lack of adoption is not related to technology or 
to motivation. The farmers do not believe that the recommended technology will help 
them. Nor do they believe it is economic despite their knowledge of latest research 
fmdings (as judged by the observations made by farmers during the survey interviews). 
Also it cannot be concluded that their non-adoption stems from an overburden of 
traditional methods or lack of motivation. On the contrary, farmers motives for not 
applying the latest technology are rational from an economic viewpoint 
Table 4b part 2 here. 
Sixty five percent of the extensionists interviewed consider that farmers know the 
recommended maize technology but do not apply it. Of the reasons given for non-
adoption, risk aversion is the most important (38% of the respondents); lack of motivation 
(in conjunction with inadequate resources) was next with 34%. 
While risk aversion has been correctly identified, the extensionists have ranked lack of 
motivation highly. This contrasts with farmer's responses which reflect the heart of the 
problem. With inflation compounding at 30% per month, fmancial costs (for seed, 
fertiliser, chemicals) incurred at the commencement of a crop cycle cannot be repaid. Crop 
price rises lag behind the inflation rate with benefit to the merchants and to the detriment 
of the farmers. Real commercial exchange is commonly effected by physical exchange 
with seed as payment; the quantity to be repaid being compounded at a rate closer to the 
real rate of interest. While farmers wish to increase their profits, their financial resources 
are limited and the risk of debt is seen to be prohibitive (Table 2, QI). 
Effectively, the extensionists appear to be recording secondary constraints (the farmers' 
unwillingness to adopt technology) as the principal problem affecting agricultural output. 
By contrast, the farmers' commercial perceptions and attitudes (to cash flow constraints, 
credit, risk, and profit) reflecting their response to persistent inflation and difficult 
financial conditions, dominate the rate of adoption and are therefore the primary 
constraints. 
- Other studies have highlighted similar issues. MYREM (1964) conducted a study with 
482 farmers asking if they wanted to increase output from their fields. 
"Ninety-nine percent answered emphatically yes, as judged by a head 
movement or by facial expression." 
The author informs that almost without exeption the farmers can explain what was done, 
by whom and why. Moreover the author comments that the reasons given by farmers for 
their actions had considerable practical sense, according to their personal decision criteria. 
RHOADES (1987) stated that farmers have in the past learned through the trials and errors 
of self determined adaptation. The cropping systems used today are the logical result of 
these adaptations proved though time. They are rational systems. They are not perfect, but 
these systems work and are adjusted by new information farmers obtain by reading, 
observation and from outsiders' recommendations. They are risk averse but accept the 
degree of risk of their familiar systems. They are not conservative or traditional in a 
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negative sense, but are careful in the adoption of unproven ideas. 
Perceptions of Farmer Objectives by Extensionists. 
The farmers' answers are observed in the tables. Their comercial orientation is strong but 
in the current circumstances they react as subsistence farmers. Extensionists see them as a 
co=ercial farmers looking for increased income and to achieve a good future for their 
family. To increase income it is necessary to increase inputs and investment, and accept an 
increase in risk. The technology reco=ended by extensionists corresponds to farmers' 
objectives as they perceived them. 
73% of the extensionists failed to recognise the economic objectives of the farmers. It 
follows that the non-adoption of reco=ended technology and loss of clients is 
predictable. Only 27 % of the extensionists identified the economic perceptions of 
farmers realistically. Ninety two percent of extensionists declared that they have been 
losing clients "sometimes" (71%) or "always" (21 %). Considering that the State extension 
service is free of charge and does not conflict with the "spend as little as possible" 
objective (Table 2, Q2), it is apparent that the farmers simply do not consider the 
assistance offered by the extensionists to be relevant 
The "not tuning in" to the needs of farmers is evidenced by the response of farmers who 
have given up meetings and other extension opportunities. DROPPA (1982) studied the 
loss of clients in southern Brazil and concluded that 
Conclusion: 
"The need for additional capital to implement the new technology can drive 
farmers who lack capital away from the extension contacts. They feel 
unable to apply it and lose motivation". 
The important point is not to search for faults among the extension officers but to 
recognize that there is a general misperception problem. This makes the extension work 
less effective and fewer people can be assisted to achieve their objectives. 
Advice to these farmers which assists the refinement and improvement of current farm 
management practices at minimal cost may be sensible and readily acceptable. In 
whatever way research information is transfered. new technology which relies on increased 
input costs will not be adopted by these farmers, at least in the short run. The farmers 
surveyed are strongly risk averse and as a consequence, avoid the adoption of new 
technology which imposes additional costs and increased risk to the present system. 
The survey results suggest clear directions for ongoing scientific research in Brazil and 
. other countries. In current economic circumstances, when farmers are strongly averse to 
financial risk, technical research output which identifies genotypes and management 
methods which improve input/output efficiency without increasing costs is likely to be 
adopted. Research leading to output gains obtained through increased inputs or increased 
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management complexity will co=only be rejected. Without substantive knowledge of 
farmers' objectives and perceptions, scientists risk an important waste of scarce research 
funds as they are blind to the likely usefulness and eventual adoption of their work. In 
the survey cited above, extensionists are hamstrung by a lack of understanding of farmers 
needs and by inappropriate technology. 
Inappropriate technical research, and extension which fails to meet the needs and 
objectives of farmers, evidenced in this survey may be no less important in other nations. 
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TABLE 1 PERSONAL OBJECTIVES OF FARM OWNER-OPERATORS IN 
SOUTHERN BRAZIL 
Questions! Answers Responses 
(%) 
1. What are your main objectives ? 
- Keep fanning 71 
- Buy additional land 17 
- Increase profit 9 
2. Why do you want to keep farming? 
- Subsistence / security 42 
- Maintain personal independence 19 
3. What recommendation do you give your sons and friends? 
- to keep fanning 88 
- go to the city 3 
- don't know 9 
4_ Do you see a good future? 
- Yes 15 
- No_ 80 
- Don't know 5 
5. Why do you not see a good future? 
- the rural community is failing 49 
- low prices 11 
- domination by the well-off inthe production chain 7 
6. What are the main constraints to progress? 
- low product prices 40 
- high inl2ut prices 11 
- insufficient capital 12 
- interest and debts 9 
- climate 8 
7. Farm work is 
- very hard 15 
-hard 54 
- normal 26 
8. Are you willing to 
- work less and earn less 8 
- maintain your existing income 32 
- work harder to earn more income 60 
1.0 
0"1 
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TABLE 2: FARMER'S FINAL'l"CIAL OBJECTIVES 
Questions! Answers 
1. What is your main financial objective? 
- no debts 
- maximise income 
- not risk current fmancial status 
2. Which of the following is the most important when deciding on 
your cropping system? 
- maximising yields 
- mimimising risk 
- spending as little as possible 
3. Is capital limiting at any time of the year? 
- yes 
- no 
4. Do you use agricultural credit? 
- Never 
- Yes and continue to 
- Yes but not any more 
5. What is your opinion of agricultural credit? 
- it is useful 
- it is very risky 
- it is not helpful 
- it has in the past been good 
6. Do you prepare your cropping plan in your head or on paper? 
- on paper 
- in your head 
Responses 
(%) 
45 
14 
38 
31 
7 
58 
84 
15 
10 
30 
56 
24 
28 
28 
20 
30 
70 
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TABLE 3: FAIUvfER ATTITUDES TOWARDS RISK, INVESTMENTS AND LABOUR 
Questions! Answers Responses 
(%) 
1. What will you do with a large sum of money equal to one 
third of your gross annual income? 
- put in a savings account 8 
- put part in a savings account and part into farm buildings 23 
- farm buildings 69 
2. Which type of investment do you prefer? 
- high risk/high gain 6 
- medium risk/medium gain 7 
- low risk/low gain 47 
- maintaining current situation 15 
- low constant gain/no risk 25 
'''',-
3. What is your willingness to work in the following three 
situations of risk and gain? 
_ high gain relative to todays income with risk of losing the gain I 
year in 2 2 
- medium gain with risk of losing the gain 1 year in 3 14 
- low gain with no risk 84 
4. Who do you consult when making a decision about maize? 
- nobody 3 
- family 28 
- Cooperative extension agent 21 
- several sources 21 
- Government extension agent 7 
5. How many contacts per year do you have with an extensionist 
from the Cooperative or Government service? 
- never 18 
- once 10 
- 2 to 4 times 31 
- 5 to 6 times 15 
- 7 or more 26 
6. Do you think that the Government extensionists assist you in 
making correct farm decisions? ! 
- always 35 
- often 15 
- seldom 26 
- never 21 
- they are doing other things 3 
~ 
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13 
7. What do you consider would be best to change or improve on 
your farm? 
- fann building coristruction/improvement 
- soil conservation 
- purchase livestock 
- would like to but do not have the money 
8. What are your SOurces of agricultural information? 
- Cooperative/radio/TV 
- Government extension!newspaper/radio/TV 
- fanners union 
- neighbours/friends 
- agricultural industries 
9. Do you discuss farming with your neighbours 
- always 
- rarely 
49 
15 
8 
11 
35 
30 
12 
9 
10 
71 
27 
14 
TABLE 4a: A COMPARlSON OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF EXTENSIONISTS AND 
FARMERS: FAR.MER OBJECTIVES. 
Responses % 
Farmers 
- keep farming 71 
- purchase additional land 17 
- improve farm profits 9 
- no debts 3 
Extensionists 
- keep fanning 8 
- increased farm income/secure a future for their children 50 
- survival 27 
- maintain soil fertility/soil conservation 8 
TABLE 4b: COMPARlSON OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF EXTENSIONISTS AND 
FARMERS: CONSTRAINTS ON THE ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
Questions/Answers Responses 
(%) 
1. Farmers 
What is the major constraint impeding you from obtaining a high 
level of productivity from your maize? 
- High input prices/inadequate soil preparation 21 
- high input prices 23 
- high input prices/low product prices/lack of fertiliser 14 
- 19w product prices 5 
- inadequate soil preparation/poor weed control/insufficient 
labour 15 
- high costs of hybrid seeds 7 
- unfavourable climate 10 
\.0 
CP 
15 
2. Extensionists: What is the major constraint impeding farmers 
from obtaining high levels of production from their maize? 
TECHNICAL reasons; 
- they do not know the technology 
- tradition and lack of motivation 
- inadequate technical options 
ECONOMIC reasons: 
31 
23 
15 
- inadequate financial resources 35 
- low output/high input prices 27 
- unfavourable Government policy 19 
- low production 8 
GENERAL PERCEPTIONS of farmers' constraints by extensionists. 
- risk aversion 38 
- lack of motivation/risk aversion/inadequate financial resources 19 
- lack of motivation 15 
- inadequate financial resources 12 
B-4 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 

~ 
~ 
CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF AGRICHEMICAL USE AND 
AGRICHEMICAL RESIDUES ON FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLES. 
Ruth Wilson-Salt 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Business, Massey University 
Palmerston North 
SUMMARY 
This paper discusses the objectives and implementation of a nationwide survey of 
consumer perceptions of agrichemical use and agrichemical residues on fresh fruit 
and vegetables. The survey asked consumers to rank their food concerns along with 
their preferences for produce grown using alternative production methods. Consumers 
were asked if they had concerns, other than the food safety issue, and whether they 
agreed or disagreed with some of the described benefits of agrichemical use. Sources 
and reliability of food safety information were also ascertained. Demographic 
characteristics were requested to test the effect of these on food concerns and 
preferred information sources. Preliminary results are discussed for a subsample of 
respondents. 
Keywords: food safety, agrichemical residues, consumer preferences 
INTRODUCTION 
Agrichemicals, as a significant input t6 agricultural production, became widespread 
post W orld War II, during which many new chemicals were developed in anticipation 
of the need to engage in chemical warfare (Crone, 1986, pI21). 
The benefits of such chemical use include a significantly reduced spoilage rate for 
all crops both on field and in storage, a reduction in the presence of natural poisons, 
for example fungal aflatoxins which are highly oncogenic, and decreased costs of 
production due to reduced labour and capital requirements. 
These benefits appeared initially to have little or no hidden costs until nearly two 
decades later when food chain effects and some chronic health effects appeared. 
Rachel Carson's evocative and emotive book, "Silent Spring", published in 1962, 
heralded the beginning of a change in attitudes regarding agrichemical use at this 
time. 
Agrichemical use presents both acute and chronic health risks to human society and 
has some well-documented effects on the environment. Given the benefits and costs 
is the current level of agrichemical use optimal in economic terms, that is, in terms 
of the benefits of crop production versus the costs of agrichemicals used to obtain 
it? A consumer survey is used to look at consumer opinion on agrichemical use. 
As McGuirk, Preston, and McCormick (1990) have noted, little is known about the 
relationship between consumer concerns toward food safety, under which the 
agrichemical issue can be considered, and food shopping behaviour. How do 
preferences regarding the food safety attribute of food influence demand? 
Producers interested in alternatives to the use of agrichemicals may face higher costs 
than those using conventional practices. It may be profitable to reduce agrichemical 
use if consumers are willing to pay a premium for foods considered to have reduced 
risk from agrichemical residues. 
Consumer studies in the United States have indicated growing consumer concern 
about the use of agrichemicals and possible presence of their residues on fresh fruit 
and vegetables. When risk assessments are performed it would appear that actual risk 
for chronic and acute ill health caused by residues is far less than for food poisoning 
such as botulism and yet consumers' perceived risk reverses that order (Ott, Huang 
and Misra, 1991). 
Despite these concerns, some studies have shown that consumers are not willing to 
pay to avoid the perceived or actual risk of agrichemical residues. This has been 
measured variously as payment of a price premium for produce grown using no 
agrichemicals (organic) or payment for produce which has been tested and certified 
as agrichemical residue free. (Ott, Huang and Misra, 1991). 
However other studies find that consumers are willing to pay significant premiums 
for either of the two options described above. A study by Weaver, Evans and Luloff 
(1992) found that over 75 percent of consumers were willing to pay a price premium 
of varying levels for certified chemical residue free tomatoes and that 26 percent 
'were willing to pay more than a 15 percent price premium for such produce. 
OBJECTNE 
The principle objective of this study is to determine consumer attitudes towards the 
use of agrichemicals and the possible presence of agrichemical residues on fresh fruit 
and vegetables. If consumers are concerned about the possible presence of 
agrichemical residues, are they willing to pay more than the current market price for 
produce grown using alternative management processes, specifically in this case 
integrated pest management? 
The relationship between consumer purchase of fresh fruit and vegetables and the 
perceived or actual level of agrichemical residues is required for evaluation of the 
impacts of food safety information, food safety events, and food safety regulation. 
It is necessary to answer questions such as; how much regulation of the level of 
agrichemical risk is optimal, if any; what is the impact of a ban on the use of an 
existing agrichemical, in terms of producer and consumer surplus changes; what is 
the potential market for food which has an increased safety component. 
Results from the survey will be tested to examine the tradeoff consumers make 
between perceived food safety and price. The description given to participants of the 
survey initially held all other characteristics constant except the use of agrichemicals 
and the respondent was asked if she or he would purchase produce grown using 
integrated pest management (IPM) (figure 1). The level of information in the survey 
is a realistic indication of the amount of information that can be given to a consumer 
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without actually estimating the levels of agrichemicals present 
Figure 1. Information on Integrated Pest Management Given to Consumers in Survey. 
INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT 
Integrated pest management (IPM) is a management process used to grow fresh 
fruit and vegetables. Growers use various monitoring methods to determine the 
number of pests in the area where the produce is grown and also take into account 
weather conditions which affect pest numbers. Agrichemical sprays are not used until 
pest numbers reach a preset threshold level. Growers also encourage the natural 
predators of the pests that attack their produce by careful selection and timing of spray 
applications: 
Use of an integrated pest management programme means the number of spray 
applications MAY be reduced compared with a conventional (non-IPM, non-organic) 
programme which uses a programme of sprays on a regular basis to prevent the build 
up of pests. 
The IPM programme produces fresh fruit and vegetables which are of the same 
quality and size as those produced using a conventional spray programme. 
Fresh fruit and vegetables grown using integrated pest management are NOT the same 
as organic fresh fruit and vegetables which are grown without the use of conventional 
agrichemicals. 
A further question then asked how much the consumer would be willing to pay to 
obtain such produce. Because individual types of produce may be of greater concem 
for consumers than the aggregate collection of fruit and vegetables this question was 
designed to indicate an overall price increase, that is, an addition to the produce 
grocery bill of so many dollars (figure 2). 
Figure 2. Questions on Purchase of and Willingness to Pay for IPM produce. 
If fresh fruit and vegetables grown using integrated pest management are available 
would you consider buying and/or eating them? PLEASE CIRCLE TIlE NUMBER 
OF YOUR RESPONSE. 
yes 
no 
................................................................... 1 
.................................................................... 2 
If all fresh fruit and vegetables you currently buy and/or eat could be bought as IPM 
produce how much would you be willing to pay above current prices? PLEASE 
CIRCLE mE NUMBER OF YOUR RESPONSE. 
O% ..•. no change ....................................................... 1 
20% ... adds $2 for every $10 you currently spend on fresh produce ..... 2 
40% ... adds $4 for every $10 you currently spend on fresh produce ..... 3 
60% ... adds $6 for every $10 you currently spend on fresh produce ... ..4 
A question on specific items was asked to determine if consumers considered all food 
and vegetables as a homogenous group on the food safety issue, or if they singled 
out some of the items by indicated a higher willingness to pay for that item grown 
as IPM produce than for other items similarly grown. 
IS CONSUMER INFORMATION OPTIMAL? 
The second purpose of this study is to find out if consumers feel they have sufficient 
information, who they think should be responsible in terms of time and resources for 
its provision and which sources they consider the most credible. Of interest also is 
the identification of groups of consumers reporting similar concerns, their 
demographic characteristics, and the implications of this information for food 
marketing and regulation. 
Agrichemical residues and the risk they present are unseen product attributes. To 
know and determine how much they are willing to pay for a good which contains a 
bundle of characteristics, consumers must be able to evaluate that bundle of 
characteristics. Where they are not able to evaluate a characteristic directly they must 
rely on some other source of information. Will the level of information be optimal 
if left to the market? 
Producers can supply such information but they must be able to recover the cost of 
doing do. Thus if their product is produced by a number of other producers they will 
be unable to gain the full benefit of provision of information on the good they 
supply. Any increase in demand from provision of that information will be enjoyed 
by all producers of that good. Alternatively producer collectives can supply 
information. By doing so they seek to increase demand for their good over non-
collective members but they must still be able to uniquely identify product produced 
by members of the cooperative as opposed to non-members. In order to distinguish 
a product there must be some form of differentiation. 
If producers are left to supply information Choi and Jensen see a problem arising for 
consumers with regard to the costs of information processing where an infinite 
amount of product differentiation can arise from producers seeking to capture rents. 
Similarly, consumer groups could monitor product specifications and product testing 
for consumer information. Consumer groups are notoriously difficult to organise and 
may therefore suffer from being unable to reap the benefits or regain costs of 
information collection and dissemination. This is due to the nature of information, 
that is, the inability to exclude others from the benefits of information while they 
may not have contributed to the cost of information gathering. 
If these are the existing conditions for both producers and consumers it may be 
optimal for government either to provide such information or to ensure that such 
information, that is provided, is legitimate. 
Furthermore there are some equity questions to be addressed. If firms are able to 
differentiate their product by level of hazard or risk some socioeconomic groups may 
be unable to pay the price premium for such produce. In this situation there exists 
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a need for government to set minimum safety standards and enforce them by use of 
taxp'ayer funds, and in this process evincing a redistribution policy. 
Consumer concerns with regard to food safety, and in particular for the purposes of 
this study, towards agrichemical residue risk, are almost certainly based on perceived 
risk thim actual estimated risk. In the case of agrichemical residues, it is extremely 
involved to estimate the presence of residues, their single and cumulative risks. 
Consumers have reported concern about agrichemical risk in numerous media articles 
and several researchers have found perceived risk to be a significant concern for 
consumers. This may indicate a need for government intervention to produce an 
optimal outcome if consumers lack factual information on which to base their 
estimate of risk. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STUDY 
The target population for the study consisted of all people in New Zealand over 
eighteen. To obtain the sample the 1992 electoral roll was used. A systematic random 
sample from this base was generated using the following method; the total number 
of pages in the 97 books was calculated, this number was divided by 1000 to give 
the number of pages between each selection. A random number was generated to 
give the initial start page and a second random number generated to give the name 
on each page to be recorded. 
Because the entire population of New Zealand was decided upon for the sample 
frame, a mail survey appeared to be the most expedient and cost-effective means of 
reaching the elements selected. 
To these addresses was sent a numbered questionnaire with a personalised letter, and 
a freepost envelope for return of the survey. An incentive was used across two 
surveys of 1000 being sent at the same time by two post-graduates in the department. 
The incentive was an Ansett mystery weekend for two to be taken in the year from 
the survey close date. A reminder letter was sent twelve days after the survey was 
mailed. 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
Due to the time scale of the survey there are still replies to the survey corning in 
therefore only the preliminary results of the fIrst 98 surveys received are presented 
here. The following items are discussed: 
Consumer ranking of a list of ten food concerns; 
A second consumer ranking of relative health risks; 
Level of consumer concern about possible presence of agrichemical residues 
on fresh fruit and vegetables; 
Consumer response to statements about the benefIts of agrichemical use; 
Consumer response to questions on information, who should be responsible 
for its provision', and which sources are the most reliable; 
Consumer response to several statements about conventional and IPM 
produce; 
Consumer willingness to buy IPM produce and how much they are willing 
to pay for it; 
Consumers were asked to rank ten health concerns according to their three greatest 
concerns (table 1). The three major food concerns are, from greatest to third greatest, 
food poisoning (score 120), food grown using agrichemicals (score 54), and chemical 
food additives (score 51). This order is consistent with actual risk for food poisoning 
and agrichemical additives but not consistent with consumer concerns reported in 
various US studies. Perhaps New Zealand consumers' concerns are significantly 
different from US consumers, however the recent death of twin infants from listeria 
poisoning in utero, and the media attention it received in New Zealand, may have 
had some impact on consumer concerns. The scores were calculated by weighting 
each concern by 3, 2 or 1 if it was ranked fIrst, second or third respectively and 
summing these scores across the food concerns. 
Table 1. Consumer Ranking for Ten Food Concerns. 
-------
Food concern Score 
foods high in salt 19 
foods high in saturated fats 50 
foods grown using agrichemicals 54 
foods high in sugar 16 
foods high in cholesterol 24 
food poisoning (botulism, salmonella) 120 
chemical food preservatives 41 
chemical food additives 51 
foods too low in nutritional value 20 
food prices too high 25 
Consumers were given a second ranking question in which they were asked to 
compare the health risk of eating food with saturated fat, sugar, salt or cholesterol 
with eating fruit and vegetables grown using agrichemicals. The responses were 
converted into a relative risk score with -2 points awarded if the statement was 
marked much lower, -1 if marked somewhat lower, 0 if marked neither lower nor 
higlier, 1 point if marked somewhat higher, and 2 points if marked much higher. 
Sugar was found to have, according to these consumers, a lower relative risk score, 
at -29, next was salt, ranked at 4, then cholesterol with a score of 26 and saturated 
fat with a score of 40 (table 2). 
Table 2. Consumer Ranking of the Relative Risk for a Second Set of Food Concerns. 
r==-
Food Score 
Concern 
Sugar -29 
Salt 4 
Cholesterol 26 
Saturated Fat 40 
I--' 
Consumers were asked to indicate their level of concern about the possible presence 
of agrichemical residues on the fresh fruit and vegetables they eat. The responses are 
in table 3. The majority of consumers indicated at least some level of concern (92 
percent). 
Table 3. Consumers' Level of Concern. 
Level of Concern Number of 
Respondents 
Not at all concerned 8 
Moderately concerned 43 
Quite concerned 27 
Very concerned 20 
Respondents were given four statements on the positive aspects of agrichemical use. 
If responses to these statements are aggregated on the basis of whether a respondent 
indicated agreement or disagreement and undecided respondents are not included, 
there is no clear polarisation on either agreement or disagreement for the statements. 
Thus, while 42 people disagree with the statement that using agrichemicals improves 
the quality of fresh fruit and vegetables, 37 people agree in some measure with that 
statement. The results are presented in table 4. 
~ Table 4. Respondent Opinion on the BenefIts of Agrichemical Use. 
Using SD" D NAD A SA 
Agrichemicals ... 
improves the quality of 16 26 19 32 5 
fresh fruit and vegetables 
reduces the price of fresh 12 34 22 22 8 
fruit and vegetables 
increases the storage life of 2 28 26 35 7 
fresh fruit and vegetables 
reduces natural- poisons 9 27 32 24 6 
from pests 
" SD Strongly Disagree D Disagree NAD Neither Agree nor Disagree A Agree SA 
Strongly Agree. 
When these consumers were asked if they had suffIcient information six responded 
yes and 92 responded no. Asked whom they thought should be responsible for 
providing such information in terms of money and time, they ranked university 
scientists fIrst, the Department of Health second, and news media third. Yet when 
given the same nine choices from which to indicate whom they considered the most 
reliable they ranked Department of health fIrst, public interest groups second, and 
government research agencies third, with university scientists ranked fourth (table 5). 
Table 5. Consumer Ranking of Organisations with Regard to the Provision of 
Information 
Organisation Should Be Most 
Responsible Reliable 
Environmental groups e.g. Greenpeace 7 6 
Department of Health e.g. pamphlets 27 31 
public health nurses 
University scientists e.g. plant health 32 10 
scientists 
News media e.g. television, radio, 24 4 
magazines 
Government Research Agencies e.g. the 6 13 
Horticulture and Food Institute 
Public Interest Groups e.g. Consumers 0 27 
Institute 
Producer Groups e.g. the Apple and Pear 0 0 
Marketing Board 
Agrichemical Companies 0 1 
--- - --------------
--------_ .. _---
Consumers were given three statements after the information on integrated pest 
management and asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with these statements. 
There was some polarisation of opinion on these statements. If the statements are 
aggregated as for the previous question using this format, 74 percent of this group 
of consumers disagreed with the statement that fresh fruit and vegetables grown using 
integrated pest management would be less safe than conventional produce. That fresh 
fruit and vegetables grown using rPM should be labelled was agreed upon by 78 
percent of these consumers. Opinion on the safety of current conventional fresh fruit 
and vegetable supplies was divided evenly across the three groups. The results are 
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presented in table 6. 
Table 6. Respondent Opinion on Various Aspects of IPM and Conventional Produce. 
Statement Given SA" A NAD D SD 
Fresh fruit and vegetables grown 5 8 12 51 21 
using integrated pest management 5.1 8.2 12.2 52 21.4 
will be LESS SAFE than 
conventionai produce 
Current conventional fresh fruit and 4 22 37 28 5 
vegetable supplies are safe 4.1 22.4 37.8 28.6 5.1 
Fresh fruit and vegetables grown 29 46 12 5 4 
using IPM should be labelled 29.6 46.9 12.2 5.1 4.1 
" A Agree SA Strongly Agree NAD Neither Agree nor Disagree SD Strongly 
Disagree D Disagree 
Percentages are reported below the number of respondents in each category. 
Of the 98 respondents, 88 people said they would purchase produce grown using IPM 
while 10 said they would not Of those people who would buy IPM produce, 41 
percent said they were not willing to pay more for such produce than they currently 
pay for conventional produce, 52 percent said they would be willing to pay 20 
percent more, 5 percent said they would be willing to pay 30 percent more and 2 
percent said they would be willing to pay 60 percent more. These results are 
presented in table 7. 
Table 7. Consumers' Willingness to Pay for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables Grown Using 
Integrated Pest Management 
Willing to Pay ... Number of Percentage 
Respondents 
Total 88 
0% more 36 40.9 
20 % more 46 52.3 
40 % more 4 4.5 
60 % more 2 2.3 
CONCLUSION 
A brief outline has been given of some consumer concerns with regard to 
agrichemical use and the possible presence of agrichemical residues. Consumers 
appear to rank their concerns in an order similar to actual risks posed in terms of 
food safety in contrast to other studies, where perceived risk does not approximate 
actual risk. However, they are concerned about the agrichemical issue and 
overwhelmingly report not having enough information on the same. They indicate a 
relative amount of faith, in terms of the reliability of information, in the department 
of health and public interest groups and place responsibility for information provision 
firmly in the hands of government institutions. 
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TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND SOVEREIGNTY CONSIDERATIONS 
by Jim Sinner 
Policy Services, MAF Policy, 
Ministty of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Wellington, New Zealand 
ABSTRACT 
The inter-relationships between trade and environmental policies are being identified 
as the "next generation" of issues for the GATT. Environmental groups remain 
suspicious that free trade will undermine or discourage improvements in 
environmental standards. The paper examines the use of trade measures to protect 
producers from competition with goods produced under less stringent environmental 
standards. It is shown that such measures will not improve national welfare, and may 
undermine environmental policies. However, failure of a government to enact 
appropriate environmental policies constitutes an implicit subsidy, and equity 
considerations suggest that this will continue to create pressure for changes to the 
GATT to protect producers meeting higher standards. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS ABOUT TRADE POLICY 
In 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 
Contracting Parries, including both Australia and New Zealand. The parries sought 
to avoid a repetition of the protectionist policies of the 1920s and 1930s and to secure 
and expand the benefits accruing to nations from trade (Jackson 1969). Between 
1965 and 1985, the value of world trade quadrupled in real terms (CEA 1986). By 
1988, the General Agreement covered four-fifths of world trade (MERT 1990), and 
at last count, the number of Contracting Parries had risen to 105. 
There have been eight subsequent multilateral negotiations during the past 40 years 
to expand the GATT and further liberalise the international trade regime. The 
Uruguay Round, staned in 1986, is the latest of these negotiations. 
Even while governments attempt to conclude the Uruguay Round, there are increasing 
concerns being voiced by environmentalists that open trade between nations may be 
harmful to the environment. Some environmentalists claim that GATT rules make 
it difficult to raise environmental standards in one countty when competing producers 
in other countries face lower standards. They note that progress on whaling and 
endangered species began with nations taking unilateral action to protect resources 
outside their jurisdiction. Others fear that if multilateral environmental agreements 
include measures which restrict trade, the agreements could be challenged under the 
GATT (Earthcare Network 1991, Royal Forest and Bird 1991). 
l' The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the official 
views of the Ministty of Agriculture and Fisheries. The comments of Marrin 
Harvey, Robin Johnson, Lindie Nelson and other colleagues are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
In a case that has received a great deal of attention, a GATT panel in 1991 ruled 
against a United States law banning the imponation of tuna which is caught using 
methods that result in the death of dolphins (GATT 1992). Although the panel ruling 
rested primarily on the fact that the US was attempting to impose its environmental 
standards on resources beyond its territorial jurisdiction, the ruling seems to have 
increased the suspicion amongst the environmental community that free trade and the 
GATT undermine improvements in environmental quality. Mexico has not sought 
formal enforcement of the ruling by the full GATT, but the European Community has 
since brought a similar case against the US tuna law. A ruling may be issued at any 
time. 
Some environmentalists have, implicitly or explicitly, questioned whether in some 
cases the uncounted costs to the environment from open trade and adherence to 
GATT principles might exceed the benefits from trade. These are serious issues 
which could be the subject of the next round of GATT negotiations. Indeed, these 
issues could force yet another major delay in the completion of the Uruguay Round 
if parries to the negotiations decide they must be resolved within the current 
negotiations. 
INTERNATIONAL VS. DOMESTIC CONCERNS 
Environmental issues can be separated into two categories: issues which are global 
or international in nature, and issues which are primarily of internal concern to one 
countty. Global or international issues include situations in which the production or 
consumption of a product in one countty has adverse environmental effects on one 
or more other countries, effects which might be called trans-boundary externalities. 
Such issues would include air pollution from one countty affecting a neighbouring 
countty, or the use of chloroflourocarbons depleting the ozone layer in the Eanh's 
atmosphere, adversely affecting people around the world. 
Issues which are primarily domestic or internal to one countty include water pollution 
(unless another countty also borders the water body) and land degradation. 
The distinction between the two categories is not always clear. Destruction of native 
forests wonld appear to be primarily an internal issue for the nation involved, but 
residents in other countries might argue that they are adversely affected by losses of 
biodiversity and by contributions to global warming from deforestation. Furthermore, 
environmentalists might not recognise the distinction between internal and global 
issues, claiming a legitimate interest in all issues. 
Despite these difficulties, the distinction between domestic and interuational issues 
is useful because it forces those who claim an interest in activities in another countty 
to specify the nature of that interest. 
This paper focuses on issues which are primarily internal to one countty, but which 
affect that countty's "competitiveness" relative to other countries. One countty's 
behaviour on domestic environmental issues does not create an environmental 
problem for other countries, but may cause commercial concerns related to effects on 
competitiveness. 
Where environmental effects are trans-boundary or global, nations have a legitimate 
interest in environmental standards of other countries. Unilateral trade measures will 
not usually be the most effective way to resolve problems, but some use of trade 
measures, eg as pan of a multilateral agreement, may be appropriate as a component 
of the solution. Thus, a large number of governments have agreed to trade 
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restrictions in the Convention'on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). 
Although questions have been raised about how such agreements should be dealt with 
by the GATT (WWF 1992), these questions are beyond the scope of this paper. 
It is argued here that nations have sovereign rights to determine environmental 
standards within their own borders, that these rights are consistent with the principles 
of free trade' and comparative advantage, and that trade restrictions are not an 
efficient or appropriate means of addressing environmental effects on 
"competitiveness." Equity considerations, however, suggest that competitiveness 
questions cannot be ignored. 
EFFECTS OF USING TRADE POLICY IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES 
Anderson (1992) addresses the concern of environmentalists that trade liberalisation 
might have adverse environmental effects by encouraging more production and 
consumption of environmentally damaging products. Anderson uses welfare analysis 
to demonstrate that, in the case of agriculture, trade liberalisation is likely to improve 
environmental outcomes. Among other reasons, price support would be reduced in 
countries where resource use is highest. In some cases, countries would need to 
establish appropriate environmental policies to ensure a positive result. 
The simple model presented by Anderson can also be used to ask a related, but 
different, question: what are the likely ~ffects on trade of the implementation of 
environmental policies? The analysis below draws substantially on the work of 
Anderson, and makes the following assumptions: 
(a) 
(b) 
Small country: Domestic production and consumption have no significant 
effect on world prices. 
Pollution: Production of a good causes pollution, which increases with output. 
The pollution affects only the producing country. 
(c) Distortions: There are assumed to be no significant distortions in other factor 
markets. 
Also, in examining the efficiency effects of a given policy, only the welfare of the 
country implementing the policy is considered, though trade implications for trading 
partners will be clear. 
THE CASE OF A SMALL IMPORTING COUNTRY 
Consider first an importing country. The initial situation is taken to be one of free 
trade and no policy to internalise environmental costs associated with production of 
the good. Thus, in Figure 1, following Anderson (1992), S represents the private 
marginal cost (ie supply) curve, and S' is the social cost curve, ie it incorporates 
environmental costs which arise from production of the good2• D is the domestic 
demand curve. 
S' is the lesser of the cost of pollution abatement and the cost of damage to 
the environment. 
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In the initial situation, at a world price of P w' open trade allows this price to be 
transmitted directly to the domestic market, where production is 0.., consumption is 
Cm, and imports are therefore Cm -0... The triangle eel represents a deadweight loss 
to the nation because at 0.., the benefits, represented by P w' are less than S', total 
costs when environmental damage is included. Note that the deadweight loss can 
only be eliminated by reducing production to 0..'. 
Consider next the introduction of environmental policy in the form of a tax T on 
pollution equal to ed, ie calculated to move producers to output at 0..' where S' 
intersects P W' Again, following Anderson, this pollution tax is assumed to be a fixed 
amount per unit of output. Producers only receive P w-T after paying the tax, and thus 
reduce output to 0..'. Producer surplus, ie profit, falls as producers absorb the full 
cost of the tax. Consumers still pay P W' and consumption remains at Cm, causing 
imports to increase to Cm-o..'. Governnient collects the rectangle abed in tax 
revenue. Environmental costs are reduced and the deadweight loss is eliminated. 
Such a policy maximises national welfare for the importing country, but it can create 
political pressures. Producers are likely to oppose an environmental policy which 
puts them at disadvantage, and leads to increased imports. Producers might seek the 
support of environmentalists to obtain, along with the pollution tax, an equal tariff 
on imports that do not meet the same environmental standards. 
In this case, consumers face a price Pw+T, and consumption falls to c,.'. Producers 
receive P w' as they are able to pass the tax onto consumers, and production remains 
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-at Q,.. Imports drop to c",'-Q., below their original level. Not only is the 
deadweight loss ceffrom environmental costs not eliminated, but a new deadweight 
loss ghi is created. This is caused by reducing consumption to a point where 
consumers' willingness-to-pay, D, is more than it would cost the nation to acquire the 
goods, ie P w. This is clearly a poor policy outcome from the viewpoint of the 
importing country3. Other forms of import restrictions, such as a requirement that 
all imports meet similar standards, would have similar effects on national welfare. 
Another option to protect producers from the loss of profits and jobs is for the 
government to subsidise pollution control for the current level of output. In this case, 
producers and consumers both face the world price P w' and production and 
consumption are unchanged at 0.. and c",. Government subsidy costs are represented 
by jef, and the deadweight loss cefremains. Recall that an efficient solution can only 
be achieved if output is reduced to 0..'. 
The problem of excessive pollution control costs could be corrected by requiring 
producers to reduce output to 0..'. However, imports would increase in that case, 
and the political consequences of job losses would not be avoided. Yet another 
option would be to avoid trade distortions entirely and use the revenue from a 
pollution tax to re-train workers who lose their jobs. 
THE CASE OF A SMAll EXPORTING COUNTRY 
Now consider an exporting country, shown in Figure 2. In this case, the world price 
P w is above the intersection of the domestic supply and demand curves, generating 
an exportable surplus. Production and consumption are Ox and Cx, and exports are 
Ox-CX" With free trade and no policy to internalise environmental cost, the area mpq 
is a deadweight loss. 
This loss can be eliminated by the introduction of a tax T on polluters equal to mn, 
ie calculated to move producers to output at Ox' where S' intersects Pw. Consumers 
still pay Pw, but producers only receive Pw-T after paying the tax, and thus reduce 
output to Ox'. -Government collects klmn in tax, and pollution cost is reduced. 
However, this policy results in a loss of exports. Such a situation could create 
political pressure for alternative policies, especially if countries with lower 
environmental standards gain market share. One possibility would be to subsidise 
producers to reduce pollution rather than tax them. Producers are clearly better off, 
as production and exports are maintained. However, if the subsidy provides for all 
costs of pollution abatement, ie the triangle rpq, at current output levels, the area mpq 
still represents a deadweight loss to the country. The pollution problem has been 
solved, but at a high cost. Beyond Ox' the benefits of more exports are exceeded by 
the costs of pollution abatement. 
A subsidy programme could avoid this deadweight loss if producers were required 
to reduce output to Qx'. Alternatively, producers could be paid the full subsidy 
regardless of production levels, in which case producers would choose to produce 
only Ox'. Like "de-coupling" of income support from production levels, this 
separation would encourage producers to equate true costs and benefits of an extra 
unit of production. 
The reduction in imports would lead to less production in exporting countries, 
and possibly less pollution, but this is of no benefit to the importing country, 
and the total pollution worldwide might be higher, as Anderson (1992) has 
shown. In any event, the more efficient way to address pollution is with 
appropriate environmental policies. 
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If consumers are a stronger political force than producers, there could be pressure for 
an export tax in lieu of a polluter pays tax. This lowers the effective price for both 
domestic producers and consumers to P w-T. Output is at Ox', which is the optimal 
amount, but domestic consumption increases to c..'. This causes a deadweight loss 
of uvw, because the amount Cx' - C. could have returned more benefits to the country 
had it been exported at price P w' rather than consumed domestically. 
Yet another policy option is to ban exports altogether, which reduces the pollution 
associated with production while still allowing domestic consumers to enjoy the 
product. This drives the domestic price down to P A' to the benefit of consumers and 
detriment of producers. . The result is a deadweight loss of xyz associated with 
pollution, plus a loss of umx from foregone export revenues. 
Finally, a government might institute a pollution tax T in conjunction with an export 
rebate, both equal to the amount mn. Procfucers would be left neutral compared to 
the initial situation, and the pollution costs of mpq remain as a deadweight loss. 
Consumers must pay Pw+T, and therefore purchase only ex", creating another 
deadweight loss stu. What is more, exports increase to Ox-Cx". To competitors on 
the world market, this rebate would look like an export subsidy. 
Thus, a range of trade measures might be considered as substitutes for, or 
complements to, environmental measures to help exporters maintain competitiveness 
despite implementation of environmental policies. However, of all the alternatives, 
national welfare is maximised by having no trade barriers and appropriate 
environmental policies. All other policies result in deadweight losses to society. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES AND THE GAIT 
The GAIT and related agreements such as the Subsidies Code give countries 
considerable flexibility to protect their own citizens and the natural resources within 
their boundaries. For instance, Article XX(b) allows nations to restrict imported 
products· in order to protect against imported pests and diseases, as long as the 
requirements are necessary and scientifically justifiable. These rules are discussed 
in detail in the Appendix; see also Johnson (1993). 
According to a recent GAIT publication: 
"GAIT rules, therefore, place essentially no constraints on a country's right 
to protect its own environment against damage from either domestic 
production or the consumption of domestically produced or imported products. 
Generally speaking, a country can do anything to imports or exports that it 
does to its own products, and it can do anything it considers necessary to its 
own production processes" (GAIT 1992). 
For instance, Gennany is implementing requirements that packaging materials be 
taken back by suppliers of goods, including importers. Meeting the requirements may 
be more difficult for importers than for Gennan firms, because of shipping 
requirements and because Gennany is just one of many markets. Nevertheless, the 
regulations are clearly targeted at a domestic environmental problem, that of waste 
disposal. As long as importers are treated no differently than domestic producers, the 
law is probably consistent with the GAIT, apart from a possible duty to notify other 
GAIT members. 
Despite this flexibility to protect citizens and domestic resources, some difficult 
issues remain. Based on the few cases to date, GAIT rules do not appear to allow 
an importing country to specify the production processes of an exporting country 
unless mese are directly related to a· characteristic of the product which is of 
legitimate concern to the importing country. 
For example, pesticide residues can affect human health and are therefore a valid 
basis for import restrictions. On the other hand, the amount of soil erosion or the 
treatment of animals in an exporting country is not a legitimate basis for trade 
restrictions by an importing country. However, this does not preclude consumers in 
the importing country from discriminating on this basis. 
If trade measures based on processes and production methods are not allowed, this 
gives rise to some difficult questions concerning the relationship between trade 
policies and environment standards, especially when questions of competitiveness are 
involved. GAIT rules are likely to be questioned in two situations in particular: (1) 
when hoine producers are disadvantaged by strict environmental standards compared 
to lower standards in other countries, and (2) when home producers are forced to bear 
costs of meeting environmental standards or are disadvantaged by environmental 
subsidies granted to competitors. These situations are considered separately below. 
COMPETITIVENESS EFFECTS OF DIFFERING 
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 
Because different governments set different environmental standards, the costs to 
industries of meeting those standards will vary from one nation to another, sometimes 
from one region to another within the same country. Along with a variety of other 
costs, environmental compliance costs will help detennine the ability of a given 
business to compete with other producers of like products. Thus, producers in 
countries or localities with lower standards will have an advantage over those who 
must meet higher standards. These advantages could potentially be large enough to 
have effects on trade flows, with producers subject to higher standards losing market 
share and consequent implications for financial viability and jobs. 
Environmentalists argue, therefore, that unless nations with high standards can protect 
producers from cheap imports, governments will face strong political pressure to keep 
environmental standards no higher than major competitors (Shrybman 1990). Arden-
Clarke (1993) argues this is "the main factor delaying the implementation of the 
European Community's carbon tax." 
Quite apart from rules in the GAIT, the theory of comparative advantage suggests 
nations should not restrict trade on the basis of production methods. The total 
welfare of all nations will be improved by allowing production to occur where costs 
are lowest, with free trade between countries. This will maximise the benefits that 
can be genemted from a given set of resources. However, this requires that all costs, 
including environmental costs, be taken into account by producers. If this has been 
done, any attempt to discourage specialization and exchange will decrease global 
welfare by imposing additional costs. 
This means that it can be efficient for a polluting industry to shut down in a country 
with high environmental standards and relocate to a country with low standards. For 
the first country, which puts a high value on environmental quality, the industry may 
not be able to meet the costs of high standards, and be forced to close. In another 
country, however, where pollution has a lower cost or development a higher value, 
the benefits of production might outweigh the environmental costs4 • 
In this situation, both countries would gain from seeing the production shift from the 
flISt country to the second, because the same product would be produced at less total 
cost (see GAIT 1992). 
Though this has sometimes been referred to as "exporting pollution," it can in fact 
be a positive outcome. However, this assumes that the lower standards in the second 
country do in fact represent social values in that country, ie that all costs have been 
fully taken into account. While this will be questionable in some cases, it is a matter 
of national sovereignty. No nation has a right to impose its values, environmental 
or otherwise, on another, nor to pass judgment on whether another nation has 
democmtic or other political processes to ensure that policies reflect social values. 
When the environmental effects cross international boundaries, however, nations have 
legitimate interests in the standards and laws of their neighbours. 
In this regard, the Principles 2 and 11 of the Rio Declaration, agreed to at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992, are 
directly relevant: . 
2 States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources· pursuant to their own environmental 
Loss of native forest would have a lower cost in countries where it is 
abundant compared to countries where it is scarce. Also, poor people may 
value the environment as much as wealthier people, but the poor have a 
higher opportunity cost of environmental protection because their marginal 
utility of income from development is higher than for wealthy people. 
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policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
States shall . enact effective environmental legislation. 
Environmental standards, management objectives and priorities 
should reflect the environmental and developmental context to 
which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to 
other countries, in particular developing countries (UNCED 1992). 
Thus, both efficiency and sovereignty considerations argne against the use of trade 
measures to protect domestic producers from imports subject to less stringent 
standards. Equity issues are discussed below. 
. COMPETITIVENESS EFFECTS ARISING FROM 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUBSIDIES 
Related to the discussion above, concerniitg comparative advantage based on differing 
environmental standards, are the effects of environmental subsidies on 
competitiveness. Consider two nations with roughly equivalent environmental 
standards, where one subsidises producers to comply with the standards while the 
other adopts the "polluter pays principle," requiring producers to bear the cost. 
Producers from the first country will have a competitive advantage over those from 
the second, unrelated to their production efficiency . 
Although this situation is similar to one country gaining advantage by having lower 
standards or not regulating at all, the analysis and conclusions are somewhat more 
complicated. Comparative advantage again suggests that the use of subsidies could 
distort trade flows, eg if the second nation has lower production costs than the first. 
This would reduce gains from trade and therefore the total welfare of both countries. 
As was shown above for both importing and exporting countries, pollution subsidies 
might result in deadweight efficiency losses. 
Decisions to subsidise could be taken on the basis of social values in the subsidising 
nation, ie compensation for benefits provided by reducing pollution. In addition, if 
subsidies are "de-coupled" from production, they need not distort trade flows and 
need not create efficiency losses. 
Coase (1960) argued in a well-known article that so long as the pollution rights were 
fully identified and tradeable, ie the costs fully taken into the decision-making 
process, the same environmental outcome will result regardless whether the laws 
provide a right to pollute or liability for pollution. This conclusion rests on 
assumptions about access to information and bargaining costs, however, and in many 
cases these will not hold true. 
Furthermore, environmental subsidies are equivalent to granting polluters a right to 
pollute. Subsidies imply that society must pay polluters if it wants to reduce their 
. pollution. It could be argued that this is a legitimate choice and a matter of national 
sovereignty. However, there is general support for the principle of "polluter pays," 
as opposed to the notion that society or the victims of pollution should pay. 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
endorsed the principle that polluters should pay for the environmental damage they 
cause or for measures necessary to reduce or avoid pollution. Application of this 
principle helps to ensure that producers have financial incentives to reduce pollution 
or other environmental impacts. Again, the Rio Declaration is relevant. Principle 16 
says: 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internaIisation of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost 
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment (UNCED 1992). 
In addition, subsidies have been recognised as having the potential to cause harm to 
the trade interests of other countries. GATT rules allow most subsidies, including 
environmental subsidies, but also allow nations to impose countervailing duties on 
subsidised goods if there is injury to domestic producers. The GATT also provides 
that countries whose exports are limited as a result of subsidies in another country, 
including competing exporters, can challenge the subsidies. (See the Appendix, part 
2.) 
Thus, governments that wish to use subsidies need to target them carefully so they 
do not provide price support to producers and distort trade. For instance, a 
government concerned about rural de-population should not subsidise specific rural 
enterprises, but rather pay people to stay in rural areas regardless of their occupation. 
If historic buildings are deteriorating, a government should consider paying a 
caretaker rather than subsidising an enterprise that happens to occupy the building. 
EQUITY VS. SOVEREIGNTY 
Where subsidies distort trade and cause injury, they are considered inappropriate and 
unfair. In this case, principles of equity and fairness to unsubsidised producers have 
taken precedence over the theory of comparative advantage, which would otherwise 
suggest that if one country is willing to subsidise a product it is to other countries' 
advantage to buy it. 
Environmentalists point out that the failure of a government to implement appropriate 
environmental policies is also a subsidy, even if the GATT does not recognise it as 
such. They argue that producers who face strict environmental standards should be 
protected from those producers who do not ~ 1992). 
This problem is similar to that posed by differing wage levels in different countries. 
Nations do not discriminate or impose countervailing duties on the basis of wage or 
working conditions in other countries, because these are recognised as the sovereign 
concerns of each country. (One exception is Article XX(e) of the GATT, which 
allows nations to restrict imports of goods produced with prison labour.) If the 
international community also recognises the sovereignty of nations to set 
environmental standards within their own boundaries, as agreed at UNCED, 
environmental standards in another country should not be a justification for trade 
barriers either. 
On the other hand, the equity considerations which underpin the Subsidies Code 
suggest that countries should have some protection from "subsidised" imports 
produced under unduly lax environmental standards. This is a treacherous area, 
however, because it could lead down a slippery slope to protectionism in a number 
of areas, including wages and working conditions. 
What would constitute appropriate protection from such implicit subsidies is 
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problematical. Harmonisation is far from ideal, except perhaps on global issues, 
because it fails to recognise that the assimilative capacity of the environment varies 
from one country to the next, making it inappropriate to impose common standards. 
In addition, nations do have different values and needs and therefore have legitimate 
reasons to have differing standards. 
What needs to be addressed is not the difference in standards, but situations where 
those in power deliberately ignore their nation's environmental values in order to gain 
financial advantage or market share at the expense of producers in other countries. 
It is argued that companies which meet strict environmental standards earlier than 
their competitors gain a long-term advantage, because other companies will have to 
catch up when their governments later adopt similar policies (GATT 1992). If the 
early companies can market this "green" image to consumers, the short-term 
disadvantage of higher costs can be converted to a value-added advantage. If many 
companies can demonstrate this to be the case, it might reduce pressure on the GATT 
from environmentalists, but the problem does not seem likely to go away. 
Agenda 21, agreed to at UNCED, describes how countries can achieve sustainable 
development. It may, therefore, form a basis for assessing whether a government has 
appropriate environmental policies. Without specifying any environmental standards 
that must be met, Agenda 21 suggests the steps that need to be taken to ensure that 
social values are considered and that appropriate policies are put in place. By 
accepting Agenda 21, nations have accepted that broad public participation in 
decision-making will be needed to ensure that environmental standards reflect social 
values. 
However, Agenda 21 specifies so many actions that few if any nations will be able 
to do them all, even for one particular sector. In many cases, recommended actions 
will be inappropriate for a given country. An alternative to assessing a country's 
performance on the basis of Agenda 21 would be to assess whether nations are 
enforcing the environmental laws they have in place. This would be one way of 
judging whether governments are ignoring social· values in order to give their 
industries an advantage over competitors in other countries. Even where governments 
have good intentions, however, financial constraints often prevent full enforcement 
of environmental laws. 
Environmental protection and economic development are truly dependent on each 
other. Without development, low income countries will never have the means to 
afford to look beyond the next year, let alone pay for environmental protection. Yet 
unless we protect our natural resources, the sustainability of our entire world 
economy is in doubt. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For either an exporting or importing country, national welfare is maximised when 
producers are required to bear the costs of pollution and trade is not restricted. 
Attempts to protect producers from the competitiveness effects of environmental 
policies will not improve national welfare, and will often result in a failure to remove 
excessive environmental costs. 
This conchision is based on a simple model for a small country, assuming no 
significant distortions in other markets. Further analysis which relaxes these 
assumptions is needed to gain a more complete understanding of the effects of using 
1+aderestrictions to further domestic environmental objectives. Since many 
environmentalists are interested in effects beyond national borders, the total (ie 
worldwide) effects of such trade restrictions also need to be examined. 
Under the GATT, governments are allowed to use subsidies to achieve environmental 
goals, but must not harm producers in other countries. Thus, any subsidies need to 
be carefully targeted; governments should be encouraged to require polluters to bear 
the costs of pollution. 
The GATT allows member countries to restrict trade if this is necessary to conserve 
the natural resources within its territory, and if corresponding restrictions are placed 
on domestic producers. This does not allow governments to protect domestic 
producers by restricting imports produced under less stringent environmental 
standards. 
However, the failure of a government to enact policies incorporating the true social 
cost of environmental damage is a de facto subsidy to producers. Equity 
considerations suggest that some agreement is needed on the appropriate way to 
address the effects of such policies on competitiveness. 
It will continue to be necessary to consider the relationship between trade rules and 
environmental policies, but this should not be used as an excuse to delay current 
negotiations. Reduction of trade barriers in agriCUlture, textiles and services through 
a successful conclusion of Uruguay Round is critical for sustainable development. 
An agreement would help to generate the wealth to pay for environmental protection, 
and it would allow the world's poor to look beyond today's crises to the well-being 
of future generations. 
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APPENDIX I: 
GATT RULES ON ENVIRONMENTALLY-BASED TRADE MEASURES 
Article XX and related agreements 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provides some guidance on the 
acceptability of policies which diston trade in the pursuit of environmental objectives. 
Article XX (General Exceptions), clauses (b) and (g), are particularly relevant, as 
they provide exemptions from most GATT rules for certain types of trade policies: 
"Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between two countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
. .. (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption; ... " (GATT 1986a). 
These clauses have been the subject of considerable interpretation and negotiation 
(see Chamovitz 1991). The GATT Secretariat (1992) takes the position that for a 
trade measure to qualify as "necessary" under Anicle XX(b), there must be no other 
GATT-consistent measures available to achieve the goal and, if not, the measure 
chosen must be the least trade-distorting way to achieve the goal (p 23n). Chamovitz 
(1991) and WWF (1992) argue that this would be a difficult test to meet. There may 
be a middle ground, however, where GATT would allow exemptions if other less-
distorting options are not reasonably available. A GATT panel took such an 
approach in a complaint against Thailand's virtual ban on imponed cigarettes. The 
panel, noting that other less-distonive options were available, ruled against Thailand's 
claim that the ban was necessary to protect human health (see GATT 1992, 
Chamovitz 1991). 
Article XX(g) has been interpreted as applying only to resources within the 
jurisdiction of the party concerned. As noted above, an important precedent may be 
set in a GATT dispute between the United States and Mexico over US laws on 
catching dolphins with tuna, and associated import restrictions. A GATT panel ruled 
in Mexico's favour, saying that the US could not use trade barriers to try to protect 
resources outside its jurisdiction, or to impose its standards on other countrie~. 
Also of far-reaching significance was the panel's view that the principle of "like 
treatment" of domestic and imported goods must apply to the goods themselves, not 
how they were produced (see GATT 1992). In other words, production processes and 
methods, sometimes called "ppm's," cannot be used as the basis for trade restrictions. 
A similar case has been brought by the European Community against the US tuna 
law. 
An earlier GATT panel on Canadian landing requirements for salmon and herring 
The ruling has not become a pan of official GATT case law because the US 
and Mexico are trying to settle the dispute through bilateral negotiation, in 
lieu of formal GATT acceptance of the ruling. However, the EC has brought 
a related case against the same US law; a GATT panel decision is pending. 
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rUled that the exemption in Article XX(g} requires that measures be "primarily aimed 
at conservation" (Charnovitz 1991). 
Despite these rules, nations have maintained long-standing provisions and enacted 
new ones. Charnovitz notes examples of trade measures of dubious legality which 
have been implemented by governments: a ban by the European Commission on fur 
imports from animals caught with leg~hold traps, a US ban of fish from driftnet 
fishing, and import bans on animals hunted out of season, among others. 
In the Uruguay Round, parties are negotiating a new sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
agreement (see Johnson 1993), which provides inter ilia detailed rules for the 
interpretation of Article XX(b}. A more detailed agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade is also "being negotiated. Both agreements oblige signatories to use 
international technical standards wherever possible to avoid undue restrictions on 
trade, but countries are allowed to deviate from those standards if necessary. 
For example, under the existing TBT agreement, deviations are allowed if standards 
are "inappropriate for the Parties concerned, for inter alia such reasons as ... 
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment .... " Under this Agreement, an exporting country can challenge another 
country's import restrictions on the basis that the restrictions are not based on 
scientific criteria and therefore constitute an unnecessary barrier to trade (GATT 
1992). 
The proposed Urnguay Round agreements clarify the conditions under which these 
exemptions could be applied. 
The Subsidies Code 
In the Tokyo Round negotiations, agreement was reached on new provisions relating 
to subsidies, known as the Subsidies Code (GATT 1986b), to clarify and expand 
Articles of VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement. The United States, the 
EC, and most other major trading countries are signatories. 
Article 11 of the Subsidies Code specifically allows subsidies for various policy 
objectives, including "(f) redeployment of industry in order to avoid congestion and 
environmental problems." Other types of environmental subsidies, eg to help 
businesses meet the cost of reducing air pollution, also appear to be allowed. 
However, signatories are still obliged to take account of potential adverse effects on 
trade and to seek to avoid causing injury to other signatories. Countries which 
employ subsidies may be subject to countervailing duties or other trade measures if 
such harm does occur. 
A new Subsidies Code is being negotiated in the Uruguay Round. The "Dunkel text" 
for the new code provides that any subsidy greater than 5% ad valorem will be 
presumed to cause harm or serious prejudice to other countries. Subsidies of less 
than 1% ad valorem would be presumed not to cause harm (GATT 1991). Whether 
or not the Subsidies Code applies to agriculture remains unclear. 
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Environmentally Sustainable Agriculture: Balancing Conflicting Interests -
Which Way is North; Which Road to Take? 
Stuart Morriss· 
Wellington 
Abstract 
Increasing attention is being paid world-wide to the concept of sustainable agriculture. To address the 
definitional variations that exist a conceptual framework encompassing the multi-dimensional relationships 
involved is developed. Environmentally sustainable agriculture (ESA) represents the agriculture - environment 
interface within this framework. Of importance to New Zealand agriculture, increasing global environmental 
awareness is likely to see: increased consumer expedations for environmental quality in produdion processes; a 
proliferation of domestic policies in New Zealand's agricultural tnarkets targeting the protection of the 
environment that will impinge in various ways on trade; and increasing pressure within New Zealand for our 
uwn agricultural sedor to address issues of environmental effeds of production systems. The implications of each 
will be briefly discussed. 
The paper then addresses issues relating to the achievement of ESA. It argues that ESA encompasses a notion of 
balance between often confliding interests, and that such balance is not only important in relation to the outcome 
sought, but also in the process used by society to define them, and in the choice of tools for achieving them. 
Theoretical aspeds of both Wl1l be discussed here in terms of implications for public policy. The outcome balance 
will be discussed using welfare economic theory within a framework of economic rationality. The political 
economy aspects will be discussed within a framework of sodal choice, seeking solutions to procedural problems of 
representation of interests and mechanisms for determining colledive societal outcomes. Conclusions will be 
drawn in terms of public policy directions in the future. 
• The author of this paper is currently studying for the degree of Master of Public Policy, at Victoria 
University of Wellington, on leave from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Included in his 
programme of study is the preparation of a research paper into the policy implications and priorities 
for New Zealand from an analysis of domestic policies being used within OECD countries, other than 
New Zealand, to encourage environmentally sustainable agriculture. 1his paper represents work in 
progress relating to selected components of that research paper. The views presented here are those of 
the author and do not necessarily represent the official view of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries. 
Introduction 
There is intensifying awareness world-wide of the need for environmental protection and 
of the environmental side-effects of agricultural production, particularly in the major 
developed countries (Tobey 1991; Runge 1990;1991). This interest has manifest itself in a 
range of policy initiatives encouraging sustainable agriculture. The purpose of this paper 
is to highlight some of the policy implications of developing environmental trends for 
New Zealand agriculture. However, as the scope of the subject of sustainable agriculture 
is extremely large, and the factors involved complex, only parts of the issue can possibly 
be addressed here. In order to rationalise a complex system into assessable pieces, a 
conceptual framework which breaks out the multi-dimensional relationships involved, 
while keeping them positioned within the wider framework of inter-relationships, will be 
developed- From within this, the notion of environmentally sustainable agriculture (ESA), 
the subject of this paper, will be explained and subsequently discussed. 
From there the paper will consider the relevance of environmentally sustainable agriculture 
for New Zealand. It will argue that increasing global environmental awareness is likely to 
see: increased consumer expectations for environmental quality in production processes; a 
proliferation of domestic policies in New Zealand's agricultural markets targeting the 
protection of the environment that will impinge in various ways on trade; and increasing 
pressure within New Zealand for our own agricultural sector to address issues of 
environmental effects of production systems. The implications of each will be briefly 
discussed-
It will be argued that ESA encompasses a notion of balance between often conflicting 
interests. Such balance is important to the outcome of a sustainable system, but also to 
the processes used by society to define them, and to the way of going about achieving 
them. Theoretical aspects of both will be examined- The outcome balance will be 
discussed using welfare economic theory within a framework of economic rationality. The 
political economy issues of process balance will be discussed within a framework of social 
choice theory. Conclusions will then be drawn in terms of public policy directions in the 
future. 
Definitions or Directions 
The sustainability of an agricultural system involves a complex, multidimensional 
interaction of a range of factors relating to the whole of the agricultural system. However, 
the degree of complexity of the factors to be considered, and the relationships involved, 
depends on how the concept is described and by some commentators, defined- A large 
range of definitions have been developed around the world. Variations revolve around 
different perceptions of what constitutes sustainability, and whether the term repres.ents 
only the agriCUltural production system, or whether it includes the whole agriCUltural value 
chain. Others advocate away from defmitions on the grounds that to do so restricts the 
subject to that which words can describe. They consider that the concept of sustainability 
requires flexibility, is continually changing with time, and should not be constrained by 
human defmition. Here it is suggested that it is more important to consider sustainable 
agriculture as a goal, and to describe the conditions that must prevail for the goal to be 
realised, than it is to define it- The OECD definition developed by its Ad Hoc Group on 
Agriculture and the Environment reflects a common but, as is argued here, incomplete 
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consideration, of the subject It defines sustainable agriculture as involving four aspects: 
"ongoing economically viable agricultural production system, maintenance or 
enhancement of the farms natural resource base, maintenance or enhancement of 
other ecosystems affected by agricultural activities and the provision of aesthetic 
qualities" (OECD 1992). 
While this extends the concept laterally beyond the farm in terms of the external effects 
of, and influences on, agriculture, it constrains the system to be sustained at the farm gate 
and therefore does not adequately reflect the vertical linkages. The fmandal performance 
of a farm or orchard business is inextricably dependant on the performance of the other 
components of the value chain; the processing and marketing sectors to broadly define 
them. The profitability of the farm business, in tum, determines in large part the extent to 
which the manageable external effects agriculture are mitigated. This is particularly so in 
the presence of market failure to account for externality costs imposed by the sector, or 
benefits accruing to it from the provision of public goods and services. These components 
of the system cannot be excluded from any account of what a sustainable agriculture . 
system comprises. It is thus argued here that a sustainable agriculture system must 
encompass lateral linkages with its surrounds at all the levels of the agricultural value 
chain. 
Conceptual Framework 
The state (degree of sustainability) of the system is therefore a function of the 
relationships between each of the component parts of the chain and their external 
environmental, social and financial surrounds (impacts and effects) and of the transforming 
influence between them of technical, economic, political and institutional considerations 
and of the social values held by those involved. Theoretically, one might consider the 
ideal outcome being one of an equilibrium state. However, in reality, because of the 
nature of the considerations mentioned and the influence of changes with time, the system 
is more likely, and more appropriately, to be in a continued state of flux around some 
point of balance. 
This complex set of relationships can usefully be rationalised into a conceptual framework 
within which these component contributing factors can be broken out and analyzed, either 
separately or in terms of their interrelationships and influence on the stability of the 
system as a whole. It is proposed here that such a framework comprises a three 
dimensional relational matrix of the agricultural value chain, its surrounds, and their 
. transjonners. 
The framework is expressed functionally as: 
Sustainable 
Agricultural fn (transformers) [(value chain); (effects)] 
fn (Ec, Sv, Po, Tc, In) [(Pd, Pr, Mr); (Ev, Fn, Cu)] 
Where: Value chain includes: Pd = Production 
Pr = Processing 
Mr = Marketing 
Surrounds include: 
Transformers involve: 
Functions 
Ev = Environmental effects 
Fn = Financial performance 
Cu = Community impacts 
Ec = Economic factors 
Sv = Social Values 
Po = Political factors 
Tc = Technical factors 
In = Institutional factors 
The remainder of this paper focuses on that part of this framework that represents 
environmentally sustainable agriculture, i.e. on the environmental relationships, as against 
those of the complete system involving the financial and community effects. 
Implications of Global Environmental Trends to New Zealand 
It is hypothesised here that increasing global attention to environmental matters as they 
relate to agriculture is likely to pose three significant developments for New Zealand 
agriculture, namely: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
increasing consumer expectations for environmental quality in production processes 
as environmental awareness becomes more heightened; 
a proliferation of domestic policies in New Zealand's agriCUltural markets targeting 
the protection of the environment that will impinge in various ways on trade; and 
increasing pressure within New Zealand for our own agricultural sector to address 
issues of environmental effects of production systems. 
Market Factors 
It has been suggested that as the world becomes increasingly committed to environment 
issues, the number of 'green' consumers will grow and producers of 'green' products will 
gain a competitive edge. In the UK, for example, the green constituency includes more 
than 4 million members of conservation and environmental groups (Elkington et al, 1990). 
Environmentally responsible shoppers in the United States comprise 14.1 million-18.8 
million households, or 15%-20% of the population (Rosendahl, 1990). In some countries, 
consumers are often prepared to pay a premium for products produced in a way that 
makes them environmentally friendly (ArIon.). New Zealand is naturally well placed to 
take advantage of a "green market place" should comparative advantages in environmental 
conditions and 'natural' production systems be allowed to prevail unadulterated in trade. 
This is particularly so if coupled with gains to be made from the general liberalisation of 
domestic agricultural policies world-wide and of the international trading regime. The 
relevant question here is the degree to which the 'green market' can be managed to 
provide the necessary incentives for producers to change to more environmentally friendly 
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agricultural practices· voluntarily, and therefore its implications for the nature of, and 
necessity for, policy intervention. 
However, it is not going to be sufficient for New Zealand farmers to rely on a clean, 
green image of New Zealand in this type of market. Confidence in 'green' advertising 
claims is eroding, and consumers are much more confident in green seals and label claims 
(Chase, 1991). In the United States, for example, as more products claiming 
environmental benefits have come onto the market over the last few years, consumers have 
become increasingly sceptical about unsubstantiated environmental claims (Klein, 1990). 
Market observers have co=ented that consumer claims that they are willing to pay more 
for "green" products have often not been matched by their actions. They put this down to 
consumer scepticism about questionable product claims. One retailer in a particular 
survey found that only 15% of consumers in 1992 felt that environmental claims on 
products were believable (Bennett, 1992). 
Many "green" products are promoted as being ,environmentally friendly on the grounds of 
their beneficial effects on the environment from their consumption; biodegradable 
products, those produced from recycled materials, etc. For New Zealand's agricultural 
produce, our competitive environmental advantage will come largely from the 
environmental quality of our production processes; proof of the natural farming conditions 
in which products are produced, and the relatively low levels of inputs required to produce 
them - from paddock to plate. In this way the-differences between New Zealand's natural 
farming environment - our climate, pastures and soils, and those of our competitors can be 
used to New Zealand's advantage. Quality syStems will be needed to provide consumers 
and trading partners with the assurance they demand about the origins of agricultural 
products while addressing the specific characteristics of environmental quality in 
agricultural production. "Quality" in environmental terms will increasingly extend beyond 
the safety and.purity of the product itself, to the way in which it has been produced. And 
if New Zealand is to claim the moral high ground on environmental issues as a marketing 
strategy, our competitors will waste no time in trying to expose any perceived lapses in 
this country's environmental performance. Such quality assurance systems will need to 
measure between countries both the environmental effects of farming and growing 
production systems (e.g., pollution levels) as well as focusing on the production processes 
used (e.g., the amount and type of chemicals or fertilisers used). If, for example, New 
Zealand's agricultural producers are required to meet production process standards based 
on those relevant to European farming systems and environmental conditions, but not to 
our own, our potential advantage is lost. Further, if the costs for competing producers of 
meeting those environmental standards are subsidised our gains will be reduced. 
Trade Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies 
Free trade arguments suggest that domestic environmental policies are the sovereign 
concern of individual nations, and should not be subject to international trade policy 
considerations. Only when environmental problems cross national frontiers do they 
become open for consideration by other nations, and then only by those affected by the 
spill-over. Furthermore, they suggest that it is inappropriate to use trade policies to 
achieve environmental objectives as the combination of IIrSt-best environmental policies 
and free trade provides the best result both in terms of environmental protection and 
economic welfare (see Anderson, 1992; Sinner, 1992; Snape, 1992). Enviroumental 
advocates, on the other hand, argue that environmental mechanisms applied within the 
confines of national jurisdiction should also be applied to imports through trade policies 
(see Shrybman, 1990). This, they argue, provides the only real avenue through which to 
influence environmental improvement outside their sovereign jurisdiction. The very 
presence of this dichotomy precipitates the potential for environmental concerns to be used 
increasingly to justify trade restrictions on the basis of environmental standards for 
production processes. 
In recent years there has been a notable increase in policy interest in encouraging farming 
systems that are environmentally sustainable through policies labelled 'Sustainable 
Agriculture'. Policy responses have varied considerably. Reform proposals for the 
Co=on Agriculture Policy (CAP) in Europe provide a relevant example of a direct 
policy approach (see Gardner 1991). While the food security objectives of the CAP have 
largely gone, the social objectives remain. Farmer expectations for income support are 
legitimised in political representation and in social aspirations for the countryside. 
However, the instruments of support for European farmers are shifting from product price 
support to direct and indirect income support; direct in the form of compensatory 
payments for production constraints, and indirect in the form of payments for 
environmentally acceptable or sustainable farming, countryside management, stewardship, 
habitat restoration and environmental enbancement. Within the UK, for example, the 
government is subsidising conversion to organic farming systems on the basis of their 
environmental benefits, has introduced policies encouraging wildlife enhancement, 
countryside stewardship, habitat conservation and farm woodland development. 
Any moves within the European Co=unity that shift the income dependence of 
European farmers away from producing surplus competitive products are to New 
Zealand's advantage, and shOuld be encouraged. However, the introduction of such agro-
environment policies bring with them other trade issues that also warrant our considered 
attention. As stated above, both efficiency and sovereignty arguments are against trade 
measures being used to protect domestic producers from imports subject to less stringent 
environmental standards. However, Shrybman expresses a view that highlights the 
relevance of this issue for New Zealand as an exporting nation. A country wanting to 
maintain stringent environmental standards, while not undermining the competitiveness of 
its domestic industry (politically a very desirable outcome) has but two choices, he argues. 
They can either: 
(a) establish import tariffs to offset pollution costs so that domestic producers 
will not be disadvantaged when competing with imports without similar 
environmental regulation: or 
(b) subsidise the cost of environmental protection with general revenues by 
underwriting pollution costs. 
Where domestic producers are compensated for the costs which they are required to bear, 
but which their foreign competitors are not, competitiveness effects can apply, both to 
imported and exported products (petrey and Johnson, 1992). Where domestic producers 
are required to meet higher environmental standards, but are not compensated through 
subsidies, but where trade instruments are used to protect domestic industries from 
imported products not required to meet such standards, the principle of national 
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· sovereignty is broken. Were ambient standards applied equally between countries, 
comparative advantage would be maintained equitably in relation to the country's base line 
natural endowments. But this is not the case in reality. Different assimilative capabilities 
and real effects of pollution on environments will vary. The demand for environmental 
protection will also vary between nations, and typically grows with income (Pearce et al 
1989). Different standards will therefore be applied within countries resulting in different 
compliance costs imposed on producers between nations; competitiveness effects are 
inevitable. 
Furthermore, such policy shifts are also relevant to the Dunkel package on agriculture in 
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (see Andrews and Roberts, 1992; Gunasekera .et al, 1992). Environmental 
policies are exempt from support reduction commitments. It appears from its use that the 
term 'sustainable agriculture' is, in many countries, synonymous with environmentally 
sustainable agriCUlture. Thus policies for sustainable agriculture are likely to be promoted 
as environmental policies and thus become exempt from ongoing reduction commitments. 
However,linkages between sustainable agriculture policies and production and trade 
outcomes obviously do exist. If the potential trade threats from these developments are to 
be avoided, there is an urgent need to establish internationally-accepted means of testing 
and comparing the trade and production.effects of environmental policies involved in the 
agricultural sector - especially those designed to encourage environmentally sustainable 
agriculture. 
New Zealand Policy Choice 
The Resource Management Act, 1991, aims to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources. Within the context of sustainable management described 
by the Act, the policy position on what constitutes the sustainability of agriculture in New 
Zealand is still being debated. A Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries policy document 
released in April, 1993, suggests a definition for sustainable agriculture as being 
"the use of practices or systems which maintain or enhance the natnral resource 
base of agriCUlture, and other ecosystems influenced by agricultural activities, in a 
way that also maintains the economic viability of agriculture, the quality and safety 
of the food and fibre produced by these systems, and the ability of people and 
communities to provide for their social and cultural well-being". 
In terms of the achievement of sustainable agriCUltural systems, the Government has stated 
that its role is primarily that of encouraging market-led adjustment to sustainable practices 
through identifying and removing impediments to change. The policy document states that 
potential measures for achieving this outcome include knowledge generation, improved 
information flows, rural adjustment assistance, institutional change, pricing mechanisms, 
transferable property rights, pollution charges, subsidies, and income tax adjustments or 
rebates and direct regulation. However, which of these approaches are appropriate for the 
New Zealand situation remains unanswered. The approaches of New Zealand and the EC 
countries to sustainable agriculture contrast in interesting ways, and there is much to be 
learned from comparing them. There will be an ongoing need to test the efficacy of 
policies being used elsewhere in the world for application in New Zealand. 
Which Way is North? - Economic Theory of Optimal Outcomes 
Having discussed the bounds of the concept of sustainable agriculture, and considered the 
relevance of global environmental trends for New Zealand agriculture, it is time to deal 
with how to go about achieving the goal. As discussed earlier, if the outcome of ESA 
requires the balancing of interests, how should such balance be struck? Here, welfare 
economic theory will be discussed to help identify possible answers. 
Optimal Externalities 
There is a basic distinction to be made between economic pollution and physical pollution. 
From an economic perspective the physical presence of pollution does not mean that 
economic pollution exists. The economic definition of pollution is dependant upon both 
some physical effects of waste on the environment and a human reaction to that physical 
effect Physical effects include biological (e.g. species change or ill-health), chemical (e.g. 
the effect of acid rain in building surfaces) or auditory (noise). Human reactions show up 
in an expression of distaste, unpleasantness, distress, conceru or anxiety. This loss of 
welfare is synonymous with other economic terms such as utility or satisfaction (pearce 
1990). 
Externalities are positive or negative spill-over effects of market transactions. They affect 
peoples welfare but are not themselves the object of market transactions as there is no 
compensation for gains or losses in welfare caused by the spill-over. A negative 
externality, for example, is produced from soil erosion on hill country farms contributing 
to the sedimentation of waterways used down stream for community water supplies. 
Positive externalities exist when producers of services are unable to enforce payment for 
them. In these cases, there is a risk that less than a socially optimal level of service will 
be maintained. 
The economic welfare effects of externalities are shown in Figure· 1. The marginal private 
benefits from consuming, and the marginal private costs of producing a particular good 
that is pollutive are represented in the D and S curves. OQ represents the equilibrium 
level of production and consumption in the absence of either trade or corrective policy. 
However, the marginal social cost of production is represented by a different supply curve, 
SI. This curve takes account of the costs of producing the good on society that are 
external to those imposed on the producer of the good. This situation yields net social 
welfare equal to the difference between areas abe and ade. PO represents the private cost 
of production (equating to the farm gate price accounting for all fixed and variable costs, 
and a return on investment - i.e. all costs internalised to the farming operation). pi_pO 
represents the additional cost to society from the production of that good, pI being the 
total price necessary to meet all costs (private and social) of producing Q units of the 
product. Where this difference is not accommodated, the market is considered to have 
failed. 
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Figure 1: Agricultural Externality Effects 
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In relation to the concept of outcome balance between the interests of agricultural 
production and environmental protection, the theory of welfare economics suggests that 
even if economic pollution exists it is unlikely that it should be eIiminated; that there is 
some level of economically optimal pollution or externality. The economic balance effect 
used to identify the point of optimal externality is explained here, following Pearce. In 
Figure 2, the level of polluters activity, Q, is graphed against the costs and benefits of that 
activity on the vertical axis, represented by the Marginal Net Private Benefits (MNPB)and 
the Marginal External Costs (MEC). The polluter incurs costs in undertaking the activity 
that is pollutive, and receives benefits in the form of revenue. The difference between 
costs and revenue is private net benefit. MNPB is then the marginal version of this 
benefit, i.e. the extra net benefit from changing the level of activity by one unit. More 
formally this can be derived by subtracting marginal cost (MC) from price (P), we derive 
marginal profit (). Marginal profit shows the extra profit made by expanding output by 
one unit. Profit is equivalent to the net benefit obtained by the firm. Hence marginal 
profit is formally equivalent to marginal net private benefits. The marginal external cost 
(MEC), is the value of the extra damage done by pollution arising from the activity 
measured by Q. 
Figure 2: Optimal Externalities 
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Footnotes to Figure 2.2 
Area A 
Area B 
Area A+B 
Area C+D 
Area C 
Q' 
Q# 
Optimal level of Net Social Benefits 
Optimal level of externality 
Optimal level of Net Private Benefit 
the level of non-optimal externality that needs to be removed by 
practice change 
the level of Net Private benefits that are socially unwarranted 
Optimal level of economic activity 
Level of economic activity that generates maximum private benefits 
The optimal level oj externality occurs at the level of output, Q, coinciding with the point 
where the two curves intersect, i.e. where MNPB = MEC. The area under the MNPB 
curve is the polluter'S total net private benefit, and the area under the MEC curve is the 
total external cost. On the assumption that the aim of society can be stated as one of 
maximising the sum of the benefits minus the sum of costs, and that society views both 
the polluter and the sufferer equally, we can see that the area depicted by OXY is the 
largest area oj net benefit obtainable. Hence Q' is the optimal level of activity. It 
follows that the level of physical pollution corresponding to this level of activity is the 
optimal level of pollution. Finally the optimal level of economic damage corresponding to 
the optimal level of pollution Q' is area OYQ·. This area is known as the optimal level oj 
externality. . 
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· Fonually, at Q" 
MNPB =MEC 
MNPB =P- MC 
where MC is the marginal cost of producing the polluted product Hence 
P - MC = MEC or P = MC + MEC 
MC + MEC is the sum of the marginal costs of the activity generating the externality, i.e. 
the marginal social cost (MSC). Hence when: 
MNPB = MEC, P = MSC 
'Price equals marginal social cost' is the condition for Parieto optimality. Referring again 
to Figure 2, this demonstrates that in the presence of externalities there is a divergence 
between private and social costs. If that divergence is not corrected the polluter will 
continue to operate at a point like Q#. At Q#, private benefit is maximised at A+B+C, 
but external cost is B+C+D. . 
Thus Social Net Benefit (A+B+C) - (B+C+D) 
A-D 
Which is clearly less than A, the Net Social Benefits when the polluters activity is 
regulated to Q'. Externality level C + D is said to be Parieto relevant because its removal 
leads to efficiency improvement, Le. a net gain in social benefits. Externality level B, 
however, is considered to be Parieto irrelevant because there is no need to remove it on 
efficiency grounds. 
Optimal Externalities and Trade 
How then does this theory apply for a country like New Zealand where much of its 
agricultural produce is exported? This subject has adequately been covered in detail by 
Sinner at this same conference. In su=ary, Anderson shows that for a small economy 
that is exporting a product whose production is pollutive, while trade worsens the 
environment, welfare mayor may not increase in the absence of a pollution tax. In short 
this depends on whether the costs on the environment are more or less that the gains from 
trade. For the comparable situation when an optimal domestic environmental policy is in 
place, Anderson concludes that there is an unambiguous welfare gain from trade for a 
small country providing something approaching the optimal environmental policy is 
introduced, despite the fact that the environment is more polluted when production 
expands to supply exports. He also shows that welfare is enhanced if the international 
price 'of exportable products increases -notwithstanding the greater environmental damage 
caused by increased production - so long as it has a sufficiently small divergence between 
its marginal social and private cost curves or has applied a pollution tax close enough to 
the optimal rate. 
Which Road to Take? - The Relevance of Social Choice Theory 
Environmental interdependence has raised fundamental questions about the capability of 
existing political systems to deal effectively with these problems and about their potential 
to generate rational, purposeful action directed at the comprehensive issues pertaining to 
the environment (see Buhrs, 1990; Hillman et al, 1992). Social Choice is about society 
making collective choices between options and for coping with or solving problems. A 
social choice mechanism is a means through which sovereiguty - whether local, national, 
supra-national or global - determines collective outcomes, Le. outcomes which can apply 
to all its members in a given domain (Dryzek, 1987). While some theorists defme social 
choice in tenus of procedures for aggregating conflicting preferences, the theory can be 
broadened to acco=odate aspects of collective interests and explain the characteristics of 
collective decisions beyond preferences. In this way it has direct application to the choice 
of public policy mechanisms as they relate to environmental sustainable agriculture. 
The social choice mechanisms used in society empower the political process. The degree 
to which the range of societal interests are able to be represented in the process of policy 
development, or in the actions of its elected Government, can determine the effectiveness 
of the policy or action in tenus of its objectives. If the balance of representation is 
inadequate because the mechanisms used are wrong, the policy solutions will be less 
acceptable to certain sections of society, irrespective of the technical optimality of the 
methods or solutions. Those excluded will not have "bought into" the policy, and will not 
therefore "own" it. However, if the mechanisms chosen ensure adequate participation and 
involvement of the range of interests, and these interests are fairly considered in the policy 
development process (as against face-value consultation), the likelihood of unity over 
policy methodology and objective will increase. Furthenuore, the likelihood of political 
backlash will be reduced, if all interests collectively own, through "pre-purchase," a 
chosen policy or strategy .. Social choice mechanisms can be categorised by coordination 
mode, as in Table 1; the concept of coordination distinguishes collective choice from 
individual choice. 
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Table 1: Categorisation of Social Choice Mechanisms 
Coordination Mode Social Choice Mechanism 
Price signals Market 
Commands promulgated from above Administered systems 
Formal rules to which actors adhere Law 
shared norms and behavioral Moral 
principles, promulgated values persuasion 
Partisan Mutual Adjustment 
formal negotiation over actions to 
be taken by each party 
Force 
Polyarchy 
Bargaining 
Armed conflict 
Conditional Cooperation Radical decentralisation 
Discussion about appropriate 
values, principles for 
behaviour and action 
Practical reason 
Source: Dryzek, 1987 
From the same source, the characteristics of ecological problems that demand special 
qualities of social choice mechanisms include: 
(i) non-reducibility, whereby the resolution or amelioration of a systems problems 
cannot be guaranteed through resolution of its parts; 
(li) complexity, where the variety of elements and interactions between agriculture and 
the environment challenge familiar concepts of choice and problem solving; 
(iii) temporal or spacial variability, due to the dynamic tendency of ecosystems and the 
nature of the different ways that humans and ecosystems combine; 
(iv) uncertainty, whereby that lack of definitive information on causation and effect 
prevent probability judgements being assigned with any confidence concerning 
either the nature of present or future conditions; 
(v) collectivity, given the large number of actors holding a stake in ecological 
problems; 
(vi) spontaneity, being the capacity of ecosystems to cope with problems without 
human intervention. 
Against the criteria of negative feedback, the production of responses to human induced 
shortfalls in life-support capability; coordination across both actors and decisions; 
robusrness of performance across different circumstances; flexibility in adjusting structure 
to cope with novel conditions; and resilience, in terms of the ability to correct severe 
disequilibrium, Dryzek argues that existing social choice mechanisms have universally 
failed to achieve ecologically rational outcomes. Dryzek concludes that within the agenda 
of institutional reform, the institutionalisation of practical reason offers the most hope. 
Practical reason involves the rational scrutiny and generation of purpose as well as means, 
and proceeds pedagogically and co=unally, rather than instrumentally and privately. It 
rules out the instrumental manipulation of social conditions and the pursuit of private ends 
in the public arena, accepting only a participatory discursive kind of collective problem 
solving. Such an analytical assessment of the policy mechanisms used in New Zealand 
would be of value. 
Looking now at the practical issues of where policy and government in general fits into 
the task of moving toward more sustainable systems, Buhrs (1990) suggests two 
alternative approaches. They are the substantive approach, being in short, co-ordination 
by co=on purpose, and the procedural approach, being the spontaneous interaction 
between actors involved in environmental policy and co-ordination by a process of 
iteration. The substantive approach requires the presence of goals and principles that are. 
same or consistent, organisations moving in the same direction, or at least not 
contradictory, and supportive mandates, political consensus, some form of ecological 
rationality, and/or scientifically based and tested understanding and management of the 
environment The difficulties associated with this approach have already been discussed, 
particularly where information is often not precise, relationships are not fully understood 
and there remains scientific disagreement. However, the possibility of conflict leads to the 
need to define the environment in a comprehensive way, encompassing both ecological 
and human (social and economic) needs, interests and values (Buhrs, 1990, p.6). 
However, the situation in New Zealand is more as Lindblom observed in 1959. Far from 
pursuing agreed-upon goals in an instrumentally rational and effective fashion, 
governments tend either to muddle through (Lindblom, 1959) or follow established 
organisational routines. Buhrs' alternative fits into this camp. It is where the process of 
alignment is seen as more important than the outcome of that process. In these cases co-
ordination takes place in an iterative way when those involved in the problem or policy 
area react to each other and adjust their actions. The nature or outcome of reactions are 
not assessed on the bases of pre-determined principles or goals. Instead, the degree of 
success of co-ordination is assumed to be reflected in the type of reactions occurring in 
the process. In fact, co-ordination is seen as an ongoing process that is unlikely to be 
achieved. One example of the procedural approach is. Partisan Mutual Adjustment (PMA), 
so defined by Lindblom in the Intelligence of Democracy. PMA is based on the idea that 
"people can co-ordinate with each other without anyone's co-ordinating them, without a 
dominant co=on purpose, and without rules that fully describe their relation to each 
other (Lindblom, 1965). It is therefore a'process of stakeholders' adjusting decisions 
based on the positions and actions of others. While politically more realistic, PMA is 
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inadequate regarding comprehensiveness and the prevention of continuing environmental 
degradation. Outcomes of this process tend to reflect the inequality in power of the actors 
involved, and it is questionable how it overcomes the tendency for collective values to be 
exploited by individual interests. 
Concluding Comments 
The implications of developing environmental policies world-wide come from each and all 
of consumerism, trade and domestic influences. To cope with the diversity of the bounds 
of the concept of sustainable agriculture, its components need to be better understood, 
particularly in terms of how they inter-relate within the system as a whole. EconOmically 
rational approaches to determining optimal points of balance between the conflicting 
interests of those holding an interest in agriculture and its environment suggests a case for 
continuing to maximise productivity of agriculture, so long its adverse environmental 
effects are mitigated. However, in the absence of accepted methods of valuing social 
costs, policy decisions will continue to be made based on the best available information 
and judgement through the political process. Depending on how agriculture considers its 
chances in the political fora, there could be more to be gained from taking a proactive, 
"high-ground", approach to the development of methods of calculating the environmental 
costs of agriculture to be measured against their benefits, than from taking a defensive 
approach to counter-claims for controlling or preventing farming activities. 
In practice, however, the likelihood of either practice or policy being based on economic 
optimality are not great, and in reality the application of such an approach is some way 
off. While the economic gains from production and trade can be relatively easily 
calculated, their costs to the environment are not. Such costs are a function of effect, time 
and values. There is often scientific difference of opinion as to the actual environmental 
effects of a practice. The future implications of practices are often unknown and difficult 
to predict, as is the potential for new technology yet to be thought of to mitigate or 
substitute their effects. Valuation of environmental effects is based as much on perceived 
value (psychological effects) as measurable value (physical effects), most often in the 
absence of a market in which to ascertain either; both depending on the ability of human 
interests to represent those of physical and ecological resources in the valuation process 
which in tern is bounded by limits of human understanding. 
The processes used by which the agricultural cOlnmunity, in its widest sense, sets its goals 
for sustainability, and by which it goes about achieving them, are going to be critical in 
achieving the changes in human behaviour required for the goal of environmentally 
sustainable agriculture to be realised. Institutional practice needs to alter in order to help 
provide solutions to procedural problems of representation of interests and mechanisms for 
determining collective goals in the absence of complete information. Agro-environment 
policy innovation in New Zealand in the 1990's needs to focus equally on the nature of 
the institutional structures and processes to develop and implement policy as with seeking 
solutions that are ecologically or economically correct. Developing substantive approaches 
to agro-environmental issues is a challenge, but offers the only real way forward. 
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DETERMINANTS OF MEAT CONSUMPTION IN NEW ZEALAND: 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS (1967-92) AND FORECAST TRENDS (1993-98)1 
Jagdish Prasad, Ram SriRamaratuam and Richard Wallace 
MAF Policy, Wellington 
ABSTRACT 
Changes in the level of consumption of all major meat categories in New Zealand 
over a 20 year period are studied, covering beef & veal, lamb, mutton, chicken and 
pigmeat. Fish as well as milk and dairy products as a whole are included as they are 
alternative aniinal protein sources in the diet. 
The changes in the consumption of different meat types are studied by examining the 
determinants of prices at the retail level for meats which are mainly exponed (beef 
& veal,lamb and mutton) and those produced particularly for domestic consumption 
(chicken and pigmeats). The influence of health considerations on consumption and 
the impacts of impon restrictions for chicken and pigmeat for sanitary and technical 
reasons are also investigated. The supply responses and the reaction time to price 
signals are additional considerations. 
An Econometric Model of Domestic Meat Consumption developed is utilised to 
derive price and income elasticities of demand for different meat types and related 
products studied. Simulation of this model using exogenous price, income and 
population assumptions are used to forecast domestic meat consumption levels in the 
medium term (1993-97) and the availability for export of beef & veal,lamb and 
mutton. 
INTRODUCTION 
There have been major changes in the level and composition of New Zealand meat 
consumption over the past twenty years. The nature of these changes and the reasons 
for them are the main subject of this paper. fu partiCUlar, an attempt is made to 
separate out to some extent the changes in meat consumption that can be explained 
by factors other than consumer expenditure and relative prices. Projections of future 
meat and fish consumption levels over the period 1993-1997 are presented based on 
an estimated econometric model and MAF's most recent price forecast. The meats 
covered include beef and veal, lamb, mutton, chicken and pigmeat. Fish and dairy 
products as a whole are also included as they represent alternative animal protein 
sources in the diet. 
The research is being undertaken to improve the forecasting ability of domestic meat 
demand and export availability within MAF Policy and to provide an independent 
perspective on the claims made by industry sources with respect to the levels of 
domestic meat consumption and at this stage has to be viewed as very much of a 
. Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
official view of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The helpful suggestions and 
comments of colleagues at MAF Policy are acknowledged. Errors and omissions remain the 
responsibility of the authors. 
preliminary nature. There have been few studies of New Zealand meat consumption 
in the past. The most comprehensive one (Yandle, 1968) is over twenty years old 
and relates to a period prior to the introduction of modern chicken and pigmeat 
production technologies and the advent of health concerns about red meats. Yandle's 
(1968) study utilised quarterly data for the period 1950-1963, covering beef, pork and 
mutton and involved simultaneous estimation of both meat consumption and 
associated retail price equations. His estimated income elasticities suggested that 
pork was viewed as a luxury good with beef and mutton being considered as normal 
goods. Pork displayed the most response to changes in its own price and that of the 
other two meats. 
Shaw (1987) used yearly data covering the period 1968-1983 to estimate a two stage 
meat consumption model of New Zealand, involving beef, lamb, mutton, pigmeat, 
chicken and total meat. Shaw's (1987) results suggested that demand for red meats 
was more responsive to changes in consumer expenditure and own prices than white 
meats and that mutton was a luxury good! These results are somewhat surprising, 
given the large increase in consumption of white meats and the fall-off in red meats. 
Shaw (1987) made no allowance for possible shifts in demand due to health concerns. 
Wallace (1985) estimated consumption equations for beef and veal, mutton and lamb 
over the period 1958-1985 and included shift variables in an attempt to capture health 
concerns. The results from that study suggested that lamb and beef & veal were 
normal goods while mutton was an inferior meat. Demand for all three red meats 
was found to be price inelastic with own price estimates ranging from -.73 for mutton 
to -.34 for beef & veal. There was some evidence of a significant shift away from 
beef & veal and lamb during the 1980's unrelated to changes in income or relative 
prices. Australian studies of meat consumption (Murray, 1984) have produced a wide 
range of expenditure and price elasticities with no clear ranking evident among the 
various meats, except mutton which tended to exhibit characteristics of an inferior 
meat type. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER 
On the basis of the scope of this study outlined above, the specific objectives of this 
paper are as follows: 
(a) to review historical trends and report the current levels of meat consumption 
in New Zealand, including a comparison of consumption levels with other 
countries of interest; 
(b) to examine the factors affecting meat and fish consumption, both conventional, 
such as relative prices and personal consumer expenditures, as well as other 
factors such as consumer attitudes related to health considerations and those 
arising from government policy in relation to impon restrictions on sanitary 
grounds; 
(c) to develop an appropriate Domestic Meat Consumption Model that is 
conceptually and theoretically sound and empirically and statistically 
acceptable; and 
(d) to employ the model to make medium term forecasts of meat consumption 
levels in New Zealand and hence the quantities available for exports. 
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The remainder of the paper is divided into fOUI broad areas. First, the trends in meat 
and fish consumption over the past 26 year period (1967-1992) are examined and the 
factors influencing the formation of retail meat and fish prices are discussed. Second, 
an econometric model of meat, fish and milkfat consumption and associated retail 
price equations are specified and estimated over this period, using a simultaneous 
equation estimator. 
This is followed by a discussion of the estimated price and expenditure elasticities 
and the relative importance of the health shift variable proxies. This model is 
validated and then used to simulate forecasts of meat, fish and milkfat consumption 
over the 1993-1997 period. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of possible 
future work to improve the quality of data used and model specifications. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Historical Trends in New Zealand 
Meat and Fish Consumption 
New Zealand's total meat consumption over the last two decades has declined by 
around 18 percent from about 121 kg per capita in 1972 to about 99 kg per capita in 
1992 (figure 1). The decline in meat consumption has occurred in the red meat 
sector (lamb, mutton, beef and veal). White meat consumption (pigmeat and poultry), 
however, has increased over the same period (figure 2). Red meat consumption over 
the 1972-92 period declined by 33%, whereas white meat consumption increased by 
just over 50%. Fish consumption over the same period also rose substantially, up 
175% from about 8 kg per capita in 1972 to about 21 kg per capita in 1992. As a 
result, the total of meat and fish consumption over the 1972-92 period fell by a lesser 
amount, 6% as compared to 18% for meat consumption ouly. 
Figure 1: New Zealand Meat and Fish Consumption 
Temporal Changes (1972-92) 
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Table 1: New Zealand Red Meat, White Meat and Fish Consumption Trends 
Year Total Red White Meat Total All Fish Total All Meat Meat (incl. Fish) 
1972 99.6 21.1 120.7 7.8 128.5 
1976 91.7 21.3 113.0 9.4 122.4 
1980 81.0 23.5 104.5 13.6 118.1 
1984 75.8 27.7 103.5 24.2 127.7 
1988 78.5 29.2 107.7 20.9 128.6 
1992 67.1 31.7 98.8 21.4 1202 
In the red meat category, the decline in consumption has been greatest for beef and 
veal followed by sheepmeats, specifically mutton. Beef and veal consumption fell 
by 46% to 30 kg per capita in 1992 compared with 56 kg per capita in 1972. Per 
capita mutton consumption in 1992 at 23 kg was down 29% on the 1972 level of 
33 kilograms. Lamb consumption, however, has remained fairly stable at about 
12 kg per capita over the last two decades, despite some year to year fluctuations. 
As a consequence of the decline in beef and mutton consumption, total red meat 
consumption had declined from 100 kg per capita in 1972 to ouly 67 kg per capita 
in 1992. (Table 1.) 
This contrasts with the consumption of white meat per capita over the 1972-92 period 
which has increased by just over 50 percent. Per capita consumption of pigmeat and 
chicken meat totalled 32 kg per capita in 1992 compared with 21 kg per capita in 
1972 (table 1). Chicken meat consumption at 17 kg per capita in 1992 has risen by 
169% compared with the 6 kg per capita consumed in 1972. Pigmeat consumption 
at 14 kg per capita in 1992 has however, changed very little from 1972, even though 
this level has fluctuated within a 10 to 15 kilogram range over the years (figure 1). 
Retail Meat and Fish Prices 
Retail prices used are those published by the Department of Statistics in its monthly 
series the "New Zealand Retail Prices of Selected Food Items". The product 
categories used for various meat and fish prices are as follows: beef (blade steak); 
lamb (lamb leg); mutton (hogget leg); pigmeat (pork cut leg); chicken (deep frozen 
No.8); and fish (wet filleted). Since January 1989, the series on lamb leg and hogget 
leg have been discontinued and have been replaced with one category for sheepmeats, 
which is hogget forequarter chops. Consequently, lamb leg and hogget leg prices 
from 1989 onwards have been derived using the hogget forequarter chop prices. The 
chicken price series has also been changed from number 6 chicken to number 8 
chicken also since 1989. However, this change has been addressed by using the price 
of whole chicken on a per kilogram basis. 
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Figure 2: New Zealand Nominal Retail Meat Prices 
Temporal Changes (1972-92) 
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Nominal retail prices of meat and fish in New Zealand have shown a steady increase 
over the last two decades reflecting the underlying effects of inflation (figure 2). 
Increases in meat prices were most rapid during the period 1972 to 1982, a period 
of high average rate of inflation. The weighted average price of all meat for the 
period 1972 to 1982 rose by 236% compared to a 80% rise for the period 1982 to 
1992 .. In real 1992$ terms, however, meat prices have declined by 24% (figure 3). 
Real prices of meat and fish at the retail level have declined by about 21 % over the 
last ten years. 
Figure 3: New Zealand Retail Meat Prices 
In 1992$ Values 
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White meat prices have declined more than red meat prices. For example, real prices 
of white meat fell by 33% between 1972 and 1992 while red meat prices fell by only 
18%. A comparison of real prices over the past five years shows that while the 
declining trend in white meat prices is continuing, red meat prices have increased 
(figure 3). In the last 5 years, real prices of white meat have fallen by 11 %, whereas 
real prices of red meat have increased by 15%. 
Beef and pigmeat remain New Zealand's most expensive meat types followed by 
lamb, hogget and chicken. Fish (wet whole) prices per kilogram are slightly above 
chicken prices. Real prices of lamb and mutton rose substantially (22%) between 
1987 and 1992 compared to a beef price increase of 12%. Pigmeat, chicken and fish 
prices for the same period, however, declined by 2%, 19% and 24%, respectively, in 
real terms. Increased export returns from 1989 onwards are responsible for the 
higher retail prices for sheepmeat and beef. Reduced production costs, mainly for 
grain feeds, in the white meat sector are responsible for the decline in real prices of 
pigmeat and especially chicken, in addition to ongoing efficiency gains in these 
industries. 
Consumer Attitude to Alternative Meats and Fish 
Over the past two decades the ratio of white meat to red meat consumption in New 
Zealand has shifted greatly in favour of white meat In 1992, per capita white meat 
consumption was 32 kg compared to 21 kg in 1972. At the same time red meat 
consumption per capita has declined from 100 kg in 1972 to 67 kg in 1992. While 
relatively cheaper white meat (especially chicken) prices are an important factor in 
explaining the shift towards white meat consumption, health considerations are also 
likely to have made red meat less attractive to consumers. Increased usage of white 
meats by fast food outlets, easiness of preparation, and wider variety of uses with 
various recipes have also made chicken and pigmeat a more attractive option 
compilred to beef and sheepmeat. 
Health considerations which have become more important in recent years, may have 
also pl~yed a role in consumers choice of meat. While evidence linking red meat 
consumption to specific health problems is not clear or conclusive, consumer's 
perception of red meat has changed greatly in recent years. White meat and fish 
seem to have a higher standing among health conscious consumers when compared 
to red meat. Consumption of the former is recommended by various health 
institutions and experts. 
The Beef and Lamb Marketing Bureau of New Zealand has started a vigorous 
campaign to counter attack some of the negative image of red meat by promoting red 
meat as being high in vitamins and minerals, especially iron, and have emphasised 
the importance of iron in peoples daily diets. This over time may help to reverse or 
slow the decline in red meat consumption. However, the one factor that can have an 
overriding impact on consumers' choice· of meat is the relative price of meat. 
Chicken and fish prices in New Zealand in the last five years have been very 
competitive when compared to red meat prices. 
Determinants of Retail Meat Prices 
Up to 90% of lamb, 70% of mutton, 75% of veal and 85% of beef produced in New 
Zealand is exported annually to overseas markets. Price developments in our major 
export markets for these meats are therefore an important deternIinant of retail meat 
prices in New Zealand. New Zealand's fish industry is also very much export 
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orientated and thus developments in major export markets (Japan and United States 
. in particular) have an important bearing on domestic price levels. Retail prices of 
poultry and pigmeat, produced predominantly for the domestic market, however, are 
determined by. the supply situation, the cost of production and the level of imports 
in the case of pigmeat. Other contributing factors are the relative prices of pigmeat 
and pOUltry meat compared to other meats, the supply situation of other meats and 
consumer perceptions. 
Export Market Developments 
Retail prices of beef in New Zealand are largely determined by the export demand 
for New Zealand beef. This includes factors such as the level of supplies for export 
available frO!Il New Zealand and competing traders like Australia and the United 
States, domestic supplies in our major export markets, and economic factors affecting 
demand in these markets. Seventy five percent of New Zealand beef has historically 
been exported to the United States market. Developments in this market are by far 
the most important determinants of export and domestic prices for New Zealand beef. 
New Zealand's main market for lamb is the EC. Within the EC, over 50% of New 
Zealand lamb is sold to the UK. It is generally recognised that the London wholesale 
price is used as a price reference in other markets. As over 60% by value of New 
Zealand sheepmeat exports go to the EC, EC prices have a dominant impact on 
determining returns to New Zealand farmers. The meat schedule offered by meat 
exporters in turn has a dominant influence on the determination of domestic 
sheepmeat prices. Apart from overseas market prices, domestic lamb prices also 
depend on prices of other meats and the level of production. 
Domestic Supply Situation 
While the domestic supply situation is always a factor in the meat price equation, its 
. importance varies depending on whether a particular meat is produced by a domestic 
or export oriented industry. Beef, lamb and mutton are export oriented industries in 
New Zealand and therefore developments in overseas markets play the greatest role 
in their price formulation. Pigmeat and pOUltry meat, however, are domestic 
orientated industries and thus the domestic supply situation has a major impact on the 
retail prices of both these meats. The price of pork and chicken thus tend to vary 
with their levels of supply, although we recognise that the general level of meat 
prices in New Zealand is established by the export meats against which the pig and 
chicken prices adjust in competition. 
Feed grain supply levels also have a major impact on pigmeat and poultry meat 
prices. Grains for animal and human consumption are imported annually to meet any 
shortfalls. Grain prices in New Zealand are largely based on the world market price 
with a years' lag. Since most of the grain in New Zealand is grown on a contract 
basis, the current year's contract price reflects the price received on the world market 
in the previous year. As grain is the principal feed stuff used in intensive pigmeat 
and poultry meat production, the supply/prices for these two meats reflect the trend 
in grain prices. Consequently, higher world grain prices in anyone year are only 
partly reflected in that year's pigmeat and poultry meat supplies/prices while the full 
. flow on effect is reflected in meat supplies/prices the following year. ';':, 
Production Cycles 
The one meat type that clearly exhibits a pattern of regular well defmed production 
cycles is pigmeat. Pigmeat production data over the last three decades shows a clear 
cyclical pattern, with production peaks occurring at 6 to 8 year intervals. The 
production expansion from the trough to the peak of the cycle occurs over a 2 to 3 
year period, whereas the decline from peak to the trough of production usually occurs 
over a longer period, 4 to 5 years. This is illustrated in the graph of total annual pig 
slaughtering from 1960 to 1992. The cyclical pattern is used to forecast pigmeat 
production out to 1997. It is intended that these production forecasts will later be 
used to assist in generating pigmeat price and consumption projections. 
Figure 4: New Zealand Pig Slaughterings 
Actual and Forecast: 1960-98 
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Import Restriction on Meat and Feed Grains 
With New Zealand's, heavy dependence on agriculture for export earnings, great care 
is taken to ensure that harmful pests and diseases from overseas countries are kept 
out. Restrictions on meat imports into New Zealand are thus usually based on 
sanitary grounds. Import of cooked meat and meat products are permitted entry 
without a permit from the following countries: Australia, the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America, the Republic of Ireland, Japan, the European Community 
countries with the exception of Italy, which currently has a "Foot and Mouth 
Disease" outbreak, and Switzerland. The permit is conditional on the meat being 
cooked or being dehydrated and packed in hermetically sealed containers, sealed tin 
foil packets, sealed jars or glass containers and that the product is shelf stable and is 
not required to be kept at refrigerated temperatures. Importation of fresh or frozen 
pigmeat, beef and sheepmeat from Australia, pigmeat, bones and pork products from 
Canada, Sweden, Northern Ireland and Denmark and fresh and frozen beef from the 
US and Canada are allowed under the condition that the product must comply with 
the requirements of the Food Regulations (1984) of the New Zealand Department of 
Health and Meat Service, MAP Quality Management. 
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New Zealand also has tariffs on importation of swine meat (10% to 20%) and poultry 
meat (20% to 28.5%). Beef, lamb and mutton imports to New Zealand are allowed 
tariff free from countries meeting the required sanitary conditions. 
Tariffs on other products that have some bearing on the meat sector are in the grains 
sector. Importers of barley and oats are required to pay a 10% tariff, which is in turn 
reflected in production costs and hence the retail prices of pig and poultry meats. 
Comparisons with Overseas Meat Consumption Levels 
Comparison of data over the last ten years show that total meat consumption in most 
of the major countries in the world has increased; Increases have been particularly 
large in Asian countries, especially in China. However, increases in meat 
consumption in these countries occurred from a low base in comparison to 
consumption levels in most Western countries. For example, in 1982, Asian 
countries, on average, consumed 17 kg of meat per capita compared to 108 kg per 
capita consumed on average in the United States and Canada. On average, meat 
consumption in the Asian countries rose by 74% to 30 kg per capita in 1992 
compared with increases in the US and Canada of 10% to 119 kg per capita. New 
Zealand is one of the few countries to record a decline in measured meat 
consumption per capita over the 1982-1992 period of 4%. It is difficult to explain 
this phenomenon. Possible explanations include inadequacies in the statistical 
database (including reported growth in the illegal meat trade); and the trend towards 
meatless meals. A recent report by the Hillary Commission (1991) on nutrition 
suggests that by comparison with 1977, many people are now eating very little meat 
due pardy to exaggerated concerns over dietary fat and cholesterol. 
Table 2: Changes in Meat Consumption Across Countries (1982.1992)(kg/head) 
Beef & Lamb, Total Total Total Countries Veal Mutton Pork Poultry Red White All & Goat Meat Meat Meat 
North America % % % % % % % 
Canada -16 4 14 22 -16 18 2 
Mexico 25 9 -37 21 24 -18 0 
United Slates -11 -13 6 53 -11 29 11 
US & Canada Average -11 -11 7 50 -11 28 10 
European Community-12 
France -6 40 7 21 -0 12 7 
Gennany -12 11 -1 28 -11 3 -1 
Greece -14 0 5 -1 -8 2 -3 
United Kingdom -5 -1 -14 30 -4 2 -1 
EC Average -3 25 14 18 1 15 10 
Asia 
Clrina (Mainland) 433 140 84 61 250 81 90 
Japan 64 -36 20 27 44 23 28 
Korea, Republic of 115 100 125 20 115 94 100 
Asia· Average 156 101 75 38 137 68 74 
Oceania 
Austtalia -15 1 16 26 -10 22 2 
New zealand -37 19 24 52 -15 38 -4 
--------- ----
The decline in red meat consumption has been common in most countries, with the 
exception of Asia. The consumption of white meat, however, has increased in almost 
all the countries for which data was available. Mexico is the only exception which 
has had a decline in white meat consumption and an increase in red meat 
consumption. 
In countries that had experienced a fall in red meat consumption, the decline has 
usually been in beef and veal. Among western countries, increases in poultry meat 
consumption have been highest in the United States (which is also the world's largest 
consumer of poultry meat), up 53% to 45 kg per capita, followed by New Zealand, 
up 52% to 17 kg per capita. The largest increase in pigmeat consumption has been 
in the Republic of Korea and China. 
Figure 5: 1992 Meat Consumption Levels 
Cross Country Comparisons 
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Beef is the most favoured meat in North America, Australia and New Zealand. North 
Asian and the European Community consumers, however, have preference for 
pigmeat over other meat types. Poultry meat consumption is the highest in the 
United States of America while lamb, mutton and goattneat consumption is the 
highest in New Zealand. At 122 kg per. capita, the United States is the world's 
largest consumer of meat 
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THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The conceptual framework of meat consumption and export availability is outlined 
in the following figure. Percapita consumption levels of meat types are determined 
by own and other retail meat prices, consumption expenditure and consumer attitudes 
relative to health and other considerations. Retail prices in turn are determined by 
farmgate prices and processing costs in the case of beef, lamb and mutton. Farmgate 
prices for these export meat types depend on overseas market prices and the exchange 
rates. 
The retail prices of chicken and pigmeat produced mainly for domestic consumption 
are influenced- by domestic production levels. This is also true in the case of lamb 
as New Zealand is a major producer of lamb in the world market and access to the 
major EC market is restricted. Per capita consumption levels along with population 
provides total consumption for all meat types, both red meats and white meats. In 
the case of pastoral activities farmgate prices of beef, lamb, mutton and milkfat 
determine the pastoral production levels which are estimated using the Pastoral 
Supply Response Model. Once pastoral production levels with respect to lamb, 
mutton, beef and veal as well as milkfat are determined and the total consumption 
is also estimated from this Meat Consumption Model, export availability of meat 
types can be derived. 
Figure 6: The Conceptual Framework 
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MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA 
As discussed in the previous section, the main data types used in this study are 
consumption levels and retail prices of all meat types, private consumption 
expenditure, farmgate prices and processing costs for all pastoral meat products. 
Consumer Price Index Series (CPl) with the base period of 1988, population and 
some dummy variables to represent health considerations and rendering of some meat 
types in certain years are also used. 
The data on retail prices were obtained from the Department of Statistics (DOS) 
publications. Consumption levels were derived from production and export/import 
quantities known from various sources such as slaughter statistics, trade statistics etc 
from the DOS and production returns from the New Zealand Meat Producers Board 
(NZMPB). Fish Consumption figures were obtained from the Fishing Industry Board 
up to 1988. 
The data period covered 25 years from 1967 to 1992 and the farmgate prices, 
processing costs, consumer expenditures, CPl, population etc were also available for 
this period either from MAP or DoS sources. 
MODEL ESTIMATION AND SIMULATION 
The meat consumption model was initially estimated in the linear form using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) procedure and subsequently estimated in natural logarithms. 
Due to the simultaneous nature of determination of prices and consumption of some 
meat types, particularly chicken and pigmeat, as well as lamb to some extent, a 
systems estimation procedure was subsequently adopted. The farm gate to retail price 
linkage equations for beef, lamb, mutton and milkfat were also estimated separately 
first and subsequently incorporated in the full systems formulation. Fish and milkfat 
equations are also included in the system. 
MODEL VALIDATION 
Consumption Model Validation results are reported in table 3. The statistical 
measures reported in this table for model validation purposes are the correlation 
coefficient (CORR) Regression Co-efficient (REGR) of actuals on predicted, Theil's 
Inequality Co-efficient, Error due to bias and the Root mean square error (RMSE). 
The CORR measures the degree of parallel changes in actual and predicted or 
estimated values, while REGR measures the extent to which the two series coincide 
together. In both cases, a value close to one is most preferred and the value for 
REGR can be greater than one. 
As can be seen in table 3, the CORR values are high for all meat consumption types 
and for beef and veal, chicken and pigmeat close to one. The CORR values for 
chicken and pigmeat retail prices were also high. These values were lower for lamb 
consumption and price equations. The REGR values were also high and close to one 
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for beef and veal, mutton, chicken, pigmeat and fish consumption and lower for 
milkfat and in particular for lamb. Similarly, retail prices for chicken and pigmeat 
also had a high REGR value while that for lamb prices was low. 
Theil's Co-efficient, error due to bias, and Root Meat Square Error (RMSE) were 
also low in the case of most equations and in particular the beef and veal, mutton, 
chicken and pigmeat equations. The exception was' the lamb equation, which had 
higher values for these measures and thus require further improvements to make the 
whole system better. 
Table 3: Validation of the Meat Consumption Model 
Endogenous Correlation Regn Co-eff Theils Error Due RMSE 
Variables Co-Efficient Act vs Pred Co-eft' To Bias 
I Per Capita Consumption 
(a) Beef & Veal 0.966 0.928 0.050 0.009 2.36 
(b) Lamb 0.771 0.335 0.395 0.024 4.69 
(c) Mutton 0.865 0.993 0.078 0.002 2.01 
(d) Chicken 0.999 1.002 0.010 0.0002 0.11 
(e) Pigmeat 0.994 0.976 0.012 0.0006 0.15 
(f) Fish 0.783 0.932 0.210 0.0115 3.33 
(g) Milkfat 0.528 0.611 0.092 0.0002 2.0 
II Retail Prices 
. 
(a) Lamb 0.711 0.496 0.143 0.0034 0.101 : 
(b) Chicken 0.939 0.983 0.096 0.0036 0.075 
(c) Pigmeat 0.881 0.809 0.064 0.0003 0.065 
NEW ZEALAND DOMESTIC MEAT CONSUMPTION ELASTICITIES 
Based on the model estimated and discussed above, the own, cross and expenditure 
elasticities were estimated and are reported in table 4. As the equations were 
estimated in natural logarithms, the estimated coefficients are interpreted as the 
respective elasticities. The elasticities reported in table 4 suggest that lamb (-1.934), 
chicken (-1.481) and pigmeat (-1.554) are price elastic, while beef (-0.179), mutton 
(-0.494) and milkfat (-0.266) are price inelastic with fish (-0.904) being almost unit 
. elastic. 
Table 4: New Zealand Domestic Meat Consumption Elasticities (1967·1992) 
Beef Lamb Mutton Cbicken Pigmeat Milk' Fisb Expend. H 
Beef -0.179 - - -0.121 - - - 1.324 -0.066 
(-3.1) (-3.3) (4.8) (-16.3) 
Lamb - -1.934 1.702 -0.275 - - - 0.939 -0.007 
(-1.9) (1.6) (-1.4) (0.9) (-0.4) 
Mutton 0.422 - -0.577 0.554 - 0.494 -
(3.7) (6.1) (7.8) (1.4) 
Chicken 0.555 - - -1.481 - - 0.997 1.906 -
(4.4) (-15.9) (7.2) (4.8) 
Pigmeat 0.358 0.316 - - -1.554 - 0.48 0.211 -
(3.1) (1.8) (-5.2) (2.6) (0.8) 
Milk' 0.287 - - - -0.417 -0.266 -0.506 -
(3.2) (-3.7) (-6.6) (-2.6) 
Fish - 0.044 - -0.116 - - -0.904 2.838 -
(0.2) (-0.8) (-3.7) (2.9) 
* Dairy Products, ( ) = t-statistics, H = health dummy variable indicator 
The expenditure elasticities estimated suggest that fish (2.838), chicken (1.906) and 
beef (1.324) are quite expenditure elastic while pigmeat (0.211) and mutton (0.494) 
are inelastic. Lamb (0.939) estimate is close to being unit elastic and milkfat (-0.506) 
exhibited inferior good characteristics. 
As many retail price series were highly correlated among themselves, not all retail 
prices could be used in all the per capita meat consumption equations. 
FORECAST CONSUMPTION LEVELS 
The model which was estimated using data for a 25 year period from 1967-1992 was 
used to forecast consumption levels for a six year period from 1993-1998. For this 
purpose, the forecast values of exogenous variables for this period was first required. 
Forecast levels of Exogenous Variables 
The recent (1990-1992) and forecast values of exogenous variables are reported in 
table 5. These include farmgate prices of beef, lamb, mutton and milkfat as well as 
processing costs of beef, lamb, and mutton estimates made by MAF Policy. The 
macro variables related to CPI, consumer expenditure, and population as well as retail 
prices for chicken, pigmeat and fish are also required. 
CPI changes are based on published DoS series, while a 2% increase in consumer 
expenditure, a net 20,000 increase in population, and 2, 3, and 4% decrease 
respectively in pigmeat, fish and chicken retail prices are assumed. 
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Table 5: Recent (1990·92) and Forecast (1993·98) Exogenous Variables 
1990 1991 1992 1993e 1994f 1995f 1996f 1997f 1998f 
I FARMGATE PRICES' (cJkg) 
(a) Beef 265.5 267.2 269.2 258.0 251.8 253.0 239.5 221.7 21D.6 
(b) Lamb 223.8 191.8 194.5 244.8 248.9 ·256.5 265.3 270.4 273.8 
(e) Mutton 89.6 59.9 60.7 116.3 100.4 100.9 108.5 117.1 125.7 
(d) Milkfat 630.0 424.0 584.0 630.0 692.0 697.0 704.0 713.0 723.0 
II PROCESSING COSTS' (cJkg) 
(a) Beef 172.9 182.0 179.6 182.1 184.4 186.9 189.1 191.4 193.8 
(b) Lamb 120.0 124.0 121.0 121.8 122.3 124.2 125.8 127.4 129.0 
(e) Mutton 111.0 114.0 113.0 114.7 116.4 118.1 119.9 121.8 123.6 
ill MACRO VARIABLE' 
(a) cpr (1988=1000) 1078 1125 1138 1154 1172 1191 1210 1230 1249 
(b) Consumer· 43,876 46,250 46,960 47,899 48,857 49,834 50,831 51,848 52,885 
Expenditure ($M) 
(e) PopUlation ('ooos) 3,404 3,435 3,452 3,472 3,492 3,512 3,532 3,552 3,572 
IV RETAIL PRICES' (cJkg) 
(a) Chicken 534.0 535.0 512.0 488.0 469.0 450.0 437.0 428.0 423.0 
(b) Pigmeat 952.0 992.0 969:0 956.0 937.0 918.0 925.0 935.0 945.0 
(c) Fish 645.0 636.0 620;0 597.0 579.0 562.0 550.0 539.0 534.0 
1 Forecast values of fanngare prices and processing costs for beef, lamb, mutton and milkfat were made by MAF Policy. 
2 CPI changes are based on published DOS series; consumer expenditure changes are based on a 2% arumaI increase and a 
20,000 net increase in population is also assumed. 
:3 An amJ.ual decline of 4%, 3% and 2% respectively of chicken, fish and pigmeat prices are assumed. 
Based on these forecast levels of exogenous variable assumptions, the per capita 
consumption of all meat types as well as milkfat and fish are forecast from 1993 to 
1998. Beef and veal consumption is forecast to continue the decline of the last 10-15 
years and reach about 22 kg per capita in 1998 from the 30 kg level in 1992 (table 
6). There is some increase in lamb consumption to 15 kg per capita in 1998 from 
the current level of about 14 kg with some fluctuations in the interim period, while 
mutton consumption is forecast to continually decline to about 15kg also in 1998 
from the current levels of about 22kg. 
Chicken consumption however, is forecast to increase from about 17 kg in 1992 to 
about 19 kg in 1998, while pigmeat consumption remains fairly static at about 14-
16 kg during the forecast period, milk fat consumption is forecast to decline 
continuously and fish consumption increase to about 27 kg from about 23-24 kg. 
This implies that total red meat consumption will decline from about 226,000 tonnes 
in 1992 to 189,000 tonnes in 1998 while white meat consumption is forecast to 
increase to about 115,000 tonnes from about 100,000 tonnes now. These have 
implications for the export availability of beef and veal, lamb, mutton and milkfat 
which are also reported in table 6. Export availability of beef and veal is forecast to 
. increase to 560,000 tonnes from 445,000 tonnes in 1992, while lamb and mutton 
tonnages for export decline. Milkfat availability however, increases somewhat due 
to declining domestic consumption. 
Table 6: Recent (1990·92) and Forecast (1993·98) Meat Consumption and 
Export A vaiIability 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
I PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION LEVELS (kg/head) 
(a) Beef & Veal 34.5 30.6 30.3 29.1 27.6 26.2 24.9 23.6 22.4 
(b) Lamb 11.9 12.6 13.7 15.0 14.1 13.9 14.2 14.6 15.0 
(c) Mutton 24.2 20.9 22.1 18.5 18.4 17.8 16.9 16.0 15.4 
(d) Chicken 16.7 16.6 17.2 17.7 18.1 18.7 18.9 19.0 19.0 
(e) Pigrneat 14.2 14.0 14.4 14.9 15.2 15.8 15.6 15.2 15.0 
(f) Milkfat 25.0 24.7 24.6 242 23.6 23.9 23.8 23.6 23.5 
(g) Fish 23.0 23.5 24.0 24.5 25.0 25.5 26.0 26.5 27.0 
II TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
(a) Red Meat 233.4 232.4 226.3 217.1 210.0 203.5 197.8 192.8 188.7 
(b) White Meat 101.7 100.0 104.3 1082 111.6 116.1 116.7 115.7 115.5 
(c) Total Meat" 335.1 332.5 330.6 325.3 321.4 319.6 314.5 308.6 3042 
ill EXPORT AVAILABILITY ('000 tonnes) 
(a) Beef & Veal 349.5 415.1 444.5 465.7 541.0 556.0 556.0 560.4 558.2 
(b) Lamb 308.0 323.7 374.7 281.9 265.5 260.5 255.1 254.4 257.6 
(c) Mutton 83.8 67.9 82.5 76.1 77.0 75.1 74.5 73.0 72.0 
(d) Milkfat 270.3 271.3 302.8 318.8 313.6 322.8 331.6 338.9 345.0 
* This total excludes fish. 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS/SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Implications for Export Meats/Availability 
Our flndings suggest that consumption of red meats in particular beef and veal and 
mutton will continue to decline but at slower rates than in recent years while 
consumption of white meats and fish increases with the latter showing the greatest 
increase. These consumptions trends will tend to increase export availability of red 
meats while reducing that of fish. In the context of projected increases in production 
of beef and veal, this will likely accentuate the marketing challenge currently facing 
the New Zealand beef industry. 
Effects of Health and Consumer Attitudes 
There is evidence of a significant shift away from beef and veal since the late 1970s 
unrelated to changes in relative prices or consumption expenditure. We consider this 
is most likely due to health concerns associated with red meats. Collinearity 
problems and lack of suitable data, have prevented us from modelling a more 
sophisticated treatment of non-price/expenditure factors. We have therefore been 
unable to obtain reliable measures of the extent to which health factors may have 
benefited white meat and fish consumption or help to explain the overall reduction 
in meat consumption. 
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Any Further WorkIModel Refinements 
There is a need for further work on estimating the determinants of pigmeat and 
poultry production and re-examining the extent to which imports may play a more 
important role in future ill meat consumption. We also propose to look at whether 
the imposition of symmetry conditions improves the estimated elasticities. Obtaining 
firm estimates for fish consumption in the post 1988 period is another area requiring 
attention. We will also be re-examining our forecasts using alternative pricing 
assumptions as time permits. 
OVERALL SUMMARY 
Our model suggests that consumer expenditure and relative price factors are the most 
important determinants of meat and fish consumption with health factors being 
important also in determining beef and veal consumption. The trend towards lower 
red meat consumption and increased white meat and fish consumption is expected to 
continue, but at a decreasing rate. 
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Abstract 
A logit model was developed to investigate the decision to eat 
lamb away from horne in the United States. Using data from the 
1987-88 National Food Consumption Survey of the United States 
Department of Agriculture, this study identified several socio-
demographic and economic characteristics of consumers who have 
eaten lamb away from horne. The information derived from this 
study is useful for lamb processors and producers in New Zealand 
who wish to anticipate future market changes and derived demands 
for their products in the United States. 
Introduction 
Meat Consumption Trends 
Between the 1970-72 and 1988-89 periods, red meat consumption in 
the United States (US) declined almost 12 per cent, while poultry 
and fish/shellfish consumption rose 70 and 30 per cent, 
respectively. Specifically, beef consumption declined about 16 
per cent; veal consumption declined by almost 40 per cent; pork 
consumption fell by nearly two per cent; and lamb consumption 
fell by almost 50 per cent. On the other hand, chicken and 
turkey consumption increased 64 per cent and 95 per cent, 
respectively (Table 1). 
These consumption trends clearly indicate a shift in COnsumer 
demand in the US toward poultry products and away from red meat 
products. Factors that could have caused this consumption shift 
are changes in: tastes and preferences, relative prices of meat 
products, and dietary and health standards. 
Consumers are increasingly aware of and concerned about food, 
nutrition, and health issues. Organisations representing meat 
producer groups in the US also appear to be very conscious of 
health and nutrition concerns in the promotion of products (Capps 
and Schmitz 1991). In fact, the US red meat industry has been 
taking steps to foster the development of meat products that are 
not only leaner and low in fat, but also quick, easy and 
convenient to prepare. 
Per capita lamb consumption in the US is far below that of all 
other meat products, in recent years reaching only half a 
kilogram in retail weight equivalent (Table 1). In contrast, per 
capita beef and pork consumption were roughly 30 kilograms and 
22 kilograms, respectively, in 1988-89. Per capita chicken and 
turkey consumption were about 21 kilograms and six kilograms, 
respectively, and per capita fish and shellfish consumption was 
about seven kilograms. These figures reflect the very small 
share of lamb in the US meat market. The low level of US lamb 
consumption is also apparent when compared to consumption 
patterns in major lamb consuming countries like New Zealand and 
Australia. For instance, per capita consumption (retail weight) 
in New Zealand and Australia are about 18 kilograms and 10.5 
kilograms, respectively (Table 2) . 
The Food Awav From Horne Market 
Food expenditures are taking a declining share of disposable 
income of US consumers. Based on some Census Bureau information, 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimated that the 
percentage of disposable income going to food decreased from 16.3 
per cent in 1970 to 13.8 per cent in 1989 (Table 3). The 
percentage of disposable income going to food at horne (FAH) has 
also declined from 10.8 per cent in 1970 to 7.6 per cent in 1989. 
In contrast, the percentage of disposable income going to food 
away from horne (FAFH) has increased from 5.5 per cent in 1970 to 
6.2 per cent a decade later. Since 1980, the proportion of 
disposable income allocated to away-from-home spending has 
fluctuated within a narrow range (6.0 to 6.4 per cent). Due to 
the above trends, the proportion of total food expenditure spent 
away from horne has increased from 34 per cent in 1970 to 45 per 
cent in 1989. 
The FAFH market is composed of commercial foodservice 
establishments (i.e. restaurants, fast food places, cafeteria) 
and noncommercial outlets (i.e. school or military dining rooms, 
child care centres). Although noncommercial outlets serve more 
food to more people, they account for only 30 per cent of the 
total retail value of FAFH. The majority of the FAFH sales from 
the past came from conventional restaurants. However, fast food 
eating establishments have more than tripled in number since the 
early 1960s. The fast food industry has started placing outlets 
in locations not previously served such as schools, military 
bases, and international markets. In addition, menus are being 
enlarged to include items such as salad bars, soups, baked 
potatoes and whole grain buns. Francpised restaurants are now 
also facing growing competition from within the industry, from 
supermarkets and other food stores that prepare take-out food and 
from hotels that offer dining room service and catering. 
Most supermarkets now have a variety of on-site bakeries, 
delicatessens with a wide array of freshly prepared and ready to 
eat foods, expanded sections of frozen-prepared foods ready for 
heating in the microwave oven, salad and juice bars and even 
natural food centres. These developments forced many full-
service restaurants to experiment with lighter dishes and 
emphasise freshness, quality, regional cooking and seasonality 
to increase customer traffic. Some full-service establishments 
are also launching gourmet take-out foods to boost volume. This 
trend toward more variety, products and services will continue 
in the future as long as consumers' demand for speed and 
convenience continue in the next few years (Nayga and Capps 
1992) . Also, customers' use of self-service restaurants has 
become more common in the last decade and a great deal of more 
self-service type enterprises seems likely to surface throughout 
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the food service industry as labour costs and labour shortages 
increase. 
Demographics and Lifestyles 
The demographic characteristics of the US population are 
undergoing dramatic changes that have major implications for the 
lamb industry. In particular, changes in consumer lifestyles are 
prompting a significant move toward eating out. Some of the 
socio-economic and demographic trends that have emerged are: a 
growing number of women in the work force; increasing importance 
of convenience in eating out; more families living on two 
incomes; more advertising and promotion by large food service 
chains; and more people in the age group of 25 to 44 who are 
inclined to eat out often (Putnam and Van Dress 1984). Only 
about seven per cent of all households now fit the old stereotype 
family of a working husband, a wife who does not work for wages, 
and two children (Kinsey 1990) . 
More women now are also in the labour force, increasing the 
demands for convenience in home prepared food, for home delivered 
food and for FAFH. In fact, over 70 per cent of women aged 25-44 
are in the labour force, and notably about 75 per cent of these 
women work full time. Moreover,the labour force participation 
rate of women increased from 52 per cent in 1980 to 58 per cent 
in 1990 (Waldrop and Exter 1991) . 
In addition to these changes, US per capita income has been 
rising. In 1982 dollars, per capita income increased over 43 per 
cent between 1970 and 1989, and by 6.6 per cent in 1989 (Kinsey 
1990) . In addition, more families now are living with two 
incomes, although there is also a growing gap between the poor 
and the rich. Uneducated and pOor households (mostly nonwhites 
and single women) with incomes under US$15,000 per year now 
account for about a third of the households (Kinsey 1990). These 
households have a budget share for food of about 50 per cent and 
are mostly participants in food assistance programmes (e.g. food 
stamp programme). In contrast, households with annual incomes 
over US$35,000 spend less than eight per cent of their income on 
food (Kinsey 1990). For this group, price will be less important 
than food safety, quality, taste ,and experience. 
Aging is another important demographic force affecting food 
consumption. Due to the aging of the baby-boom population, the 
median US age has increased from 30 in 1980 to 33 in 1990 (Noah 
1991). By 2020, about half of the US population will be aged 50 
or more (Noah 1991). Also, due to information about the linkages 
between longevity and health and diet, older people are changing 
their diets and the make-up of the foods they eat (e.g. less fat 
and sodium, more grains, fruits and vegetables). A consequence 
of an aging population is the shrinking of a labour pool, 
especially among young adults who provide much of the work force 
in the fast food sector. The demand for labour is not expected 
,to ease in the near future. In fact, employment for food 
preparation and service positions is expected to grow 37 per cent 
between 1986 and 2000 (USDA 1989-90) . 
The US population is more ethnically diverse than ever. As in 
the 1980s, the growing ethnic diversity will create new 
challenges for food marketers especially in the FAFH sector. In 
the early 1980s, less than 20 per cent of Americans belonged to 
a racial or ethnic group (Waldrop and Exter 1991). By 1990, 
nearly 25 per cent belonged to a racial or ethnic minority. 
Specifically, numbers of Americans of "other races" (e. g. not 
white or black) grew seven times faster than the overall 
population in the 1980s (Waldrop and Exter 1991). Between 1980 
and 1990, the percentage change in numbers was greatest for 
Asians/Pacific Islanders at 108 per cent followed by the 
hispanics at 53 per cent. The white and black populations only 
increased six and 13 per cent, respectively (Business Week 17 
June 1991). By 2005 there will be an equal number of blacks and 
hispanics in the US, and they will make up over one quarter of 
the population (Business Week 17 June 1991). These trends will 
mean that the overall make-up of consumer needs and preferences 
are likely to change. 
Objective of the Study 
Lamb competes with a wide variety of meat and other food products 
for a share of the US consumer's dollar. Lamb also faces a 
rapidly changing marketplace within which consumers are spending 
their food dollars. With over 70 billion food service meals 
served each year in the US (TAMRC Lamb Study Team 1991), 
excellent opportunities may be available for Australasian lamb 
to command a larger share of the dollar in the FAFH sector. 
Little is known, however, about the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of individuals in the US who have eaten 
lamb away from home. In fact, no studies as yet have analysed 
the effect of socio-demographic and economic factors on the 
decision to eat lamb away from home. Considering the potentially 
important opportunity that the US food service industry presents 
for lamb, the New Zealand lamb industry would benefit from a 
study that analysed these consumers. 
This research attempts to fill this information void by using the 
Individual Intake phase of the 1987-88 National Food Consumption 
Survey (NFCS) of USDA. This study attempts to identify the 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of individuals in 
the US who have eaten lamb away from home, with some implications 
for the New Zealand lamb industry. 
Model Development 
To investigate the decision to eat lamb, logit analysis is used 
to estimate a model in which the likelihood of eating lamb away 
from home is a function of a set of socio-economic and 
demographic variables. 
Since the dependent variable'is discrete (binary), the analysis 
relies on the use of a qualitative choice model. The linear 
probability model, the probit model, and the logit model are the 
alternative specifications of qualitative choice models (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld 1991). The linear probability model is given by: 
Yi = Xi'B + Ei 
where Yi is 1 if the ith decision maker selects the first 
alternative and 0 if the ith decision maker selects the second 
t-' 
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'alternative; Xi' is the ith row of the nXp matrix of regressors, 
i= 1, .... , n (n refers to the sample size and p refers to the 
number of coefficients); B is a pXl vector of parameter 
coefficients; and Ei is the ith independently and identically 
distributed random variable with zero expectation. 
Logit and probit analyses, however, are preferred to the linear 
probability model since the latter suffers from a number of 
deficiencies. The variance of the disturbance term of the model 
is heteroscedastic and, therefore, the standard errors of the 
ordinary least squares parameter estimates are biased. Further, 
the disturbance term is not normally distributed. The classical 
statistical tests are therefore not applicable. Another 
deficiency of the linear probability model is that it allows the 
predicted values (probabilities) to fall outside the interval 
between 0 and I', which is inconsistent with the interpretation 
of the conditional expectation as a probability. 
A logit or probit specification circumvents these difficulties 
by the use of monotonic transformations to guarantee that 
predictions lie in the unit interval. Logit models are employed 
in the analyses reported here. These models are based on the 
cumulative logistic probability function and are specified as 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991) : 
P = F(Z) = F(Xi'~) = l/(l+e-z ) = 1/(l+e-(Xi'~I) 
where Z is a theoretical index determined by a set of explanatory 
variables X; F(Z) is the cumulative logistic function; e 
represents the base of natural logarithms (approximately equal 
to 2.718); and P is the probability that an individual will make 
a certain choice, given the knowledge of X; 
The most suitable technique of estimation when using logit is 
maximum likelihood. Although this technique requires the use of 
an iterative algorithm, this procedure assumes the large-sample 
properties of consistency and asymptotic normality of the 
parameter estimates so that conventional tests of significance 
are applicable. 
The logit analysis centres on the hypothesis that a set of 
variables influence the decision to eat lamb away from home. The 
logit model is specified as follows: 
PROB=bo + b1urbanl + b2urban2 + b3regionl + b4region2 + 
bsregion4 + b6race2 + b 7race3 + bsrace4 + b9hispl + b10sexl + b llemployl + b 12 fstampl + b13dietl + b14hsize + b1slogage + b 1610gincome + b17weekend + b 1squarterl+ b19quarter3 + 
b 2oquarter4 ; 
where PROB is equal to 1 if the individual consumed lamb away 
from home and 0 otherwise. The independent variables refer to 
the following: 
urbani = 1 if individual resides in a central city; 0 otherwise; 
urban2 = 1 if individual resides in a suburban area; 0 otherwise; 
regionl 1 if individual is in the Northeast; 0 otherwise; 
region2 1 if individual is in the Midwest; 0 otherwise; 
region4 1 if individual is in the West; 0 otherwise; 
race2 = 1 if individual is black; 0 otherwise; 
race3 '1 if individual is Asian or Pacific Islander; 0 
otherwise; , 
race4 = 1 if individual is of some other race; 0 otherwise; 
hispl = 1 if individual is hispanic; 0 otherwise; 
sexl = 1 if individual is male; 0 otherwise; 
employl 1 if individual is employed; 0 otherwise; 
fstampl = 1 if individual is receiving food stamps; 0 otherwise; 
dietl = 1 if individual is on a special diet; 0 otherwise; 
hsize = household size; 
logage = the logarithm of age; 
10gincome = the logarithm of income; 
weekend = 1 if the three-day intake of the individual occurred 
mostly during a weekend; 0 otherwise; and 
quarterl, quarter3, and quarter4 = correspond to a set of binary 
variables that measure seasonality, (quarterl=l if January -
March; quarter3 =1 if July-September; quarter4=1 if October-
December) (reference category, April-June). 
One classification is eliminated from each group of variables for 
estimation purposes. The base group are individuals who satisfy 
the following description: reside in a nonrnetro area (urban3); 
in the South (region3); white (racel); nonhispanic (hisp2); 
female (sex2); not employed (employ2); not participating in the 
food stamp program (fstamp2); not on a special diet (diet2); and 
the three-day intake occurred mostly during a weekday (weekday). 
The variable depicting the presence or absence of hispanics 
(hispl) is separated from the race variables because hispanics 
as a group is defined by USDA as an ethnic group rather than a 
race. Therefore, a hispanic can be white, black or some other 
race. 
Several studies on FAFH (e.g. Redman 1980; Lee and Brown 1986; 
Horton and Campbeli 1991) included an employment status variable 
in their analyses as a measure of the opportunity cost of time. 
These studies based their analysis on household production 
theory. Household production theory implies that household time 
as well as market goods and services enter the assumed utility 
maximisation process (Becker 1965; Lancaster 1966). This theory 
also suggests that an individual's employment could cause a shift 
away from consumption of time-intensive toward goods intensive 
commodities (Horton and Campbell 1991). Based on this theory and 
due to the increased attention given to the value of time as a 
determinant of away from home consumption, the employment status 
of the individual is included in the analyses as a measure of the 
opportunity cost of time. Certainly, the number of hours worked 
per week or per year is an alternative to employment status as 
a measure of the opportunity cost of time. However, because of 
incomplete reporting of hours worked for by the sample of 
individuals in this study, the employment status of the 
individual is used. 
Data Source and Description 
The 1987-88 NFCS is the most recent of the national household 
food consumption surveys conducted by USDA. As in any cross-
sectional study, several issues arise in handling the data set. 
The original number of respondents in the survey is 11,045. 
However, after deleting observations with missing individual 
relevant socio-economic and demographic information, the data set 
contained 6276 observations. 
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There has been controversy about the validity of the 1987-88 
NFCS. The US General Accounting Office (1991) has publicly 
criticised these data on two grounds: (1) the data collected may 
not be accurate because of quality control problems and (2) only 
34 per cent of the households provided individual intake data. 
However, the 1987-88 NFCS is the only current data set available 
in the US on household and individual food consumption. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
regression analyses are exhibited in Table 4. About 21 per cent 
of the sample reside in central city areas; 49 per cent in 
suburban areas; and 30 per cent in nonmetro areas. Most of the 
individuals (35 per cent) included in the sample come from the 
South. Eighty six per cent are white; 96 per cent are non-
hispanic; 45 per cent are male; 58 per cent are employed; 95 per 
cent are non-recipients of the food stamp programme; 14 per cent 
are on a special diet; and about 16 per cent ate food mostly on 
a weekend during the three-day survey period. Moreover, the 
average age of the individuals is about 43 years while. the 
average household size is approximately three. Average household 
annual income is close to US$30,000. 
Based on the 1988 US population, this sample is probably 
underrepresentative of individuals located in the northeast and 
west and overrepresentative of individuals located in the south. 
In addition, the sample is not uniformly distributed across 
seasons. The sample is probably underrepresentative of the 
number of employed individuals. The average age of individuals 
in the sample and the average household size are also above the 
national average. However, the distribution of individuals by 
urbanisation, race, origin, sex, food stamp participation, 
special diet status and income seems representative of the US 
population in 1988. 
Empirical Results 
The maximum likelihood estimates for the logit analysis are 
exhibited in Table 5. The significance level chosen for this 
analysis was 0.05. Based on the statistically significant 
coefficients and the changes in probabilities, the results 
indicate that individuals of "other" races are more likely to 
consume lamb away from home than either whites or blacks. A 
significant positive association also exists between age and the 
probability of consuming lamb away from home. The same is true 
with income. Moreover, recipients of the food stamp programme 
are less likely to consume lamb away from home than individuals 
who are not recipients of the food stamp programme. 
Although not statistically significant, some other trends are 
apparent. Hispanics are surprisingly less likely to consume lamb 
away from home than non-hispanics. The positive sign of the 
variable dietl indicates that individuals who are on a special 
diet are more likely to eat lamb away from home than individuals 
who are not on a special diet. This result is surprising 
considering consumer perceptions about health and nutrition 
qualities of red meats such as lamb. However, lamb may already 
be gaining an image as more easily digestible and nutritious than 
other red meats (TAMRC Lamb Study Team 1991). This image would 
be appealing to the growing segment of the US population 
interested in nutrition. 
The probability of consuming lamb away from home, although not 
statistically significant, is negatively related to household 
size. Individuals from the northeast, midwest, and west regions 
of the US are more likely to eat lamb away from home than those 
from the south. Individuals from the northeast are more likely 
to eat lamb away from home than those from other regions. On the 
other hand, individuals from central cities and suburban areas 
are more likely to eat lamb away from home than those from non-
urban areas. Sex of the individual, employment status of the 
individual, urbanisation, seasonality and weekend intake are not 
key determinants affecting the probability of consuming lamb 
products away from home. 
Thus, it can be implied from the results that the typical away 
from home lamb consumer in the US is an older, high income, 
relatively well-established ethnic individual who lives in urban 
areas in the Northeast (e.g. Philadelphia, Boston, New York). 
The McFadden R-squared (goodness of fit measure) shown in Table 
5 is 0.0820. Although this value is low, it is reasonable 
considering the type of data (survey of individuals) used in the 
analysis. Another measure of goodness-of-fit is the correct 
classification of individuals as either consuming or not 
consuming lamb away from home on the basis of the regression 
results. With a 50-50 classification scheme, approximately 99.5 
percent of the individuals in the sample were correctly 
classified as either consuming or not consuming lamb away from 
home using the logit specification. 
Implications for the New Zealand Lamb Industry 
Table 6 presents New Zealand lamb shipments to the u.s. from 1980 
to 1991. Lamb shipments peaked in 1981 when New Zealand exported 
close to 15,000 tonnes to the U.S.. Since 1981, however, lamb 
shipments to the U.S. have been significantly lower each year 
with the exception of the 1985 and 1986 shipments. In fact, 
since 1986, the U.S. imported less than two percent of the total 
New Zealand lamb exports each year. 
Europe represents the largest market for New Zealand lamb. In 
1991, a little more than half of the total lamb exports were 
shipped to Europe (Table 7). The Middle East, which imported 
about a fifth of New Zealand's total lamb exports, is the second 
largest market for New Zealand lamb. New Zealand shipped about 
15,000 tonnes of lamb to North America in 1991, which comprised 
only about five percent of its total lamb exports. Although the 
outlook for New Zealand lamb during 1992 is for strenghthening 
prices and consumption increases in Britain, Continental Europe, 
and the Middle East, the New Zealand lamb industry can not afford 
to ignore the vast and untapped potential of the U.S. market. 
Table 8 exhibits the percentage of lamb imports into the U.S. 
coming from either New Zealand or Australia. In 1981, New 
Zealand's share of the total lamb imports into the U.S. was 90 
percent compared to only about 10 percent for Australia. 
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Increased'U.S.domestic production and strong competition from 
Australian exporters, however, have displaced New Zealand lamb 
(Sheep and Wool Review, 1991). Moreover, the New Zealand lamb 
industry has for too long concentrated on a very limited product 
range, namely frozen lamb (Wilkinson, 1985). Consequently, New 
Zealand and'Australia have switched places in their dominance of 
lamb imports to the U. S. . By 1990, Australia was already 
exporting more than half (56.6%) of the total lamb imports by the 
U.S .. 
The U.S. food service sector presents a potentially important 
market opportunity for New Zealand lamb due to the increased 
consumer emphasis on meals eaten away from horne. In fact, New 
Zealand already occupies about 60 percent of the U. S. food 
service market for lamb (American Sheep Industry Council, 1991). 
Lamb in the U.S. is traditionally served only in full-service 
restaurants. However, the New Zealand lamb industry should 
encourage its processors and marketers to introduce more lamb 
cuts that can be added to the menus of restaurants already 
serving lamb as well as to menus of restaurants currently 
offering no lamb. 
The New Zealand lamb industry should also encourage a product 
diversification strategy that should include chilled lamb, 
products aimed at the fast food and ethnic restaurants as well 
as products aimed at frozen entree markets. Within the food 
service sector, the fast food segment is the most rapidly growing 
area. Although lamb is being served in U. S. full-service 
restaurants (i.e. fine dining), it has not generally been 
promoted to any extent to fast food restaurants in any form 
(TAMRC Lamb Study Team, 1991). Other red meats, chicken, and 
fish commodity groups have been more aggressive in terms of their 
fast food service marketing efforts and spending. The New 
Zealand lamb industry should tap into this market by developing 
lamb menu concepts for national fast food chains like McDonalds, 
Wendy's, Burger King, etc .. 
One of the results of this study indicates that ethnic 
individuals, which comprise a small but growing portion of the 
U.S. population, are more likely to eat lamb away from horne than 
either whites or blacks. The growing economic importance of 
Muslim Americans, for instance, could stimulate the consumption 
of lamb (Meat and Livestock Commission, 1991). New Zealand 
lamb's promotional programmes, therefore, should be designed not 
only to encourage ethnic individuals to increase consumption of 
lamb but also to persuade whites and blacks to experiment with 
lamb. This initiative should not only help build consumer 
awareness of New Zealand lamb, but also help obtain wider 
exposure of the product to the general American public. 
Australian shipments, for instance, have already been heavily 
supported by a $3-$4 million annual promotion fund, called the 
Fresh Australian Range Lamb campaign, put up by the Australian 
Meat and Livestock Corporation (Sheep and Wool Review, 1991). 
The New Zealand lamb industry should promote and introduce leaner 
lamb to the American public, given the emphasis by consumers on 
healthier diets. One of the results of this study indicates that 
individuals who are on a special diet are more likely to eat lamb 
away from horne than those not on a special diet. New Zealand 
lamb is used to be perceived by many consumers as lacking 
versatility, sometimes tough and as being excessively fatty with 
an unattractive appearance compared to poultry and other red 
meats (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1983). A number 
of measures have been adopted to increase lean lamb production. 
These include the production of ram lambs, using lean sire 
breeds, increasing stocking rates, and increasing lambing 
percentages. 
There should also be increased emphasis on branding New Zealand 
lamb products. Australia has certainly improved its export 
prospects for lamb in the U.S. market by putting more emphasis 
on their branded "Fresh Australian Range Lamb" product 
(Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit, 1992). 
The results, therefore, generally suggest a two-pronged strategy 
to lamb marketing in the US FAFH sectqr. First, marketing 
efforts should be directed at individuals who have a higher 
probability of consuming lamb away from horne. These marketing 
efforts should include targeting food service outlets that cater 
for ethnic groups. Since the results indicate that the 
probability of consuming lamb away from horne is positively 
related to income, lamb marketers in New Zealand should target 
food outlets (e. g. restaurants) that cater to higher income 
groups. The second strategy would be to target those individuals 
who have lower probabilities of eating lamb away from horne to 
increase exposure of the product as well as to broaden the 
consumer base. 
Concluding Remarks 
A logit model was developed to investigate the decision to eat 
lamb away from horne in the US. This model provided a profile, 
in terms of the socio-demographic characteristics, of consumers 
who were more likely to eat lamb away from horne. The 
identification of these types of consumers is essential in 
analysing consumer behaviour and in developing specific marketing 
programmes. Moreover, a complete understanding of away from horne 
lamb consumption in the US is needed to keep up with the recent 
trends in consumer demand. In particular, the information 
derived from this study is useful for processors and producers 
in New Zealand who want to anticipate future market changes and 
derived demands for their lamb products. 
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Table 1. Average, Annual u.s. Per Capita Consumption of Meat and 
Fish products, 1970-89 (retail weight equivalent, kg/capita) 
Meat 1970-72 1980-82 1988-89 
Red Meats 60.44 54.76 53.40 
Beef 36.21 32.85 30.40 
Veal 0.82 0.59 0.50 
Pork 22.46 20.83 22.05 
Lamb 0.95 0.45 0.50 
Poultry i5.74 19.87 26.81 
Chicken 12.71 16.06 20.87 
Turkey 3.04 3.81 5.94 
Fish/Shellfish 5.40 5.67 7.03 
Source: Putnam 1990 
Table 2. Per Capita Lamb Consumption in Selected Countries, 
1975-89 (retail weight equivalent, kg/capita) 
Country 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 Average 
Greece 6.30 6.22 6.22 6.26 
Ireland 4.35 3.40 3.l3 3.63 
U.K. 3.45 3.27 3.00 3.22 
France 1.68 1.86 2.04 1.86 
Spain 1.81 1. 68 2.45 2.00 
Mexico 0.36 0.36 0.45 0.41 
Turkey 3.72 3.00 3.00 3.22 
Japan 1. 09 0.64 0.59 0.77 
Australia 9.26 9.03 10.4 9.57 
New Zealand 14.9 15.3 17.9 16.0 
United States 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Source: USDA 1991b 
Table 3. Percent of Disposable Personal Income (Total Food 
Expenditure) Spent for All Food; Food at Home; Food Away from 
Home: Selected Years, 1970-1989. 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
All Food 
16.3 a 
16.5 
16.0 
15.5 
15.3 
15.2 
14.7 
14.3 
14.2 
l4 .4 
14.0 
l3.8 
Food at Home 
10.8a (66.2) b 
10.5 (63.8) 
9.7 
9.3 
9.1 
8.9 
8.6 
8.3 
8.1 
8.0 
7.7 
7.6 
(60.6) 
(60.1) 
(59.4) 
(58.8) 
(58.3) 
(57.9) 
(57.0) 
(55.5) 
(54.8) 
(55.0) 
'Percent of disposable persOnal income. 
bpercent of total food expenditures. 
Source: USDA 1991a 
Food Away from Home 
5.5a (33.8)b 
6.0 (36.2) 
6.3 (39.4) 
6.2 (39.9) 
6.2 (40.6) 
6.3 (41.2) 
6.1 (41.7) 
6.0 (42.1) 
6.1 (43.0) 
6.4 (44.5) 
6.3 (45.2) 
6.2 (45.0) 
...... 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used in Analysis 
Variable 
Urbanisation 
Central City 
Suburban Area 
Non-metro Areaa 
Region 
Northeast 
Midwest 
Southa 
West 
Race 
Whitea 
Black 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
Other race 
Origin 
Hispanic 
Non-Hispanica 
Sex 
Male 
Fernalea 
Employment Status 
Employed 
Unemployeda 
Food Stamp 
Participation 
Recipient 
Non-recipienta 
Special Diet 
Yes 
Noa 
Mean 
0.21 
0.49 
0.30 
0.20 
0.27 
0.35 
0.18 
0.86 
0.10 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0.96 
0.45 
0.55 
0.58 
0.42 
0.05 
0.95 
0.14 
0.86 
Std. Dev. 
0.4044 
0.5000 
0.4567 
0.3997 
0.4452 
0.4762 
0.3843 
0.3380 
0.2970 
0.0906 
0.1571 
0.1855 
0.1855 
0.4968 
0.4968 
0.4935 
0.4935 
0.2219 
0.2219 
0.3495 
0.3495 
Range 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
0-1 
variable Mean Std. Dev. Range 
Week Variable 
Weekend 0.16 0.3682 0-1 
Weekdaya 0.84 0.3682 0-1 
Seasons 
Quarter1 0.29 0.4554 0-1 
Quarter2a 0.41 0.4899 0-1 
Quarter3 0.14 0.3508 0-1 
Quarter4 0.16 0.3689 0-1 
Age 43.30 18.37 15-99 
Household Size 3.03 1.46 1-12 
Income 29621.80 23927.8 3-300000 
"Refers to the omltted category In the analysls. 
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Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Logit Model 
Variable Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept 
Urban1 
Urban2 
Region1 
Region2 
Region4 
Race2 
Race3 
Race4 
Hisp1 
Sex1 
Eroploy1 
Fstamp1 
Dietl 
Hsize 
Logage 
Logincome 
Weekend 
Quarter1 
Quarter3 
Quarter4 
-17.710* 
0.232 
0.530 
0.598 
0.036 
0.027 
0.100 
-5.809 
1.999* 
-7.135 
0.393 
0.527 
-1.952* 
0.237 
-0.263 
1.084* 
0.735* 
0.557 
0.376 
0.227 
0.188 
3.736 
0.650 
0.540 
0.490 
0.564 
0.589 
0.805 
5.901 
1.092 
22.770 
0.381 
0.475 
0.879 
0.475 
0.167 
0.576 
0.293 
0.427 
0.441 
0.598 
0.552 
% of Right Predictions 99.5 
R Statisticb 0.1880 
McFadden R2 0.0820 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Urbanisation 
Region 
Race 
Season 
Number Of Iterations 
1.11 
1.98 
2.39 
0.73 
8 
Changes in Probability" 
-0.039 
0.0005 
0.001 
0.001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0002 
-0.013 
0.004 
-0.016 
0.0008 
0.001 
0.004 
0.0005 
-0.0006 
0.00005 
0.55-07 
0.001 
0.0008 
0.0005 
0.0004 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
"Equal to the product of the parameter estimates times the value 
of the logistic density function. At the sample means, the value 
of this density function (f(z)) is 0.0022 while the value of z 
is -6.1017. 
bThe R statistic is similar to the mUltiple correlation 
coefficient in the normal setting, after a correction is made to 
penalise for the number of parameters estimated (SAS Institute 
Inc. 1983). 
Table 6. New Zealand Exports to the U.S. by Volume, 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
"In tonnes 
bprovisional 
Volume" 
11,360 
14,993 
7,577 
6,535 
6,195 
11,541 
14,636 
3,260 
5,253 
6,085 
4,950 
4,954b 
Percentage of Total Exports 
3.24 
3.95 
2.16 
1.52 
1.46 
2.95 
3.62 
0.84 
1. 63 
1. 85 
1.82 
1. 69 
Source: New Zealand Meat Producers Board 
1980-91 
Table 7. New Zealand Lamb Exports by Destination (1990-91) 
Region Volume" % of Total Exports 
Europe 153,550 52.5 
Middle East 63,901 21.8 
Pacific 28,799 9.8 
North Asia 22,179 7.6 
North America 15,240 5.2 
All Others 9.082 3.1 
Total 292,751 100 
"In tonnes 
Source: New Zealand Meat Producers Board 
Table 8. Percentage of the Total Lamb Imports by the U.S.: 1981-
90 
Year New Zealand Australia 
1981 90.3 9.7 
1982 83.3 16.7 
1983 83.3 16.7 
1984 88.9 11.1 
1985 81.2 18.8 
1986 50.0 50.0 
1987 27.6 72 .4 
1988 40.0 60.0 
1989 41.4 58.6 
1990 43.5 56.5 
Source: New Zealand Meat Producers Board 
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A FORECASTING MODEL FOR NEW ZEALAND 
LAMB EXPORTS 
G.F. Thomson & A.C. Zwcrt 
Agribusiness end Economics Reseorch Unit, PO Box 84, Uncoln University 
SUMMARY 
New Zealand experts lomb In a variety ef different ferms. frem carcasses to. beneless 
cuts and as chilled er frezen preduct. Preduct differentlatlen prevides new 
marketing eppertunltles. but Increases the cemplexity ef ferecastlng. This paper will 
eutllne a medel which ferecasts demand fer lomb cuts as a greup ef six clese 
substitutes. rother than as a single hemegeneeus preduct. A brief dlscussien ef the 
specificotlen ef the theeretlcal medel ond mo.delling methedelegy will be fellewed 
by on examlnatlen ef the medels speciel features and illustrative examples ef the 
empirical results. 
Keywords: Lomb Experts. Ferecastlng. Heteregeneeus Preduct Medelling. 
INTRODUCTION 
Backgroynd: 
The past decade has seen significant changes in the sheepmeat industry. Change has been 
forced upen the industry by deregulation, by economic neccessity, and through changes in 
the nature and type of products sought by major export markets (Zwart & Martin). The 
removal of incentive schemes and export controls has broadened the range of marketing 
strategies available to sheep meat producers, and allowed the transmission of market signals 
directly from consumer to producer. A key change resuHing from this has been that of further 
product processing. 
In the mid eighties a number of industry commentators decried the sheepmeat industry's 
commodity focus and called for producers to follow a value added approach to meat 
experting (such as Pappas Carter et ai, Morris & Hughs). While the Meat producers Board 
had increased levels of further processing as a stated objective incentive structures 
sometimes worked against companies engaging in further processing. 
In the last decade there has been considerable growth in the export of further processed 
sheepmeat. The percentage of lamb shipped in frozen carcass form has failen from around 
n% in 1982 to 40% in 1991 (Hutching). The strongest growth has been in the export of bone 
in and boneless cuts. These products accounted for only 20% of shipped lamb in 1984 but 
now account for more than 50% (Storey). 
While the majority of sheep meat products are experted frozen there has been steady growth 
in exports of chilled and fresh meat, now around 3% of lamb experts by weight (Storey). The 
range of products being exported is becoming larger, and the processing is becoming more 
sophisticated. 
The broadening of the product range produces a number of benefits, such as the potential for 
increased returns, a more respensive approach to consumer preferences, and access to 
niche markets. However the information requirements of the industry have increased also. 
The prices and volumes of differentiated sheepmeat products differ dramatically across 
international markets, making the task of f9recasting market conditions more difficuH than in 
the past. 
The objective of this paper is to present a synopsis of an econometric model for short to 
medium term forecasting of demand for New Zealand expert lamb products. The focus is on 
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lamb for two reasons. Firstly, because it makes up the bulk of exported sheepmeat, and 
secondly because lamb, more than mutton, is sold as a set of differentiated products. These 
products have been separated into· six main product types. First the products are 
differentiated acording to whether they are fresh/chilled or frozen, and then whether the 
product is in carcass form, bone in cuts or boneless cuts. 
The model has been used to simulate and forecast the importing behaviour and price 
responsiveness of major markets. One of the key objectives in this was to preserve the 
maximum level of detail possible for aiding analysis of individual market behaviour. Two 
other variables of interest are the total quantity traded, and the prevailing world price. 
The paper consists of four parts. The first section will outline the basic structure of the model 
that we have developed. Second, the novel features of the model will be discussed. Given 
the number of markets involved the analysis of resuHs, which comprises the third section, 
does not go beyond general trends and global aggregates, but where possible specific 
examples have been used for illustrative purposes. The final section contains some 
conclusions, and suggestions for application of the model. 
MODEL STRUCTURE 
Specification of the Theoretical Model: 
The three basic building blocks of a trade model are consumption, production, and stocks 
adjustment. A simple model based on these can be refined by the introduction of equations 
modelling such things as price transmission, arbitraging, and intermediate consumption 
(Abbott,1988). 
The lamb export model was specified with a four part structure, modelling export demand 
consumption in overseas markets), export quality production, stocks adjustment, and price 
transmission effects. Given that trade flows were not a focus of the study it was felt that 
investment of time in modelling arbitraging behaviour was unwarranted. Intermediate 
consumption, ie use in further processing, was accounted for by converting shipped weights 
into carcass equivalents. 
Within each market we wished to preserve two variables of interest, the prevailing price and 
quantity for each type of lamb product. The domestic price for each type of cut is PiJt' the 
price in time t for the ith product in market j. This is a function of its historic value and the 
current and historic values of WPt, the prevailing world price in time t. Prices for each 
product .are allowed to vary across markets to account for differences in the quality and 
sophistication of the product being exported to each market. 
This gives a set of price transmission equations 
P1jt = (l + ~lg PiJ1.1 + ~2iJ Pijl.2 + ~3g Pijl-3 + ~4ij Pijl-4 + ~5ij WP1 + ~sg 
WP1.1 +~7ij WPt.2 + ~8g WPt.3 + ~9g WPt4 + ulJt 
The quantity of the ith product exported to the jth market is Xljt . This is a function of its 
historic value. and the current and historic values of Pijt. 
~Jt = Ii + «Plg X1jt.1 + «P2iJ ~Jt.2 + «PSij ~jt-3 + CP4ij Xijl-4 + CPs! Pijt + CPSij Pijt.1 
~Pijt.2 + CPag Pijl-3 + CP9ij Pijt-4 + vijt 
Aggregate Demand W~ is the sum of demand for all products across all markets, ie, 
WXt = D:X;jt 
On the supply side the quantity of export quality slaughter in time t is Qt This is a function of 
its historic value and the world price. 
Qljt = III + 11 Qt.1 + 12 Qt.2 + 1s Qt.s + 14 Qt-4 + 15 WPt + 16 WPt·1 
+Y7WPt.2 + 1a WPt.3 + "(9 WPt4 + wt 
The change in stocks is positively related to the level of slaughter and inversely related to the 
world price. Stock change is also expected to be related to historic values of the change in 
stocks. An increase in the world price would lead to destocking, and vice versa, while large 
increases in stocks overtime should reduce the possibility of further large increases. The 
inverse stock change function is thus, 
WPt = 1] + A1WPt.1 + ~ASt + As ASt.1 + A4 Qt + ;l.gQt-l + Zt 
Three general points about the specification of these equations. Firstly, in order to obtain 
stationarity in some of the variables being examined it was neccessary to respecify an 
equation with that variable and it's lags in first differences. This was true for most price 
variables, particularly the prevailing world price. Secondly, note that none of the equations 
include seasonal dummies. They were excluded because of the degrees of freedom 
constraint and because it was felt that the four quarter lags could account for most of the 
seasonality in the data. Finally, the real focus of the model is on demand side variables. 
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The supplY,side has been over simplified, and requires more work before a truely acceptable 
specification can be arrived at. In spite of this simplification the supply side rather than the 
demand side presented the most problems in later estimation, with key variables having 
theoretically unacceptable signs. It is anticipated that rather than use the supply side 
specified here the model would be married to a more detailed supply side model, such as the 
New Zealand Livestock Sector Model (Grundy et al.). 
MyHlcolllnearHy: 
One of the major issues in modelling the market response of a group of close substitutes is 
that the prices and quantities traded are highly correlated. When these correlations are exact 
estimation techniques break down, making the problem easy to detect. However when the 
intercorrelations are not exact the estimation techniques produce estimates that are highly' 
sensitive to changes in the data, have high variance and covariance, and insignificant t ratios 
, even when r2 values are high (See Johnson, Gujarati, or Kennedy for a more indepth 
analysis). 
In order to avoid the problems associated with multicollinearity the demand equations were 
specified as a function of current and historic prices, and historic levels of demand, for the 
product of interest only. In essence this has resuHed in a trade off between muHicollinearity 
and specification error. The trade off was neccessary for two reasons. Firstly, because 
multicollinearity was considered to be a serious problem within the data, and secondly, 
because the number of data observations available was veri small only a few explanatory 
variables could be included. 
SybstHutlon Effects; 
The degrees of freedom problem and the identification problem restricted the way in which 
SUbstitution between products could be modelled. There was not enough data to include all 
of the relevant prices as independent variables in the demand equations. In addition the 
pattems of substitution would vary across markets, with some of the substitute products not 
being apparent. Substitution effects were ,instead handled through the world price 
mechanism. 
Income Effects: 
Income effects have not been dealt with explicitly in the specified model. This has been 
done to reduce the data requirements of the model. This Simplification has been justified on 
the grounds that the time period being dealt with is relatively small. 
pata Sources: 
For the demand and price transmission equations quarterly trade data from the Department 
of Statistics was obtained for the period March 1988 to September 1992. The data gave $NZ 
free on board (fob) values and volumes (kg) exported by destination. 
Prior to 1988 trade data was compiled under a different classification system. The current 
system uses a more dis aggregated classification, with the classifications not being entirely 
comparable. This has limited the analysis to 19 usable observations. 
On the supply side export quality slaughter was used as a proxy for production, with the 
change in stocks being the difference between production and actual exports. This meant 
that domestic consumption of export quality lamb was included in the stocks change figure. 
However it is expected that both the change in stocks and the level of domestic consumption 
are inversely related to the world price. 
EstImatiOn; 
It is obvious from the specification given above that the system of equations we are dealing 
with is simuHaneous at the aggregate level. However the principal blocks of the system are 
recursive, viz. the price transmission and demand equations within each market, so each 
market could be estimated separately. 
It was expected that an exogenous shock in a market would affect the prices or demand 
levels of one or more of the products, and hence the error terms of the price transmission 
and demand equations would be correlated. Because of this Zellner'S Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression was used to produce more efficient estimates. 
The production equation was estimated using OlS because it was the only equation relating 
specifically to the domestic situation. The world price equation was estimated using a 
baysian technique to constrain the parameter on stocks to be negative. 
The model was constructed so that the three sets of equations estimated above related to 
each other simultaneously. The effect of this is that changes in one market can produce 
changes in conditions in other markets in the same period, by directly affecting the level of 
stocks and hence the world price. 
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NOVEL FEATURES 
The estimated model which resulted from the specification in the previous section has two 
interesting features. The first relates to the way in which countries have been aggregated 
into markets, the second relates to the detail of the data which the model will generate. 
Aggregation Into Markets; 
Aggregation of countires into markets presents some procedural problems. Aggregation 
across countries will i.ntroduce aggregation bias to the extent that market behaviour differs 
from one country to the next. However, without aggregation the size of the model becomes 
unweildy. Also many countries could not be analysed because their purchasing behaviour is 
too eratic. Without a reasonably continuous data series econometric analysis would not 
produce a meaningful set of forecasts. 
Unlike most trade models the countries being aggregated into markets are not necessarily 
neighboUrs, or even within the same geographical region. Differences in component 
behaviour, and hence aggregation bias, was reduced using a market research technique, 
cluster analysis, to create groups of countries which are similar in terms of purchasing 
behaviour. Each segment, or market, is a group of countries which exhibit purchasing 
behaviour different to that of other markets. This means that the estimated parameters and 
associated forecasts will reflect the specific market more closely so that market level results 
can be more readily applied to an individual country. 
Key decisions to be made in clustering include the variables upon which to cluster countries 
(the basis for segmentation), the similarity measure used to determine like behaviour, the 
number of clusters to be obtained, the decision criteria used in choosing between alternative 
solutions, and which countries, if any, to keep separate from the analysis. 
The analysis began with over 100 countries in the dataset. About 50% of these were very 
sporadic and low turnover clients, who were aggregated by geographical region, because it 
was felt that the impact of this would be minimal. In addition some major trading partners 
were kept seParate because they are of a great deal of interest on their own. These 
countries were the United States, Japan, Canada, Iran, and Australia. The EC was kept 
separate for the same reason, and also to allow policy analyis in the later stages of the 
project if so desired. 
For the remaining 47 countries and small country groups average kg exported per quarter, 
average market share (by volume), average unit price per kg, and simple growth rate 
(movement between average of the first and last nine quarters) was calculated for each 
product category. These were used to describe the behaviour of each country. 
The number of clusters was limited to twenty because of a software constraint. With six 
markets already set aside this meant a maximum of fourteen markets could be used to 
summarise the 47 countries. 
In clustering the countries a heirachical method was used so that each country would be a 
member of only one market. Four different clustering algorithms were used to group the 
countries, and the resulting solutions compared on the basis of relative cluster size, the 
identities of single member clusters, and the composition of multi-member clusters. The final 
clustering solution, shown in table 1, was based on Ward's method for cluster analysis. 
Table 1: Market Segments 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
European Community 
Japan 
USA 
Canada 
Iran 
Austrailia 
Papua New Guinea 
8 Europe n.e.s. 
9 Switzerfand 
10 Saudi Arabia 
11 Asia n.e.s. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
American n.e.s. 
Pacific 1 
Pacific 2 
French Pacific 
Island States 
Intermitent Purchasers 
Cook Islands, Nuie, Qatar, Mexico 
Fiji Tonga Samoa 
French PolyneSia New Caledonia Norfolk Island 
Pacific n.e.s. Bahrain Reunion Bahamas Martinique 
Gibraltar Malta Cyprus French Guiana Guadeloupe Solomon 
Islands Vanuatu Niger Barbados Jamaica 
18 Low Carcass Purchasers Austria Sweden Wallis & Futuna Indonesia Singapore 
19 Middle East 
Thailand Bermuda 
Jordan Kuwait Oman UAE Middle East n.e.s. Africa n.e.s. 
South Korea 
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Early analysis based on geographical regions grouped all of the pacific islands together as 
one group. Cluster analysis grouped the pacific countries into three solely pacific groups, the 
Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa cluster, The French Pacific cluster, and Papua New Guinea as a 
single member group. The French Pacific group purchases higher value cuts, and were 
more regular purchasers than other pacific islands. Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa purchased lower 
quality cuts, except for the Christmas Tourist trade, while Papua New Guinea purchased low 
quality, low value cuts. Other pacific islands were grouped in with countries from other 
regions with which they were more similar. 
Level of Disaggregation; 
Being able to obtain detailed market information from the model was one of the key 
objectives of the project, so the model solution was required to be as transparent as possible. 
To facilitate this the model was built within a spreadsheet and solved iteratively, rather than 
by an analytic method. 
The second novel feature of this model is that the forecasts can be analyzed at several 
levels at once, with spreadsheets capturing dynamic changes in each market for each 
product. This allows a wide variety of reports, charts and diagnostics to be built directly into 
the model. 
Analysis can be conducted across products within one or more markets, or across markets 
with respect to one or more products. This is possible because the export volumes have 
been converted into carcass equivalent kilograms, by scaling up the weights of cuts to reflect 
wastage in the production process. Table 2 shows the relevant weights for each product 
(Source MAF Situation and Outlook New Zealand). 
Table 2: 
Type of Cut Conversion Weight 
Carcass 1.00 
Bone In Cuts 1.08 
Boneless Cuts 2.00 
To illustrate this, the French Pacific group regularly purchases a full range of lamb products 
from New Zealand. Total demand in carcass equivalent kgs, is forecast to increase slightly 
over the next two to three years. 
Figure 1: French Pacific 
Total Volume - All Products 
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At a more disaggregated level it can be seen that in the forecast period demand for most 
lamb products is static, with the increase in demand coming from growth in demand for 
chilled and frozen carcasses (figure 2). 
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Figure 2: French Pacific 
Total Volume By Product Type 
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Aggregating across the frozen carcass m;lrket the global demand for frozen carcasses is 
forecast to decrease over the next two to three years (figure 3). This is of course driven by 
the EC lamb market where the frozen carcass market has been declining for some time. 
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Unfortunately this flexibility applies mostly to the quantity forecasts. prices are available at 
only two levels, At the world level, where the world price is a function of stocks, and at the 
local level, where a product's price in a market is a function of the prevailing world price. 
Rather than present a further example in this section charts of the simulated and forecast 
world prices are presented in the next section. 
RESULTS 
This section is comprised of three parts. The first sub-section presents the aggregate 
demand, world price and production and stock change forecasts. The second sub-section 
examines various diagnostic statistics from the estimation and simulations phases of the 
analysis. The final section compares the forecast values, and compares them with actual 
values obtained since the time of estimation. 
Aggregate Variables: 
Demand for lamb is expected to grow steadily over the nex two to three years (figure 4). A 
strong component of this growth will be for carcasses being processed into bone in and 
boneless cuts. Prices are trending upwards over the same period, resulting in an increased 
return for producers. This aggregate resu~ is a little deceptive however. The prices being 
received for further processed products have tended to improve over this period, offsetting 
weak falls in carcass prices. This indicates that returns are only improving for producers who 
have persued a differentiation strategy sucesstully. This forecast is in line with forecasts 
from other sources, which have world lamb prices increasing in the short to medium term 
(SONZA 1993, and ABARE). 
Figure 4: Global Market CondHlons 
Forecast from September 1992 
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Both the demand and the world price forecasts are less volatile than the actuals series. In 
addition the price series follows a more apparent seasonal trend than in the past . 
As mentioned earlier the production and stocks estimates proved to be the most difficu~ to 
estimate. The forecast for production (figure 5) is acceptable, though the change in the 
seasonal pattern is quite distinct. This undoubtably stems from the deliberate simplification 
of the model's supply side. 
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Figure 5: NZ Production of Lamb 
Forecast from September 1992 
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The problems are even more evident in the derived stock change series (figure 6). Its likely 
that the historic stocks series, which also includes domestic consumption, is partly to blame, 
because the series does not include stocks held offshore, which can be significant. 
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Diagnostic Statjstics; 
Figure 6: Change in Stocks 
Forecast from September 1992 
Two sets of diagnostic statistics have been reported in the appendix, the simple R2 from the 
regression equations, and Theil's U statistic from the models simulation of the historic period. 
High values of R2 are preffered, while values of Theil's U greater than 0.3 indicate problems 
in the simulation. Reported with Theil's U are three moments representing the proportion of 
the U statistic which, can be attributed to bias, differences in variance, and differences in 
covariance. Proportions due to bias and variance should be low, while the proportion due to 
covariance should be close to one (Pindyke and Rubinfeld). 
Most of the equations have quite high R2 statistics. Equations estimated in first differences 
had much lower R2 values, which was to be expected, while for some others it is apparent 
that additional explanatory variables are required. For the simulations the Theil's U statistics 
also tend to be, small. Care should be taken when using forecasts for those variables which 
have high bias or variance proportions. 
Validating the model can only be done by comparing forecast values with actual values as 
they become available. Trade data for the December 1992 Quarter were received late in 
June, and were not processed in time to be included in these results. It was apparent that 
total exports were well down on the previous December quarter, while the model is 
forecasting an increase. It is likely that the production forecast is overshooting, due to the 
impact of last years harsh winter. The model forecasts an increase in prices for December 
1992, and the actual figures seem to bear this out. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained indicate that the model forecasts market trends reasonably well in the 
short term. However the diagnostic statistics indicate that there are still a few problem areas 
that need to be resolved. In particular the specification of some of the demand equations 
needs to be re-examined, as does the supply side. Many of the specification problems resuH 
from the degrees of freedom constraint, and so can only be resolved by progress of time. 
The model's special features allow it a wide range of applications. The segmentation 
approach allows the simulation of market response to price and product mix within specified 
market segments, aiding those following a target marketing strategy. The model can also be 
adjusted to examine the effects of exogenous shocks on global markets, and the impact of 
protectionist policy on prices and volumes traded across and within markets. 
Future research using this model will include both implications for individual markets, policy 
simulations, and further verification of the model's parameters and forecasts. 
REFERENCES 
Aaker DA & Day GS, "Marketing Research" 4th ed, John Wiley & Sons, New York (1990). 
Abbot PC, 
Blyth N, 
"Estimating US AgricuHural Export Demand Elasticities: Econometric and 
Economic Issues" in Elasticities in Intemational AgricuHural Trade, Carter CA 
& Gardiner WH, editors, Westview press, Boulder Colorado (1988). 
"An Analysis of the World Sheepmeat Market" Phd Thesis, Lincoln University 
(1982). 
Grundy TP, Lattimore RG, & Zwart AC, "New Zealand Livestock Sector Model 1986 Version" 
AERU Research Report 192, (March 1988). 
Gujarati ON, "Basic Econometrics" 2nd ed, McGraw-Hili Singapore (1988). 
Harvey AC, "The Econometric Analysis of Time Series" 2nd ed, Phillip Allan, 
Hertfordshire (1990). 
Hutching C, "Can Added Value Solve Meat's Woes?" Marketing Magazine, (April 1991). 
Johnston J, "Econometric Methods" 3rd ed, McGraw-Hili Singapore (1984). 
917T 
~ S g} '"\J '"\J '"\J Z ," 
< 5' 0 c: s· III 0 III <1l ~ "" @ .2. ~ :g 2 ~ 5 
<1l "< Gl A" Ill!!!. m <1l f> c r I/O m !" m :E~ 
- - 00:0 o:!:: .P '"\J I/O:E - 00 III ~ " 
:!:: 0 ~ - ;:l. 00 
111::1 III I/O !!! '"\J 
'"\J;:l.:!::<O:O-:>;:l.:!:: -- 00, __ 
as' noo mg"Co n:O am 00 ~~ l> Co Gl o mlll"Q.<::: GlC: c:< S'-'::I Gl 5~ ii1- m::J 0'_< 'p)2.: 21~ 0 ~t» c:: 
CD :: a '9. !a :I :E 3. ~!" -:I ~ 3 a: ~..j.:E =r::l o·O.m 00 0 _. <1l 
"'-=s' :C2: :0<0 ::Ie :co: 01/0 '"\J::In -I 
!Dm _!!l. mW·!!l. == g ooOlO 0 gz zm "8"0 ~!!! :;l2 g6 !;!? 8~ m 
a. ~ ~ ~ ;:l. g 3 ~ ~ -. ~.g ~ ~ 3 § 
N -<- ~:!:: !!!.!!!. 'CiW -0 +:!::8. 0 
i1ii<1l 01/0""-1111 0"< 0 Zo l>1lI"" 3 :D~ ~:r: ....... x -~. w:l N21 ~ m'< se. 
C ::I c: 1O!a :!:: -. 00 ~ ~ 0 III ~ s:: g. 9.~ ~~ l§~ ~~ !!t ~o g E8. (1)= CI)::r DC/) • o !aD) :::!. _3 a. (1)(0 N ~m -:-» ~ ~·x o. N !!J m:!ir 5. 
m "0 = m !a :!:: ::+ III en <1l 
o' 3 00 :e:o s· 8. <' =. ~..g> fl. 
::I<1l :c N 3l<o m ~ gJ..IO~-I 
'"\J!!l. ~ m m:o en m 1Jej_. =r t» _ w Sll CD C/) _ ~ CD 
"O:l iU 000 p) (I) ~'O ~g. ~ :J::T1E a -. 0 ~. ~ 
(f.I a. 1\)- ::S:l 0 --I ~ .::; tr OO.Q g. m m ~ _::I '"\J 
""-1"<; <1l =r :!::" n >< 18 ~ 
....... t» @ ~ s»:n g "8 0 {Xl m IDa 'U::s..!g 0 ::1. -:- = ~ ~_ :0 3 -iii' 3 3:!:: 
"":-' iE it m <D:: o· ~ ~. ~ 
a (D : ~~ "m. g m m 5 <D ~ a. Q ~ ~ ~ 
o CD ~ 00 ~ a III c: 
:: ;: ....... tE ~ ~ 5. m 
i6 § ffi ~ Cit ~ en @= c:: ....... en - _. -. FS!!!. g.!3' ~ 2 <0 
s:: < fii ~ Co:!:: !if 8l 
<1l f» :0 " ~ <1l 0'';-' 
et ~ c Q .. a ::J: 
Appendix: Diagnostic Statistics 
Demand PrIces 
........... ""' .............. ft """"' ..... 0111""'1 """V 
Europeon Community Chilled Boneless 0,52 0,33 0.60 0,02 0,38 0,88 0.07 0,07 om 0,92 
Frozen Boneless o,so 0,04 0,01 0,28 0.71 0,35 0,06 0.00 0.05 0,95 
Chilled Corcosses 0.94 0.11 0.05 0,00 0,95 0,45 0,12 0.00 0,00 1.00 
Frozen Carcasses 0,85 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,89 0,88 0,03 0,00 0,09 0.91 
Chilled Bona In 0,77 0,18 0,09 0,08 0,83 0,67 0.07 0.00 0,00 0.99 
Frozan Bona In 0,82 0,05 0,00 om 0,99 0,84 0,03 0,00 0.10 0,89 
Jopan Bonalass 0,11 0,23 0,06 0,27 0,67 0,85 0,03 om 0,11 0,89 
Frozen Carcasses 0,30 0.14 0,00 0,33 0.67 0.70 0,03 0.01 0,00 0.99 
Chiliad Carcasses & Bona In cut 0,89 0,06 0,02 0.02 0,96 0,94 0.02 0,01 0,02 0,96 
Frozan Bona In Cuts 0.83 0,08 0,39 0,02 0,59 0.49 0.07 0,00 0,33 0,66 • 
USA Chilled Boneless 0,98 0,06 0,06 0,03 0,91 0.66 0,11 0.00 0.02 0.98 
Frozen Boneless 0.76 0,08 om om 0.98 0,82 0,05 am 0.00 0.99 
Frozen Carcasses 0,87 0.13 0,00 0.D2 0.98 0.75 0.05 om 0,04 0,94 
Chiliad Carcasses & Bona In Cut 0,19 0,18 0.60 0,18 0,22 0.45 0.10 0.22 0,13 0.65 • 
Frozen Bone In Cuts 0,92 0,04 0,03 0.07 0,90 0.75 0.04 am 0.00 0.98 
Canada Boneless 0,77 0.06 0,02 0,06 0,92 0.65 0.05 om 0.08 0.91 
Chilled Corcasses 0.60 0.21 0,63 0.00 0.37 0,43 am 0,07 0,10 0.83 
Frozen Carcasses 0,11 0.31 0,21 0,02 0]7 0,55 0.07 0.03 om 0.96 
Chilled Bone In cuts 0.78 0.09 0.00 0.D2 0.98 0.74 0.05 0,05 0.02 0.93 
Frozen Bone In Cuts 0.52 0,08 0.68 0,15 0,17 0.63 0.14 0,62 0.32 0.07 • 
Iran Frozen Carcasses 0,27 0.31 0,25 0,18 0,57 0.10 0.21 0.25 0.11 0.64 • 
Australia Boneless 0,91 0.13 0,00 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.36 0.14 0.02 0.84 
Papua New Guinea Frozen Boneless 0.78 0,13 0.04 om 0.94 0,96 0,05 0,11 0.04 0,84 
Frozen Carcasses 0,82 0.16 0,01 0.03 0.97 0,20 0.23 0.00 0.16 0,84 
Frozen Bone In Cuts 0,92 0,06 0,07 0.02 0,91 0,60 0.05 0,04 om 0.95 
Chilled Bone In Cut. 0,98 0,06 om 0,00 0,99 am 0.70 0.44 0.23 0.33· 
Europe n.e.s. Frozen Bona In Cuts 0.92 0.13 0,06 0.05 0,90 0.12 0,10 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Switzerland Chiliad Boneless 0.77 0,31 0.03 0.04 0.93 0.75 0.06 0.00 0,18 0.82 
Frozen Boneless 0.68 0.12 0,09 0.05 0,86 0.45 0,11 0.01 am 0,93 
Chilled Carcasses & Bone In Cut 0,82 0.14 0,00 0,26 0.74 0.89 0.09 0.00 om 0,99 
Frozen Carcasses & Bone In Cuts 0,93 0,04 0.04 0.10 0.86 0.91 0.14 am 0.00 0.99 
Saudi Arabia Boneless 0.93 0,03 0.11 om 0.88 0.16 0,11 0.02 0.09 0.89 
Chilled Carcasses 0,18 0.19 0.00 0,30 0.70 0.99 0.25 0.05 0.02 0,92 
Frozen Carcasses 0.74 DAD 0,09 0,38 0,53 0.69 am 0.00 am 0,92 
Chilled Bone In Cuts 0,86 0,13 0,02 0,05 0,93 0.96 0.04 0.06 0,31 0.63 • 
Frozen Bone In Cuts O,SO 0,03 0,14 0,00 0.86 0.68 0045 0.03 0,10 0.87 
Asian.8.s. Boneless 0,40 0,08 0,00 0.03 0.97 0,58 0,10 0.26 0.11 0.62· 
Chiliad Carcasses & Bona In Cut 0,30 0,34 0.01 0.25 0.75 0.23 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.85 
Frozon Carcasses & Bone In Culs 0.61 0,25 0.00 0.08 D,n D.l5 D.D'! DOl 0.04 0,95 
Amortc{Jn n.o.s, frozen ilono In cui. 1.00 0,02 0,49 0.01> 0.46 0.47 O.ll2 0.D2 om 0.96 
l'acUlc 1 Uonoloss 0,90 0,13 0.00 om 0,'1'1 0.52 0.23 om 0.02 0.98 
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Demand Prices 
MUflU:fI ......, .... 11 ... 11 ...... ~ """,,,"UI""'II,",.:III 
Chilled Carcasses 0..62 0..13 0..03 Dm 0..96 0..59 0..10. 0..09 0..0.7 0..84 
Frozen Carcasses 0..69 0..22 0..00 0..00 0..99 0..93 0..12 0..00 0..00 1.00 
Chilled Bone In Cuts 1.00 0..14 0..00 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Frozen Bone In Cuts 0.57 0.12 om 0.04 0.94 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.98 
Pacific 2 Boneless 0.83 0.25 0.00 om 0.99 0.33 0.03 0.02 0..02 0..96 
Frozen Carcasses 0.66 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.86 0.22 0.11 0.00 0..04 0.96 
Chilled Carcasses & Bone In C 0.96 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.37 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.98 
Frozen Bone In Cuts 0.94 0.25 0.07 0.01 0.93 0.82 0.03 0..00 0..00 1.00 
French Pacific Chilled Boneless 0..36 . 0..0.2 0.01 0.10 0.89 0.24 0.07 0..05 0.11 0.84 
Frozen Boneless 0.73 0.16 0.00 0.0.2 0.98 0.63 0.12 om 0.07 0.91 
Chilled Carcasses 0.61 0.15 0.0.2 0.09 0.89 0.84 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.93 
Frozen Carcasses 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.92 0.30 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.93 
Chilled Bone In 0.93 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.96 0.71 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.96 
Frozen Bone In 0.52 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.96 0.64 0.08 0.00 0..00 0.99 
Island Stales Boneless 0..90 0.04 0.0.2 om 0.97 0..66 0.06 0..01 0.01 0.99 
Chilled Carcasses & Bone In C 0..97 0.07 om 0..09 0..91 0..63 0..07 0.00 0..02 0.98 
Frozen Carcasses 0..78 0.08 om 0.03 0.96 0..91 0..12 0.01 0..00 0..99 
Frozen Bone In 0.74 0.0.2 0..00 0.00 1.00 0.30. 0.38 0.00 0..08 0.92 
Inlermilenl Purchasers Boneless 0.72 0.09 om 0..13 0.86 0.63 0.06 0.01 0..28 0.70 
Frozen Carcasses 0..86 0.21 Dm 0.02 0.96 0.20 0.11 0..66 0..10 0.24 • 
Chilled Carcasses & Bone In Cut 0.27 0.05 Dm 0.18 0..80 0..19 0.10. 0..06 0..05 0.89 
Frozen Bone In Cuts 0.75 0.35 0.06 0.09 0.86 0.38 0.05 0.00 Dm 0.99 
Non-Carcass Markel Chilled Boneless 0.98 0.08 Dm 0.00 0.99 0.55 0.04 0..00 0.01 0.99 
Frozen Boneless 0.88 0.06 0.0.2 0.09 0.90 0.73 0.18 0.00 0..02 0..98 
Frozen Carcass 0..96 0.10 Dm 0..00 0.98 0..11 0.09 0..00 0..03 0.97 
Chilled Carcasses & Bone In C 0.98 0..06 0..01 om 0..98 0..90 0:13 0..00 0.00 1.00 
Frozen Bone In Cuts 0.79 0.05 0.00 0..01 0.99 0.60 0.10 0..02 0..0.2 0.96 
Middle East Boneless 0..69 0.06 0..06 0.02 0.92 0.30. 0.13 0.17 0..04 0.79 
Chilled Carcasses & Bone In Cut 0.75 0.24 om 0.11 0.88 0..90 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.91 
Frozen Carcasses 0..91 0.18 0..00 0.00 1.00 0.91 0..0.2 0..05 0.03 0.92 
Frozen Bone In cuts 0.79 0..06 0.00 0..05 0..95 0.90 0.02 o.m om 0.92 
Tolal All Meal Types 0.68 0.06 0.26 0.08 0.66 
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Abstract 
Meat consumption patterns are changing in New Zealand. Due to health and nutrition 
concerns, consumers are purchasing more lean meat products. The purpose of this paper is 
to determine the sociodemographic factors affecting the selection of lean meat products. 
Examined are degree of health concern, degree of price consciousness, sex, education, age, 
marital status, ethnicity, income, household size and employment status. 
Introduction 
Meat consumption patterns are changing in New Zealand due partly to increasing health and 
nutrition concerns. In fact, dietary animal fats are now considered one of the major sources 
of saturated fats and cholesterol. Based on many continued medical and dietary studies, the 
media, consumer education groups, physicians, and food manufacturers have increasingly 
provided health information to consumers. Such information may induce structural changes 
in the consumption of fats as a response to consumer's health concern (Capps and Schmitz 
1991). Not surprisingly, the medical profession, nutritionists and public health agencies have 
recommended the reduction of fat consumption to the public. Likewise, the New Zealand 
Government, through the Department of Health, has requested the meat industry to produce 
leaner carcasses and explore further techniques for producing animals with less fat (New 
Zealand Department of Health 1991). 
To fulfill consumers' demand for leaner meat; several experiments have been undertaken 
either by the universities or by the meat industry (see Massey University 1985a, 1985b; 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 1983). No studies as yet, however, have investigated 
the effect of sociodemographic factors on the purchase and consumption of lean meat 
products in New Zealand. 
A few studies have been made in recent years related to meat consumption. Some of these 
studies focused their attention on: (1) the Willingness of consumers to pay for attributes of 
lamb (Mullen and Wohlgenant 1991); and (2) the relationship between the various 
socioeconomic characteristics of consumers and the types of meat purchased (Blaylock 1983). 
Recently, several studies also evaluated consumers' attitude toward leaner meat products 
(Massey University 1985a, Capps et al. 1988, and Skaggs et al. 1987). 
Menkhaus et al. (1988) identified some factors affecting consumer purchase of lean meat 
products. Although none· of the demographic variables used in this study turned out to be 
statistically significant in terms of purchasing decisions, the results indicated that some factors 
directly affecting the probability of purchasing are related to health factors. Menkhaus et al. 
(1988) acknowledged as well that concern for health is an essential factor to be considered 
in meat demand modelling. 
Skaggs et al. (1987) examined consumers attitude toward low fat, branded and fresh beef. 
This study revealed different consumer attitudes toward purchasing lean meat products. 
Results of this study also indicated that consumers with active lifestyles tend to consume 
leaner beef products. Brayshaw et al. (1967) analyzed the opinions of butchers in the United 
Kingdom regarding their consumers' requirements surrounding leanness and tenderness. The 
majority of butchers surveyed indicated that consumers desire to purchase leaner meat 
products. In addition, more than 50 per cent of those butchers interviewed stated that 
consumers considered leanness as the most important factor in their purchase decisions, 
followed by tenderness and flavour. 
In 1983, Blaylock analyzed various sociodemographic characteristics affecting the demand for 
red meats, poultry and fish. The results of the study indicated that high income households 
are more likely to eat beef than pork even though their expenditure for pork increased as 
income increased. Metropolitan residents are more inclined to increase their consumption of 
meat products, with the exception of pork, than suburban residents. Results also showed that 
black consumers consumed more meat prepared at home than non-blacks. In addition, 
household composition is a significant factor affecting meat consumption. 
Capps et aL (1988) also conducted a similar study of supermarket shoppers in Houston, 
Texas. This study indicated that consumers who had attended a college/university, consumers 
with larger household size, and fat conscious consumers are more likely to try lean meat 
products. However, no statistically significant relationship existed between income groups 
and the likelihood of trying lean meat products. 
Little is known, however, about the sociodemographic characteristics. of consumers in New 
Zealand who have purchased lean meat products. This study, therefore, aims to investigate 
the sociodemographic characteristics affecting the purchase of lean meat products. Fifty three 
randomly selected shoppers at three supermarkets were interviewed in Palmerston North 
during the period August-September 1992. The survey instrument, which included questions 
regarding the purchase of lean meat products as well as sociodemographic information, was 
administered through personal interviews. The three supermarkets selected were Food Town, 
New World, and Wool Worth. 
Model Development 
Some of the studies conducted (e.g. Capps et at. 1988 and Goodwin and Koudele 1990) 
related to meat consumption utilized qualitative choice models such as the linear probability 
model, the probit model and the logit model in their analyses. Logit and Probit analyses, 
however, are preferred to the linear probability model when qualitative choice models are to 
be estimated since the latter suffers from a number of deficiencies. Among the deficiencies 
of the linear probability model are :(a) non normality of the disturbance terms;(b) 
heteroscedastic variances of the disturbances; and (c) non-fulflIment of 0 < E (Yi/x) < 1 
(Gujarati 1988). 
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Logit models are employed in the analyses to circumvent the inadequacies of the linear 
probability model and because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables that are 
used. 
Suppose Y is an experimental unit of an observation that can have one of two possible values: 
Y is equal to 1 if the consumer purchased lean meat and 0 otherwise. Further, suppose X is 
a vector of independent variables and p = Pr (y = 1/x) is a response probability. Hence the 
logistic probability can, therefore, be specified as : 
Logit (p) = log (p I (l-p)) = a + Wx 
where a is an intercept and W is the vector of independent variables. 
Maximum likelihood technique is used in the estimation of the models. This technique 
requires the use of an iterative algorithm and assumes the large-sample properties of 
consistency and asymptotic normality of the parameter estimates so that conventional tests of 
significance are applicable. 
The logit models are specified as: 
Lean=a.o + a l Health + ~ Price + ~ Sex + a4 Marriage + as Education 
+ ~ Ethnicity + ~ Age + CXg Income + ~ Income1 + a lO Size 
+ au Employment. 
where Lean is equal to 1 if the respondent purchased lean meat products and 0 otherwise 
(referred to as Modell). To augment the analyses, four more models (referred to as Models 
2 to 5) are estimated for each type of meat product (beef, pork, lamb, chicken) using the same 
set of independent variables. 
The description of the independent variables is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Data Description of Independent Variables 
Variable Description 
Health Extremely concern (5) - Not at all (0) 
Pric e Extremely conscious (5) - Not at all (0) 
Sex 1 if male, 0 otherwise 
Education 1 if college, 0 otherwise 
Age Absolute age 
Marriage 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
Ethnicity 1 if white, 0 otherwise 
Income 1 if $ 27000 - $ 33000, 0 otherwise 
Incomel 1 if > $ 33000, 0 otherwise 
Size Household size 
Employment 1 if employed, 0 otherwise 
This study focused on the hypotheses that several variables affect the decision to purchase 
lean meat products :(1) health concerns; (2) price consciousness; (3) sex; (4) education level; 
(5) age of consumer; (6) marital status; (7) ethnicity; (8) household income; (9) household 
size; and (10) employment status. 
It is hypothesized that consumers would purchase lean meat products due to health and 
nutrition concerns. Consequently, the higher the degree of concern by consumers for health 
and nutrition, the more likely they will try lean meat products. This hypothesis is supported 
by Capps et al. (1988). 
It is also expected that consumers who are price conscious are less likely to purchase lean 
meat products because of the price premium usually commanded by lean meat products. 
Consequently, differences in the probability of trying lean meat products may occur across 
income groups as well. It is expected that income is positively related to the probability of 
consuming lean meat products. 
Consumers who have attended a college or university, due to their assumed exposure to health 
information, are expected to be more likely to try lean meat products than consumers who 
have not attended a college or a university. Redman (1980) found a positive correlation 
between consumers who have attended college and nutrition-conscious consumers. It is also 
hypothesized that age of consumer is positively related to the probability of consuming lean 
meat products. Skaggs et al. (1987) revealed that older consumers are more likely to eat lean 
meat products than younger consumers. 
Household size is expected to be positively related to the probability of consuming lean meat 
products. Capps et al. (1988) revealed a positive relationship between household size and the 
likelihood of trying lean meat products in their study. 
Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables utilized in the analyses are presented 
in Table 2. The means of the binary variables represent the proportion of respondents that 
fall into each category. In this sample, over 88 per cent of the respondents purchased lean 
meat products. Most of the respondents are also concerned about health and nutrition, basing 
from the average response of 3.44. Likewise, the majority of the respondents are price 
conscious as reflected by the high average response of 3.78. Approximately 62 per cent of 
the consumers are married. Average age of the respondents is 44 years old. Forty four per 
cent of the respondents are male and 46 per cent have attended a college or university. 
The survey was fairly well dispersed across consumer income groups. Approximately, 40 per 
cent of the respondents have annual household income of less than $27000, 36 per cent have 
annual household income between $27000 and $33000, and 24 per cent have annual 
household income of more than $33000 .. Roughly 80 per cent of the respondents are white, 
and the average household size is about 2.60. Seventy per cent of the respondents are 
employed. 
~ 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Range 
Deviation 
Health Concern 3.440 0.951 1 - 5 
Price Consciousness 3.780 0.764 2-5 
Marriage 0.620 0.490 0- 1 
Sex 0.440 0.501 0-1 
Education 0.460 0.503 0- 1 
Ethnics 0.820 0.388 0- 1 
Income 0.360 0.495 0- 1 
Income 1 0.240 0.485 0- 1 
Household 2.620 1.524 1 - 7 
Employment 0.700 0.463 0- 1 
Age 44.200 15.439 19 - 83 
Model 1 Results 
The logit model was estimated using maximum likelihood technique. Parameter estimates and 
the relevant statistics including the changes in probability are presented in Table 3. Although 
statistically insignificant, consumers who are concerned about health are more likely to 
purchase lean meat as indicated by the positive sign of the health variable. The relationship 
between price consciousness and the likelihood of trying lean meat products is not statistically 
significant, ceteris paribus. 
Surprisingly, male consumers are more likely to try lean meat products than female 
consumers. This variable is statistically significant at the 0.10 level of significance. In 
accord with prior expectation, the older consumers are more likely to try lean meat products 
than the younger consumers. With a unit increase in age, the probability of trying lean meat 
products increases by 0.004. This variable is statistically significant at the 0.20 level of 
significance. 
Education is not a significant factor affecting the likelihood of trying lean meat products. 
Interestingly, nonwhites are more likely to try lean meat products than whites. This fmding 
is generally consistent with the Adrian and Daniel (1976) study which revealed a positive 
relationship between fat intake and being a white individual. 
Income is not a significant factor affecting the probability of trying a lean meat product. This 
result is not consistent with the finding of the Capps et al. (1988) study. The results of the 
Capps et al. study indicated that a statistically significant relationship exists between income 
groups· and the likelihood of trying lean meat products. 
As expected, although not statistically significant, the likelihood of trying lean meat products 
increases with increases in household size. On the other hand, employed individuals are more 
likely to try lean meat products than unemployed individuals. The change in probability of 
the employment variable is 0.134. This variable is statistically significant at the 0.20 level 
of significance. This result is consistent with prior expectations. 
Table 3. The Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Model 1 
Variable 
Health Concern 
Price Consciousness 
Marriage 
Sex 
Education 
Ethnics 
Income 
Income1 
Household 
Employment 
Age 
ercentage ot ngnt nr~01"'h""O p IIU'1c 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
"Significant at the 0.1 level 
"'Significant at the 0.2 level 
Parameter 
0.049 
(0.659) 
1.077 
(0.796) 
-0.143 
(1.386) 
2.654" 
(1.461) 
-1.375 
(1.496) 
-2.707'" 
(1.706) 
-1.703 
(1.434) 
-2.689 
(2.005) 
0.253 
(0.387) 
3.190'" 
(2.081) 
0.093'" 
(0.066) 
Change in Probability 
0.002 
0.045 
-0.006 
0.112 
-0.058 
-0.114 
-0.072 
-0.113 
0.011 
0.134 
0.004 
A measure of the goodness of fit of the logit model involves the correct classification of the 
consumers into two categories: whether they were correctly classified as having purchased 
lean meat products or not based on the maximum likelihood estimates. Using a 50-50 
classification scheme, the logit model correctly classifies 80 per cent of all responses. 
Models 2-5 Results 
This section presents the consumers' characteristics affecting the likelihood of purchasing 
various types of lean meat products (beef; pork, lamb and chicken). Goodwin and Koudele 
(1990), Wallendorf and Reilly (1983), and Blaylock (1983) have analyzed as well the effect 
of sociodemographic characteristics of consumers in the United States on the likelihood of 
purchasing various meat products. 
As exhibited in Table 4, although no variable is statistically significant in the beef model 
(model 2), some signs in the independent variables like health, age and employment status 
I-' 
(J1 
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are consistent with prior expectations. 
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Models 2-5 
Variable Beef 
Model 2 
Health 0.242 
(0.451) 
Price 0.169 
(0.605) 
Sex 0.208 
. (0.855) 
Age 0.022 
(0.038) 
Education -0.185 
(0.978) 
Ethnicity 
Marriage -0.314 
(1.062) 
Income -0.390 
(1.223) 
Income 1 0.521 
(1.320) 
Household -0.319 
(0.384) 
Employmerit 0.583 
(1.255) 
tanaara errors are mUle -- -+ ----p 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
Significant at the 0.1 level 
Significant at the 0.2 level 
Pork 
Model 3 
0.334 
(0.473) 
0.516 
(0.669) 
0.717 
(0.879) 
-0.023 
(0.045) 
1.835" 
(1.130) 
-0.826 
(1.432) 
0.645 
(1.046) 
-2.625" 
(1.304) 
-1.873'" 
(1.309) 
0.267 
(0.334) 
-0.756 
(1.168) 
-- -----
Lamb Chicken 
Model· 4 Model 5 
0.358 -0.090 
(0.455) (0.528) 
-0.549 -1.687' 
(0.666) (0.749) 
-0.211 0.593 
(0.830) (0.976) 
0.086" 0.003 
(0.048) (0.045) 
2.107" 0.383 
(1.083) (1.060) 
0.515 -2.392'" 
(l.272) (1.521) 
-1.768'" 0.251 
(1.256) (1.080) 
-0.643 -2.063'" 
(1.078) (1.335) 
-0.340 -1.819'" 
(1.217) (1.384) 
0.074 -0.765'" 
(0.330) (0.409) 
-0.526 1.439 
(1.142) (1.399) 
With respect to model 3, results indicate that consumers who have attended a college or a 
university are more likely to purchase pork than those who have not attended a college or 
university. Interestingly, consumers with annual household income of at least $27000 are less 
likely to try pork than those with annual household income of less than $27000. 
In tenus of model 4, age is positively related to the probability of trying lamb. This variable 
is statistically signifIcant at the 0.1 level of significance. The education variable is also 
statistically signifIcant at the 0.1 level of signifIcance. Consumers who have attended a 
college or a university are more likely to purchase lamb than those who have not attended a 
college or university. Results also indicate that married consumers are less likely to purchase 
lamb than the non-married consumers. 
Findings from model 5 indicate that a negative relationship exists between the degree of price 
consciousness and the likelihood of trying chicken. This variable is statistically signmcant 
at 0.05 level. Four other variables are statistically significant at the 0.2 level. For instance, 
whites are less likely to try chicken than nonwhites. In addition, household size is negatively 
related to the likelihood of trying chicken. As in the pork model, respondents with annual 
household income of at least $27000 are less likely to purchase chicken than those with 
annual household income of less than $27000. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study revealed some factors that significantly affect the purchase of lean meat products. 
As mentioned earlier, there are indications that consumers are shifting their demand for meat 
toward leaner products due to health and nutrition concerns. To meet consumers' demand, 
meat industries and meat retailers should take into account consumers' characteristics which 
affect the demand for their meat products. In fact, many fInns in the food industry are 
already moving away from a mass marketing type of approach toward target marketing 
(Kotler 1983). 
This study attempted to identify some sociodemographic factors affecting the purchase oflean 
meat products. In light of increased concerns by consumers for health and nutrition, an 
opportunity exists in marketing lean meat products to consumers. The models developed in 
this study provided a proflle, in tenus of the sociodemographic characteristics, of consumers 
who were more likely to purchase lean meat products. Although done as a pilot project, the 
results of this study should appeal to meat producers and processors who want to anticipate 
future market changes and derived demands for their products. Due to the sample considered 
in this study, however, care should be used in generalizing results to regional or national 
levels. Perhaps, a follow-up research using a national survey will shed more light on this 
topic. 
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PRICE DYNAMICS OF MEAT PRODUCTION 
T.L. Gundry 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
P.O. Box 5179, Wellington 
SUMMARY 
This paper has been presented to provide some understanding of the 
price levels that drive changes in production and ultimately changes in 
the national livestock base. Because the majority of New Zealand's 
meat production is exported, production changes both within a livestock 
type and between livestock types, reflect changes in international market 
prices and exchange rates. Shifts in meat production in response to 
price changes are evident from the analysis of gross margins ,and 
examination of price signals and trends over time. 
Key words: Meat prices, production changes. 
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 
World Supply 
Contrary to common perception, the N.Z. meat industry is very small in 
the context of global production. The total annual world meat and fish 
protein supply is around 249 million tonnes. New Zealand's red meat 
production contributes 1.1 million tonnes (0.4%) to this (Figure O. 
Of significance to the New Zealand meat industry is the high proportion 
of production which is traded internationally. Around 90 per cent of 
annual lamb production and 70 per cent of mutton production are 
exported each year. Of the 7.0 million tonnes of the world sheep meat 
produced, around 0.8 million tonnes (12%) is traded internationally. New 
Zealand sheep meat exports account for 45 per cent of this traded 
volume (Figure 2). Lamb is New Zealand's most diversified meat export 
with the top 5 markets in 1991-92, (U.K, Germany, France, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia), accounting for 53 per cent of exports. 
Though around 80 per cent of New Zealand's annual beef production is 
exported, the contribution from this to the international beef trade is of 
a smaller magnitude than for sheep meat. For beef, of the 51.4 million 
tonnes of annual world beef production, 4.4 million tonnes (8.5%) is 
traded internationally. New Zealand's annual beef exports account for 
around 5.5 per cent of this traded volume (Figure 3). Beef is New 
Zealand's least diversified meat export with 76 per cent of shipments in 
1991-92 going to the U.S. North America the largest beef producing 
nation is also the largest beef consumer. In fact, North America is a 
net importer of beef and is reliant on net exporting countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand to maintain their level of beef consumption. 
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The Realities of International Trade 
Trade Barriers & Access: 
There are potentially many gains to be made in the meat industry from 
free tr.ade. _ Currently, many markets are not free and are subject to 
quotas, tariffs, and ceilings on access (Table O. For example, the 1993 
activation of the U.S. Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA) effectively 
reduced New Zealand's access to the U.S. beef market by 10,000 tonnes 
(5%) at a time when New Zealand's beef production is increasing. 
Table 1: Meat Market Conditions and Exports 1991-92 
(September year) 
Per Cent of 
Market Exports Importing Country Conditions 
Lamb and Mutton EC 49 N.Z. Export Ceiling 205,000 
tonnes. 
Iran 14 
Japan 81 
Saudi Arabia 4 
Canada 2 
Beef USA 76 
Canada 5 
Japan 2 
South Korea 5 
Single buyer, Halal slaughter. 
No restrictions, development mkt. 
Halal slaughter, Arabic labelling. 
No restrictions. 
Meat Import Law annual ceiling. 
Meat Import Act-scope for quota. 
(25% tariff introduced June 1993). 
Tariff 50% from 1 April 1993. 
Minimum global quota, tariff 20%. 
Tender system. 
1 Includes South Korea where imports are processed and re-exported, 
mainly to Japan. 
Source: N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
N.Z. Meat Producers Board 
Any change brought about from GATT to liberalise international trade is 
likely to be beneficial to New Zealand in enabling us to further develop 
our competitive advantage in primary production. However, there will 
be no guarantee of long lasting benefits as any reforms that take place, 
will apply to our competitors also. 
The future therefore sees a clear need for continual development of 
products and markets to ensure that the preference and premium for 
New Zealand meat is maintained or increased. 
Leverage & Domestic Prices: 
The reliance of production on exports means that world prices and the 
exchange rate determines farm gate prices. The change in domestic 
price though is frequently greater than the change in international price, 
Le., there is a leverage effect. In general, the higher the processing 
and handling charge component in the FOB value of an export product, 
the greater the impact on farm gate price of a change in world price 
(or exchange rate). 
LIVESTOCK TRENDS 
N.Z. agriculture is dominated by 3 types of livestock - sheep, beef 
cattle, and dairy cattle. On a stock unit basis these livestock classes 
represent 97 per cent of total- livestock. Potentially each of these 
livestock types will compete with the others for available grazing. 
It is relatively easy for producers to alter their mix of sheep and cattle 
to suit current economic conditions and preferences. Figure 4 shows the 
trend in sheep and beef cattle numbers over the period 1971 - 1993 and 
the substitution which has taken place between those two livestock 
types. The main driving force behind this substitution is relative 
profitability between sheep and cattle. 
Following the severe oil shock in 1973-74 New Zealand faced a massive 
increase in the cost of oil imports. To generate increased foreign 
revenue the government embarked on poliCies to increase production in 
the primary sector by making available development loans at 
concessionary rates. Supplementary minimum prices were also introduced 
at around this time but remained inactive up until 1981-82 for sheep 
products. The expansion of the sheep flock and the decline in cattle 
numbers through the late 1970s was driven by market prices favouring 
sheep. 
In 1980-81 on farm inflation reached 23 per cent. This placed the 
export sector under pressure as world market prices were insufficient to 
compensate for high domestic inflation. Though the exchange rate was 
successively devalued over the following years the government guaranteed 
supplementary minimum prices became the price paid to farmers for 
wool, lamb and mutton through to 1984-85. Figure 4 includes bar graphs 
showing the relative total amounts and timing of supplementary support 
included in farm gate prices received. All price support ceased in 
1984-85. 
The increase in beef cattle numbers over the last 5 years was the result 
of higher beef cattle profitability relative to sheep. The large falls in 
both sheep and cattle numbers from June 1988 to June 1989 reflected 
the severe drought conditions that affected much of the country during 
the 1988-89 season. 
Over recent years, the number of dairy cows in N.Z. have increased. 
This in turn has led to the increased availability of dairy calves 
available to rear for beef production which has been the trend in the 
1980s. Figure 5 shows this with the ratio of beef cows in the herd 
declining relative to the export cattle slaughter. i.e., the beef herd now 
has a greater proportion of "trading" stock. 
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Figure 4 Sheep and Beef Cattle Numbers 
1971 to 1993 ]5·@t I 
OO@ (~~ j 
I \ 
I \ 
! '-\ 
" , 
65.CXJO 
.. \ 
\ 
6,500 
6,CXJO 
-;;; 
5,5OO~ 
-Q) 
o:l!l 
g. 6O.CXJO \ 5,CXJO '0 
~ 
-~ 
-
'" o:l!l 
8. 
x 
Lo.J 
0 
~ [;; 
Year 
(; 
0-
4,500 : 
4,CXJO 
p = provisional. e = estimte. f = forecast 
Source: N.Z. Meat /{ Wool Boords Economic Service 
Based on Depart:nent of Stat i st i cs data. 09 JUL 1993 
Figure 5 
3,CXJO 
2,750 
2.500 
2,250 
2,CXJO 
1,750 
1,500 
1,250 
I,CXJO 
Relationship Between the Number of Beef Cows Mated 
& Annual Export Beef Slaughterings 
N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 m ~ _ N ¥ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ N ~ 
'1'1'1'1'1, '1'1 "P"P "p ,m'1''1' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - - ~ ~ - ~ - - - ~ ~ 
Year 
Source: N.Z. ·Maat 1£ Wool Boards Economic ServIce 
01 JUL 1993 
i 
I 
1 
1 
1.60 
1.40 ~ 
~ 
1.20 ... 
.. 
E 
.. 
U> 
i 
., 
800.0 ~ 
::~I 
200.0 
0.0 
:E 
1.00 §' 
(/'l 
0.80 '; 
o:l!l 
0.60 .E 
U> 
0.408 
-
'" 0.20 Jl 
PRICE SIGNALS & PRODUCTION TRENDS 
Sheep vs Cattle 
Regional gross margins generated from Economic Service Sheep and Beef 
Farm Survey data show the relative profitability between sheep and beef 
cattle (Table 2). These gross margins presented in Table 2 sum up the 
economic response from all sheep and beef farms in each region. While 
gross margins for individual farms may lie above or below the regional 
averages, the underlying price dynamic that drives changes in sheep and 
cattle numbers can be observed from these gross margins. 
It is not by chance that 43 per cent of the beef herd is located in 
North/South Auckland, and 8 per cent of the beef herd in 
Otago/Southland. There are sound economic and practical reasons for 
this which the gross margin analysis sums up. 
Table 2: Regional Sheep & Beef Cattle Gross Margins - 1991-92 
Sheep2 Cattle2 GM 
G~ GM Difference 
$ per SU $ per SU $ per SU 
North/South Auckland 16.14 32.12 15.98 
East Coast 17.13 28.84 11.71 
Taranaki/Manawatu 17.48 25.92 8.44 
North Island 16.98 30.26 13.28 
Marlborough/Canterbury 23.28 27.35 4.07 
Otago/Southland 23.22 22.45 -0.76 
South Island 23.39 25.88 2.49 
New Zealand 20.35 28.85 8.50 
Source: Department of Statistics 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
The relative change in gross margins for sheep and cattle over time is 
shown in Figures 6 and 7 where the graph line traces the ratio of beef 
cattle to sheep gross margins. The effect of inflation is removed by 
presenting the relationship as a ratio. While historically the relationship 
has been similar in both islands, currently the gross margin in favour of 
beef cattle is much higher in the North Island than in the South Island. 
In particular, the gross margin advantage for beef cattle relative to 
sheep in North-South Auckland saw sheep numbers decline 40 per cent 
from June 1985 to 1993. 
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Dairy Calves vs Beef Calves 
The traditional beef management system has a beef breeding herd 
producing calves. Bull calves are castrated and raised as steers for 
slaughter. Heifer calves replace cows within the breeding herd. In 
recent years many of the bull calves have been left as bulls to achieve 
higher growth rates. While this management system is still practised 
around the country, another system relying on the dairy herd has come 
into prominence. 
This alternative system purchases bobby calves from the dairy herd and 
raises these as bulls or steers for slaughter. The advantages of this are 
two-fold. Firstly there is no capital overhead tied up in a beef breeding 
herd, so more capital can be used for direct income generation. 
Secondly, more grazing is available to slaughter animals as there is no 
breeding herd to feed. 
The number of bobby calf retentions for beef production have been 
increasing over recent years. For the 1992-93 season a number of dairy 
calf retentions for beef production were estimated at 734,000 which was 
around 40 per cent of the total calves entering the beef herd. This 
compares to a dairy calf input of around 35 per cent five years earlier 
in 1987-88. 
This increase in the input of dairy beef calves into the beef herd has 
helped drive up the gross margin trend for North-South Auckland cattle 
shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 8 shows that in 1970-71 there was little variation in cattle gross 
margins among Class 4 North Island Hill Country Farms. In comparison, 
Figure 9 shows that in 1990-91 there was a much greater variation in 
cattle gross margin. The average proportion of beef breeding cows in 
the herd in 1970-71 was 40 per cent, and purchases as a per cent of 
cattle at open were 19 per cent. In 1990-91 the average number of 
cows in the herd had declined to 27 per cent while average purchases as 
a per cent of cattle at open had increased to 36 per cent i.e., the 
amount of "trading" had increased and reflects increased base of dairy 
origin cattle in the beef herd. 
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Heavy weight lambs vs light weight lambs 
Increasing Margin Between Seasons: 
The margin for producing medium to heavy weight lambs over light 
weight lambs has been steadily improving over recent years (Table 3). 
In 1979-80 the average differential between a 11.9 kg PL lamb and a 
14.4 kg PM carcase was $2.74 (~1 9%) including skin and I kilogram wool 
pull. By 1992-93 this margin had increased to average $9.26 (+30%) per 
head. A similar analysis of PX over PM lambs shows that in 1979-80 
the margin of a 17.3 kg PX lamb compared with a 14.4 kg PM lamb was 
$1.48 (+9%) and compares with a $8.64 (+21%) margin in 1992-93. 
The additional revenue from putting an extra 2.5 kg onto a light weight 
lamb in 1979-80 was $1.18 per kg (carcase only). This increase at the 
margin was in fact very high given that the average PL schedule in 
1979-80 was $0.88 per kg and the average PM schedule was $0.93 per 
kg. The additional revenue from putting on an extra 2.8 kg in 1992-93 
equated to $3.14 per kg. This compared with the PL payment $2.03 
per kg and PM payments of $2.24 per kg. Figure 10 illustrates these 
trends. 
In the earlier years, there was less difference in the total return 
particularly between the PM and PX grades than today. Since 1985-86 
the price differential between grades has been more distinct. 
Increased Weight vs Leanness: 
The increased margin from producing leaner lambs (Le., YM vs PM) is 
less significant than the increased margin from producing heavier lambs 
(i.e., PM vs PL). Waldron et al (1992), compared carcase returns of 
lambs at a constant feed cost, and showed that the relative economic 
value of increasing carcase weight by 1 kg was 2.82 times the value of 
decreasing GR (a measure of Leanness) by Imm. 
Production change: 
Lamb producers have responded to the increasing price differential 
between grades by producing a greater proportion of heavy weight lambs. 
In 1975-76, light (PL, YL, TL and FL grades) and medium (PM, YM, TM, 
and FM grades) weight lambs contributed 85.4 per cent to total 
production. The contribution from heavy weight lamb production (PX, 
YX, PH, TH and FH grades) in the same season was 14.6 per cent. For 
the first 6 months of 1992-93 the contribution from light weight lambs 
had decreased to 72.1 per cent while the contribution from heavy weight 
lambs had increased to more than a quarter (27.9%) of bone-in lamb 
production (Table 4). 
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Table 3: P Grade Lamb Margins - $ Per Head 
Margin Margin Margin 
. Year PM - PL PX - PM PX - PL 
($/head) ($/head) ($/head) 
1979-80 2.74 1.48 4.22 
1980-81 3.44 2.61 6.05 
1981-82 5.53 5.43 10.96 
1982-83 5.36 4.51 9.87 
1983-84 4.98 3.24 8.22 
1984-85 3.11 5.39 8.50 
1985-86 4.44 -0.42 4.02 
1986-87 7.02 3.35 10.37 
1987-88 4.19 2.10 6.29 
1988-89 7.47 3.87 1/.34 
1989-90 9.73 7.51 17.74 
1990-91 6.13 8.97 15.10 
1991-92 8.01 8.65 16.66 
1992-93 9.26 8.64 17.90 
Source: N.Z. Meat Producers Board 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
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Climate and Risk: 
It must be recognised that in some regions the production of heavy 
weight lamb may not always be possible. For example, climatic 
variation may make it a non-viable option in some regions. In addition, 
there is a certain amount of risk associated with carrying lambs to 
heavier weights. 
The margin between the different grades can vary within a season. The 
risk in holding lambs to heavier weights is that the margin between 
grades may close, or alternatively, the actual schedule may fall. In 
either of these situations it might have been better to have quit stock 
earlier, freeing up pasture as well as cash flow. The differential in per 
head payments between PL and PM grades closed from 38 per cent in 
1991-92 to 30 per cent in 1992-93. In part this closing gap reflected 
strong competition for reduced supplies of Iamb. 
A further element of risk, is the over-fat grading of lambs. Referring 
to Table 5 it can be noted that the proportion of lambs grading over-fat 
has decreased in the last decade. In 1983-84, 33 per cent of heavy 
weight carcases (PX, PH, YX, TH, and FH grades) were TH's and fkI's. 
This compares to 12 per cent in 1992-93. '. 
In general, it can be more profitable to produce heavier lamb grades 
provided this can be achieved without slipping into the discounted heavy 
"over-fat" TH and FH grades. As long as the market continues to 
demand a high' proportion of processed product in the future, the 
incentive paid for producing lambs of heavier grades will remain. 
Table 4: Heavy & Light Weight Lamb Percentages 
Year Heavy Light & Med 
(% Tonnes) (% Tonnes) 
1975-76 14.6 85.4 
1980-81 8.6 91.4 
1985-86 17.0 83.0 
1986-87 13.4 86.6 
1987-88 19.1 80.9 
1988-89 13.1 86.9 
1989-90 17.7 82.3 
1990-91 20.3 79.7 
1991-92 23.8 76.2 
1992-93 27.9 72.1 
Note: 1992-93 data = 6 months only 
Source: N.Z. Meat Producers Board 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
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Table 5: Percentage of EXQort Lamb Slaughter Graded Over-fat 
1983-84 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 
TH & FH as % all 
heavy weight lambs 32.8 11.9 15.3 13.5 
TM & FM as % all 
medium weight lambs 8.3 3.3 3.8 2.9 
TL & FL as % all 
light weight lambs 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Source: N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service 
N.Z. Meat Producers Board 
SUMMARY 
1992-93 
12.0 
2.0 
0.1 
The New Zealand meat supply is small on a world scale. Despite this 
international markets and prices are important as the majority of New 
Zealand meat production is exported. At the farm gate level there is 
clear evidence that prices received dictate trends in livestock numbers 
and mix of livestock types. 
The examples used show that within and between livestock types there 
have been production shifts in response to market Signals. The evidence 
presented shows that sheep and beef production has always been driven 
by the trend in prices received at the farm gate. 
REFERENCES 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service Paper No. C436, 1992-93 
Sheep & Beef Industry Mid-Season Review. 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service Paper No. G2011, Beef 
Prospects for the 1990s. 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service Paper No. G2054, A Review 
of Financial & Production Trends in the :\.Z. Sheep & Beef 
Sector. 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service Paper No. G2056, 
Background to the N.Z. Meat Industry. 
N.Z. Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service Paper No. G2058, Lean 
Heavy Weight Lamb Production Background Notes. 
The N.Z. Meat Producer (1990), 18:2 pp 3, Market Signals - Premiums 
for Heavier Weights. 
The N.Z. Meat Producer (1992), 21:1 pp 31, Lamb Makes the Grade. 
Sandrey, R., and Reynolds, R., (1990). Farming without Subsidies. 
Waldron, D.F., Clarke, J.N., and Rae, A.L. (1992). Comparison of 
relative economic values for lamb carcase traits in different 
seasons of the year and regions of New Zealand. 
..... 
01 
C> 
. Appendix 1: 
Lamb and muNon is classilied according to the maturity 01 the 
carcase (Iamb, hogget or muNon), sex, fat content (GR measure), 
. weight and in some cases muscling. 
F.za_ ·",tl~ Li M X :e H 
I 
L-
A 
!.J!thlV.t:'~gh~ and 
aimoS! u<"Hl!d IJi 
~x:~mal!a! 
y 
Low/at ..:')~:ent 
p 
\1i:dlUmlalcomen! 
T 
Hu::hfaICOnrenI Cut 
and:-nmmo:dot,:,xCe5.5IIC 
F 
::"'Ces5I\E'faICOn!enl Cut 
4na !nmmee 01 t'l\,essilt' 
la: 
c 
'01 ~h;:i!1:(' lor expor. 
dut'lf'Otrlmmrn~ 
[nta,-:c\J!<,.:-::a. 'tH: 
t'xpt'lnt'C HasarlE:'i1S1 
lhfl-t'ol:he tour hmC 
pnm,,:cul~ ;~and 
~t;r~r.. toms accepI4t:l{' 
M 
(\lanufacturing: 
GR - A fat content 
as.~menl ba.c:.ed on 
mE':i."uremeni of total tissue 
dep:~ over the 12th rib at a 
pomt 1 lcm from the 
mldbne althe carca$e 
Incl:.!dt.'S.::ar(a."~whlch· 
• are 100 Ih,n for export Jf'! carcast form or a. .. ~lT1mal eulS 
• art' damast-d bUI fad 1(. 'T.t't'::/W cunt'rcnteria 
• V.E.'I!tn (est. thaI"! ~ k~ bu: "If." !.,r. fa! for tnt" A clas...;. 
• 
Hot weight - Ihe bac;is on 
which :\ev,; Zealand 
producer" are paid 
This measurement is used 
only within :,\(,h- Zealand, 
E.-..:port weight. or mid 
weight - Ih~· ba501:- nn whIch 
\ew Zt'aland t','\pon 
carca .. es are :;otd 
i 
(fter 9mm up to and 
mcludmgl::!mm 
""""""'" 
\tuscling cJa'>S 
Beta Lamb is a specialised class. A very young milkled lamb weighing les.." than ;,5 kg, \loderalely to well muscled wiln an e\en but not excessh'(' 
fat cover. 
E;'(cessively yello ..... colourE'd carcases arE' not eligible for export. 
1 Del oid o( (al A type (ar(ases that are In (he L !uighr range afF dassed as restncred YL 
1 -Leggy- (arCDses hom (he PL and P.\! classes. are classed as resfn'cled PL and P.\! Producers ,ecen e (he same pa,\me"t (or "[egB,' • (a/cases and no separOlr 
tdenulica/lon appears on the klllmg sheets 
3 See ,~fusding Class 
B-6 CHERRIES, EGGS, PIPFRUIT & KIWIFRUIT 

...... 
0'1 
...... 
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES APPLIED TO THE CHERRY INDUSTRY IN 
MARLBOROUGH 
SUMMARY 
M P Kearney and M D Neal 
Agriculture New Zealand, Nelson and Blenheim. 
Rain damage is a serious problem for cherry orchards. Over the period 1942 to 1993 
rain damaged crops in Marlborough in 3 out of 4 years. Susceptibility to damage from 
rain varies by variety. The optimal variety mix was investigated taking risk into account 
using target Motad. -Results suggest that a change in variety structure would benefit 
growers by reducing risk for similar returns. Covering is another major way to reduce 
the effect of rain damage. This was investigated for one variety but was found to be 
highly uneconomic. 
Keywords: risk, rain damage, cherries, target MOTAD. 
INTRODUCTION 
The cherry industry in New Zealand is a small industry. Marlborough grows 60% of 
New Zealand cherries, with the remainder being produced in Central Otago. The 
Marlborough cherry industry comprises some 26 growers and 150 hectares producing 
a crop of around 500 tonnes per annum. Approximately 60% of the crop is exported 
to a range of markets with Japan being important. The remainder is split between 
fresh sales to local market and process/waste . 
The distinctive feature of the cherry industry is its susceptibility to rain damage. The 
effect of rain close to harvest makes it perhaps the most risky horticultural industry in 
New Zealand. One rain event can completely ruin over 4 to 10 days of crop ready for 
harvest depending on the severity of rain and variety susceptibility to rain damage. 
There are other sources of risk such as market returns, variation in yields, frost and 
hail. There are also financial risks such as debt loading and failure to meet fixed 
commitments. However the main risk to cherry growers is from rain damage. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide information that will allow growers to better 
manage risk on their individual properties. The paper will firstly quantify the level of 
risk applicable to cherry growers from rain damage in Marlborough. Secondly it will 
test strategies for reducing risk by changing variety mix and covering. 
The paper will firstly outline the probability of rain over the harvest period in 
Marlborough. Secondly it will explain how rain effects cherries. It will discuss the 
different susceptibility of varieties to rain damage and outline the mechanism for 
calculating the rain damage. The average damage affecting each variety will be shown 
as well as some descriptive statistics showing the probability of occurrence over a 
period surveyed. 
Finally having identified the present level of risk that growers face, two alternative 
strategies will be tested to see whether they can help growers reduce the amount of 
risk they face from rain damage. Firstly the affect of changing varieties on overall risk 
to the growers will be considered. Secondly the value of covering the cherries with 
plastic will be analysed. 
RAINFALL 
Analysis of monthly data over the period 1942 to 1989 (Revfeim, Saville) shows that 
December and January have the lowest total rainfall and lowest number of rainfall 
events. However when it does rain each event is heavier than in other months of the 
year. 
The period of interest for cherries is around harvest. Although harvest in a normal 
season goes from 29 November to 15 January, the appropriate period for assessing 
rainfall affects extend forward from the start of the harvesting season. Therefore the 
period to consider when assessing rainfall events is from 20 November to January 15. 
Over this harvest period, there were no significant trends in number or severity of 
rainfall events over this period based on analytical research (e.g. harmonic spliCing) 
and examination of the data. As figure 1 shows rainfall appears to be a random event. 
There does not appear to be any trend in the average, nor does the standard 
deviation appear to follow any significant trend over the season. Therefore it has been 
assumed that there is no trend over the season, and that rainfall is equally likely to 
occur on any day of the season, with random severity. 
Rain in Blenheim over Cherry Harvest 
Doily ro;nfcl 1942-93 
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Figure 1 
The rainfall data is shown as a table in appendix 1. All rainfall greater than 1 mm for 
the period from 15 November to 15 January is shown for the last 52 years i.e. from 
1942 to 1993. Please note that the data is continuous. i.e. it shows the picture over 
one season. Therefore for the 1993 season the data shown as 
November/December/January is actually November/December 1992 leading onto 
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JanuarY 1993. Although the data ·is recorded on a calender basis, for this analysis we 
are interested in converting it to a seasonal basis. 
The data from 1942 to 1989 is based on New Zealand Meteorological Service records 
from the Blenheim township. From January 1990 to 1993, the weather station based 
at the Marlborough .Research Centre is used as a source of the data. Although there 
is approximately 1 km between the two sites, it is not felt, from local knowledge, that 
there is a significant difference in the incidence or severity. 
The probability of rain occurring on anyone day of the harvest season is quite low. 
As Table 1 shows, 75% of the time there will be no rain event on any given day. In 
fact damage does not occur until rainfall greater than 8 mm has occurred. Therefore 
a rainfall event that can do some damage to cherries has a probability of under 6% of 
occurring on anyone given day. 
Table 1: Probability o"frain on anyone day in harvest period 
- - -----------
~--
I AVERAGE I 
I Daily Rainfall (mm) II Number II % I 
0 39.3 75.4 
0.001 - 8 9.9 19.0 
8.001 - 15 1.5 2.9 
15.001 - 50 1.3 2.5 
50.001 + 0.1 0.2 
52.1 100.0 
However the picture is different over a season. Over the past 52 seasons there have 
been no years without any rain over this period. However some years are wetter than 
others. For example 1992 and 1993 were wet seasons compared to 1990 being a dry 
year. However, it is dangerous to consider averages or totals over a season when 
analysing an event like rainfall damage to cherries. It only needs one day with a 
moderate rain event to cause significant damage to the crop. 
DAMAGE MODEL 
The main reason that cherries split is water on the outside of the fruit. This water is 
absorbed into the fruit due to osmotic differences between the inside and outside of 
the fruit. This causes rapid expansion of the cherry beyond the elasticity of the skin. 
Hence splitting occurs. Therefore the major factors influencing the damage due to 
a rainfall event is: 
the amount of rain 
duration of rain (leading to fruit being wet for 1 to 2 days) 
variety susceptibility 
Temperature also affects the rate of uptake of water but it is felt that this a minor 
influence on splitting so it was not considered further. 
The major factor of influence is how much cherry split is the amount of rainfall that falls 
within two days. The damage levels that we have used as a basis for assessing 
damage in this paper are shown in Table 2: 
Table 2: Rainfall causing damage by group 
Amount of rain/2 days Class 
0- 8mm 0 No damage 
8.01 - 15mm 1 Light 
15.01 - 50mm 2 Medium 
50 + mm 3 Severe 
Rainfall is grouped over 2 days partly due to the way data is recorded, and also to 
reflect the length of time that cherries are damp. Rainfall is recorded for the day 
ending at 9 am in the morning. Therefore two days records might show that the first 
day has 1 mm of rain and the second day having 8mm of rain. In fact it would be one 
rain shower starting at 8 o'clock in the morning and finishing at 11 o'clock in the same 
morning. As far as the cherries are concerned 9mm of rain fell on them, and there 
would be some damage. Therefore. it was felt that it was more appropriate to use two 
days to trigger damage classes. 
The other factor influencing the decision to use two days rather than one day is that 
while weather records may show that rain has stopped, trees take a considerable time 
to dry after rain has stopped. 
There is considerable variability between varieties and their susceptibility to rain 
damage. As figure 2 shows. varieties such as Sam and Stella (new improved strains). 
are affected less by rain damage than varieties such as Bing and Rainier. These 
damage curves are based on limited scientific work done by the Marlborough 
Research Centre. with the main source being grower and consultant experience of 
what happens in the district. 
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To see how the damage curve works let us take Bing as an example. Say there was 
a rainfall event of between 15 and 50 mm on day one. The damage curve implies that 
this one rainfall event will affect fruit ready to be harvested in the following way. 
The day of rain, 100% of the fruit ready to be harvested will be split and be unsaleable. 
Two days after rain, fruit ready to be harvested will be 100% damaged. 
Three 100% damage. 
Four 100% 
Five 83% 
Six 66% 
and so on it goes until 10 days after the rain there is no damage. 
Cherries do not ripen all at the same stage. Some are ready for harvest earlier than 
others. The susceptibility to damage is related to ripeness of the fruit not to calender 
date. Therefore one rain event will damage that proportion of the crop that is ready 
to harvest over the next 3 to 10 days. There may still be a significant quantity of fruit 
from that variety which is not affected, because the fruit is not ripe enough. 
SIMULATION OF DAMAGE 
The damage models for each variety incorporating the above points were applied to 
rainfall events for the previous 52 years. Actual weather data was used rather than 
generated data from probability distributions such as is seen in literature. It was felt 
in the case of rainfall, 50 years of data is a long period. Although history will not 
repeat itself exactly, the previous 50 years should give some guideline as to what may 
be faced in the future. While it would be possible to generate 50, 100, 250 
years of rainfall data based on probability distributions and assuming sufficient 
computer hardware, this would serve little extra purpose. In this case 50 samples 
were believed to be adequate. 
The overall damage due to rain over the period 1942 to 1993 is shown in Table 3. The 
district average damage. level is 28.5%. This is an average of some years with no 
damage compared to other years with higher levels of damage. It averages damage 
occurred for each variety according to the current production from each variety over 
the district. 
Table 3: Overall damage due to rain 1942 - 1993 
I Variety II % of crop 
Rainier 39.2 
Sam 10.8 
Dawson 29.5 
Lambert 26.7 
Stella 11.4 
Bing 33.0 
Merton 10.8 
District Average 28.5 
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Figure 3 shows the rain damage for the whole district in more detail. Approximately 
24% of the time there will be no damage. That is one year in four there will be no 
damage due to rain. Of the other 3 out of 4 years damage trends downwards from 10 
and 20% per annum to very low occurrence of 100% damage (0.4%). 
There are significant differences between varieties. Sam and Stella at around 11 % are 
significantly lower than the major varieties at the moment of Bing and Dawson. 
Dawson averages at 29.5% compared to Bing at 33%. These overall damage levels 
relate very closely to the difference shown in the damage curve shown in Figure 2 
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above. 
Within each variety there are significant differences in how the damage occurs. For 
example Bing has 21% probability of no damage i.e. one year in five there will be no 
rain damage for Bing. Most of the damage is low except for a 30% probability that 
damage will be between 40 and 50%. Therefore for Bing damage is either non-
existent or quite significant at 30 to 40%. 
This is in comparison to Dawson where damage is more evenly spread across the 
range. The largest grouping is 10 to 30% where 28% of damage occurs. (See Figures 
4 and 5). 
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Figure 6 shows the simulated damage that occurred for Bing over the data period. 
There does appear to be some repeating pattern of good years (ie no damage) 
followed by a period of severe damage followed by a period of good years. 
Rain dl~T2C:?i9ia.. ~~~!;;"'-to~oI0wson 
2~:;: 
~o:; 
111I1ul. 
IS::: 
10: 
,. 
" o 10 20 30 "0 50 6'0 70 SO 90 lOa 
:;:Oe,"lIIl.<"'I-:fwvd.rc.........,c:n 
Figure 5 
-
-!= 
!-
l= 
&~~ 
J-
-= 
m 
~ 
Rain damage to cherries - Bing 
1942-1993 - Norrr:c1 season total 
i . 
l : dj : 
i ~ m li ~ 
I II Iii i .lIi ~ Ii Ii iii 
i.ii i iiiiinil I. lHilliii 
~2 ~8 54 ~ 65 72 78 84 90 
T_ 
Figure 6 
FINANCIAL RESULTS OF SIMULATION 
Table 4 shows the gross margin of each variety ignoring the affect of rain damage. 
With the exception of Stella, most of the high profit varieties are extensively planted in 
the district. Stella is a relatively new variety which is being planted in greater numbers. 
However production is still increasing. Absolute profitability seems to correlate more 
with current plantings than the assessment of risk discussed below would seem to 
indicate. 
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Table 4: Gross Margin bv variety ignoring rain damage 
I Vari~ II G~;'~ 1 Ranking r "!z 
Stella 40,690 1 4.2% 
Lambert 34,130 2 13. 7% 
Bing 34,130 3 lB. 7 
Dawson 23,200 4 2B.B 
Rainier 23,100 5 20. 7 
Sam 17, 700 6 4.6 
Merton 12,500 7 9.1 
Table 5 summarises the average gross margins and some summary statistics based 
on the simulated data. For each variety, the damage model mentioned in the previous 
section was run for each of the 52 years in the study period. The overall damage level 
per year was then entered into a gross margin template and the resulting gross margin 
was recorded. In affect there are 52 samples of performance after rain damage. 
Table 5: Summary of Simulated Gross Margins/ha 
Average Std COY % years Max Min 
Dev negative GM GM 
Merton 9,312 3,181 34.2% 0 12,464 1,965 
Dawson 10,439 8,892 85.2% 25 20,378 (6,749) 
Sam 14,091 3,203 22.7% 0 17,266 6,693 
Rainier 5,665 10,366 183.0% 42 19,587 (13,084) 
Bing 12,722 11,291 88.7% 23 26,604 (9,154) 
Lambert 15,352 11,832 77.1% 21 26,604 (8,752) 
Stella 24,943 6,231 25.0% 0 30,339 8,348 
Including rain damage levels changes the profit ranking quite significantly. Stella is still 
the highest gross margin, but what is noticeable is that it has a very low damage level. 
Both Sam and Stella, new varieties, had no years with negative income. In other 
words although they did have some damage, the damage was not large enough to 
cause a loss. 
At the other extreme Rainier has gone from fifth highest gross margin to the lowest 
average gross margin. It has very high standard deviation which is approximately 
183% greater than it's average. 42% of the years results were negative due to rain 
damage for Rainier. Therefore Rainier does not look very attractive at all when rain 
damage is considered. 
Merton on the other hand has improved quite significantly. Although the gross margin 
is low at $9,312 its standard deviation is very low. There appears to be some 
potential of switch between low return, low risk varieties like Merton, compared to Bing 
which is a higher return, but also higher risk. 
STRATEGIES TO MINIMISE RISK 
Two strategies that we considered in this paper were firstly to change variety mix, and 
secondly to cover cherries. 
CHANGING VARIETY MIX TO ALTER RISK PROFILE 
CHOICE OF TECHNIQUE - THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
TECHNIQUE 
The standard approach for considering risk and returns is the mean variance 
approach developed in the 1950's. There are some criticisms of this approach. Firstly 
it gives more weight to larger variances both negative and positive. However when the 
focus is on negative deviations i.e. bad aspects of risk, it is often largely relevant to 
penalise larger deviations below the mean more than the smaller deviations (Parton 
& Cumming). 
Secondly positive risk is treated as equally as negative risk. There is research 
suggesting that individuals perceive risk as negative deviations from an ideal outcome 
(Boggess, Hanson & Ladd). Individuals_are very happy to accept positive deviations 
and are not adverse to these at all. However the mean variances approach treats 
both positive and negative deviations as one and the same. 
Mean variances problems can be solved using quadratic programming. However this 
is a cumbersome technique to apply and the data requirements are very intensive 
(Hazell, Boisvert & McCarl). Alternative methods have been developed by Hazell 
called the MOTAD model. This is a proxy for the mean variances approach focusing 
on minimising absolute deviations. It can be solved using linear programming code 
and so is often easier to solve in practice. However the MOTAD approach still treats 
positive and negative deviations the same. 
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Table 6: Summary of points on Risk efficient frontier 
Target Income 
Orchard area 
= $46,500 
= 6 ha 
Area Planted 
Merton (ha) 0.7 0.7 
Dawson 2.6 1.9 
Rainier 
Bing 0,2 1.1 
Lambert 2;5 2.2 
Expected Revenue 74,443 75,077 
Mean negative deviation 9,000 10,000 
% negative deviation 28.8% 28.8% 
Maximum negative deviations 60,220 70,793 
0.7 
0.6 
3.2 
1.4 
76,126 
11,678 
30.8% 
82,286 
\ 
I 
, 
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NB: Merton constrained to maximum production of 8,OOOkg for marketing reasons. 
The variety mix changed with decreasing aversion to risk. At the low tolerance of risk 
3.1ha were planted in Dawson, with 1.8ha planted in Lambert. As risk tolerance 
increased there was a swing from Dawson to Lambert. 
Referring to the data presented in Table 5, comparing the mean and standard 
deviation would suggest that Lambert is a lower risk variety based on the Coefficient 
of Variation. However when you consider the maximum and minimum gross margins 
for each variety, it appears that Dawson has a smaller range. 
Table 7: Variety Ranking 
I Present II After considering Risk 
Stella 1 1 
Sam 6 2 
Lambert 2 3 
Bing 2 4 
Merton 7 5 
Dawson 4 6 
Rainier 5 7 
Therefore when the Target Motad is comparing the gross margins for a product mix 
against its target income, Dawson would be seen as less riskier than Lambert. Here 
again is an example of where in the case of cherries, it is more important to consider 
the actual data than summary statistics such as the mean or standard deviation. 
CHERRY COVERING 
Some cherry blocks in the Marlborough district have a plastic covering installed over 
the trees for the duration of the season. 
The benefits from covering cherries is less damage from rain. Note that covering 
reduces damage rather than eliminating it completely. The effect is to shift the damage 
curves to the right. ie 15 to 50 mm would lead to the same amount of damage under 
covers as 8 to 15 mm without covers. 
The benefits of lower damage was analysed using Bing as an example variety. 
Applying the lower damage curves lead to a significant reduction in overall damage. 
No covering 
Covered 
. Average Annual 
Damage (%) 
Gross Margin 
~ 
33.0% 12,720 
14.18% 20,640 
Net Benefit $7,920 
The costs of covering are the initial setup costs plus ongoing maintenance. The initial 
costs are: 
Structure 
Cover 
Labour 
$65,000jha 
25,000 
18.000 
108,000 
...... 
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An alternative formulation was first proposed by Tauer which has been labelled Target 
MOTAD. This approach focuses on minimising negative deviations and is inherently 
more acceptable to most individuals. Both MOTAD and target MOTAD do not require 
risk preferences to be elicited. The data is presented and the user can make his own 
mind up. Ther.efore he or she can apply their own risk preferences to the data and 
make their own decisions (Boisvert & McCarl). Target MOTAD has also been shown 
to be more risk efficient than the previous two methods in that it is efficient in both first 
and second order stochastic dominance (Watts, Boisvert & McCarl) 
Target MOTAD was selected as the appropriate method to use in this situation from 
. both theoretical and practical points of view. Theoretically it seems at least as sound 
as other methods available. In practical terms Target MOT AD models can be solved 
using codes which are readily available. It also does not require individual user risk 
preferences to be elicited. The data can be presented and users can make their own 
assessment of which solution is the best for their own needs. 
TARGET MOTAD MODEL FORMULATION 
The Target MOTAD model formulation used in this analysis is copied from Parton and 
Cumming (see their article for more detail). 
Maximise E(R) = R X 
Subject to: AX<B 
R* X + d- > T 
Pd- < D 
X, d- > ° 
R = 1 * n vector of expected gross margins for each ·activity 
X = n * 1 vector of activity levels 
E = expectation 
A = k * n vector of resource requirements 
B = k * 1 vector of resource constraints 
R* = series of m 1 * n vectors of simulated gross margins 
T = m * 1 vector with each element equal to the target 
d- = m * 1 vector of negative deviations from target 
P = 1 * m vector of probabilities for each observation (i), Pi = 1 /m 
D = a scalar parameterised from zero to a very large number 
n = number of activities 
m = number of observations, (simulated years) 
k = number of resource constraints 
Activities were formulated as area planted by each variety. Subsidiary activities were 
needed to allow harvest constraints to operate and to include negative deviations as 
part of the Target Motad technique. 
Constraints were total land area being less than 6 hectares, and minimum and 
maximum throughput constraints over the harvest period. Like other products with 
multiple varieties with overlapping harvest dates, if there is not some constraint on the 
model to produce an even flow of fruit, the model will select one variety that has the 
highest profit margin. In practise growers are not prepared to do this as it prevents 
them from spreading capital costs of harvesting and packing equipment over a longer 
period. 
DATA 
The variable costs and fixed overheads are based on typical levels in the Marlborough 
Region. Yields, packouts and prices are based on average levels achieved in the 
district. Note of prices, yields and packouts are assumed to be deterministic. No 
allowance is made for risk due to variation in yield price or packout. 
RESULTS OF MOTAD 
Stella and Sam dominate the model outcomes because of their relatively high returns 
compared to low risk. It is interesting to compare this with Table 5. Comparing the 
average and standard deviation gives a low co-efficient of variation for both Sam and 
Stella. However perhaps more importantly is the observation that over the 52 samples 
for both these varieties there were no negative results. 
Using averages is a little misleading with cherries. The severity of one event in terms 
to damage to the crop can mean that averages are somewhat misleading. A more 
accurate picture of the risk/return trade-off can be established after considering the 
actual data rather than the average and standard deviation. 
Sam and Stella were prevented from coming into the final solution in order to study the 
interaction in risk and return for the other varieties. Merton also has a low co-efficient 
variation and no negative years. It would of been planted up to a large extent. 
However this variety is suitable for the local market only. There are restrictions on the 
size or volume that can be sold on the local market. Therefore the volume was 
restricted to 8,OOOkg which is equivalent to 0.7 hectare. 
The results of the Motad formulation are shown in Table 6 and in Figure 7. The risk 
efficient production function slopes to the right as theory would suggest. In other 
words higher returns are. associated with higher risk, in this case measured by a 
higher mean negative deviation. 
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Ongoing maintenance costs are : 
Labour $18,000/ha/yr 
Cover replacement $25,000/ha/every 5 years 
The benefits of covering cherries does not cover the additional annual labour cost for 
maintaining the covers. Amortising the structure and initial cover and replacement over 
20 years at 15%, gives a annuity cost of $19,300/ha to which must be added the 
annual labour costs. 
There does not seem to be any direct financial benefits from covering cherries. As 
some blocks are partially covered, this could be seen as a means of reducing risk 
from a bad season. It could, therefore, be taken as a measure of how much growers 
are prepared to pay for some certainty of return. In addition, for marketing reasons, 
the Japanese market must have a reliable supply. If some cherries are not sent to 
Japan every year, New Zealand will not get access to the market. 
The above analysis has been done for Bing. Other varieties such as Rainier may 
benefit more from covering than Bing. However, some varieties may benefit less. 
Growers should consider restructuring their variety mix in preference to covering their 
blocks. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Rain is a major risk problem for cherries. 76% of seasons will get some damage, with 
the average damage level being 28.5% across all varieties. There is a significant range 
in damage susceptibility and overall damage between varieties. Varieties like Sam and 
Merton are at the lower end of the scale at 11%. Varieties such as Dawson and Bing 
are at the high end at 30 to 33%, with Rainier the riskiest variety at 39%. 
There would appear to be some value from growers reconsidering their variety mix in 
the light of overall expected rain damage. There present orchard production does not 
seem to be well aligned to the risk of rain damage. In particular Rainier is a significant 
variety in the district. This analysis suggests that it should not be planted at all. 
Target Motad was useful in helping to establish the trade-off between risk and return 
for some varieties. It was particularly useful in that it considered the negative deviation 
in each year and compared that to a target income. This was felt to be more useful 
for cherries than another approach of comparing the mean and standard deviation. 
The variation in cherries can be quite extreme from one year to another, and from one 
variety to another. The mean and standard deviation appears to smooth some of the 
riskiness out of the picture. 
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TIIE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN 
THE EGG MARKET IN PALMERSTON NORTH 
Miriam A. Janett 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Business 
School of Applied and International Economics 
Massey University, Palmerston North 
SUMMARY 
Producers who supply goods with ethical standards above those stipulated by 
law will need to use information markets to communicate their product's existence 
to consumers. Using a pro-competitive view of advertising, Davis, Kay and Star 
(1991) hypothesise that there are four types of goods, each of which falls into a 
certain advertising/sales (AJS) ratio and corresponds to a certain level of verifIable 
information. 
A case study of the egg market in Palmerston North was used to examine 
research questions based on these hypotheses since deregulation of the egg industry 
during 1986 to 1988 had led to the cessation of generic marketing and the 
introduction of new egg types. In particular, free-range eggs and battery eggs became 
differentiated, with free-range eggs perceived by some as ethical, and battery eggs as 
unethical. 
The research estimated the AS ratios for these two types of eggs in 
Palmerston North, using estimates of advertising expenditure and sales by egg sellers 
in the Manawatu (producers, wholesalers and producer cooperatives) and Palmerston 
North retailers. The research also examined the verifIability of the information 
presented to consumers when they purchased eggs. 
KEY WORDS: Ethics, Information Markets, Advertising, Eggs 
INrRODUCTION 
Last year I presented a paper at the combined conference held at the 
University ofWaikato examining the literature on business ethics, consumer choice, 
advertising and information markets. I examined how these areas could be integrated 
and proposed some ideas of what research could be carried out as a result of this 
. work. The paper I am presenting to you today is the results of the research that was 
ultimately carried out. 
A producer's behaviour is constrained by profIt-maximisation, the need to 
obey the law, their own and their industry's ethical standards. Whether or not a 
producer is responding to consumer demand or innovating, by supplying a product 
with an ethical content for the market place, consumers' perceptions will be of 
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interest to the producer, since these feed into consumers tastes, which influence their 
demand curve. The production of a good with ethical content a producer believes 
will be valued by consumers necessitates that consumers are informed of the good's 
existence if nothing else. This information is believed to reduce consumers search 
costs, and given the assumption that a good's ethical content is a desirable 
characteristic, provides information on quality. Therefore, information markets are 
a major key in understanding ethics and the producer. 
The research posed two hypotheses/research questions: 
Hypothesis One/Research Question One 
As a generic good, eggs may be defIned as a search good. A consumer can 
ascertain at a glance that (i) the item in front of them is an egg and (ii) the price with 
respect to quantity. (Nelson, 1974; Ward, Chang, Thompson, 1985; Davis et aI, 
1991). Although the latter may require walking to a counter, this information may 
be considered immediate. 
The literature postulates that over a period of time advertising for search goods will 
have a low priority (Davis et al, 1991). Therefore, it is expected that between 1986-
1992 eggs as a generic product will have a low total expenditure on advertising with 
respect to sales. 
Hypothesis TwolResearch Question Two 
Differentiating eggs with respect to their animal husbandry practices requires 
consumers to believe that there is a difference. A free-range egg may be considered 
a credence good because sight and even experience of a free-range egg will not 
necessarily confIrm its production method to a consumer, and will require consumers 
to individually decide whether the egg is different (King, 1992). 
For this reason there are two parts to hypothesis two: 
(a) Credence goods are generally expected to have low advertising-sales ratios. 
Therefore free-range eggs are not expected to be more heavily advertised than battery 
eggs, unless information can be made more verifIable to the consumer, that is, unless 
the goods can be moved into the experience good category. This leads to (b): 
(b) Based on observations in the marketplace prior to the research, free-range eggs 
are usually more expensive than battery eggs. Since this allows an opportunity for 
passing off battery eggs as free-range eggs in order to reap abnormal profIts (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981), it will be important to free-range egg producers to differentiate 
their product in a verifIable way . 
Therefore, it is expected that a survey of retail outlets in Palmerston North 
will show that information on free-range eggs is verifIable, so as to reduce the 
possibility of producers cheating. This information may be a farm address people 
may visit, a Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) approval, an industry stamp 
of approval, or legal proceedings. 
I-' 
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The limitations of the research. should be noted at the outset of this disucssion. The 
research that has been conducted is a case study, and is therefore not generalisable 
to egg markets outside of Palmerston North, nor to other products which may, by 
defmirlon, fit the categories devised by Davis et al (1991). The case study nature of 
the research precluded the possibility of using inferential statistics to test the 
hypotheses. The results are therefore discussed in terms of research questions. There 
were limitations to the data collected. Retailers for instance were unable to provide 
advertising information when eggs were advertised with other products, and were 
vague about the precise quantities they had sold through their retail outlets. 
The advertisihg literature defines three types of goods: search goods, experience 
goods and credence goods. (Ward et al,1985; Nelson, 1974; Davis et al, 1990). 
* Search goods are defmed as items whose characteristics are easily ascertained by 
viewed the product prior to purchase. Examples of these goods are jewellery, fruit, 
pens. 
* Experience goods are broken into two categories, short-term and long-term. A 
short-term experience good is defmed as a good that needs at least one try to 
ascertain whether the qualities it is advertised to have exist. For example, cans of 
fruit, a chocolate bar, a loaf of bread. Long-term experience goods need a longer 
time to ascertain the validity of any claims. For example, an anti-dandruff shampoo 
will need to be used over the course of time recommended for its benefit to be seen. 
* Credence goods are items where consumers must trust the information provided 
by the producer. For example, washing machines, dolphin-free tuna and products not 
tested on animals. These items involve either a level of technology many consumers 
will not possess, or some ethical component that is unable to be qualified or proven 
by the producer. 
Evidence for these criteria is based upon the advertising! sales [AS] ratios 
(Davis et al, 1991). The AS ratio is the ratio of money spent on advertising a 
product with respect to the money value of total sales, expressed as a percentage. 
Hence, say that the AS ratio was 0.86. This means that for each one dollar of sales, 
only 0.86 of a cent is spent on advertising. (This method was also used by Telser 
(1964) who believed it was a good estimate of advertising intensity). 
Ethical aspects are brought into the equation via quality which is a subjective 
term and is therefore problematic and open to interpretation. The literature in the 
field provides little aid, as not all writers offer a definition of the term (see for 
example, Oxenfelt, 1950; Smiillwood and Conlisk, 1979; Gabor and Granger, 1966; 
Tull, Boring and Gonsior, 1964; Davis, 1990; Gerstner, 1985; Klein and Leffler, 
1981). For the purposes of this research the notions of Oxenfelt (1950) and Klein 
and Leffler (1981) were adopted and the ethical content considered a factor of 
quality, a characteristic the consumer desires in the product they purchase. 
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THE EGG INDUSTRY IN NEW ZEALAND 
The egg industry was first regulated in 1933 by the Poultry Runs Registration 
Act which established a Poultry Board funded by levies on producers with over 
twenty-five birds. (Industries Development Commission, 1985). Price legislation 
came in during World War Two, and marketing legislation came in during the 1950s 
and was updated in 1980. (NZPB, 1980/1). Post-1980 the New Zealand Poultry 
Board controlled the supply and selling of eggs, marketed them nationally, via radio, 
television, magazines, schools and instore campaigns and was also responsible for 
research and development in consumer areas (such as packaging) and production 
matters (such as egg supply and quality). (NZPB, 1984; IDC, 1985). 
In 1985 the IDC report commissioned by the National government in 1984 
was presented to the Labour Minister of Trade and Development. In brief, the IDC 
report recommended that all producer controls with regards to supply - price, 
quantities, marketing regions and the likes - be lifted. The entitlement system which 
dealt with stock numbers, was to be phased out by 1988, after which time producers 
were free to hold any number they chose. (!DC, 1985). As a result the cost of 
surplus production would be borne by the producers themselves, not consumers, as 
was the situation under the producer board. (IDC, 1985). Distributors were to be free 
to buy and sell eggs from and to whom ever they chose, "at prices determined by 
them" (IDC, 1985, pii). Retailers could also buy from any source, and sell at prices 
they wished in direct competition with other retailers. In addition, retailers would 
have to meet any legal standards required in the selling of eggs. (IDC, 1985). 
An underlying assumption of the report was that deregulation would result in 
only efficient producers and distributors staying in business, which would 
automatically benefit consumers. In addition, making producers responsible for 
surplus production and transportation and the likes was seen as enabling the consumer 
price to fall. (IDC, 1985). 
It was recommended that the Poultry Board be maintained, since they had a 
role "in the research, production and genetic efficiency, promotion and related areas 
requiring an appropriate industry organisation." (IDC, 1985, pl1). 
The IDC recommendations were adopted, and the egg industry in New 
Zealand was partially deregulated in 1986, ending fifty-three years of complete 
producer-board control in the egg market. The NZPB no longer controlled the supply 
of eggs, collected producer levies or collated information on the industry nation wide. 
From April 1986, the Board's functions were limited to generic marketing, research, 
and the handling of the phasing out of the entitlement scheme (NZPB, 1985/86; IDC, 
1985). In September 1988 the entitlement scheme ended, along with all statutory 
powers and functions of the Board. (NZPB, 1987/8). 
The NZPB noted several developments in the egg markets post 1986. From 
their point of view was the difficulty of obtaining information from egg floors and 
merchants, which made their task of research and marketing difficult (NZPB, 198617; 
1987/88). Different types of eggs which consumers specifically wanted were being 
sold (NZPB, 1985/6), and eggs "were being marketed by more producers/marketers 
since deregulation." (NZPB, 1987/8). 
...... 
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In the 1987/8 annual report it was reported that the deregulation post-1986 had 
brought increased prices to the consumer, financial pressures to producers but 
increased profit margins for the retailer. The report states the astonishment and 
bitterness of the NZPB that the government fully deregulated the market, and 
reiterated that "both egg producers and consumers of eggs throughout New Zealand 
[were] going to be the major losers ... " (NZPB, 1987/8, p6). 
The Board was still to maintain its marketing position, and the 1987/8 annual 
report outlines its development for an advertisement campaign, 1988/9. However, 
without statutory backing to obtain funding and a lack of unanimous support from 
producers, the Board could no longer continue, and ended in 1988. 
THE EGG MARKET IN THE MANAWATUIPALMERSTON NORTH 
Two methods were used to obtain information on advertising expenditure on 
free-range and battery eggs in the Palrnerston North area between 1986 and 1992. 
First, all commercial producers and wholesalers in the Manawatu who could have 
sold eggs to retailers or inhabitants of Palmerston North were interviewed in order 
to obtain their estimates of advertising expenditures. Second, direct estimates of 
advertising expenditure was made through a survey of the media, and through a 
survey of point of sales information. It was assumed each method would provide a 
check on the other. 
The survey was limited to the Manawatu producers and wholesalers because 
while talking with members of the industry in this area, it became clear that they 
considered eggs were not imported into the region from outside localities, on any 
major scale. The Manawatu was considered that area defined by Telecom in their 
Manawatu telephone directory, and the region outlined by the NZPB as per their 1988 
producer list. 
POPULATIONS l : 
Producers: 
The current producer population was not obtainable from any government or 
private body who may have an interest in the industry. However, a list compiled by 
the NZPB in 1988 before its demise was given to the researcher. The list contained 
eighteen producers with addresses in the Manawatu. Of these, fifteen were traceable 
through the white and yellow pages of the Manawatu 1992 telephone directory. From 
this list, the producers were called, and it was discovered that eleven of the fifteen 
traceable producers still produced eggs. Two producers raised and sold pullets 
(young chicks) and did not have any egg production. Another two producers had left 
the egg market. 
One of the two producers who had left the industry had ended production in 
1992, which from the point of view of this research made them a relevant population 
1 A population is defined as all people or businesses in the region defined who make up 
the aggregated elements under study. (Babbie, 1986). 
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member. However, the producer was reluctant to participate which is a right that 
must be respected (Kidder, 1981). 
Using this method a sampling frame2 of eleven was formed and all of these 
producers were contacted. One producer, currently producing eggs, was reluctant to 
participate in the research because of the competitive nature of the industry. Another 
producer did not respond to messages and telephone calls during one week. These 
two producers are not included in the data obtained. The remaining nine producers 
were interviewed using a structured interview. All information on total expenditure 
relates only to these nine producers for the period 1986-1992. 
Eight of the nine producers interviewed had produced prior to 1986. There 
was a new entrant in 1990 who had had prior experience on a pOUltry farm. 
Therefore, all producers had experience, although minimal in one case, of farming 
under the NZPB. 
The WholesalerlProducer Cooperative Population: 
There is one commercial wholesaler and one producer cooperative in 
Palmerston North. The latter was referred to as an egg floor by every producer 
interviewed. Both of these businesses buy producers eggs and market them under 
their own brands. The information about the two businesses, had it been published, 
would have breached confidentiality since the aggregate figures could have been used 
by each competitor to deduce the other firm's sales. Both businesses were contacted 
however and asked about advertising, and both gave sufficient information to make 
a rough estimate of advertising expenditure they undertook in the period 1986-1992. 
The Retailer Population: 
The retailer sampling frame in Palmerston North was drawn from the Yellow 
pages in the Manawatu 1992 telephone book. While it is recognised that this is not 
the ideal place to obtain a sampling frame, it was felt that was consistent with the 
way the producers sampling frame was obtained. Only outlets with 'PN' before their 
phone number (denoting Palmerston North), were contacted, since that is the city on 
which this part of the research focuses. The retail outlets were broken down into 
four categories: 
(i) Supermarkets/Grocers 
The sampling frame located was fourteen and eleven of these stores were 
willing for the researcher to call in, discuss eggs, and examine their display. 
It was deemed necessary by the researcher to contact all members of this group since 
they were assumed to be the dominant retailers in Palrnerston North. 
There were some limitations to the data. For instance some stores being 
unable to give volume information. Moreover, volume and price information, 
2 The sampling frame is defined as all valid population data points that were traceable 
using any given method (Kidder, 1981). 
-
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especially with larger stores, was confidential. However, the medium sized stores 
were cooperative when it came to sharing that information. 
(li) Service' Stations 
It was assumed that service stations were convenience outlets, where people 
could pick up an item they found they needed, with or without purchasing petrol. It 
was assumed that few people would go there to do a full week's shopping. Therefore, 
a random sample was selected. Service stations that sold only mechanical or 
appliance parts for vehicles were not included in the sampling frame reducing it to 
twenty-six. A sample of ten was chosen, all representing an oil company3. 
(iii) Dairies 
A sample size of twelve was randomly selected from the sampling frame of 
thirty-four. 
(iv) Butchers and Fruit-Shops 
During the process of the research it was indicated that many producers sold 
to these retail outlets, so it was necessary to include a sample of them in the research. 
The sampling frame for both the butchers and fruit-shops was nine respectively. Five 
butchers were selected and contacted, but only four fruiterers were visited, because 
the fifth one was "too busy" to participate. 
All producers and retailers were interviewed using structured questionnaires 
administered at the place of work at a time prearranged with the person concerned. 
RESULTS 
The basic objective of the research was to estimate the ratio of advertising 
expenditure to sales for free-range and battery eggs in Palmerston North, in order to 
see whether the ratios were consistent with the hypotheses generated by the literature. 
It must be emphasised that the hypotheses could not be tested for statistical 
significance since the data related to a single product in a single area. The research 
was conducted in Palrnerston North in 1992-1993, examining the period 1986-1992. 
Two methods were used to estimate the ratio. First, expenditures by 
producers, retailers and wholesalers on advertising were estimated directly by 
surveying the various parties. Second, advertising media were surveyed to check 
actual expenditure. 
There were discrepancies between the two estimates and these are discussed 
further on and possible explanations are presented. The two estimates, their 
calculation and their relationship to the research questions are discussed below. 
3 A sample is defined as a proportion of the sampling frame chosen by a 
recognised sampling technique (Kidder, 1981). 
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It should be noted that in estimating advertising expenditure, a definition had 
to be given on what constituted advertising, since advertising material may take 
several forms and be presented in several places. For the purposes of this research, 
advertising was defined as the presentation of visual or aural information about 
brands or products: 
(i) at the point of sale 
(ii) in the media 
Expenditure on information via packaging was excluded from estimates of 
advertising expenditure as all producers spoken to regarded this as part of general 
production costs. 
Producers can sell eggs at their gate, direct to a retailer, to a wholesaler or to 
a producer cooperative (commonly defined as an egg floor by the producers 
interviewed). All four methods of sale are used in the Manawatu, although not by 
every producer, and all four avenues can, in theory, provide a venue for advertising 
the producer's eggs. However, in practice, the producers confine their advertising to 
outlets where they are in control of the sales. (The farm gate and direct to retailers). 
Until 1990, eight of the surveyed poroducers produced only battery eggs. In 
1990 there was a new market entrant weho produced solely free-range eggs. In the 
same year a battery producer diversified production in to free-range eggs, joined by 
another battery producer in 1991. All of these were on a small scale, from under 100 
hens to 1,800 by the end of 1992. 
The output for all battery farmers was ascertained by the research. While no 
figures on free-range egg production were given by the three free-range producers, 
an estimate was 'made by multiplying free-range flock numbers by a modified output 
per hen, based on battery hen production. Most battery producers estimated that 
each hen laid twenty-two dozen eggs a year. Since free-range hens roam and may 
lay their eggs where a producer can not fmd them, and since they are more accessible 
to predators, and subject to bad weather and disease, the figure of twenty-two dozen 
was modified to seventeen dozen every ten months. (Ten months allows for the 
natural moult that battery eggs do not have because of their controlled environrnent.). 
Before focusing on the advertising, the results of asking all participants in the 
research for their defmition of free-range egg production is worth noting. All 
producers recognised that there was a difference between free-range and battery egg 
production, and they were asked to define this in their own words. The answers 
consistently fell into three areas. 
First, three of the nine producers believed that free-range egg production 
meant that "The chooks should not be in battery cages". 
Second, five of the nine producers said that the hens should be able to "run 
outside", with one of the producers stipUlating a period of more than eight hours, and 
another adding that no time frame should exist. 
I-' 
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Finally, four of the nine producers believed that the hens should have "access 
to fresh grass", again with the two time stipulations recorded in the second response. 
There were additional comments with this question. Two producers stated 
that the area needed defIning, citing instances where having the door of the hen house 
open for half an hour may enable a producer to call their eggs free-range. Another 
two commented in stronger terms. After being read the question the fIrst words 
spoken were: "A lot of rot - there's no such thing as a real free-range egg. A lot of 
cheating occurs, you know."; and "A lot of nonsense, there's no such thing." 
It was the retailers who were vague about the term, although butchers and 
fruiterers were consitent in their defInitions. Other interviewees defmed the term as 
"a brown egg", "a loose egg" or "farm fresh eggs". While this is a brief comment, 
the research clearly showed confusion in the information markets. 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES 
Producers 
In the years 1986-1988 and 1990-1991, only three of the surveyed producers 
advertised. In 1989 that number rose to four, and in 1992 it was five. All of these 
producers advertised to increase gate sales; none gave specifIc advertising material 
to retailers. Two of the producers supplied free-range eggs, but did not at any stage 
emphasise this in their advertising; all eggs were advertised generically. All 
producers who advertised said that they did so to inform consumers of the fact that 
they sold eggs at the farm gate. 
Table 1 shows the number of surveyed producers who said they advertised, and 
their total expenditure on advertising other than packaging for each year under 
discussion. Four of the producers used newspapers, either free, or the local papers. 
Only one used leaflets ("junk mail"), and local magazines (which were not specified). 
Five set up gate signs, although these were generally a one off cost and only renewed 
if they became worn. Three also advertised in the yellow pages, while only one 
advertised on the radio. Expenditure on packaging is omitted since it proved almost 
impossible to get reliable estimates of costs. 
The information presented enables advertising sales ratios to be calculated. (See 
tables 2 & 3). 
I 
I 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
TABLE I 
TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE BY 
SURVEYED PRODUCERS 1986-1992 
---
NUMBER OF NUMBER PRODUCER 
PRODUCERS ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 
8 3 $ 4140 
8 3 $ 4140 
8 3 $ 4140 
8 4 $ 4 340 
9 3 $ 4140 
9 3 $ 4 840 
9 5 $10 840 
TABLE 2 
ADVERTISING/SALES RATIOS FOR ALL EGGS 
(FREE-RANGE AND BATTERY) FOR TIffi 
SURVEYED PRODUCERS 1986-1992 
10 
- - ---- -----
YEAR ADVERTISING VOL PRICE PER RATIO 
EXPENDITURE PRODUCED DOZEN AD/SALES 
* (dozen) (exc1.GST)** (VolxPrice) 
% 
1986 $ 4140 2462916 $ 2.00 0.084 
1987 $ 4140 2462916 $ 2.07 0.081 
1988 $ 4140 2462916 $ 2.17 0.077 
1989 $ 4 340 2554166 $ 2.10 0.081 
1990 $ 4 140 2 581 791 $ 2.80*** 0.057 
1991 $ 4 840 2606016 $ 2.70*** 0.069 
1992 $10 840 3 085 361 $ 2.65*** 0.13 
* This does not include the NZPB advertising estimate which is relevant to the 
Manawatu. The figure only states what the producers said they spent. 
I 
** Based on information in NZPB annual reports, and producer and retailer 
interviews. 
*** Prices are higher because of free-range eggs in the marketplace 
..... 
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YEAR 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
TABLE 3 
ADVERTISING SALES RATIOS FOR 
BATTERY EGGS 1986-1992 
(ALL SURVEYED PRODUCERS) 
ADVERTISING VOL PRICE PER 
EXPENDTIURE PRODUCED DOZEN 
* (dozen) (excl.GST)** 
$ 4140 2462916 $ 2.00 
$ 4140 2462916 $ 2.07 
$ 4140 2462916 $ 2.17 
$ 4 340 2554166 $ 2.10 
$ 4140 2554166 $ 2.00 
$ 4 840 2554166 $ 1.80 
$10 840 3033228 $ 1.70 
RATIO 
AD/SALES 
(VolxPrice) 
% 
0.084 
0.081 
0.077 
0.081 
0.084 
0.10 
0.21 
* This does not include the NZPB advertising estimate which is relevant to the 
Manawatu. The figure only states what the producers said they spent. 
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** Based on information in NZPB annual reports, and producer and retailer 
interviews. 
The advertising-sales ratios in the tables above are low. From table 2, for all eggs 
and all surveyed producers, no more than 0.084 cents per dollar of sales was spent 
on advertising. With the introduction of free-range eggs into the marketplace that 
ratio fell to 0.057 cents per dollar of sales, although it rose in 1992 to 0.13 cents per 
dollar. Removing the free-range egg sales and examining only battery sales (table 
3) a maximum of 0.21 cents per dollar of egg sales was spent on advertising in 1992, 
and was as low as 0.077 cents in 1988. 
During 1986-1988 the NZPB was also advertising nationally. As they represent the 
producers their expenditure should also be included, although only a rough estimate 
for any specific region is possible. The NZPB advertised throughout New Zealand 
on television, radios, in the Listener and the New Zealand Woman's Weekly. The 
local radio stations have no record of any advertising occurring here and neither do 
the two magazines for 1986. 
However, on the Listener, the NZPB spent $30,300 in 1987, and over $33,040 in 
1988. The NZPB included a recipe insert in 1988 which increased the cost but no 
estimate was available from the Listener. The NZWW estimated over $25,000 dollars 
spent for both 1987 and 1988 respectively. Since the industry was spending a large 
amount of money on generically advertising eggs in those three year this may account 
in part. for the low level of advertising that occurred in these years. 
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To estimate how much money of this national budget could be apportioned to the 
Manwatu area, the output (in dozens) of the surveyed Manawatu producers was 
divided by the National Output (in dozens) as recorded by the NZPB. This ratio was 
2462916 divided by 44 821 000, which equals a fraction of 5.5%. Since the NZPB 
uses the 1986 figure for its 1986/87 and 1987/88 annual reports, this figure has been 
used for all three years. With magazine, television and radio advertising, the NZPB 
spent an estimated $70 000 to $80 000 in 198617 and 1987/8 on various media 
campaigns. Therefore, multiplying $75 000 (a halfway point between the two figures 
above), by 5.5% an estimated figure of $4 125 of the NZPB advertising budget is 
apportional to the Manawatu area in the years 1986-1988. 
The advertising/sales ratios for 1986-1988 calculated in tables 2 and 3 do not 
include this estimated figure. However, once $4 125 is added to the producers' 
reported advertising figure of $4 140, the total advertising by producers for each year 
1986-1988 becomes $8 265. Maintaining the same sales values, the ratios change. 
For all battery and free-range eggs (table 2), and battery egg production only (table 
3), the advertising/sales ratio become: 1986: 0.17, 1987: 0.16, and 1988: 0.15 
(In 1986-1988 there was no commercial free-range egg production by the surveyed 
producers). 
The free-range egg producers interviewed who advertised eggs, did not differentiate 
their battery eggs and free-range eggs at any stage. They advertised eggs generically, 
whether instore or in the media. 
WholesalerlProducer Cooperative 
A total advertising cost of $2500 was reported, corresponding to only 1992. No 
advertising was said to have occurred 1986-1991. 
Retailers 
Supermarkets and Grocers 
There was no external advertising of eggs by the eleven retail outlets spoken with. 
Two retailers added the comment that they felt there was no need to advertise eggs 
as people always wanted them. They believed that any advertising would be a waste 
of money, as additional sales would be unlikely to cover the advertising costs. 
Dairies 
One of the twelve dairies sampled, who sold only battery eggs, advertised their 
eggs externally in 1991 for a period of three months at a cost of three hundred 
dollars. This corresponds to a volume of 3 120 dozen sold at $2.85, giving an 
advertising-sales ratio of 3.38. Therefore, in 1991, for each dollar sale of eggs, 3.37 
cents was spent on the advertising of those eggs. In terms of the advertising theory 
this figure falls into the short-term experience good category (Davis et al, 1991). 
This advertising occurred for only a short period of time to inform consumers that 
the outlet had cheap eggs for sale. Therefore, the change of category may be 
explained by consumers having to find the eggs, see that they were cheaper than their 
normal egg sellers, and trying them to ascertain their qUality. It must be reiterated 
that this advertising ceased after three months and eggs were once again only 
advertised by a sign on the shelf. 
I--' 
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Service Stations 
None of the service stations sampled advertised eggs. The volumes carried were 
very low, with a maximum of five dozen a week delivered. 
Butchers 
One butcher did advertise externally using the newspaper and radio in 199112. 
However, the advertisement was mixed with other lines so he was unwilling to 
estimate a figure. However, given information from the radio stations, thirty seconds 
would have cost approximately thirty dollars. The newspaper advertisement is more 
difficult to estimate as it depends upon size, but given other butcher advertisements 
it would have cost between sixty and eighty dollars. 
Eggs were only included when there was a special deal on price and quantity, 
otherwise they were not specified. 
Fruiterers 
Two of the fruiterers advertised, but neither could provide information on cost. In 
one instance the eggs were advertised with other products on the radio, (where again, 
thirty dollars for thirty seconds applies) whilst in the other it was run in a free-
newspaper when a special deal was available. (This can be estimated to be between 
thirty and fifty dollars). 
For both outlets eggs were advertised when there was a special, and they were 
advertised only on this attribute. 
Summary 
Table 4 summarises what the producers, retailers, wholesaler and producer 
cooperative interviewed, reported saying they spent on advertising: 
TABLE 4 
WHAT SURVEYED PRODUCERS, WHOLESALERS AND 
PRODUCER COOPERATIVE IN THE MANAWATU, 
14 
AND SlJRVEYED RETAILERS IN PALMERSTON NORTH 
REPORTED THAT THEY SPENT ON ADVERTISING EGGS 1986-1992 
-
YEAR PRODUCERS WHOLESALER! RETAILERS TOTAL 
PROD. COOP 
1986 $ 8 265* 0 0 $ 7 890 
1987 $ 8 265* 0 0 $ 7 890 
1988 $ 8265* 0 0 $ 7 890 
1989 $ 4340 0 0 $ 4340 
1990 $ 4140 0 0 $ 4140 
1991 $ 4 840 0 $ 300** $ 5 140** 
1992 $10 840 $ 2 500 0** $13 340** 
* Includes the estimated NZPB advertising expenditure of $4 125 and $4 140 
specified by the surveyed producers. 
** There were retailers who advertised but would not give a figure for reasons set 
out above. 
DIRECT ESTIMATE OF ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (EXCLUDING 
PACKAGING): INFORMATION CONTENT OF ADVERTISING 
Producers 
The retail outlet research brought six brands to light which are presented in cartons, 
made of plastic, fibre, or cardboard, to the consumer. Two of these brands had 
several packets for various quantities and sizes of eggs. 
The researcher tried to obtain estimates for the expense of packaging and printing 
labels on packaging from producers, with limited success. While producers could give 
an estimate of the cost of packaging (see below), they had no figures for total costs 
or total number of packets used, nor could they estimate the costs of printing 
information on the packets. For this reason the costs of the informational content of 
printing on packaging will be excluded from the [mal estimates. 
I-" 
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WholesalersIProducers Cooperatives 
Overall, five brand signs made of a plastic material advertising Little Red Hen eggs 
were discovered in various retail outlets. There was a logo, packet of eggs and three 
blocks ·of colour on the sign. (These are discussed further in appendix five). A sign 
writer in Palmerston North estimated that these would have cost $60 to $100 to 
make. This cost would have been incurred since 1988/9, when the NZPB ended. In 
this case an estimate can be made for the signs that were found: they would have cost 
between $300 to $500 in total. 
Packaging costs that these firms face would assumedly be similar to those faced by 
producers. However, since no volume information was released by these fmus no 
estimation is -possible on these costs. In addition, the same problem found with 
producers also exists: there is no indication of how many eggs sold through the 
wholesaler/producer cooperative were packaged or loose. This would affect the 
packaging costs and advertising costs. 
Two outlets used hutches, one of which was provided by the local producer 
cooperative, and the other by an Auckland producer. 
The 'local' hutch was painted dark brown, stood 2.130 metres high and 0.985 
metres square. It stood in a supermarket/grocer store beside the wire cages, and sold 
loose eggs, with unbranded boxes provided for the customers. The signs associated 
with the hutch were produced by the retail outlet, and gave the prices and quantities 
of the loose eggs. The supplier was noted on a small sticker in the bottom left hand 
corner of the larger signs. No claims about the type of eggs were made, other than 
they were loose eggs. 
The other hutch was unstained wood, 1.9 metres high and 1.4 metres square. It 
was located away from the wire cages, by the dairy food (such as butter) and sold 
only free range eggs, both pre-packed (branded), and loose eggs. Again, unbranded 
boxes were available for the consumer to package the loose eggs. This hutch was 
aimed at providing information about the producer's free-range eggs. 
A printed sign explaining the difference between 'farm fresh' and free range was 
1.880 metres above the eggs; the prices and quantities had been written in by the 
retailer. Pictures (31Omm by 395mm) which showed healthy brown hens feeding in 
lush green grass were displayed around the hutch also at 1.880 metres. These 
emphasised the written information which provided information about the birds being 
outside in a green environment as opposed to being in cages. The sign explained 
why most farm eggs were not free range eggs, but battery eggs, and then emphasised 
that their product was free-range. 
It is not possible to compare the two hutches with regards to the image they want 
to give to consumers. One hutch clearly states that free-range eggs are sold, and 
gives a guarantee on its packaging. The other hutch has retail signs which note the 
brand name but do not emphasis it. No claims are made about the eggs located there, 
other than their size, prices, and that they are sold loose. In addition, the free-range 
eggs sold by the same producer are sold in the retail outlet, but are located on the 
wire rack, a metre away from the hutch. Therefore, drawing a comparison is not 
possible. 
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In terms of costs, the first hutch was given no estimated cost. A tradesperson said 
that although it would be difficult to cost the hutch accurately, it would be a minor 
expenditure. It should be noted that the second hutch is not a Manwatu producer's 
cost, nor a Palmerston North retailer's cost. The- cost is incurred out of town, and 
the eggs it stocks are not advertised by the retailer. Therefore, an estimate of its cost 
has no valid part in this research, although its information content does. 
Retailers 
Not all retailers surveyed used in-store signs, and those that did valued them at a few 
dollars. Branding signs were not common and were only found in supermarkets and 
-grocers stores. In all but one instance they were unused (usually not fitting the shelf 
where the eggs were). The retailer who used them did so in association with a hutch 
supplied by the producer who was situated in Auckland. 
Sign Summary 
Although no summary of the costs of signs is possible, maiulY because of the 
- difficulties of verifying that all brand signs were included in the survey, it is clear 
that total costs for signs are very low. It is estimated that the handmade instore signs 
and the branding signs would total to approximately $2 000 at most across the period 
under investigation. (This includes the display units of the local hutch and the 
barrow). 
TIIE MEDIA 
A systematic random sample was taken for each year 1986-1992 across the 
Manawatu Evening Standard, the Guardian, Tribune, More magazine, North and 
South magazine, the Listener, and the New Zealand Woman's Weekly. 
Advertisements were found in the two former and two latter publications. 
The Print Media 
The NZPB used the Listener and NZWW to advertise eggs generically through-out 
New Zealand. These costs were noted because they were aimed to increase egg sales 
nationwide, and are therefore assumed to have benefited the producers, retailers, 
wholesalers and producer cooperatives of Palmerston North. This advertising totalled 
(for television, radio and magazines) between $70 000 to $80000 for 1986-1988. 
Advertising did occur in the Manawatu in the period 1986-1992, but was only 
found in the Manawatu Evening Standard and the Guardian. The fmdings from the 
systematic random sample are presented below in table 5. The costings are based 
upon those given by the printers of the newspapers. 
During this research, two advertisements for free-range eggs were found, one in 
1990 and another in 1992. These were estimated to have a cost of $5.46 and $19.08 
I-' 
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respectively, and is the only media cost of advertising that was found for free-range 
eggs. The eggs are not advertised by a commercial free-range egg producer, and may 
be backyard production. In addition, the larger advertisement was a regular feature 
in the newspaper, and although it specified eggs were sold in other advertisements, 
only once in the seven years under review were free-range eggs stipulated in the 
advertisement. 
Although this production does not relate to a commercial producer, it is free-range 
egg advertising and can be used, in conjunction with the estimates of the volumes of 
free-range eggs and prices from retailers and producers interviewed, to formulate two 
advertising-sales ratios. In 1990, $5.46 divided by 27 625 dozen eggs x $3.80/dozen 
gives a ratio of (in percent) 0.0052. In 1992, $19.08 divided by 52 133 dozen eggs 
x $3.80/dozen gives a ratio of (in percent) 0.0096. These ratios are considerably 
lower than those found for the battery eggs. 
--
YEAR 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
TABLE 5 
EGG ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 
IN PALMERSTONNOR1H FROM THE SAMPLE ONLY 
1986-1992 
-- -------- -- --
~- -
GUARDIAN GUARDIAN EVENING EVENING 
No. ADS* COSTS** STDNo STD 
ADS* COSTS** 
1 $ 34.56 3 $ 286.65 
0 11 $ 579.60 
0 7 $ 414.10 
0 0 $ 000.00 
1 $ 175.05 33 $ 965.68 
0 21 $ 871.08 i 
2 $ 456.05 24 $ 267.30 
* Number of advertisements found in the newspaper 
** Costs of those advertisements found 
Therefore, the largest quantity of advertising in PaImerston North was done in the 
Evening Standard. The advertisements were placed by fruit farms (1986-1991), 
poultry farmers, (1990-1992) or by Massey University (1986-1988) who used to sell 
eggs 1986-1988 with fruit and vegetables. A poultry farmer who advertised frequently 
. is still in business, but when interviewed gave a low advertising cost. This is likely 
to· have occurred because the main item being advertised is actually pullets (young 
chickens), the eggs are a secondary item. 
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These costs are based on random samples, so a scaling up of these figures to the 
population results in the following total advertising expenditure for each year to be 
estimated (See table 6). The scaling up was done by dividing one hundred percent 
by the sample size (also in a percent), giving a weighting value. For example: in 
1986, 100% - 22% gives 4.545455. Multiply this by $286.65 and the scaled up value 
of advertising in the Manawatu Evening Standard is $1302.95. 
~-
YEAR 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Radio 
TABLE 6 
SCALED UP EXTERNAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 
FOR P ALMERSTON NOR1H 1986-1992 
--------- -_._---------- ... _---------
SCALING: GUARDIAN SCALING ElSTD 
100% - n% TOT. COST 100% - n% TOT. 
COST 
3.571429 $ 123.43 4.545455 $1302.95 
0 4.255319 $2466.38 
0 4.385965 $1816.23 
0 0 
3.125 $ 547.03 4.424779 $4272.92 
0 4.545455 $3959.45 
3.571429 $1628.75 4.716981 $1260.85 
TOT. EST 
AD COST 
$1426.38 
$2466.38 
$1816.23 
0 
$4819.95 
$3959.45 
$2889.60 
The radio stations which run advertisements in PaImerston North were contacted 
and asked if they could furnish information on egg advertisements which had 
occurred on their radio station 1986-1992. The four stations all stated that no 
advertisements were on their records. However, one dairy owner said he ran radio 
advertisements, and several fruiterers also used the radio. This usage was between 
1990 and 1992. The radio stations provided cost information of approximately thirty 
seconds for $30. Since a dairy, butcher and two fruiterers advertised in 1991 or 
1992, a few hundred dollars would have been spent in this medium in those years. 
However, no discussion of the information these advertisements may have provided 
is available. 
...... 
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RECONCILIATION. 
It w~ difficult to obtain a direct estimate of everything, but comments made by the 
surveyed eggs sellers indicates that the [mal media figures of table 6 require Yellow 
pages, radio, and sign costs to be added for each year. From the surveyed producers, 
several indicated that they had placed advertisements in the Yellow pages at some 
stage during the period under investigation, but did not record this as an advertising 
expense. The placing of a company's name, address and phone number in the 
Yellow pages is free, but placing an advertisement is charged per height and column 
width. From conversations with the various producers, it became clear that some of 
them had placed advertisements, although not until the late 1980s. Therefore, 
assuming that two producers placed one column wide, and six centimetre high 
advertisements in the Yellow pages 1990 to 1991 at $680 (excluding GST) must be 
added to those years. One producer who was interviewed placed a smaller 
advertisement in the 1992 telephone directory, but did not record this when they were 
surveyed, so $100 (excluding GST) must be added to that year. (Another who did 
advertise did record it in the research).4 
All instore signs were estimated to be worth approximately two thousand dollars. 
Since instore signs were rarely changed, and the brand signs are understood to have 
been placed in stores after the NZPB demise, this cost will be added to 1989. 
Radio costs discussed above show that an estimated three hundred dollars should 
be added to 1991 and 1992. 
In addition, the NZPB advertising (estimated as $4 125 for 1986-1988) must be 
included in this section. 
Therefore a comparison of the two methods of estimating egg advertising is set out 
in table 1. Due to data limitations, no advertising expenditure-sales ratio may be 
formulated with this. 
4 These figures were obtained from Telecom Directories and are the prices 
charged in those years. 
TABLE ?-
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE RECONCILIATION 
(FOR ALL TYPES OF EGGS) 
1986-1992 
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YEAR METIfOD ONE METIIODTWO DIFFERENCE 
(WHAT WAS (WHAT WAS 
SAID) ESTIMATED) 
1986 $ 8 265* $ 5 551 * $ 2 714 
(Ml>M2) 
1987 $ 8 265* $ 6591 * $ 1674 
(Ml>M2) 
1988 $ 8265* $ 5941* $ 2 324 
(Ml>M2) 
1989 $ 4 340 $ 2 000 $ 2 340 
(Ml>M2) 
1990 $ 4140 $ 5 499 $ 1 199 
(Ml<M2) 
1991 $ 5140** $ 4 939 $ 201 
(Ml>M2) 
1992 $13 365** $ 3 292 $10 073 
(Ml>M2) 
* These figures include the NZPB advertising estimated for 1986-1988 (see page 86). 
** There were retailers who advertised but would not give any figures because eggs 
were not the focus of the advertisement 
This table shows that there is a discrepancy between the two fmdings. The figure 
in 1992 found by using the second method has the most marked difference. This is 
most likely explained by two commercial egg sellers who stated that they began 
advertising in 1992. One stated that he advertised using displays in retail outlets, but 
despite locating the brand in several shops, no evidence of display material was 
found. The other portion of the discrepancy and those recorded during the other years 
are likely to relate to producers advertising in other local free-to-the-home Manawatu 
newspapers (in townships such as Fielding and Ashhurst) which were not under 
examination in this research. (These newspapers are not delivered to Palmerston 
North houses). 
Despite this discrepancy, overall advertising expenditure in both estimates is still 
low in comparison to the volumes of eggs that are produced in the region. In the 
media, eggs were generically advertised in all cases except two in 1990 and 1992, 
...... 
0:> 
o 
21 
when they were specified as free-range. (11ris infonnation was verifiable if a 
consumer chose to drive to the place advertising the eggs). In comparison to the 
advertising of battery eggs however, free-range eggs had a low priority, as no local 
producers advertised their free-range eggs. The trend shown by this research was for 
retailers, producers and wholesaler and producer cooperative to advertise eggs 
generically, if they were advertised at all. 
Estimating the advertising expenditures of sellers of eggs, from packaging to 
displays to external mediums proved more difficult than had been originally thought. 
Battery eggs were advertised in-store and in the media more than free-range eggs 
(only two free-range egg advertisements to ninety battery egg or generic 
advertisements). While there was some discrepancy between the estimates of 
advertising expenditure, some advertising which occurred outside of Palmers ton North 
may account for the difference. The majority of the discrepancy however, relates to 
advertising which the producers, wholesaler, or producer cooperative said they 
supplied to retailers but which was not located by the researcher. 
Free-range eggs were not advertised by any of the local producers, and retailers did 
not do any external advertising either. The two free-range egg advertisements located 
in the Manawatu Evening Standard were not advertised by any of these businesses. 
Some retailers erected signs stating that eggs were free-range, but no verifiable 
infonnation was provided. Only free-range eggs imported from Auckland were found 
to try to present verifiable infonnation in-store, but the cost of this advertising with 
relation to sales values was beyond the scope of this research. 
The first research question anticipated "that between 1986 and 1992 eggs as a 
generic good will have a low total expenditure on advertising with respect to sales." 
The advertising/sales ratios for all eggs (battery and free-range output, see table 2) 
were low. Davis et al (1991) expected search goods to have an average ratio of 1.79, 
although individual products included in their work show that some goods ratios are 
as low as 0.19, while others were as high as 1.17. The generic findings for eggs in 
the Manawatu were lower than this, although the inclusion of the NZPB advertising 
expenditure achieved ratios of 0.15 to 0.17 for the years 1986 to 1988. Once the 
NZPB left the marketplace after 1988, the ratios fell to a low of 0.057 in 1990, but 
rose to 0.13 in 1992, when advertising increased. 
When eggs were separated into battery and free-range eggs, a change was noted. 
Examining only battery eggs (see table 3), the ratio was higher in 1990 and 1992. 
In 1990 the ratio became 0.084, while it rose to 0.21 in 1992, a figure obtained by 
Davis et al (1991) for search goods. 
Therefore, the anticipated finding of research question one, that eggs as a generic 
product would have low total expenditure on advertising with respect to sales was 
. obtained. The inclusion of the NZPB advertising 1986 to 1988 creates search good 
like ratios, and while the ratio declined between 1989 and 1991, the increases in 
advertising and sales in 1992 saw eggs move back into the search good regions laid 
down by Davis et al (1991). These factors combined with the factual infonnation 
presented by all advertising found in the stores and on all but three packets, shows 
theseratios to be consistent with Davis et al's (1991) hypothesis on search goods. 
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The second research question had two aspects to it. Part (a) stated that "free-range 
eggs are not expected to be more heavily advertised than battery eggs, unless the 
infonnation can be made more verifiable to the consumer." 
Free-range eggs were not advertised more heavily than battery eggs. Only two 
newspaper advertisements were found for free-range eggs, giving two 
advertising/sales ratios, one for 1990 (of 0.0052) and another for 1992 (of 0.0096). 
Of the surveyed egg sellers, no attempt was made to differentiate free-range and 
battery eggs in their external advertising. Packaging located in the retail outlets 
related to free-range eggs in only two instances, one a local packet and one imported 
from Auckland. The local packet gave a packing centre but no verifiable infonnation 
on how the eggs were raised. The imported packet attempted to provide some 
verification. 
The ratios of free-range eggs are below the credence levels found by Davis et al 
(1991). However, since these ratios are expected to be lower than search good ratios, 
the free-range egg advertising appears to be consistent with the credence good 
hypothesis put forward by Davis et al (1991). 
This leads to part (b) of the second research question. The infonnation presented 
to consumers on free-range eggs was expected to be verifiable, whether via addresses, 
MAF, industry standards, if the producer wished to move the product out of the 
credence good category. No industry standard exists as yet and nor do any general 
MAF guidelines. As was discussed above, the locally packaged free-range eggs 
differentiated their product only by labelling it as free-range egg, but provided no 
verification about the method of animal husbandry used in the raising of the eggs. 
The Auckland packet however, has attempted to verify their product using a MAF 
inspection guarantee, and locates the township where the farm is located. In addition, 
the hutch used to display their eggs is clearly considered an investment in 
verifiability with photographs and infonnation for the consumers. Therefore, some 
attempt appears to be being made to move the free-range eggs into a search good 
category. 
Overall, Davis et al (1991) ideas in relation to search and credence goods are 
supported by this research. It appears that the Auckland free-range eggs are 
attempting to move out of these categories and become an experience good by 
investing in displays, photographs, infonnative packaging and the likes. The 
imperfections that exist in this infonnation market at the moment lead to the 
conclusion that consumers can not search up to the point where the marginal cost of 
infonnation equals the marginal benefit as they are not provided with relevant 
infonnation on the product they wish to purchase. 
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SUMMARY 
The average payout to pipfruit growers by the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board 
(NZAPMB) is the only orchard level financial parameter reported annually. The NZAPMB, 
growers and industry commentators appear to judge the success of the industry by annual 
increases in this parameter. However, important factors influencing the payout to pipfruit 
growers such as inflation, production increases, the production mix' and currency fluctuations 
are 'bundled' in this parameter. The terms of exchange for the New Zealand pipfruit industry 
were calculated using an input index based on the New Zealand Department of Statistics' 
Horticultural Inputs Price Index. The New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board's average 
payment to pipfruit growers was used as the industry's output index. The Horticultural Inputs 
Price Index was derived for the 22 year period 1971 to 1993, based on the same index as 
reported by the New Zealand Department of Statistics from 1982. The terms of exchange 
facing New Zealand's pipfruit growers decreased from 1971 until 1990. However, from 1990 
to 1992 the terms of exchange increased markedly. This increase is a result of the increased 
average payment to pipfruit growers, continued low inflation and declining debt servicing costs. 
At current (1993) input costs the average payout to growers must decline to $11,64 per tray 
carton equivalent to reduce the terms of exchange to 1971 levels. This increase explains, in 
part, the recent increase in investment in the New Zealand pipfruit industry. 
Keywords terms of exchange, pipfruit industry, New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board 
INTRODUCTION 
"' The merits and success of producer boards has been a widely discussed topic, particularly 
in agricultural economics literature from New Zealand and Australia (Campbell, 1973; McCann 
and Lattimore, 1990; Nicholson, 1990; Hussey, 1992). It is difficult to gauge the success of 
producer boards with monopsony powers as there are no immediate competitors to compare 
their performance against. The issue of whether producer boards are performing in the most 
efficient manner is unlikely to be fully resolved. Instead the success of the New Zealand 
pipfnuit industry, dominated by the NZAFMB, is "measured" in terms of growers' financial 
wellbeing at the orchard level. One measure of the financial success of a primary industry is 
its terms of exchange (Reynolds and Moore, 1990). 
New Zealand's pipfruit growers have recently benefitted from the rewards of three consecutive 
successful years of exporting, (1990, 1991 and 1992). The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries Policy Unit (MAF Policy) judge the success of the industry as the receipt by growers 
of record returns from pipfruit sales (MAF Policy, 1992). 
An analysis of the Board's advance payments to growers for the 1993 season, suggests that 
premium varieties such as Braeburn, Cox's Orange Pippin and Gala are expected to return 
similar final payments to those achieved in 1992. However, the advance payments for Fuji 
and Royal Gala have been revised downwards from those paid in 1992. The advance 
"payments for less preferred varieties, such as Granny Smith and Red Delicious have also 
The produc;tion mix' includes submissions from the range of export varieties and the size distribution of fruit 
within each variety. -
been heavily reduced (NZAPMB, 1992a; NZAPMB, 1993). In late May 1993 the Board 
reduced prices for apples on the UK and European markets to stimulate demand ("Mixed 
news", 1993, 1). The cumulative difficulties encountered by the Board resulted in the 
[temporary] suspension of interim payments to producers ("Board suspends interim payments·, 
1993,1). 
The single financial parameter indicative of orchard financial performance reported by the 
pipfruit industry is ·the average annual payout to growers" (APPG) made by the New Zealand 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board. The APPG has been reported annually for the last 44 
years. Since 1970 this figure has increased from $1.71 per tce2 to $12.94 per tce in 1991 
and then declined to $12.60 pertce in 1992. MAF Policy (1993) estimate that the average 
payment to pipfruit growers will decline to $9.00 per tce in 1993. However, the likelihood, and 
amount of financial support drawn from the NZAPMB's 'price stabilisation fund' remains 
unknown. 
Indices can be used to compare the relative changes in the cost of factors affecting both 
inputs and outputs. Reynolds and Moore (op. cit.) used indices when reporting changes in 
the financial state of New Zealand's pastoral industries. Inputs and outputs are weighted by 
an indice based on changes from a base year (say, 1982 = 1000). Pastoral sectors appear 
to attach importance to the collection and reporting of such industry standard data (Wright, 
1989). This data is available publicly and reflects both relative and absolute changes within 
each sector. 
The Consumer's Price Index (CPI) is the most common measure of the 'cost of living' in New 
Zealand (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1991). The CPI measures changes in the general level of 
prices paid for goods and services that households purchase New Zealand Department of 
Statistics (NZDS), 1990). However, this index is inappropriate to use when analYSing inflation 
within a specific primary industry. The main shortcoming of the CPI is due to the Goods and 
Services Tax (GSl). GST is paid by consumers and is not retained by firms. Therefore, the 
cost of goods to firms is always less than the cost of goods to consumers. While the rate of 
GST is constant (currently 12.5%) there will be no difference between absolute values in the 
indices. However, when changes in the rate occur, the relative difference between the CPI 
and other industry related indices will alter. 
The best measure of inflation in New Zealand is the percentage change in the Gross Domestic 
Product Deflator (Dalziel and Lattimore, op. cit.). However, the GDP deflator ignores the cost 
of imported goods and services, "·it excludes the costs of producer's imported inputs. 
Therefore, it is not an accurate measure Of producers' input inflation. 
The NZDS calculates and reports a Horticulturat tnputs Price Index (HIPI) as one of the sub-
indices of the Agricultural Inputs Price Index (AIPI). The HIPI, reported since 1982,is 
calculated from a 'basket' of goods and services that is common to the AIPI sub-indices (for 
example see NZDS, 1991). However, the individual weights attributed to each of the goods 
and services are unique to the HIP!. 
OBJECTIVE 
The real return to the factors of production depends on the price received for goods and the 
costs involved in producing these goods. The ratio of output prices and input costs is the 
producers' 'terms of exchange'. The terms of exchange are a measure of competitiveness or 
the ability of one industry to attract a greater share of scarce resources from another with 
which it is in competition (Robinson and Reynolds, 1989). The objective of the study was to 
derive and discuss the terms of exchange of New Zealand's pipfruit industry. 
A tee (tray carton equivalent) is a bushel equivalent of frurt [hat is sold to export, local and processing 
mar'~ts. 
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METHOD 
The APPG Was used as a proxy for the output variable. The APPG is calculated by the 
NZAPMB as follOWS. First, all costs incurred by the Board are deducted froin the gross 
revenue r.eceived. Second, funds withdrawn from or paid into a 'price stabilisation fund' held 
by the Board are then either added or deducted. Third, the resulting net revenue is then 
divided by the total yield (tce) received by the Board from all submissions for either export, 
local or processing markets. 
The HIPI is the most appropriate measure of horticultural producer's input inflation. GOP 
inflation, the CPI, the HIPI reported by the NZOS and the HIPI calculated for this study for the 
period 1971 to 1993 are presented in Table 1. The input index was calculated for the years 
prior to 1982 using the same 'basket' of goods and services and their associated weights as 
used in the HIPI. The calculated input index for the period 1971 to 1992 is presented in Table 
2. 
Table 1: 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
19n 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Reported measures of inflation indexed over the period 1971-1993 (base year 
1982=1000). 
GDP' inflation 
261 
300 
330 
358 
378 
430 
519 
584 
660 
752 
867 
1000 
'1117 
1200 
1288 
1466 
1727 
1906 
2094 
2231 
2358 
2442 
CPI 
250 
262 
289 
326 
378 
436 
504 
553 
645 
750 
867 
1000 
1035 
1133 
1307 
1544 
1693 
ln3 
1901 
1993 
2012 
2021 
2041 
NZDS HIPI 
1000 
1008 
1047 
1236 
1308 
1370 
1445 
1495 
1610 
1596 
1551 
1551' 
Calc HIPI 
251 
268 
284 
316 
353 
404 
470 
502 
562 
732 . 
869 
1000 
1048 
1103 
1209 
1304 
1405 
1479 
1558 
1629 
1628 
1594 
1594' 
• GDP inflation = Gross Domestic Product deflator, CPI = Consumers Price Index, NZDS HIPI = New Zealand 
Department of Statistics Horticultural Input Price Index. Calc HIPI = Calculated Horticultural Inputs 
Price Index. 
tI Authors' estimate 
. Source; Dalziel and lattimore (1991). 
New Zealand Department of Statistics (1984, 1987, 1989, 1991. 1991a, 1991b. 1991c, 
. 1991d. 1992. 1993. 1993a). 
The percentage weights assigned by the NZDS were compared to the actual percentage 
weights on three pipfrun orchards and the MAF Farm Monitoring Report pipfrun model 
(MAFTech,1991). Few significant differences between the MAF Monitoring model, the case 
study orchards and the NZDS model were observed. The input index used to calculate New 
Zealand's pipfruit growers' terms of exchange was a combination of the NZOS HIPI and the 
calculated HIP!. The calculated HIPI was used for the period 1971 to 1982, and the NZDS 
HIPI was used for the period 1982 to 1993 (Table 3). 
RESULTS 
The terms of exchange for New Zealand's pipfruit industry for the period 1971 to 1993, using 
the HIPI, were calculated (Table 3, Fig. 1). The terms of exchange for New Zealand's pipfruit 
industry declined from 1971 to 1989, measured with indices of 1.31 and 0.90 respectively. 
The terms of exchange then increased markedly over the following three years, to the extent 
that in 1991 it was the highest recorded during the period of study. The terms of exchange 
were maintained in the 1992 financial year but are expected to decline markedly in 1993. 
Table 3: The indexed terms of exchange of New Zealand's pipfruit industry 
(1971-1993). 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
APPG 
$1.81 
$1.85 
$2.18 
$2.20 
$2.28 
$2.49 
$3.23 
$3.70 
$3.89 
$5.06 
$4.34 
$5.51 
$5.55 
$6.30 
$6.82 
$7.73 
$7.96 
$7.83 
$7.40 
$9.44 
$12.94 
$12.60 
$9.00' 
Indexed APPG 
328 
336 
396 
399 
414 
452 
586 
'672 
706 
918 
788 
1000 
1007 
1143 
1238 
1403 
1445 
1421 
1343 
1713 
2348 
2287 
1551' 
CPI 
250 
262 
289 
326 
378 
436 
504 
553 
645 
750 
867 
1000 
1035 
1133 
1207 
1544 
1693 
ln3 
1901 
1993 
2012 
2021 
2041' 
Estimates based on MAF Policy expected payout. 
HIPI 
251 
268 
284 
316 
353 
404 
470 
502 
562 
732 
869 
1000 
1008 
1047 
1236 
1308 
1370 
1445 
1495 
1610 
1596 
1551 
1551' 
ToE CPI 
1.31 
1.28 
1.37 
1.22 
1.10 
1.04 
1.16 
1.22 
1.09 
1.22 
0.91 
1.00 
0.97 
1.01 
1.03 
0.91 
0.85 
0.80 
. 0.71 
0.86 
1.17 
1.13 
0.81' 
ToE HIPI 
1.31 
1.25 
1.39 
1.26 
1.17 
1.12 
1.25 
. 1.34 
1.26 
1.25 
0.91 
1.00 
1.00 
1.09 
1.00 
1.07 
1.05 
0.98 
0.90 
1.06 
1.47 
1.47 
1.05' 
Source; New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board (1992), New Zealand Department 01 Statistics (op. cit.). 
MAF Policy (op. cit). 
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To equal.the 1971 terms of exchange (ToE = 1.31), the APPG needs to be $11.64 pertce at 
current input costs. This is an increase of some $2.60 over the estimated payment to growers 
for the 1993 season. The estimated payment to growers of $9.00 per tce, represents a 30% 
decline from the previous year in nominal terms. The terms of exchange confronting pipfruit 
growers are now similar to those during the period 1982 to 1987. 
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Figure 1. The terms of exchange of New Zealand's pipfruit industry (1971-1993). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Inpol costs are expected to increase only Slowly over the next few years and, therefore, the 
. significant factor affecting the industry's terms of exchange will continue to remain the returns 
obtained by the NZAPMB. New Zealand's current economiC policies have removed the 
destructive inflationary environment. Pipfruit growers would not have benefitted from the 
mar'.<ed increase in returns received in 1990, 1991 and 1992 had inflation remained in double 
figures, i.e". the benefits of markedly improved returns would have been absorbed by rising 
inpol costs. 
The high returns in 1990 appeared to be attributable to the improved varietal mix, the early 
completion of sales and favourable exchange rates (NZAPMB, 1990). The record returns in 
1991 and 1992 were reported to be attributable to consecutive low harvests of summerfruit 
and pipfruit in European countries (NZAPMB). 1991; MAF Policy, 1992; NZAPMB, 1992). In 
the early part of the 1992 season the NZAPMB was able to sell '15 percent more fruit at 
prices five to ten percent above 199i levels' (NZAPMB, 1992). However, by the beginning 
of the European summer New Zealand pipfruit prices were severely depressed. Depressed 
pipfruit prices were reported to be attributable to large 'berry fruit and stone fruit production, 
lack of growth of consumer spending and the continuing oversupply of bananas' (NZAPMB, 
1992)_ The average payment to pipfruit growers (APPG) for 1992 was $12.60 per tee, down 
34 cents (2.7%) from the record payout achieved by the NZAPMB in 1991 of $12.94 per tce. 
Growers in the New Zealand pipfruit industry are confronted with declining terms of exchange. 
This decline IS similar to that found in most other land based industries in New Zealand 
(Reynolds and Moore, op. cit.). They have recently benefitted from two outstanding revenue 
years. However, the record returns received in 1990, 1991 and 1992 may prove to be 
temporary exceptions to the trend. Market performance needs to be enhanced to maintain, 
let alone improve the industries terms of exchange in the medium term. 
The terms 0/ exchange, however, are a gross industry level measure of orchard financial 
performance. They should not be interpreted as being a fait accompli/or individual growers. 
The range of growers' management ability in the pipfruit industry is as diverse as that in other 
land based industries. Furthermore, the resources at growers' disposal (land, labour and 
capital) are also varied. Thus, individual growers are likely to respond to the declining terms 
of exchange in an orchard specific manner. 
The production mix importantly influences the individual grower's average pipfruit price. 
Growers have the opportunity, within the constraints of crop maturation times and capital, to 
manipulate the production mix to their advantage. Varietal selection, fruit size, export packout 
as well as crop load contribute to orchard production and income. Fruit size, packout and 
crop load can be largely manipulated by tactical management in the form of pruning, thinning 
and disease and pest control. Varietal selection is determined by strategic decision making 
at either orchard establishment of subsequent renovation. Through time the difference 
between the payout for preferred varieties and less preferred varieties is likely to increase. 
Varietal selection will, therefore, remain a crilical strategic decision for growers. 
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RISK EFFICIENT PERENNIAL CROP SELECTION: A MOTAD APPROACH TO 
KIWIFRUIT DIVERSIFICATION 
SUMMARY 
M Kearney 
Agriculture New Zealand, Nelson 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a method for assessing changing perennial 
crop enterprises while taking risk into account. Kiwifruit growers are interested in 
diversifying into other crops due to the current poor profitability of kiwifruit. Citrus was 
used as an example of a perennial crop that could be diversified into. 
Gross margins were simulated based on historical information and analysed using a 
two stage process. Firstly a Target MOTAD model was used to assess the relative 
risk return associated with individual crops. In effect this was a partial analysis 
concentrating on expected profit. Having reached a solution, this was used as a target 
to aim for. 
This two stage approach gave useful results that showed the trade off between risk 
and return. While it is a compromise between an ideal model where all factors are 
considered at the same time, it is felt that it gave useful results for the resource 
available. More work is needed on what basis should be used to assess the optimal 
pOSition to aim for. 
Keywords: risk, perennial crop replacement, kiWifruit, citrus, diversification, 
Simulation, Target MOTAD. 
INTRODUCTION 
The kiwifruit industry is currently experiencing the lowest prices they have ever 
received at $3.85 a tray. There is a lot of interest amongst kiwifruit growers to diversify 
into other crops. Districts such as Nelson and Gisborne have alternative crops like 
apples and grapes to diversify into. 
However the major kiwifruit production zone is in Tauranga with approximately 10,000 
hectares out of the national total of 16,000 hectares. There are fewer alternatives 
available to growers in Tauranga. 
. Orie group of options available is to diversify into citrus. However none of the 
alternatives available to growers are risk free. All the alternative horticultural crops 
have some element of business risk associated with varying incomes. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate an appropriate methodology for analysing 
perennial crop replacement problems taking into account business risk, specifically 
related to income variation. The nature of the problem facing growers is that they 
have make decisions where the future outcomes are uncertain but considerable capital 
expenditure is required and there is a long lead in time until they reach maturity. 
This paper will firstly discuss the choice of techniques available to solve the problem 
posed. It will then discuss the data sources and generation of expected incomes for 
the relevant crops. The model framework will be outlined and important assumptions 
highlighted. Finally results will be discussed and conclusions reached regarding the 
suitability of the technique chosen for assessing perennial crop replacement taking risk 
into account. 
CHOICE OF TECHNIQUE - THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
TECHNIQUE 
The standard approach for considering risk and returns is the mean variance 
approach developed in the 1950's. There are some criticisms ofthis approach. Firstly 
it gives more weight to larger variances both negative and positive. However when the 
focus is on negative deviations i.e. bad aspects of risk, it is often largely relevant to 
penalise larger deviations belOW the mean more than the smaller deviations (Parton 
& Cumming). 
Secondly positive risk is treated as equally as negative risk. There is research 
suggesting that individuals perceive risk as negative deviations from an ideal outcome 
(Boggess, Hanson & Ladd). Individuals are very happy to accept positive deviations 
and are not adverse to these at all. However the mean variances approach treats 
both positive and negative deviations as one and the same. 
Mean variances problems can be solved using quadratic programming. However this 
is a cumbersome technique to apply and the data requirements are very intensive 
(Hazell, Boisvert & McCarl). Alternative methods have been developed by Hazell 
called the MOTAD model. This is a proxy for the mean variances approach focusing 
on minimising absolute deviations. It can be solved using linear programming code 
and so is often easier to s91ve in practice. However the MOT AD approach still treats 
positive and negative deviations the same. 
An alternative formulation was first proposed by Tauer which has been labelled Target 
MOTAD. This approach focuses on minimising negative deviations and is inherently 
more acceptable to most individuals. Both MOTAD and target MOTAD do not require 
risk preferences to be elicited. The data is presented and the user can make his own 
mind up. Therefore he or she can apply their own risk preferences to the data and 
make their own decisions (Boisvert & McCarl). Target MOTAD has also been shown 
to be more risk efficient than previous the two methods in that it is efficient in both first 
and second order stochastic dominance (Watts, Boisvert & McCarl) 
Target MOTAD was selected as the appropriate method to use in this situation from 
both theoretical and practical points of view. Theoretically it seems at least as sound 
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as other methods availabie. In practical terms Target MOTAD models can be solved 
using codes 'which are readily available. It also does not require individual user risk 
preferences to be elicited. The data can be presented and users can make their own 
assessment of which solution is the best for their own needs. 
TWO STAGE METHOD 
Target MOTAD data requirements are too large to allow risk to be incorporated directly 
into a detailed Intertemporal Model such as used by Kearney. Instead a two stage 
process was used as suggested by Rae. 
Firstly, Target MOTAD will be used to determine an optimum crop mix to aim for 
having regard to risk and return. This target will give a crop mix to aim for when the 
model orchard is fully mature. 
The second stage is to check to see if the target crop mix is feasible. A more detailed 
Intertemporal Linear Programming will be used to see if moving to the target mix is 
feasible given the long lead in time and considerable development costs of perennial 
crop systems. Detailed constraints can be applied as required. 
Seperating the problem into the two stages of deciding where to go and then seeing 
if it is feasible to get there is not as intuitively pleasing as a model that does all these 
at one time. However, while there may need to be some cycling between the two 
stages, the resulting solution should be satisfactory and able to be achieved with 
reasonable use of resources. 
DESCRIPTION OF MODEL ORCHARD 
The analysis is based on a 6 hectare kiwifruit orchard in Tauranga. The orchard is 
fully mature. There is $19,000 of orchard income earned. 'It has no capacity to 
borrow as lenders are unwilling to lend on kiwifruit orchards at the moment. Therefore 
all development has to be out of existing cash flow. 
The decision analysed in this paper is whether to replace all or part of the existing 
kiwifruit orchard with one of three citrus crops. The citrus crops considered are Navel 
Oranges, Standard Lem0r:is and Encore Mandarins. 
While it is possible for an individual to consider replacing kiwifruit with citrus, it is not 
feasible over the whole industry for all kiwifruit growers to move out of kiwifruit into 
citrus. There are approximately 10,000 hectares of kiwifruit in Tauranga alone. This 
compares to a total national area of citrus of approximately 2,400 hectares. Obviously 
a small change out of kiwifruit into citrus could easily swamp the citrus market. 
In particular Encore Mandarins are a high profit, high labour use crop. It is felt that 
the market for this variety is limited. Therefore the maximum area that could be 
planted in Encore Mandarins as a means of diversifying on a kiwifruit orchard has 
been set at 1 hectare. Lemons and Navels can be incorporated up to the remaining 
5 hectares if·that is profitable. 
TARGET INCOME 
The target income level (see Table 1) is the amount required to meet minimum fixed 
costs. It is based on the typical levels shown in the MAF Farm Monitoring Report for 
December 1992. 
Table 1: Target Income 
Fixed production Costs 
Repairs and Maintenance 
Administration 
Drawing 
Mortgage interest 
principle 
Total Target Income 
SIMULATED GROSS MARGINS 
3,650 
6,880 
10,530 
18,500 
10,250 
3,500 
42,780 
The source of risk that was of interest in this analysis was income variation. Other 
sources of Business risk and Financial risk have not been considered in this paper. 
Table 2: Distributions used to simulate income 
Average ~ 60 70 97 Minimum 30 20 70 Most Common 50 60 90 100 130 130 
tjha) I[J!; 
Average 6,000 33 ~ Minimum 20 30 25 Most Common 30 40 40 Maximum 50 50 50
Standard Deviation 765 
distributions are triangular with the exception of kiwifr 
normal distribution. 
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· There are no forecasts for yield price or income available. Therefore the approach 
taken was to generate estimates of income from triangular distributions in the main of 
yield and price for each product. The distributions used are shown in Table 2. 
Graphs of each distribution is shown in appendix 1. 
Kiwifruit yield estimates are based on subjective opinions from industry experts (Sale, 
Underwood). National and regional historical data is not that useful as yield trends for 
mature orchards are camouflaged by young vines maturing. Therefore it was felt more 
reliable to use the judgement of experts who observe mature orchards. 
Kiwifruit prices were set based on historical data adjusted for the stage of industry 
development. The highest price since 1980 was $10.08 a tray in 1983. Since then 
price has tended to trend downwards as New Zealand and world production has 
increased. It is unlikely that prices will return to these levels. However it is also felt 
that it is unlikely that prices will go much further than they are at the present. Therefore 
the minimum price for kiwifruit is set at $3.00 a tray and a maximum of $7.00. 
Citrus price and yield data was based on Gross Margin surveys done for MAF Farm 
Monitoring Reports. Scientific trial results were used where available and expert 
opinion from industry commentators was also used (Sale, Loudon). 
The actual levels of prices and yields used will no doubt create much interest from 
people in the industry. However for the purpose of developing a technique which is 
the focus of this paper, it is felt that these prices are in the right order . 
Costs are based on historical data from a range of sources primarily various farm 
monitoring reports. 
SAMPLE SIZE 
With current computers power and software packages, it is possible to generate very 
big sample sizes. However sample sizes and in the literature are often 50 or less 
(Teague and Lee, Parton and Cumming). However graphs of 50 simulations showed 
these distribution to be skewed and incomplete (see figures 1 and 2). 
It was felt that small sample sizes such as 50 would lead to bias in the results. 
Through the luck of the draw the expected gross margin might be higher or lower than 
the population mean. Therefore the sample size was increased to 500 samples. Tests 
were done on a sample size of 1000 but there seemed to be little increase in accuracy 
for a considerable amount of extra effort. 
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WHAT DATA TO GENERATE 
There are very few studies done on perennial crop replacement incorporating risk. 
Those that have been done have used annual gross margins at maturity as the focus 
of their simulation and analysis. However analysis such as that done by Teague and 
Lee have been considering enterprises which all have the same starting point. In the 
case of Teague and Lee they were comparing different grapefruit and citrus spacings. 
However they all started at the same time and had an approximately similar 
development period. 
In the case of the model kiwifruit orchard based in Tauranga, the existing situation is 
that there is 6 hectares of kiwifruit prodUCing some income. If it is to be replaced then 
there is a loss of income from the kiwifruit until the replacement citrus crop is into 
production. There is also considerable extra expenditure involved in planting a new 
I-' 
co 
-0 
crop. If the kiwifruit is allowed to remain in the ground there is no extra expenditure 
but a continuing source of income. 
The approach taken in this analysis was to use Equivalent Annual Returns as the end 
point of the simulation. Development budgets were drawn up for each of the three 
citrus crops. Yield and price distributions were applied to each age group. The 
simulation programme was run. At the end of each simulation the net present value 
for 20 years was calculated and then converted into an equal annual return i.e. 
amortised to an annuity. This approach of using an equivalent annual return has been 
used by Faris in comparing replacing an orchard with continuing the existing varieties. 
The effect is to convert an uneven stream of income, starting with large negatives 
progressing over 10 years to large positives, into one figure which can be compared 
to the annual gross margin of kiwifruit. 
The outcome from the two different approaches is shown in Table 3. As can be seen 
there is no difference in kiwifruit whether an annual gross margin or an equivalent 
annual return is concerned. Note that kiwifruit has no development cost. . The 
difference comes with an item such as Navels. It has a high annual gross margin at 
maturity of $14,383. This compares very favourably with kiwifruit. 
Table 3: Comparison of annual gross margins with Discounted 
($jha 
Gross Margin at Equivalent Development 
Annual Return Cost 
Maturity 
Kiwifruit 6,296 6,296 0 
Navels 14,383 3,746 12,397 
Lemons 22,010 7,523 5,162 
Encore Mandarin 28,679 10,435 5,162 
I Discount factor used = 15% I 
In any subsequent analysis using Target MOT AD or linear programming Navels, would 
dominate kiwifruit at all stages. However, when development costs and time to reach 
maturity is taken into consideration Navels are much less profitable in this particular 
scenario than kiwifruit. The margin between lemons and Encore is also considerably 
reduced compared to kiwifruit. . 
.Growers considering planting a new crop do not consider only the annual gross 
margin when the orchard is in full production. Other very important factors are the 
development cost to get the crop into production and the time delay to reach full 
production. These two· aspects are more than matters dealing with feasibility. 
Growers incorporate these factors into their assessment of profitability of the 
respective crops. 
In the case of Navels the overall profitability of the variety is lower than the annual cash 
flow would suggest because of the high development costs. Development costs for 
Navels are $12,397 compared to $5,162 for the other two citrus varieties. Navels have 
a much higher planting density than other citrus varieties. 
Also in this particular case it must be remembered that continuing the kiwifruit orchard 
in production has no development cost and no delay for income to come on stream. 
Therefore it was felt that the most appropriate output from the simulation was the 
equivalent annual return rather than an annual gross margin. 
The output from the simulation is summarised in Table 4. Mandarins is the most 
profitable crop at $10,383jha. It has the lowest variation and therefore is likely to 
dominate a solution. In fact if it is not constrained to one hectare it would be planted 
in preference to all other crops. 
I 
I 
Table 4: Output from Simulation 
Average 
Standard Deviation 
Coefficient of Variation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Sample size = 500 
Method = Monte Carlo 
(Equivalent Annual Return $/ha) 
I Kiwifruit I Navel I Lemon 
6,229 3,737 6,608 
1,440 1,233 1,758 
23.1% 33% 26.6% 
10,227 8,203 11,832 
1,677 953 1,988 
I 
I Mandarin I 
10,383 
1,293 
12.5% 
14,106 
7,232 
Navels have the lowest return per hectare, being approximately 50% less than kiwifruit 
and lemons. Therefore Navels are unlikely to come into the solution. Kiwifruit and 
lemons have similar average returns although lemons are slightly higher. However 
kiwifruit has lower returns but lower variation. It is possible that there may be some 
situations where risk adverse individuals may prefer kiwifruit than lemons. 
TARGET MOTAD MODEL 
The Target MOTAD model formulation used in this analysis is copied from Parton and 
Cumming (see their article for more detail). 
Maximise E(R) = R X 
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Subject to: AX<B 
R* X + d- > T 
Pd- < D 
X, d- > 0 
R = 1 * n vector of expected gross margins for each activity 
X = n * 1 vector of activity levels 
E = expectation 
A = k * n vector of resource requirements 
B = k * 1 vector of resource constraints . 
R* = series of m 1 *n vectors of simulated gross margins 
T = m * 1 vector with each element equal to the target 
d- = m * 1 vector of negative deviations from target 
P = 1 * m vector of probabilities for each observation (i), Pi = 1 1m 
D = a scalar parameterised from zero to a very large number 
n = number of activities 
m = number of observations, (simulated years) 
k = number of resource constraints 
The activities in the model are kiwifruit and the three citrus crops. Dairy was 
considered briefly but the gross margin was too low to come into the solution. The 
model is constrained by total land availability of 6 hectares. There was also a 
constraint that Encore Mandarins cannot be more than 1 hectare due to marketing 
limitations. The main constraint affecting risk is the acceptable deviation from the 
target. This is paramatised to provide the risk efficient frontier. 
RESULTS 
The results from the Target MOTAD model using the equivalent annual returns as the 
measure of gross margin for each activity shown in Figure 3 and Table 5. The graph 
is sloping to the left as would be expected. This implies that as an individual is more 
risk adverse and will tolerate a lower mean negative deviation than the expected 
revenue will decline with lower mean negative deviation. 
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Table 5: Notes to Risk Efficient Frontier 
Target Income = $42,780 
Orchard Area = 6ha 
I Area Planted I I I I 
Kiwifruit 1.8 1.2 0.6 0 
Navels 0 0 0 0 , 
Lemons 3.2 3.8 4.4 5.0 
Encore 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
I Expected Gross Margin 
, 
42,741 42,953 43,188 43,421 
I 
Mean negative deviation 2,600 2,750 3,000 3,302 i 
I % negative deviations 52.6% 51.6% 51.2% 51% 
Maximum negative deviation 15,846 
~--- ----- ~ -
17,131 19,355 23,319 i 
Table 5 shows a considerable change in the optimal planted area as risk attitudes 
change. Risk adverse individuals will choose a lower mean negative deviation. At this 
point the best solution is to have 1.8ha of kiwifruit with 3.2ha of lemons and 1.0ha of 
Encore. Encore remains in the target solution regardless the changing levels of risk 
aversion. 
However as an individual is prepared to accept a higher level of risk as measured by 
a higher mean negative deviations, the proportion of kiwifruit decreases and the 
proportion of lemons increases. 
This reflects the output summarised in Table 4 which show kiwifruit to have a lower 
average gross margin and also lower variation. Therefore as risk tolerance increases 
the crop mix changes from a lower risk crop (kiwifruit) to a higher return but higher 
variance crop (lemons). 
.Sample Number 
Relating back to the point made previously about what sample size should be used, 
the Target MOTAD model was recalculated using only 50 samples instead of 500. The 
results are shown in Table 6. In both cases the risk constraint is set very large so it 
does not constrain the optimal crop mix. 
I-' 
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Table 6: 50 vs 500 samples 
I Kiwifruit II Navels 1 Lemons II Encore 
1500 Samples II II 1 II 
Mean Gross Margin 6,229 3,737 6,608 10,383 
Standard Deviation 1,440 1,233 1,758 1,293 
Area planted (ha) 0 0 5.0 1.0 
Objective function 43,421 
Mean negative deviation 3,302 
% negative deviation 51% 
Max negative deviation 23,319 
150 samples I I I II I 
Mean Gross Margin 6,689 3,555 6,628 10,803 
Standard Deviation 1,246 1,256 1,708 1,339 
Area planted (ha) 2.9 0 2.1 1.0 
Objective function 44,119 \ 
Mean negative deviation 1,241 
% negative deviations 38% 
Max negative deviation 8,698 
NB: Both the above examples are for unconstrained scenarios ie: M is very large. 
The 50 sample analysis is not as accurate as the 500 samples. The mean gross 
margin for kiwifruit is considerably higher under the 50 sample than the 500 sample, 
while Navels is somewhat lower and Lemons remains unchanged. 
This alters the relative risk return relationships. In the cases of the 50 sample, kiwifruit 
has a higher mean gross margin and a lower standard deviation than lemons. 
Therefore there is 2.9ha of kiwifruit coming into the target solution with 50 samples 
whereas the 500 sample analYSis had no kiwifruit in the target solution. 
Therefore although 50 is a common number reported in literature, it appears to be 
adequate. only for research. For providing practical advice larger sample sizes are 
needed. The sample size of 500 was picked from visual checking of the output 
distribution. More efficient stopping rules are given by Naylor. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Using triangular distributions to simulate estimates of yield and price and hence 
income was an effective method of assessing the streams of income likely to be faced 
in the future. The Target MOTAD method works according to the theory and 
assessing the trade-off between low return/low risk activities compared to high 
return/high risk activities. Therefore using Target MOTAD to assess risk is a valuable 
addition to the sum of information available on perennial crop replacement. 
However more work may need to be done to assess the theoretical appropriateness 
of using the equivalent annual returns in a Target MOTAD situation. Target MOTAD 
models are a safety-first approach. The focus is to allow the user to compare how well 
their annual fixed cash costs are met by the optimal solution. In this paper equivalent 
annual returns were used instead of annual cash flows in order to get around the 
problem posed by the case study where development costs and time were uneven 
between activities. However there is a question as to whether it is appropriate 
to compare the variability of equivalent annual returns against fixed annual costs. 
The results of the Target MOTAD should be assessed for feasibility with an intempcrai 
model. 
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KIWIFRUIT AREA CHANGES AND YIELD V ARlABILITY BY 
. GROWING REGIONS! 
Ram SriRamaratnam, Phil Hay, Beth Bailey, Carolyn Stevens 
and Prakash Narayan 
MAF Policy, Wellington 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the expansion in the kiwifruit area for the major growing 
regions in New Zealand from 1975-1991. The regional yields derived from bearing 
area and regional production are also smdied. 
The smdy aims to identify the factors that influenced the changes in area in the 
different regions and estimate their level of impact through econometric relationships. 
Also covered in the paper is the extent of yield variability and a comparison of 
regional yields. An understanding of factors which influenced the kiwifruit area and 
yields by growing regions will enable estimation of likely area and yield responses 
in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this smdy is to model New Zealand kiwifruit production in the main 
growing regions and nationally. It examines the expansion in kiwifruit area in the 
main growing regions and investigates the changes in regional yields derived from 
bearing areas and regional production estimates. These were analysed by developing 
an econometric model of kiwifruit production based mainly on historical data. 
The four separate regions smdied are: 
(a) Northland & Auckland; 
(b) Bay of Plenty & Waikito; 
(c) rest of North Island; and 
(d) South Island. 
Factors which influenced the expansion of the industry and yields are incorporated 
into the model. This includes such factors as; prices, costs, government policies, 
relative profitability, crop management and climatic conditions. Also included is the 
use of the chemical Hi-cane and its effect on yields and on lowering yield variability. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
official view of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The helpful suggestions and 
comments of colleagues at MAP Policy and else where are acknowledged. Errors and 
omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. 
The emphasis is on regional econometric modelling by representing the dynamics of 
perermial crop agriculrnre (French and Mathews, 1971; Rae and Carman, 1975 and 
Knapp and Konyar, 1991) and also by recognising the regional diversity of 
production. 
OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives of this work are as follows: 
(a) to examine the expansion in the kiwifruit growing area by major growing 
regions; 
(b) to investigate the level and variability of yields in these growing regions; 
(c) to develop a model of area and yield responses to understand the nature and 
the level of impacts of key factors responsible; and 
(d) to employ the model developed to make medium-term estimates of future area 
responses as well as yield and production levels in the kiwifruit industry. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The Growth in Kiwifruit Area 
Over the period 1975 to 1991 the area planted in kiwifruit expanded dramatically. 
In 1975 the total planted area of kiwifruit was 642 ha. However, by 1991 the total 
area had increased by over 2000% to 15,086 ha, peaking at 15,895 ha in 1989. Area 
is divided into two categories, total area and bearing area. Bearing area is the total 
planted area less any area not yet in production. 
The growth curve in figure 1 is a classic S-shaped growth curve typical of new 
products. Up until 1980 growth in area expanded steadily, but at a relatively low 
rate. From 1981 to 1987 the area grew rapidly. The period from 1987 on represents 
the maturation phase of the industry with the growth in area slowing down and 
evenmally becoming negative. 
The growth curve in national area closely reflects that of the most significant growing 
region - the Bay of Plenty (BOP) which represented about 65% of the national 
bearing area in 1991. The bearing area in the other regions also grew rapidly, but 
on a much smaller scale. Northland/Auckland represented 16% of the area in 1991, 
the Rest of North Island 11 %, and the South Island 7%. 
Figure 1: Kiwifruit 
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The rapid growth in plantings meant that the percentage of the total area in bearing 
fell until 1981. As the new vines came into production the area in bearing rose and 
by 1991 around 97% of the total area was in production. 
Factors Contributing to Growth in Area 
Kiwifruit Returns and Relative Profitability ~ 
Relative returns for kiwifruit in relation to other competing enterprises have 
influenced the nature of growth in the New Zealand kiwifruit industry. 
Figure 2: Kiwifruit Returns Relative to Other Enterprises 
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Three enterprises that have had a major impact on total kiwifruit area in New Zealand 
are apples, dairy and beef (figure 2). Until 1985, the returns from kiwifruit were 
higher than the returns from these other enterprises. However, this situation has now 
largely reversed. Since 1985 returns for apples have been higher than kiwifruit, while 
milkfat returns have been about equal to kiwifruit. Only beef remained relatively less 
profitable than kiwifruit in the period to 1991. 
In the main Waikato and Bay of Plenty region, the two enterprises competing with 
kiwifruit were dairy and beef farming. Kiwifruit, an intensive horticultural system 
does not compete with dairy and beef for land. However, being highly capital 
intensive, kiwifruit competes for capital funds. The big increase in kiwifruit area in 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s was due to the higher levels of profitability 
kiwifruit was generating (figure 3). This was also the period when sheep and beef 
farming received very favourable returns mainly as a result of the livestock incentive 
schemes that were in place. During this period, farm advisors also encouraged on-
farm diversification, and kiwifruit looked the best of all options. 
Figure 3: Gross Margins: Kiwifruit & Competing Enterprises 
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In the Northland and Auckland region, deer and beef farming, and to a lesser extent 
dairy farming, were alternatives to kiwifruit production. Deer farming being a new 
farming enterprise like kiwifruit, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, was also 
quite capital intensive. Kiwifruit area in=ased rapidly in this region during this 
period (figure 4), once again because relative profitability (gross margins) favoured 
kiwifruit production. In the mid-1980s, as the gap in relative profitability between 
deer and kiwifruit declined, this resulted in a lack of expansion in kiwifruit 
However, in the late 1980s the kiwifruit area in this region expanded again as the 
profitability (gross margin) of alternative enterprises to kiwifruit, such as deer 
farming began to decline considerably, while beef profitability (gross margins) did 
not increase substantially. 
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Figure 4: Gross Margins: Kiwifruit and Competing Enterprises 
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The above trend was experienced in the rest of the North Island (figure 5) as well, 
except for the fact that kiwifruit area declined since 1985. This was mainly attributed 
to the relative profitability (gross margin) of kiwifruit production in relation to apple 
production, which has declined substantially since mid to late 1980s. The 
profitability of beef and especially deer farming activities also declined during the 
late 1980s but not to the same extent as kiwifruit production. 
Figure 5: Gross Margins: Kiwifruit & Competing Enterprises 
Poverty Bay, Hawkes Bay & Rest of Nonh Island 
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In the South Island, there appear to have been two phases of area expansion. During 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, kiwifruit area rose because of its higher relative 
profitability (gross margin) in comparison to competing alternative enterprises such 
as deer and apples (figure 6). In the mid-1980s, there was some competition from 
deer which led to an arrest in kiwifruit expansion in 1986, but deer profitability 
declined by the same extent as kiwifruit, afterwards. In the second phase, ie since 
1985, kiwifruit profitability (gross margins) dropped and so did the area under 
kiwifruit, mainly due to very strong competition from apples (figure 5). Both being 
capital intensive horticultural crops, apple profitability in recent years has been almost 
as good as the best kiwifruit boom period of early 1980s. 
Figure 6: Gross Margins: Kiwifruit & Competing Enterprises 
South Island 
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Cost of Financing 
The amount of debt an orchard has is a major factor determining its profitability. In 
the early 1980's land prices in prime kiwifruit growing areas rose to very high levels 
which led to high debt loadings by those buying properties. For example a five 
hectare orchard in Te Puke had a capital value of $149,000 in 1976 but by 1981 this 
had increased nearly 250% to $370,000. 
A high debt loading was only sustainable in many cases if interest rates were low. 
However, interest rates on mortgages rose dramatically from around 11 % in 1980 to 
over 20% in 1987. This increase meant that many orchards brought in the early 
eighties were no longer profitable. At the same time grower prices for kiwifruit were' 
falling in both real and nominal terms. 
As a result of these factors some growers started to leave the industry. Those who 
brought orchards generally bought in at a lower cost and hence their debt loading was 
less. This means that the orchard can be profitable with a much lower level of 
grower return. 
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Government Policies 
Government policies had a significant effect on the expansion of the area in kiwifruit. 
Over the period 1975-1991 there was a range of incentives' available to the 
agricultural and horticultural sectors. Most of the incentives required that 
development took place, and since kiwifruit production was in the development 
phase, the incentives tended to encourage change from well established sectors, such 
as dairy, to kiwifruit. The most significant incentives for kiwifruit producers were 
delivered via the tax system and included the tax deductibility of development 
expenditure, claw back provisions and export incentives. 
(a) Development expenditure. Under these incentives, certain items of 
development expenditure, which would normally be regarded as capital 
expenditure and therefore not deductible for taxation purposes, were fully tax 
deductible in the year that they occurred. This incentive was subject to a 
change in tax law in 1983. Before this, during 1979 - 1982, losses from one 
taxable activity could be completely offset against other sources of income 
with no limits. However from 1983 the offsetting of losses against income 
from other sources was limited to $10,000. Further changes following the 
1986 taxation reforms saw a system introduced where capital expenditure on 
land improvements was capitalised and depreciated over time. These changes 
were progressively introduced with full current year expenditure being phased 
out as follows: 
1987 100% 
1988 90% 
1989 75% 
deductibility 
deductibility 
deductibility 
1990 55% 
'1991 30% 
1992 0% 
deductibility 
deductibility 
deductibility 
(b) Claw back provisions. Until 1983, kiwifruit land could be sold at profit after 
five years with no claw back of tax deductions on development expenses and 
debt servicing. This period was then increased to 10 years in 1983. 
(c) Two different export incentive schemes operated during the period. Up until 
1983 the Increased Exports Taxation Incentive increased the profitability of 
kiwifruit by subsidising export sales. In 1983, this scheme was replaced by 
the Export Performance Taxation Incentive (EPTI). Under this scheme, 
assistance was given as a tax credit against tax payable. It was less lucrative 
for producers but still increased their profitability above market returns. The 
EPTI scheme was terminated in 1987. 
The Level and Extent of Yield Variability 
National and Regional Yields 
While kiwifruit area and production in New Zealand has increased steadily for the 
last two decades, total yields (ie production per bearing area) have fluctuated from 
year to year. 
Figure 7: Kiwifruit (1975·91) 
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In 1986, favourable climatic conditions were experienced throughout the country, 
resulting in a high national yield (figure 7). In 1989 there was a fall in national 
yield, influenced largely by a poor harvest in the Bay of Plenty/Waikato region. This 
region represented 65-70% of the total production, and therefore had a major impact 
on national production. The national yield rose again in 1990, which proved to be 
a bumper year for all regions. Again favourable climatic conditions was the major 
factor but the use of Hi-cane was also important. Poor climatic conditions were 
experienced again in 1991, and there was a significant fall in national production. 
Table 1: Level and Variability of Regional Yields 1982·1991 (Trays per Hectare) 
Regions Mean Std Max Min 
Yield Devn 
Northland/Auckland 2,846 868 4,646 1,393 
Waikato/Bay of Plenty 3,755 1,201 5,593 2,257 
Poveny Bay/hectarewkes Bay/Rest of North Island 3,424 1,222 5,726 1,367 
South Island 3,906 1,880 6,734 955 
New Zealand 3,628 1,151 5,583 1,977 
The yield data for the ten year period from 1982-1991 is used to provide summary 
measures for the four regions studied and for New Zealand (table 1). The mean fruit 
yield per hectare for New Zealand was about 3,600 trays and ranged between a 
maximum of 5,600 trays in 1990 and a minimum of about 2,000 trays in 1982, when 
most orchards were still immature. 
Northland/Auckland 
Kiwifruit yields in the Northland/Auckland region are the lowest of the regions 
studied and have increased only slowly over the past 10 years. Production of 
kiwifruit has been somewhat limited in this region due to inadequate winter 
temperatures. However, the use of Hi-cane has overcome this problem and lead to 
an increase in yield since 1990. 
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Rest of Nonh Island· 
Yield in this region has risen slowly as plantings reached full production. This 
region incorporates the small kiwifruit growing districts in the rest of ·the Nonh 
Island.. . 
The mean yield in this region was about 3,400 trays!hectare. The maximum yield of 
approximately 5,700 trays in 1990 was higher than that in the BoP region (table 1). 
Yields are most likely to range between 2000-4000 trays!hectare (figure 9). 
South Island 
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Kiwifruit yields have skyrocketed in the South Island since 1983 (figure 8b). The 
key reason for this is the large increase in plantings which occurred from 1979 to 
1983. The climate in this region is considered to be ideal for growing kiwifruit. 
Early, cool winter temperatures tend to trigger bud break earlier than in other parts 
of the country, and as a result higher yields are achieved. 
The mean yields for the South Island growing districts is the highest amongst all the 
four regions at approximately 3,900 trays!hectare. The maximum yield was more 
than 6,700 trays!hectare in 1990 (table 1). Yields in this region were centred around 
2,000 trays!hectare up to the mid 1980s, but have risen dramatically in recent years 
to about 5,000 trays!hectare (figure 9). 
Figure 9: Frequency Distribution of Total Yields 
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Factors Affecting Yield 
Since 1981 the production of kiwifruit has increased substantially, primarily as a 
result of increased plantings since 1979. As kiwifruit production became more 
widespread throughout New Zealand, yields between regions have varied as a result 
of climatic variations and different crop management practices. 
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Table 2: Annual Growth Cycle of Kiwifruit 
SeasonIMontb Growth Stage Climatic Factor 
Winter 
June - August 
-DORMANCY 
- Min. temperature 
Late August 
- BUDSWELL ( Winter chilling 
- Frost 
Spring 
September/October -BUDBREAK 
- Avg temperature 
November/December 
- FLOWER BUDS OPEN ( Sunshine hours 
- POLLINATION 
- Rainfall 
Summer 
December 
- FRUITSET 
J anuary/February 
- RAPID FRUIT GROWTII ( Sunshine 
Autumn 
March/April 
- FRUIT MATURATION 
Early May 
- HARVESTING 
June -LEAFFAU.. 
Note: This calendar presents a general outline of the different stages of the growth and 
production of kiwifruit. However. the actual stages and the climatic impacts vary from 
year to year and are pronounced between regions .. 
Climate 
, 
As kiwifruit plantings have moved away from the Bay of Plenty region, kiwifruit is 
now being grown in a range of quite different climatic conditions. Climate is one of 
the most important factors which influences yield and, in particular, temperature 
variations. The seasonal climatic variations and its role and impact on the growth 
cycle are discussed below. 
(a) Winter Chilling. Kiwifruit vines enter a rest or dormant phase in autumn with 
the onset of cooler, shorter days. Winter chilling occurs during June, July and 
August and is essential to overcome the dormancy phase and initiate budbreak:. 
Inadequate chilling can delay and reduce both budbreak: and flower production. 
Kiwifruit requires an estimated minimum of 950 " 1000 hours of chilling at 
4°C to break: dormancy (Brundell 1976; Lionakis and Schwabe 1984a). 
Winter chill units in the main kiwifruit growing areas range from an estimated 
1000 hours in Northland to 2000 hours in Nelson. 
(b) Average temperatures. While cool temperatures are required in winter, 
warmer spring temperatures are desirable to encourage shoot growth and 
flower development. Low temperatures during this period can delay the 
opening of flowers, which will delay harvest. Very low temperatures at this 
time can severely damage the tender new shoots and flowers. 
(c) Frost. Some regions in New Zealand may not be suitable to grow kiwifruit 
because of the frequency and severity of frosts. In spring, young growing 
shoots, developing flower buds and flowers are particularly susceptible to frost 
and can be severely damaged by temperatures of -1.5°C. Severe frosts at this 
'stage in the growth cycle can damage fruit growth and cause poor yields. 
(d) Sunshine hours. Sunshine and light are essential for kiwifruit growth. The 
amount of sunlight during different stages of the growth cycle can affect the 
growth of kiwifruit by influencing the initiation and development of flower 
buds and fruit growth. High sunshine hours will therefore influence fruit size 
and number. 
Crop 11anagement 
Crop management is the practices used by kiwifruit growers to create favourable 
conditions for a kiwifruit vine to maximise production. Some important crop 
management practices which affect yield include pruning, pollination and the use of 
Hi-cane, a dormancy breaking chemical. 
(a) Pruning 
Pruning plays aH major role in influencing both yield and fruit size. Pruning 
removes unnecessary canes and foliage, which is particularly important in 
summer to provide adequate light within the vines for fruit ripening and 
maturation. Pruning also provides easier access for bees to pollinate the 
flowers; increases penetration of sprays; increases air movement around the 
vines, which reduces the conditions favoured by pests and fungi disease. 
(b) Pollination. Pollination is essential for a good yield. Up to 90% fruit set is 
required for a good commercial crop. Without good pollination, fruit will be 
small and not up to an exportable size. Warm, [me weather is desirable 
during pollination to encourage bee activity. Rain fall during pollination will 
reduce the number of sunshine hours, and will discourage the bees from 
working. However, artificial pollination can be used to ensure adequate 
pollination occurs. Pollination can also be influenced by using different vine 
planting arrangements. 
(c) Hydrogen Cyanamide (Hi-cane). Hi-cane is a dormancy breaking chemical 
which is used to enhance normal bud break. By improving bud break, 
flowering, fruit yield and profitability can be improved. Hi-cane became 
available in 1989, and is currently used in regions which experience mild 
winters such as Northland/Auckland and the Bay of Plenty. 
Hi-cane is currently used by 95% of Northland growers, and over the last four 
years has become an accepted management tool. The use of Hi-cane in the 
Northland region has successfully increased total' yield. 11any orchards in 
northern regions would not be viable if Hi-cane was not available to break: 
dormancy. 
(d) Hi-cane's influence on the national crop. The major areas where this product 
is used are the Bay of Plenty, Northland and Auckland. These areas represent 
75.5% of the total national crop (1991). Since the widespread use of Hi-cane 
in 1990-91, the total national crop is significantly higher than previous years. 
Kiwifruit Production and 11arketing 
The first commercial plantings of kiwifruit took place in the Bay of Plenty in the 
1950's. By the 1970's kiwifruit was being exported in small quantities to markets 
in Europe and Japan. Expons grew rapidly from $4.3 million FOB in 1975 to reach 
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$539 million in FOB in 1990. Kiwifruit is currently New Zealand's fourth largest 
export earner. 
Role of Government and the Marketing Structure 
Throughout the early phase of getting kiwifruit accepted on world markets in the 
early to mid 1970's there was no government involvement in the structure of the 
industry. Several exporters were involved in marketing kiwifruit on world markets. 
It is these early exporters that are credited with establishing kiwifruit on world 
markets. 
Some co-operation between exporters did occur however through the Kiwifruit Export 
Promotion Committee. This committee, formed in 1970, was funded by a levy on 
producers and exporters. The committee's major task was the development of 
grading systems and storage and packaging methods. 
The New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority was formed, under government regulation, in 
1977. It had control over the licensing of exporters, the coordination of export 
marketing, and control over packaging and coolstoring. The number of exporters 
declined over the 1980's and by 1987 there were only 7 licensed exporters. 
The New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board (NZKMB) was formed in 1988 after 
a vote by growers. It was hoped that a marketing board would be able to arrest the 
fall in fortunes by the industry. In 1988 returns had fallen to $4.83 per tray from a 
high of $8.38 per tray in 1984. 
The NZKMB was given sole power to acquire and market the New Zealand kiwifruit 
crop in all export markets excluding Australia. It also has the power to determine 
grower payouts and set grade standards. 
However, despite the creation of a marketing board, the position of growers has not 
changed significantly.' They still have little real control over the marketing of their 
fruit and grower prices. Both under private exporters and the NZKMB grower 
returns are the residual monies that are left after meeting all shipping and marketing 
costs. Growers have little ability to query the amount of the payout. This means that 
much of the risk involved in the kiwifruit industry is borne by the growers and not 
by the marketing organisation. 
Export Standards 
Export standards for kiwifruit have changed considerably over the last 10 years. The 
Kiwifruit Authority set and enforced standards for all kiwifruit exports after 
consultations with the industry. The NZKMB took over this role from 1988. Since 
its formation grade standards have been increased each year to try and maintain New 
Zealand's premium price in world markets. 
International standards for kiwifruit were developed by the OECD in 1990. New 
Zealand was the prime mover behind these standards in an attempt to improve the 
overall quality of kiwifruit on the world market. This standard is now being used by 
the EC.The US has also developed standards for kiwifruit which are used by the 
domestic industry and by exporters such as New Zealand. 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF KIWIFRUIT PRODUCTION 
In this study, kiwifruit area and yield responses are investigated for four growing 
regions and for New Zealand as a whole. The boundaries for the four regions were 
determined following discussions with the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board 
(NZKMB) with the objective of identifying homogenous areas into single production 
regions and also to keep the number of regions modelled to a manageable size. The 
potential availability of important data on production and area were also additional 
considerations. Due to the diversity of alternative enterprises to kiwifruit available 
in the different parts of the country and the variability of climatic impacts on 
kiwifruit yields necessitated a regional modelling approach. 
The following is an outline of the conceptual model of kiwifruit production adopted 
in this study to model kiwifruit area and yield responses. The 17 year data period 
covered in this study is from 1975 to 1991. The latest data available on regional 
kiwifruit areas was for the 1991 season, even though national production data is 
available for the 1992 and to some extent the 1993 seasons. The study differentiates 
bearing areas (BAREA) from total areas (TAREA) for each region and for New 
Zealand. For each production season of the study period, the bearing area is derived 
as total area less the non-bearing area, where the latter is defined as net increases 
(positive changes) in total area for the last three production seasons, including the 
current one. This derivation is based on the assumption that some bearing takes 
place in the fourth year from planting. 
Time periods - t = 17 (years/production seasons) 1975-1991 
Regions - n = 5 
Region 1 - Northland/Auckland 
Region 2 - Waikato!Bay of Plenty 
Region 3 - Hawkes Bay/Poverty Bay and Rest of North Island 
Region 4 - South Island 
Region 5 - New Zealand (National) 
Annual Area Adjustments (Canopy Hectares) 
(a) Total area - TAREA.,t 
(b) Bearing area - BAREA".t 
(n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); (t = 1973-91) 
(n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); (t = 1973-91) 
(c) Changes in total area - CTAREA.,t = TAREA.,t - TAREA.,(t.l) 
(net new plantings) n = 1-5 and t = 1974-91 
Bearing Area Derivation: 
(d) Non-bearing area - NBAREA".t (n = 1-5); (t = 1975-91) 
NBAREA.,t = CTAREA".t + CTAREA.,(t.l) + CTAREA.,(t.2) 
Bearing area - BAREA",. = TAREAD •• - NBAREA. .• 
for all n = 1-5 and t = 1975-91 
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Determinants of Changes in Total Area: 
CTAREA",t = f( RP .. (t.;) , RR.,(t.;) , GPt ) 
Where: 
RPn,(t.;) -
RR.,(t.;j -
GPt -
Relative profitability of kiwifruit in relation to alternative 
enterprises defined in terms of ratios of gross margins (GM) , 
Alternative entemrises 
- Dairy (MFGM) 
- Deer (DRGM) 
- Beef (BFGM) 
- Apples (APGM) 
i = 1, 2 or 3 
Ratios 
KFGM/MFGM 
KFGM/DRGM 
KFGMJBFGM 
KFGM/APGM 
Relative returns (RETN) of kiwifruit in relation to alternative 
enterprises defined in terms of ratios of prices. 
Alternative Entemrises 
- Dairy (MKRETN) 
- Beef (BFRETN) 
- Apples (APRETN) 
i = 1,2 or 3 
Ratios 
KFRETN/MKRETN 
KFRETN/BFRETN 
KFRETN/ APRETN 
Government policies in relation to: 
(a) tax concessions of development expenditure (DTC): 
DTCt = 1 
DTCt = 0 
for 1975-1987; 
for 1988-1991; 
(b) offsetting of losses and clawback provisions (DLC): 
DLCt = 1 
DLCt = 0 
for 1979-1982; 
for 1975-1978 and 1983-91. 
Yield Response Relationships (Trays per Canopy Hectare) 
(a) Total yields - TYDS .. t (n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); (t = 1975-91) 
Defined as TYDSn,t = TPRODNn,t / BAREA",t 
Where TPRODNn,t is total kiwifruit production in region n during period t. 
(b) Export yields - EXYDSo,t (n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5); (t = 1975-91) 
Defined as EXYDSn,t = EXPRODNn,t / BAREA",t 
Where EXPRODNn,t is export kiwifruit production in region n during period t 
Determinants of Total Yield: 
TYDSn,t = g( TY82t , DHCt , WINTMINn,(t.l) , SPRMEAl'~n,(t.l) , SUMMEANn,t ) 
Where: 
YT82t -
DHC~(n=l,2) -
A yield trend dummy variable representing yield increases with the 
maturity of orchards/plantings made since late 1970s. 
YT82t = 0 
YT82t = 1, 2, 3, .... , 10 
for t = 1975-1981 
for t = 1982-1991. 
A dummy variable representing use of Hi-cane since 1989 in 
certain regions for breaking dormancy of kiwifruit. 
DHCt = 1 
DHCt = 0 
for t = 1990-91 
for t = 1975-1989 
WINTMINn,(t.l) - Average monthly minimum termperatures for the winter months of 
June. Julv and August during previous winter in each region. 
SPRMEANn.(t.l) - Average monthly mean temperatures for the spring months of 
September, October and November during previous spring in each 
region. 
SUMMEANn,t - Average monthly mean temperatures for the summer months of 
December, January and February in each region. 
Data Sources and Availability 
The assembly of relevant data on kiwifruit production and particularly area of 
production by regions for a sufficiently long enough historical period, as required for 
this study, was a formidable task. This is the case evidently for all horticultural 
enterprises, not just kiwifruit. But with kiwifruit, the data collection effort was made 
further cumbersome due to the changes over the years in the management structure 
of the industry itself. The agencies responsible for collecting and maintaining data 
and the nature and extent of data gathered also differed for the sub-historical periods 
under study. More importantly, current availability of some data collected in the 
distant past was made difficult due to informal and some lack of reporting systems. 
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In recent years, particularly since the mid 1980s, first the Kiwifruit Marketing 
Authority (KMA). and subsequently the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board 
(NZKMB) have been responsible for collecting and maintaining data on production 
and area by growing districts. Before that, during the early period of the kiwifruit 
development iIi New Zealand, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAP) 
carried out this task, especially during the 1973-1983 period. Some production and 
area data is available from the Department of Statistics (DoS) as well, but they differ 
from KMA and NZKMB as well as MAF figures due to defIDitional differences such 
as total hectares vis a vis canopy hectares. 
For the purposes of this study, MAF reports for the earlier period and NZKMB and 
KMA reports and particularly direct personal communication (peter Bull, NZKMB, 
Tauranga) enabled the availability of more recent data. The production and area data 
from more than one source for some periods were reconciled following consultations 
and the data for missing periods of 2-3 years in the early 1980s were interpolated 
using standard statistical techniques available on computer packages. 
The data on explanatory variables such as gross margins, prices, Government policies 
etc in the past, required to study area responses, were obtained from MAF and 
NZKMB sources as well as some purchased from Agriculture New Zealand 
consultants. Gross margins were not readily available for both kiwifruit as well as 
alternative enterprises in the historical context. But to the extent possible, gross 
margins on a perl.ectaYII basis were considered more preferable to the returns or prices. 
as the latter are for variable units of production such as per tray for kiwifruit and per 
kg for milkfat, beef etc. 
The climatic data for regional yield response modelling was obtained from the 
National Institute of Water and Atmosphere Research (NIW AR). Monthly average 
minimum and mean temperatures were purchased for 3-4 weather stations located in 
each of the four growing regions studied. The selection of weather stations were 
based on the size of the kiwifruit area by districts within each of the four regions. 
The individual station data was then aggregated by regions using the kiwifruit area 
as weights. Monthly data was also aggregated into seasons and the average minimum 
temperatures for the winter months (June, July and August) and the average .!!!!<lID. 
temperatures for the spring (September, October and November) and ~ 
(December, January and February) months were employed in the yield response 
equations. For some regions, temperature data for individual months were employed 
as they explained yield variations better. 
Only temperature data (minimum and mean) is used in this study so far, to capture 
climatic impacts on yield variability, as they were considered to be the most 
important factors (Food and Horticulture CR!, Palmerston North, personal 
communication) influencing yields. Subsequently, data on other climatic factors such 
as rainfall, sunshine hours etc w;1I btused in this study depending on the degree of 
explanatory power of temperature and other non-climatic variables such as the use 
of Jti-cane and the yield trend with the maturity of orchards. 
Model Estimation 
The estimated area response equations and yield response relationships are reported 
in appendix table 1. The total area response was estimated in the change as opposed 
to the level form as this provided better results. The yield response ·relationships 
were estimated for total yields as opposed to the export yields, typically reported by 
NZKMB, since climatic effects impact on total yields more in a physical context in 
terms of the size of the crop, Modelling quality and standard specifications for 
exports were considered too complex at this stage, due to changes that have taken 
place in standards over time. 
Area Response Equations 
These are estimated for a 15 year period from 1977-1991, even though data on 
kiwifruit area changes was available from 1975 onwards. Gross margins were able 
to be derived starting from the production season of 1975 only, for kiwifruit and the 
competing enterprises such as dairy, deer, beef and apples. As the estimations 
suggested a two year lag period for the relative profitability to impact on area 
changes, the Area Response Model was estimated from 1977 to 1991, the latest year 
area data was available. 
Different enterprises and some combinations of enterprises were found to be 
important in the four regions modelled, and for New Zealand as a whole, in terms of 
the impacts of their relative profitability (gross margins) in relation to kiwifruit, on 
the changes (or increases) in the area under kiwifruit production. For New Zealand 
as a whole, dairy, beef and apples appear to have been the competing enterprises in 
the order of importance, in explaining changes in total area (CTAREAS). 
Government policies with respect to tax concessions used as a dummy variable 
(DTC) also explained changes in total kiwifruit area in New Zealand. This equation 
was statistically good overall with an R of 0.906 and an F value of 35. Individual 
parameter estimates were also significant at least at the 10% level, based on t-
statistics reported (appendix table 1). 
In the Northland/Auckland region (CTAREA1), deer and beeffarming appear to have 
been the competing enterprises with tax concession dummy variable also playing a 
role. This equation had an R value of 0.600 only and an F statistics of 8, with some 
parameter values significant at the 10% level. The non-inclusion of some other 
important enterprises for this region, such as citrus, in the model due to the lack of 
data availability appear to have been a constraint. 
In the main kiwifruit growing area of WaikatolBay of Plenty (CT AREA2), dairy and 
beef were the main alternative enterprises to kiwifruit and the tax concessions dummy 
variable (DTC) appear to have been important here as well. The statistical properties 
of this equation was much superior to the Northland/Auckland equation, but not as 
good as the overall New Zealand equation, as the R value was 0.800 and the F 
statistics about 20. Individual parameter estimates were also significant at the 10% 
level or more (appendix table 1). 
In the third region covering the Rest of the North Island (CTAREA3), including 
Hawkes Bay and Poverty Bay, three enterprises - apples, beef and deer, appear to 
have been the important competing enterprises and the tax concession dummy 
variable (DTC) was also important. The overall fit of this equation was almost as 
good as the New Zealand equation with an R value of 0.879 and an F value of about 
37. Individual parameter estimates were also significant at the 5% level or higher. 
In the .South Island kiwifruit growing region (CTAREA4) of Nelson, Golden Bay, 
KaranlIia etc, apples and deer were found to be the competing enterprises and the 
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investment loss clawback dummy variable (DLC) was more imponant than the tax 
concession dummy variable (DTC), which was thus omitted in the final equation. The 
overall fit of the equation was satisfactory with an ~ value of 0.743 and an F 
statistics of 14.5,along with individual parameter estimates also significant at the 10% 
level or higher;' 
Yield Response Relationships 
These relationships are also reported in appendix table 1 for New Zealand as a whole 
and for the four regions modelled separately. ill contrast to the area response 
relationships, where the New Zealand equation was found to be statistically better than 
the individual regional equations, the New Zealand wide yield response relationship 
was not as good as the separate regional equations. This was consistent with prior 
expectations of regional differences in climatic impacts which was the main reason 
for the adoption of a regional modelling approach in this study. 
ill all the four regions studied, the yield trend variable representing the maturity of 
orchards since 1982 (YT82) was imponant in explaining the general increase in the 
yields throughout New Zealand. Along with this, minimum temperatures in the 
previous year's winter season and the mean temperature in the same summer season 
were imponant in all the three Nonh Island regions studied. Higher minimum 
temperatures in previous winter months had a negative impact and higher mean 
temperatures in summer months of the same year a positive impact on yields. These 
temperature effects were not observed to have similar impacts on the South Island 
yields, where an individual spring month's meari temperature was somewhat 
impottant along with YT82. 
As anticipated, use of Hi-cane in the Northland/Auckland and Waikato!Bay of Plenty 
regions since 1989 represented as a dummy variable (DHC) was found. to be 
impottant and statistically significant especially in the former region. 
The overall fit of the yield response equation was particularly good in the 
Waikato!Bay of Plenty region with an ~ value of 0.962 and an F value of 58 and the 
parameter estimates were also statistically significant at the 1 % level except for the 
DHC dummy variable on Hi-cane use which was significant at the 10% level only. 
Overall, New Zealand yield equation had an ~ value of 0.523 only and seasonal 
climatic impacts were not as pronounced as the effects of individual winter, spring 
and summer months as the climatic data from all four regions were aggregated. 
Model Validation 
Kiwifruit model validation results are reported in table 3. The statistical measures 
reponed in the table for model validation purposes are the correlation co-efficient 
(CORR), regression co-efficient (REGR) of actuals on predicted, Theil's inequality 
co-efficient, error due to bias and the root mean square error (RMSE). 
The CORR measures the degree of parallel changes in actual and predicted or 
estimated values, while REGR measures the extent to which the two series coincide 
together. In both cases, a value close to one is most preferred and the value for 
REGR can be greater than one. As can be seen in table 3, all CORR and REGR 
values 'for changes in total area, total yields and bearing areas for all four regions as 
well as NeW Zealand are close to one. The lowest CORR values are for the 
Nonhland/Auckland region at about 0.800 for area changes and 0.880 for total yield 
estimations. Even then the CORR value for bearing area was very close to one for 
this region. 
Table 3: Validation of the Kiwifruit Production Model 
Endogenous Correlation Regn Co-eff Theil's Error Due RMSE 
Variahles Co-Efficient Act vs Pred Co-eff To Bias 
I CHANGES IN TOTAL AREA 
(a) Nonhiand/ 0.805 0.976 0.379 0.001 95.6 
Auckland 
(b) Waikato/Bay of 0.922 1.001 0.280 0.009 241.1 
Plenty 
(c) Rest ofN! 0.899 1.002 0.387 0.012 97.6 
(d) South Island 0.904 1.()")7 0.368 0.014 59.3 
(e) New Zealand 0.969 0.996 0.171 0.016 234.0 
n TOTAL YIELDS 
(a) Nonhiand/ 0.888 0.895 0.159 0.033 447.6 
Auckland 
(b) Waikato/Bay of 0.989 1.000 0.044 0.001 173.5 
Plenty 
(c) Rest ofN! 0.943 0.959 0.121 0.009 405.5 
(d) South Island 0.959 1.095 0.159 0.042 610.9 
(e) New Zealand 0.902 1.107 0.134 0.013 509.8 
m BEARING AREA 
(a) Nonhiand/ 0.991 1.051 0.083 0.002 132.5 
Auckland 
(b) Waikato/Bay of 0.997 0.967 0.042 0.035 283.9 
Plenty 
(c) Rest ofN! 0.988 0.895 0.121 0.192 154.3 
(d) South Island 0.%1 0.939 0.159 0.076 115.6 
(e) New Zealand 
- rgns aggrgted 0.998 0.975 0.039 0.132 404.3 
- NZ - direct 0.998 0.956 0.047 0.214 487.9 
IV TOTAL AREA-
New Zealand I 0.998 I 0.961 I 0.024 I 0.125 I 312.7 
The Theil's co-efficient measures the degree of error in estimation and so does the 
RMSE value, while the error due to bias indicates any systematic bias in the 
estimation such as consistent over or under estimation. A low value is preferred in 
all these measures. Waikato!Bay of Plenty region has the lowest Theil's co-efficient 
among all regions in the case of yields and area estimation. 
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KrwlFRUIT AREA RESPONSE ELASTICITIES (KARES) 
These elasticities are computed in order to evaluate within a standardised framework, 
the impacts of relative profitability of enterprises and other factors on area changes 
in the different regions. Average changes in areas over the historical period and the 
average values of all exogenous variables in the equations are used along with the 
estimated parameters for each variable to compute these elasticities. These elasticities 
therefore, have to be considered as estimates to be evaluated at the mean. 
In table 4, the standard formula for computing these elasticities and the individual 
mean values for both endogenous and exogenous variables are reported along with 
the computed Area Response Elasticities (KARE) for each region. For New Zealand 
as a whole, relative profitability of kiwifruit in relation to dairy and beef had an 
elastic KARE value of around 1.250, whereas the value for apples was very small 
and thus inelastic. The KARE estimate for tax concessions dummy variable (DTC) 
was higher than for apples, but still inelastic. 
In the case of Northland! Auckland region KARE value for deer relative profitability 
was elastic (1.216), while KARE for beef relative profitability (0.921) and DTC 
(0.959) were inelastic. But they were quire high and close to being unitary elastic. 
The average change in total area for this region was about 145 hectares (table 4). 
For the Waikato/Bay of Plenty region KARE estimate for dairy or milkfat relative 
returns was quite elastic (1.324) and for beef (0.961) close to being unit elastic. The 
KARE value for DTC (0.606) was inelastic. The average changes in total area for 
this region was about 500 hectares (table 4). 
In the third region representing the rest of North Island including Hawkes Bay and 
Poverty Bay, the KARE estimate for deer relative profitability was very elastic 
(2.279) as was that for beef (1.486) but to a lesser degree, while the apple relative 
profitability value (0.446) was inelastic. ill contrast to the other regions, the tax 
concessions dummy variable (DTC) had an elastic KARE value (1.750) in this region 
suggesting greater impacts of these policies on area expansion. The average 'change 
in total area in this region was about 92 hectares. 
In the South Island kiwifruit growing region, once again KARE estimates for deer 
relative profitability was elastic (1.453) but was not as high as for region 3 above and 
for apples (0.476) similar to region 3. The KARE estimate for the Investment loss 
clawback variable (DLC) was inelastic (0.422) even though statistically significant 
in the equation. The average change in area for this region was about 65 hectares 
(table 4). 
Table 4: Kiwifruit Area Response Elasticities (KARE) 
KARE. = ( ... CTAREAj ... EXOG,) x (EXOGJCTAREA,) 
... CTAREA, 
... EXOG. CTAREA, 
I NEW ZEALAND (CTAREA5) 
(a) Kiwifruit/Milkfat 402.0 803.2 
Returns (KFMKRETN) 
(b) Kiwifruit/Beef 38.2 803.2 
Gross Margins (KFBFGM) 
(e) Kiwifruit/Apple 2.9 803.2 
Gross Margins (KFAPGM) 
(d) Tax Concessions 377.9 803.2 
Dummy Variable (DTC) 
II NORTHLAND/AUCKLAND (CTAREA1) 
(a) Kiwifruit/Deer 33.9 144.9 
Gross Margins (KFDRGM) 
(b) Kiwifruit/Beef 5.0 144.9 
Gross Margins (KFBFGM) 
(e) DTC 181.7 144.9 
ill WAIKATOIBAY OF PLENTY (CTAREA2) 
(a) Kiwifruit/Milk 266.9 500.2 
Returns (KFMKRETN) 
(b) Kiwifruit/Beef 18.0 00.2 
Gross Margins (KFMFGM) 
(e) DTC 396.5 500.2 
IV REST OF NORTH ISLAND (CTAREA3) 
(a) Kiwifruit/Apple 5.23 91.9 
Gross Margins (KFAPGM) 
(b) Kiwifruit/Beef 24.9 91.9 
Returns (KFBFRETN) 
(e) Kiwifruit/Deer 40.3 91.9 
Gross Margins (KFDRGM) 
(d) DTC 210.2 91.9 
V SOUTH ISLAND (CTAREA4) 
(a) Kiwifruit/Apple 3.95 65.1 
Gross Margins (KFAPGM) 
(b) Kiwifruit/Deer 18.2 65.1 
Gross Margins (KFDRGM) 
(e) Loss Offsetl 116.8 65.1 
Claw Back Dummy Variable 
(DLC) 
EXOG, KARE, 
2.482 1.242 
26.7 1.270 
7.843 0.058 
0.765 0.360 
5.196 1.216 
26.7 0.921 
0.765 0.959 
2.482 1.324 
26.7 0.%1 
0.765 0.606 
7.843 0.446 
5.483 1.486 
5.196 2.279 
0.765 1.750 
7.843 0.476 
5.196 1.453 
0.235 0.422 
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KIWIFRUIT YiELD RESPONSE ELASTICITIES (KYRES) 
The Kiwifruit Yield Response elasticities (KYREs) are similar in concept to the 
Kiwifruit Area Response Elasticities (KAREs). These are reported in table 5 for all 
four regions and for New Zealand. The exogenous variables in this case are the yield 
trend dummy variable (YT82), Hi-cane use dummy variable (DRC) and the climatic 
factors related to minimum and maximum temperatures specific to individual regions. 
Table 5: Kiwifruit Yield Response Elasticities (KYRE) 
KYRE" = ( ... TYDSj ... EXOGJ x (EXOGjTYDSJ 
b.TYDS 
-_. TYDS. EXOG. KYRE. 
IlEXOG. 
I NEW ZEALAND (TYDS5) 
DHC 1556 3,483 0.118 0.053 
JUNMINs -607 3,483 5.2 0.906 
SEPMEAN5 358 3,483 11.6 1.192 
JANMEAN5 506 3,483 18.7 2.717 
FEBMEANs 265 3,483 18.5 1.408 
II NORTHLAND/AUCKLAND (TYDSl) 
¥T82 191 2;278 .0.882 0.074 
DHC 779 2;278 0.118 0.040 
W1NTMIN1 -206.3 2,278 22.2 2.010 
SUMMEAN1 176.1 2,278 56.2 4.345 
ill WAIKATOIBAY OF PLENTY (TYDS2) 
¥T82 246 3,692 0.882 0.059 
DHC 399 3,692 0.118 0.013 
WlNTMIN2 -429 3,692 16.9 1.964 
SUMMEAN2 462 3,692 54.8 6.857 
IV REST OF NORTH ISLAND (TYDS3) 
¥T82 342 2,634 0.882 0.115 
W1NTMIN3 -138 2,634 16.2 0.849 
SUMMEAN3 125 2,634 55.6 2.639 
V SOUTH ISLAND (TYDS4) 
YT82 506 2,838 0.882 0.157 
SEPMEAN4 ~--~? .. I 2,838 10.1 1.064 --------
The KYRE estimates for yield trend (YT82) and Hi-cane use (DRC) were inelastic. 
The KYRE for YT82 was the highest in the South Island (TYDS4) at 0.157 and the 
lowest for BOP/Waikato region (TYDS2) at 0.059. The KYRE for DRC was higher 
for theNorthlarid/Auckland region (TYDS1) at 0.040 in comparison to 0.013 in the 
BOP/Waikato region (TYDS2). 
The effects of winter minimum temperature measured through KYRE was the highest 
for Northland/Auckland (2.010), followed by Bay ofPlenty/Waikato (1.964) and then 
rest of the North Island (0.849). This would be anticipated due to their relative 
locations in the North Island. 
The KYRE estimates for summer mean temperatures for these three North Island 
regions are much higher than for winter minimum temperatures. The highest value 
was for the BOP/Waikato region (6.857), followed by Northland/Auckland (4.345) 
and then Rest of North Island (2.639). 
The KYRE estimates on temperature variables for South Island and the whole of New 
Zealand follow a similar pattern, but are lower in value. They were also for 
individual months as opposed to the seasons in the three separate North Island 
regions. 
FORECAST AREA AND YIELD RESPONSES 
The Kiwifruit production or supply response model developed and outlined in this 
paper was then used to make preliminary forecasts of kiwifruit area changes likely 
by regions as well as to study yield responses. 
Forecast levels of exogenous variables 
In order to carry out this exercise, the exogenous variables in the model such as 
relative gross margins, relative returns etc between kiwifruit and other enterprises 
have to be forecast for the period of forecast. Nevertheless as the relative 
profitability was found to impact on area changes with a lag of two periods, actual 
gross margins and returns up to 1992 was sufficient to make forecasts ilp to 1994 
(table 6). 
In table 6, returns (prices) for kiwifruit, milkfat and beef as well as the gross margins 
for kiwifruit, dairy, deer, beef and apples are reported from 1988 too 1994, the last 
two years being forecast values. Based on these values the relative returns and 
relative gross margins are computed and reported (table 6). 
The ratios indicate a decline in kiwifruit relative to dairy profitability both in tenus 
of returns as well as gross margins from 1991 onwards, with the greatest decline in 
1992. For beef, the decline between 1991 and 1992 does not continue as beef returns 
also decline, but the recovery in the ratios does not reach levels prevailing in 1990 
or 1991. 
In the case of deer farming, the sharp decline in gross margins after 1989 suggest that 
the ratios in fact rise sharply, particularly in 1991, and then decline, but stay at about 
the 1989 levels during the forecast period. With respect to apples, the decline in 
relative profitability of kiwifruit is quite dramatic between 1991 and 1992 and there 
is only a slight recovery afterwards, with ratios remaining at about a third of 
profitability ratios in 1990. 
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Table 6: Recent and Forecast Exogenous Variables (1988-1994) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993f 1994f 
I RETURNS 
(a) Kiwifruit (e/tray) 483 646 477 591 385 390 395 
(b) Mi1kfat (ejkg) 407 570 640 424 584 623 692 
(e) Beef (ejkg) 161 223 266 267 269 258 252 
II RATIO OF RETURNS 
(a) KFMKRETN 1.187 1.133 0.745 1.394 0.659 0.626 0.571 
(b) KFBFRETN 3.000 2.897 1.793 2.221 1.431 1.512 1.567 
m GROSS MARGINS ($/hectare) 
(a) Kiwifruit 5,597 7,590 4,061 8,940 2,452 2,600 2,700 
(b) Dairy 1,218 1,696 2,028 1,528 1,808 2,000 2,300 
(e) Deer 1,232 1,056 848 400 304 350 375 
(d) Beef 1,385 1,455 1,530 1,615 1,570 1,500 1,450 
(e) Apples 10,644 9,472 8,098 13,762 19,875 17,500 18,000 
IV RATIO OF GROSS MARGINS 
(a) KFMFGM 4.593 4.475 2.002 5.851 1.356 1.300 1.174 
(b) KFDRGM 4.541 7.188 4.789 22.350 8.067 7.429 7.200 
(e) KFBFGM 4.039 5217 2.654 5.536 1.562 1.733 1.862 
(d) KFAPGM 0.526 0.801 0.501 0.650 0.123 0.149 0.150 
For the purposes of yield response estimation; the corresponding exogenous variables 
were assumed as follows: the yield trend (YT82) variable was assumed to continue 
as orchards are continuing to mature, the use of Hi-Cane (DRC) is assumed to 
continue in the future and for the main scenario, the climatic factors are assumed to 
be at their mean levels. 
In addition, two alternative weather scenarios were also used to cover extreme 
possibilities. For the favourable weather scenario the winter temperatures were set 
at their lowest and the summer temperatures at their highest level realised during the 
historical period. Alternatively, for the unfavourable weather scenario the winter 
temperatures were set at the highest and the summer temperatures set at the lowest 
level for the historical period. 
FORECAST AREA CHANGES 
Area changes forecast for 1992, 1993, and 1994 are reported in table 7. These are 
provided along with actual area changes for the 1988-1991 period for each of the four 
regions and for New Zealand. The New Zealand results are provided from two 
methods, one is based on the New Zealand wide changes in total area equation 
(CfAREA5) and the other by aggregating the results from the four separate regions. 
(CfAREAl through CfAREA4). 
Table 7: Recent and Forecast Area Changes (1988-1994) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992f 1993f 1994f 
I NEW ZEALAND 
(a) Changes (CfAREA5) 56 30 -151 -658 -654 -282 -733 
(CfAREAl+2+3+4) (-552) (291) (-307) 
(b) Total Area (TAREA5) 15,865 15,896 15,745 15,086 14,432 14,150 13,417 
(TAREAl+2+3+4) (14,534) (14,825) (14,518) 
(e) Bearing Area 14,151 15,251 15,319 14,637 14,432 14,150 13,417 
(BAREA5) (l4,131) (14,014) (13,683) 
(BAREA1+2+3+4) 
II NORTHLAND/AUCKLAND 
Ca) Changes -14 -65 137 117 -7 224 100 
(b) Total Area 2,472 2,408 2,546 2,662 2,655 2,879 2,979 
Ce) Bearing Area 2,349 2,310 2,408 2,408 2,401 2,538 2,655 
m WAIKATOIBAY OF PLENTY 
Ca) Changes 147 -12 -131 -683 -486 -261 -529 
(b) Total 10,360 10,348 10,216 9,533 9,047 8,786 8,257 
Ce) Bearing Area 8,933 10,074 10,070 9,533 9,047 8,786 8,257 
IV REST OF NORTH ISLAND 
(a) Changes -105 34 -164 -173 -120 150 2 
(b) Total Area 1,999 2,033 1,869 1,696 1,576 1,726 1,728 
Ce) Bearing Area 1,885 1,885 1,835 1,662 1,576 1,576 1,576 
V SOUTH ISLAND 
Ca) Changes 28 73 7 81 61 178 120 
(b) Total Area 1,034 1,107 1,114 1,195 1,256 1,434 1,554 
Ce) Bearing Area 984 982 1,006 1,034 1,107 1,114 1,195 
The national New Zealand equation suggests a decline in kiwifruit area throughout 
the forecast period with the total area declining from around 15,000 hectares in 1991 
down to 13,400 hectares in 1994. The results from aggregating the regional results 
suggest that kiwifruit area declined in 1992 to about 14,500 hectares but then will 
remain at that level up to 1994. 
This is due to the decline in kiwifruit area in the Bay of Plenty and Waikato region 
as well as the rest of North Island region occurring since 1989 and forecast to 
continue to 1994, being offset to some extent by forecast small increases in the 
kiwifruit area in the Northland/Auckland and South Island regions. Separate results 
for individual regions are reported in table 7 for changes in total area, actual total 
area as well as bearing area, where last 3 year's positive changes in total area were 
assumed to be non-bearing. 
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FORECAST YIELD RESPONSES 
The forecast yields for the 1992-1994 period using three weather scenarios are 
provided in figure 10 for the four regions modelled in this study. Actual and 
estimated yields for the historical period are also provided. Based on the average 
weather scenario, yields are forecast to increase in all four regions due to the yield 
trend variable representing maturity of orchards being operational. 
Figure 10: Kiwifruit Yield Response Variations 
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The results from the two extreme weather scenarios provide the band for this average 
yield forecast. This yield band is the widest for the BOP/Waikato region, followed 
by Northland/Auckland, rest of North Island and then South Island. 
The plot of actual and estimated yield values for the historical period provide an 
indication of the.extent of the yield response relationships to track actual outcomes. 
It has to be recognised that of the many climatic factors impacting on kiwifruit 
yields, only minimum and maximum temperatures have been used in this modeL 
Some of the unexplained variations could be addressed when the other climatic 
variables such as rainfall and sunshine hours are also represented in this modeL 
SUMMARY .<\.c"lD CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a kiwifruit supply response model developed on a regional basis using 
historical production and area data is reported. In order to do this, a detail 
background information on the changes in kiwifruit growing area and regional yields 
and the factors influencing them were discussed. The objectivell' of this study was 
to understand the nature and the extent to which these factors influenced the 
development of the kiwifruit industry in New Zealand. 
Some of the main features considered were the relative profitability of Kiwifruit in 
relation to alternative enterprises such as dairy, beef, deer and apples. The impacts 
of Government policies with respect to Investment, taxation and export incentives are 
also addressed. The influence of climatic factors such as temperatures and 
management factors such as the use of Hi-cane on regional yields are also 
investigated. 
Overall, the results of this study look promising in terms of the ability of the model 
developed to track past area changes and yield variability. There is still considerable 
scope to enhance the forecasting ability of this model and make it more useful. This 
will be addressed by considering additional enterprises and climatic factors as well 
as through consultations with the industry sources. 
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